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Abstract
This analysis of critical issues in the plea bargaining controversy is based on data obtained in six jurisdictions including structured observations of 711 in-court acceptances of guilty pleas; structured interviews with a total
of over 200 judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, defendants, and police officers; a plea bargaining decision simulation and quasi-experiment administered to 138 prosecutors and 105 defense attorneys; and a statistical analysis
of case file data from 3,397 robbery and burglary cases.
The findings suggest that plea bargaining cannot be abolished but can be changed. The policy choices are: how
much of a concession should be given to defendants;
which criminal justice official should give it; and what
procedures are necessary to safeguard against the institutional weaknesses of the plea bargaining system.

tion. When presented with the same hypothetical cases
prosecutors and defense counsel were in remarkable
agreement in their estimates of the probability of conviction in those versions of the cases where the evidentiary
strength of the case was strong. But in the weaker version there were significant differences among and between them.

Eliminating or severely restricting plea bargaining
among prosecutors appears to force judges to increase
the size of the sentencing discount used to induce
pleas-from 14 percent in a jurisdiction where prosecutors regularly make charge concessions to 138 percent
and 334 percent in jurisdictions where prosecutorial bargaining is restricted or eliminated. In jurisdictions where
prosecutors' offices have established explicit policies fortified with centralized managerial control over the decisionmaking of their assistants, plea bargaining is freer of
some of its controversial characteristics including inaccurate charging; manipulation of charges solely for purposes of plea bargaining; obtaining convictions in cases
where the evidentiary strength is weaker than it could
be; and failure to make a record of the plea agreement.

Also, contrary to expectations, prosecutors given the
weak version of the cases were not more likely than
those given the strong version to recommend it be plea
bargained (rather than dismissed or taken to trial). Thus,
the description of the "plastic, exploding" character of
plea offers when cases are weak and the "half-a-loar•
hypothesis were not supported by the findings. Similarly,
the existence and significance of other reported practices
are questioned by the present study. Prosecutors do not
appear to engage in elaborate frauds or substantially deceptive practices in order to bluff defendants into pleading guilty. Defense attorneys do not engage in "court
busting." The "overcharging" of prosecutors does not
involve unethical or unlawful conduct. The problem lies
with the concept of "overcharging" itself. Existing national standards for the charging decision require inconsistent purposes of the charging decision which can be
regarded as "overcharging." Much of what is referred to
as "overcharging" involves cases in which there are accurate charges with supportable evidence, but as a
matter of local policy these cases involve types of crimes
or criminals who are regularly disposed of with less serious charges.

The practice of plea bargaining is neither as bad as its
critics fear nor as good as its reformers hope. The decisions of prosecutors and defense counsel regarding
whether to plea bargain a case and on what terms is not
as haphazard as it may appear. There is considerable
agreement among and between the two types of attorneys as to what factors are important and how much
weight to attach to them in deciding the appropriate disposition of cases. Prosecutors systematically take into account the seriousness of the criminal and the crime as
well as the evidentiary strength of the case. Defense
counsel consider these same factors but also look for
characteristics of their clients or the case upon which to
base a special appeal for an even more lenient disposi-

One major reform of plea bargaining has been to increase the judge's responsibility for assuring the fairness
of the process. Before accepting guilty pleas judges are
to inquire as to whether the pleas are intelligent, voluntary, and accurate. Our observations indicate that this
reform has resulted in a much lengthier and more careful
plea acceptance process than once occurred. Defendants
entering pleas ·are usually informed by the judge of at
least one of their constitutional rights (70 percent); of the
nature of the charges (69 percent); and may be told of
the maximum possible sentence (48 percent). They were
usually (65 percent) asked if any threat or pressures had
caused them to plead guilty. Usually (71 percent) the
specific terms of any plea agreement were entered into

v

the record; and usually a factual basis for the plea was
established by asking the defendant if he committed the
offense.
This increase in judicial supervision of the guilty plea
process is undoubtedly a salutary development. But
there is less here than meets the eye. Pleas that are "voluntary" under these standards are not free from pres~

sures or inducements. Virtually all defendants still plead
guilty to obtain the inducements offered by the state. In
establishing the factual basis for pleas, judges do not examine the strength of the state's case. In responding to
the plea acceptance inquiries of judges, defendants say
what their counsel have told them to say in order to get
the promised bargain. Also, despite the required judicial
inquiries, pleas are rarely rejected (2 percent).
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Chapter One
The Plea Bargaining
Controversy
Introduction
Plea bargaining has been a controversial issue in the administration of criminal justice for at least a half century
and seems destined to remain a perennial source of misunderstanding, public anxiety and scholarly disagreement. This fate is not for want of research or scholarly
interest in the topic. In the United States there have
been three main periods of intense research on plea bargaining: the 1920's and 30's; the 1950's and 60's, and the
1970's. Each era has identified shortcomings, dangers,
and abuses associated with plea bargaining, and each has
had its share of critics condemning the practice. But at
the same time there has also been a continuing recognition that plea bargaining can serve useful and just purposes. Thus, rather than supporting the abolition of plea
bargaining, some commentators have recommended reforms designed to minimize or eliminate dangers and
abuses associated with it but leave the essence of the
plea bargaining system intact.
The controversy over plea bargaining is complex. It involves both matters of fact about how plea bargaining
actually does or could work and matters of policy regarding whether plea bargaining should be allowed to
operate and, if so, according to what set of blueprints.
For instance, while there are differences of opinion as to
whether plea bargaining should be allowed to exist,
there are also disagreements over the related question of
whether it is even possible to eliminate plea bargaining.
Among people willing to accept the plea bargaining
system with modifications there are disagreements over
what modifications are appropriate; who should do the
plea bargaining; what considerations should be given;
and under what circumstances and with what procedural
protections it should be done. Among researchers there
are disagreements over how plea bargaining actually operates; for example, whether defendants are in fact pun-

ished for going to trial rather than pleading guilty.
There is even disagreement at the most fundamental
level of all, language. The very definition of key terms
in the plea bargaining controversy is in dispute. Two
key terms, namely "plea bargaining" itself and "overcharging," are subject to a number of different uses and
interpretations.
Given the complexity of the controversy, no single
study is likely to address all the issues involved or even
be definitive on a sample of issues. Rather, at this stage
in the development of the literature, authors must content themselves with the nonillustrious task of retracing
old paths. With the help of new and sometimes more
robust data, they must reexamine the terrain long since
identified with the names of the trailblazers in the field.
Their joy must be the muted satisfaction of confirming
or challenging established truths; revising some beliefs;
extending others; and occasionally adding new insights,
clarifications and perspectives.
This report, "Plea Bargaining: Critical Issues and
Common Practices," is such a work. It does not address
or even enumerate all the issues related to plea bargaining. Rather, we have selected issues which revolve
around the question of abolishing or reforming plea bargaining. This focus, of course, did not automatically
specify a list of issues. Additional choices were made on
the basis of both practical constraints arising from the
available data and reso]Jrces for this study, and the author's judgment regarding the relative importance of
certain topics.
Our report is based on a secondary analysis of the data
collected by the plea bargaining study of the Institute of
Criminal Law and Procedure of Georgetown University,

primarily upon Phase II of that study. 1 The Georgetown
researchers collected qualitative and quantitative data on
many aspects of plea bargaining from many perspectives.
Our choice of issues was necessarily limited by theirs,
and theirs was influenced by the abolitionist and reformist arguments. Without taking a position on whether plea
bargaining should (or could) be abolished, the Georgetown researchers set out to determine whether the foundation for the abolishment argument was as solid as it
appeared in the literature and in the mind of the general
public.

amount and nature of the data available to examine
them, it is not practical to divide this report into separate chapters for each issue. The report has been divided
into six chapters as follows:
Chapter One presents a summary of the major findings;
discusses the history of the controversy over plea bargaining; defines plea bargaining; and explains the methodology of the study and gives some background on the
study sites.
Chapter Two focuses on several issues related to the
charging process and its relationship to plea bargaining.
These include early scrutiny of cases, questionable
charging practices referred to as "overcharging," and
the effect of increased formalization and centralized
policy control within prosecutors' offices. The belief that
if discretion is restricted at one stage of the process it
will be compensated for in other ways is also discussed.

Were prosecutors "giving away city hall"? Was the
safety of the community routinely compromised by plea
bargaining? Were these perceptions of the general public
well founded or were p.rosecutors and other criminal
justice officials more rational in their decisionmaking
than it appeared? Were the reports in the literature about
"court busting" by defense attorneys and "bluffing" by
prosecutors accurate? Were defendants being punished
more severely for going to trial than if they had pleaded
guilty? Had the "no plea bargaining" experiments really
worked? Was it possible to adequately reform plea bargaining short of abolishing it? Did the major reforms and
experimental programs regarding plea bargaining actually change the plea bargaining systems where they had
been implemented? Was plea bargaining different in significant ways in jurisdictions where it was regulated by
guidelines in the prosecutor's office? Was it different in
jurisdictions where there was thorough initial case
screening? Was it different where judges had been given
an extended role in supervising the taking of guilty
pleas?

Chapter Three follows up the matter of charging further
by focusing on the specific allegation that a common feature of plea bargaining is prosecutorial bluffing.
Chapter Four examines how the plea bargaining decisions of prosecutors and defense attorneys are reached.
It analyzes what factors are influential in that decisionmaking process; whether the process differs by type of
attorney; and whether it is as arbitrary as some descriptions make it appear.
Chapter Five analyzes the question of whether defendants who plead guilty are given less severe sentences
than those who are convicted after trial. This sentence
differential is examined both objectively and subjectively. Also, the chapter addresses the question of what happens to the differential when the prosecutor's office restricts its charge bargaining or eliminates plea bargaining
altogether.

Plea bargaining is a complex topic involving numerous
issues with threads leading off to still other issues. There
is no rank order of importance among the many questions which arise, nor is there any single critical issue
that, if settled, would quiet all of the anxieties about plea
bargaining. Consequently any selection of issues to be
addressed is necessarily arbitrary. Some issues can be addres ed quickly and simply while others require lengthier analyses. Differences in the length of the analyses are
irrelevant to the ignificance of the issue. Because of the
differences in the complexity of the issues as well as the

Finally, Chapter Six examines what some reformers believed would be a major solution to a critical weakness
in the plea bargaining system. It analyzes the extent to
which the increased degree of judicial supervision of the
guilty plea process has offset the danger of false conviction.

Historical review

1
Phase I of that study was supported by Grant Number 75-NI-990129 from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice (now National Institute of Justice) to the Institute of Criminal
Law and Procedure, Georgetown University. The report of that part
of the study is contained in Miller, McDonald, and Cramer, Plea Bargaining in the United States, 1978. Phase II of that study was supported
by Grant Number 77-N-99-0049. While a report of this research was
submitted to the National Institute of Justice in February 1980, that
report was not published. A copy is on file with the Georgetown Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure.

The crime commissions of the 1920's and 30's (e.g.,
Pound and Frankfurter, 1922; Missouri Association for
Criminal Justice, 1926; Illinois Crime Survey, 1929; and
U.S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 1931) documented the existence and central
place of plea bargaining. They established that most justice was not the product of trial by jury but rather was
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i
the result of decisions to plea bargain, dismiss, or not
accept cases. They found that of every one hundred arrests only 8 percent to 37 percent resulted in convictions; and of all convictions only 14 percent to 50 percent were the result of trials (U.S. National Commission
on Law Observance and Enforcement, 1931). Most convictions were the result of defendants pleading guilty,
and it was believed that in most of these cases there had
been some consideration given to the defendant in exchange for his guilty plea. One important consideration
appeared to be sentence leniency. The commissions had
analyzed sentencing practices and found substantial differentials in sentences between defendants convicted at
trial and those who pleaded guilty to the same offense.
The pleaders got lighter sentences. 2

guilty plea system, they recommended that the initial
screening process be improved. Prosecutors should
review cases shortly after arrest and only accept those
cases where evidentiary strength was much more than
the minimal legal standard necessary for arrest, namely,
probable cause.

It was also established that a crucial component of this
new system of justice by guilty plea had developed
during the nineteenth century. New York statistics
(Maley, 1929:164) showed the transformation of the jury
trial system into the guilty plea system. In 1839, 22 percent of the convictions for the entire State of New York
were the result of guilty pleas. By 1869 this increased to
70 percent; and by 1920 it was 88 percent.

"There can be no doubt that [our low visibility
system of administering criminal justice] is dangerous, both to the rights of individuals and to orderly,
stable government . . . . The necessity for making a
good record . . . may well result in prosecutors
overlooking the rights, privileges and immunities of
the poor, ignorant fellow who . . . is induced to
confess crime and plead guilty through the hope of
reward or fear of extreme punishment."

The guilty plea system was criticized by some of these
early writers, as Alschuler (1979) has shown; The Illinois
Crime Survey (1929:318) argued that plea negotiation
"gives notice to the criminal population of Chicago that
the criminal law and the instrumentalities for its enforcement do not really mean business. This, it would seem, is
a pretty direct encouragement to crime." Dean Justin
Miller (1927:72) wrote:

Having described the guilty plea system, however, the
commissions did not recommend its elimination. They
were surprised at the statistical insignificance of the jury
trial as the means for dispensing American justice. They
were concerned about the enormous potential for abuse
of power, and about inefficiencies, political influence,
and the competence of prosecutors. In this regard they
were as concerned about the numerous cases that were
rejected or dismissed as they were about the guilty plea
cases. They wanted greater accountability in the system
and recommended that reasons be given as to why these
various discretionary decisions were made in individual
cases. 3

But on the other hand, while it was being pointed out
that many cases were "compromised" through laziness,
politics, or ignorance, it was also noted that there are a
number of "valid" reasons for the prosecutor to "compromise" certain cases. Dean Miller himself (1927), as
well as Professors Jerome Hall (1935) and Newman
Baker (1933), contributed to the list of justifications for
plea bargaining. These include the following:
(a) the inadequacy of the prosecutor's office's resources
to handle caseloads;
(b) the public burden of jury and witness duties;

In keeping with their systemwide approach to the understanding of the administration of justice, they recognized
the connection between the initial screening (charging)
process and the pattern of case dispositions (including
dismissals, pleas and trials). They realized that the
volume of cases being referred to the urban courts had
far exceeded the courts' capacities and that dismissals
and guilty pleas were ways of disposing of the excess
caseloads. Rather than recommend the elimination of the

(c) overloaded court dockets;
(d) weakness in the state's case which could result in acquittal (hence, a "half-a-loaf is better than none at all");
(e) mitigating circumstances present in certain cases but
unrecognized in the statutes.
The second era of empirical interest in plea bargaining
occurred in the 1950's and 60's. During this period a
split emerged between reformers and abolitionists. Some
writers described the plea bargaining system and its relative merits but withheld judging it. Other writers made
similar assessments but concluded that the system was
useful and necessary although in need of reform. Still
others concentrated on the weaknesses and supported
abolition.

For details of these analyses see Chapter 5, Differential Sentencing,
infra.
3
The importance attached to this solution to the problem of discretion
can be seen in a study done by Weintraub and Tough (1941). One of
their main findings was that reasons for discretionary decisions were
not being recorded in the case files.

2
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are endemic to the entire peno-correctional process.

In his classic study, Donald Newman (1966) described in
detail the operation of the guilty plea systems in three
states. His analysis is relatively detached and impartial.
He describes the process; points out its advantages and
disadvantages; identifies certain weaknesses; and notes
that even with these remedied there would still remain
the fundamental question of "whether bargaining for
guilty pleas is a proper form of criminal justice administration" (1966:236). He does not offer an opinion on this
question. But others did.

It is precisely because of this ambiguity in the total

process that it lends itself to the kind of manipulation described above.
The ultimate answers to the problems [of plea bargaining] cannot come from mere tinkering with the
process of negotiation but must be sought in improvement of the total process.

Similarly the Johnson Commission (1967a:l35) issued a
separate list of useful functions and potential abuses of
Writing for President Johnson's Crime Commission the plea negotiation system· and also concluded that
(President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Ad- overall the system should be maintained although reministration of Justice, 1967b:l17) Enker described plea formed.
bargaining as serving many useful ends. He also enumerPlea negotiations can be .conducted fairly and
ated some of the costs of the system, but on balance he
openly,
can be consistent with sound law enforcefelt the benefits outweigh the costs. He and the Johnson
ment policy, and can bring a worthwhile flexibility
Commission did not recommend abolition but reform.
to the disposition of offenders. [But in many juris. . . I have suggested that plea bargaining serves
dictions] it is desirable for judges and prosecutors to
several useful ends: It eases the administrative
reexamine ·existing practices.
burden of crowded court dockets; it preserves the
Negotiations should be more careful and thorough,
meaningfulness of the trial process for those cases in
broader, and preferably held early in the proceedwhich there is a real basis for disputes; it furnishes
ings.
defendants a vehicle to mitigate the system's harsh[Plea discussions should be between prosecutors and
ness, whether the harshness stems from callous indefense
counsel and] should thoroughly assess the
fliction of excessive punishment or from the occafacts
underlying
the prosecutor's case, consider insional inequities inherent in a system of law based
formation
on
the
offender's background and correcupon general rules; and it affords the defense partional
needs,
and
explore all available correctional
ticipation in and control over an unreviewable procalternatives
as
well
as review the charge to which
ess that often gives the appearance of fiat and arbithe plea will be entered.
trariness. These are not insignificant accomplish[The negotiated, plea agreement] should be openly
ments.
acknowledged
and fully presented to the judge for
But we have also seen that the system pays a price
review before the plea is entered.
for these accomplishments. It bears a risk, the extent
The judge's function is to insure the appropriateness
of which is unknown that innoeent defendants may
of the correctional disposition reached by the parplead guilty; negotiation becomes directed to the
ties and to guard against any tendency of the prosissue of how many years a plea is worth rather than
ecutor to overcharge or to be excessively lenient.
to any meaningful sentencing goals; factual informaThe judge should satisfy himself and insure that the
tion relating to the individual characteristics and
record indicates that there is a factual basis for the
needs of the particular qefendant are often never deplea, that the defendant understands the charge and
veloped; and a sense of purposelessness and lack of
the consequences of his plea, and where there has
control pervades the entire process. This is a high
been an agreement on sentence that the agreed disprice.
position appears within the reasonable range of senE nker (1967:119) sees the problems with the plea bartencing appropriateness.
gaining system as not inherent in or limjted to the negotiation system itself. Rather they are the result of prob- Echoing an . idea that had been advanced in the 1920's
lems in the context in which it arises, namely, the broad- the Commission (1967a:133) also noted that the problem
er sentencing process.
of overcrowded court dockets could be partially relieved by improved early screening procedures by prosThe absence of "legal standards to govern the exerecutors.
cise of individualized correction," both procedural
and substantive, the subjectivism and unreviewa~il
In the year following the Johnson Crime Commission's
endorsement of the plea negotiation system, Professor
ity of most sentencing decisions, and the failure to
Alschuler (1968:52) published his influential study of
articulate goals beyond the most general and unhelpful are not only attributes of plea bargaining but
plea bargaining. His "admittedly unorthodox position

4

[was] that plea bargaining should be abolished." The justification for his position was to be a comprehensive
analysi of the guilty plea system and its alternatives. He
cautioned readers that his justification was so lengthy
that only a portion of it was contained in his initial 62page Jaw review article. Thus there is some risk of oversimplifying his objections in any attempt to summarize
them. Nevertheless, some sense of his argument needs to
be given.
He presents a list of the "horrors of the guilty-plea
system" (1968:64). Included among them are the practices of bluffmg and overcharging by prosecutor as well
as their willingness to magnify pres ure to plead guilty
if an acquittal appears likely. Also, there is the danger of
false conviction against which the safeguards of the plea
negotiation system are in his view inadequate. The primary source of weakness is the fact that the strength of
the state's case ignificantly affects the plea bargaining
decision. When case are weak. the main protection
against false conviction is the personal opinion of the
prosecutor that the defendant committed the crime. But
he notes (1968:59) that in such circumstances prosecutors
"seem to exhibit a remarkable disregard for the danger
of false conviction." As for the flexibility of the system
which Enker and others regarded as beneficial, Alschuler (1968:71) writes:
The flexibility of today's guilty-plea system would
be duplicated if our society abandoned traditional
legal restrictions and gave its judges the powers of
Solomon . . . [A] lawless system of courtroom justice would have most of the advantages that Professor Enker perceives in the guilty-plea system and
fewer of its faults."

practitioners assembled to assess the state of the knowledge about plea bargaining. T hey found that despite a
half century of research and commentary, the controversy over plea bargaining p rsisted. The split between the
reformers and the abolitionists continued, but it was evident that academics had become more sympathetic to
plea bargaining than had been the case.
In introducing the papers from the French Lick confer. ence, Feeley (1978:204) notes that none of them provides
definite answers. They probe the questions more deeply.
In this controversial topic, there are no definitive answers. Rather there has been a slow accumulation of evidence about how the system operates and how it responds to new policies. The present study does not purport to be defmitive but rather only to contribute new
insights into our understanding of plea bargaining.

Plea bargaining defined
Two of the more controversial aspects of plea bargaining are its name and its definition. At one time the practice of negotiating for guilty pleas was referred to as
"compromising'' or "settling" cases. When we began, it
was called "plea bargaining." Today the fashion is to
refer to it as "plea negotiation." Some practitioners, especially prosecutors, prefer not to use this rubric because
it sounds bad and is misleading. The public gets morally
outraged at the thought of "bargaining" with criminals,
and negotiated agreements are not necessarily "bargains." We shall use the phrases plea bargaining" or
"plea negotiation" interchangeably.
Of course it is not the name but the essence of the practice that is important. Di cussions about plea negotiations with some American practitioners and with foreign
justice officials often require one to avoid the use of
labels like 'plea bargaining" altogether and instead talk
in terms of the essence of the practice. Otherwise, one
may be led to believe that no "plea bargaining" by any
name occurs in the jurisdictions at issue. Some officials
maintain that the law in actiori is identical to the law on
the books.

In the 1970's the split between the reformers and the
abolitionists continued with the latter gaining momentum. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals (1973) recommended that
plea bargaining be abolished no later than 1978. Several
jm·isdictions announced "no plea bargaining' policies
were being inaugurated. But at the same time reforms
were being introduced either by prosecutorial policy,
new case law requirement , or experiments supported by
the National Institute of Justice. Also during this period
there was a burst of additional studies of plea bargaining.
Some evaluated the new experimental policies. Others
probed more deeply into the actual operation of plea
bargaining. In June 1978 a Special National Work hop
on plea bargaining was convened at French Lick, Indiana, by tbe National Institute of Justice.• Scho1ars and

In our search for an adequate definition of plea bargaining we began with Newman's (1966:60). He wrote:
The negotiated plea implies a preconviction bargain
between state and accused whereby the defendant
trades a plea of guilty for a reduction in charge, a
promise of sentencing leniency, or some other concession from full, maximum implementation of the
conviction and sentencing authority of the court.
However, it should be noted that in any waiver of
trial even without overt negotiation there may be an
implicit bargain in the form of a reasonable expecta-

• The papers of this conference have been published in 13 Law and Society Review ( 1978).

5

tion of sentencing leniency on the part of the offender and an established practice by the court of
showing differential leniency to defendants who
plead guilty in contrast to those who demand trial.
We modified Newman's definition only slightly. In our
view a negotiated plea occurs when a defendant enters a
guilty plea with the reasonable expectation of receiving
some consideration from the state. This definition has
certain advantages. It is cast in general terms which
allow for most-but not all-of the various ways in
which plea bargaining is done to be subsumed within it.
The presence or absence of plea bargaining does not
depend upon whether various nonessential conditions
obtain, such as differences in the nature of the consideration given; differences in which of1icial doe the negotiating; or differences in the degree of explic itness or specificity of the consideration. The usual consideration will
be some form of differential sentencing (i.e., leniency in
exchange for the plea), but other considerations might be
given. The only limit on the nat ure of lhe consideration
given is the imaginations of the people involved.
The primary disadvantage of our definition is that it is
cast in terms of guilty pleas. This is overly restrictive. In
some jurisdictions at home and abroad (see Goldstein
and Marcus, 1977) some trials are more like guilty pleas
than trials. 5 Defendants learn that if they agree not to
contest the trial they will receive more lenient sentences
than they might if they challenge the cases against them.
These cases get counted as trials and help maintain the
appearance of a trial system, but they involve the essential feature of the guilty plea system, namely, defendants
are induced to minimize the state s burden in convicting
them by being offered some benefit from the state in exchange.

which defendant's belief becomes unreasonable cannot
be easily defined. Thus our definition is somewhat openended in this respect, but this reflects the reality it attempts to define. Moreover, it underscores the point that
it is the perception of the defendant which influences his
or her decisions. Consequently, jurisdictions which have
relied on guilt y pleas in the past or are part of a larger
system which continues to rely on them cannot uddenly
claim to have eliminated plea bargaining by changing
policies.

Methodology
This study is a seco ndary analy is of data gathered by
the G eorgetown Plea Bargaining Study. Tha t original
study used four methods: semi-structured interviews;
structured observations; a statistical analysis of data from
court case flles; and a deci ion-simulation technique
which incorporated a quasi-experimental design. D ata
from each of those ources have been used in thi current report. All of the instruments used in the original
study are available in a separate report entitled, The
Study of Plea Bargaining in Local Jurisdictions: A Self
Study Manual (Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure,
1978).

T he original study had two phases. During the first
phase 30 jurisdictions were visited for brief open-ended
interviews with pro ecutors, judges, and defense attorneys. That study developed a classification of plea bargaining systems and a clarification of basic issues in need
of in-depth analysis (Miller, McDonald and Cramer,
1978). The second ,phase of the study conducted in-depth
analyses in six jurisdictions. The sites were chosen to
represent a continuum in terms of the degree of formalization of the prosecutor's office. By formalization was
In sum, then, the test of whether there has been a " plea meant the degree to which the prosecutor's office had
baJ:gain" is whether a defendant has reasonable grounds implemented and enforced formal written policies govto believe that he or she w ill receive some perceived erning decisionmaking regarding plea bargaining (or
benefit from the state by pleading guilty or not contest- other) decisions and/or the degree to which the execuing the case against him or her. A defendant's belief tive level prosecutors reviewed and controlled the decicould be reasonable even if there has been no overt ne- sions of their assistants. T hi factor was used as a prigotiation and even if an official "no plea bargaining" mary basis for seleetion because of its potential policy
policy was in effect. If a general belief in differential sen- significance. Reformers have uggested that the control
tencing (or other considerations) had existed in the of prosecutorial decisionmaking through office policy is
recent past in that jurisdiction or in other jurisdictions desirable and could b ring consistency and control to the
with which the defendant was familiar and that belief plea bargaining process (see, e.g., Katz et al., 1972).
persisted despite changes in local policy, a defendant
might be justified in concluding that he or she would No quantitative measure of the degree of formalization
benefit from his or her plea (either from the local judge was used. Rather selections for five of the six sites were
or from the parole board or governor). The point at made on the basis of field visits to potential sites in
which executive level and assistant prosecutors were
asked about the existing office policies and the office's
• For a description of these trials in Baltimore County, see Chapter 6 review and control of decisions. The sixth site, El Paso
infra.
County, Texas, was selected because of its "no plea bar-
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gaining" policy under which both the prosecutor's office
and the judges refused to plea bargain. Because this
policy basically eliminated the usual plea bargaining discretion and because the office had controlled its initial
screening through policy, the El Paso prosecutor's office
was placed at the high end of our continuum of formalization.
We believe that the rank order of jurisdictions which resulted from our assessment is accurate. If it is in error, it
involves at most a reversal of the ordering of contiguous
pairs of jurisdictions. The ranking in terms of decreasing
degree of formalization is as follows: El Paso County,
Table 1.1

Texas; New Orleans, Louisiana; Seattle (King County),
Washington; Tucson (Pima County), Arizona; Delaware
County, Pennsylvania; Norfolk (independent city), Virginia.
In addition to formalization, other factors influenced the
final selection of the five sites (other than El Paso).
These included: cooperation from the prosecutor's
office; regional differences among sites; and jurisdictions
able to produce a combination of 700 or more robbery
and burglary cases that went to guilty plea or trial per
year. Selected features of the six sites which were
chosen are presented in Table 1.1.

Selected Characteristics of the Six Study Jurisdlctlons-1976
Jurisdiction

Population
Square miles
Estimated annual Indictments/lnformatlons filed
No. felony judges
No. prosecutors
% Conviction robbery &
burglary by guilty plea
No. felony trials per year
Two tier court?
Type of defense counsel &
estimated % of defendants covered
Any prosecutorlal restrlctiona on plea bargaining

EIPaso

New Orleans

Seattle
(King Co.)

Tucson

Delaware
County

Norfolk

359,000
1,058
808

562,000
305
5,063

1 ' 157,000
2,131
4,500

500,000
9,240
2,309

600,000
184
3,000

285,500
52
2,800

2.5
13
85%

10
63
81%

8
69
86%

7
39
87%

4
30
80%

3
15
78%

491
Yes

648
Yes

229
Yes
Assigned 80%
Retained 20%
Yes, plea
bargaining
prohibited.

1,069
Yes
Public 65%
Assigned 10%
Retained 25%
Yes, limited
charge
bargaining.

4,567
Yes
Public 64%
Assigned 16%
Retained 20%
Yes, for high
impact
cases.

The selection of persons to be mterviewed on site was
designed to assure a thorough understanding ·of plea bargaining in that jurisdiction. The sampling was purposeful
and jurisdiction-specific. Within each site interviews
were conducted with a target of ten prosecutors, ten
judges, ten defense attorneys, and ten defendants, and
from two to five police officers. The prosecutors interviewed were selected from among the executive and line
staffs and the staffs of special programs such as screening units. The judicial officers interviewed included both
judges of courts of general jurisdiction and ones from
the lower courts. The defense attorneys included both
assigned counsel and public defenders. The defendants
were all interviewed after their convictions and were
usually serving time at a state facility. The police officers interviewed were patrbl-level or middle commandlevel officers.

270
Yes
Public 70%
Assigned 3%
Retained 27%
Yes, for career
criminals.

Public 65%
Retained 35%
Yes, but
minimal.

.

Assigned 75%
Retained 25%
Yes, but
minimal.

The structured observations focused on the taking of
guilty pleas in court. The target sample size was 100
cases per jurisdiction. In each jurisdiction, a target of 20
plea-takings were to be done in the lower (misdemeanor)
courts. In all jurisdictions, an attempt was made to
divide the 100 observations among different judges up to
a maximum of five judges. In the end, a total of 711
plea-takings were observed.
The individual case file data were obtained from court
and/or prosecutors' records. The sample consists of burglary and robbery cases which were disposed of by
either a guilty plea or a trial during the 18-month to 2year period prior to June 1977. In each jurisdiction the
sampling plan called for the selection of up to 750 cases.
In the end, data were collected on 3,397 cases. Burglary
and robbery cases were chosen because of their statistical frequency and because they pose a range of seriousness of offense and can be the subject of "overcharging."
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The plea bargaining decision simulation technique is explained in Chapter 4. Briefly, it involves presenting decisionmakers with two hypothetical cases that they must
dispose of by plea bargaining or other means. The methodology allows for an analysis of the information used in
reaching this decision and for the impact of two variables which were manipulated, namely case strength and

the prior criminal record of the defendant. These simulations were administered to 138 prosecutors and 105 defense attorneys, of which 46 percent were from the five
jurisdictions studied in depth. (El Paso was excluded due
to the ban on plea bargaining there.) The other respondents were obtained at national professional meetings and
at jurisdictions convenient to the Di trict of Columbia.
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Chapter Two
Charge Bargaining
and the Case
Screening Process
is usually assumed or implied by the national groups that
their standards should apply to the initial charging decision (defined below) which should be controlled by the
prosecutor. But these assumptions overlook the substantial diversity in the organization of the charging process
and ignore or underestimate the impracticalities of trying
to achieve such a standard in many jurisdictions.

Introduction
Plea negotiations involving charge reductions or dismissals have been the focal point of much of the criticism of
plea bargaining and the target of "no plea bargaining"
policies instituted by prosecutors in Alaska (Rubinstein
and White, 1980); New Orleans, La.; El Paso, Tex.;
Blackhawk County, Iowa (Iowa Law Review, 1975);
Maricopa County (Phoenix), Ariz. (Berger, 1976); Oakland County, Mich. (Church, 1976); and Multnomah
County (Portland), Oreg. (Parnas and Atkins, 1978).
Behind the criticisms of charge bargaining lies a set of
interrelated but distinct issues which often get indiscriminately lumped together as complaints about "overcharging." It is difficult to assess the meaning, much less the
validity, of some of these criticisms and suggested reforms because of the ambiguities of language, the lack of
unequivocal standards of proper charging, and the diversity in the ways in which the charging process is organized. Although the term "overcharging" is widely used
and regularly described in pejorative language, it has no
universally accepted definition. Commentators and practitioners use it in various ways and, naturally, reach
problematic conclusions.

This chapter will sort out the issues behind the criticisms
of charge bargaining and of "overcharging." It will describe the charging process and show that the criticisms
of it are part of a historically evolving debate about
three fundamental, interrelated policy questions: whether
there should be any plea bargaining at all; what role the
prosecutor should play in the criminal justice process;
and how the screening of criminal cases in the postarrest-pretrial stage of the criminal justice process should
be done (by whom, at what point in the process, and according to what standards). This debate consists of differing opinions about the optimum (fairest, most efficient
and effective) way to respond to the reality that the
overwhelming majority of cases referred to the courts
(in medium to large jurisdictions) must be disposed of
without trial.

Standards for proper charging that go beyond the constitutional minimum requirements have been promulgat- The emergence of the prosecutor
ed by national groups. But they are not unequivocal.
Some assign incompatible goals to the charging process. The long-term trend in the development of the urban
None provides a clear methodology for determining (and suburban) criminal justice system has been for the
whether their standards are being met. Most fail to iden- public prosecutor to emerge as the official. He or she
tify which decision they regard as the charging decision. has become the official responsible for resolving the disThis compounds the confusion in the literature on the crepancy between ever-increasing caseloads and insufficharging decision because there are four different deci- . cient court capacity. This trend is the logical solution to
sions located at different points in the justice process the organizational and legal fragmentation of the Amerithat are variously referred to as the charging decision. It can criminal justice system. The partitioning of that
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system into subunits divided by legal, geographic and
political restrictions represents (partially by design) a
major obstacle to an efficient or coordinated response to
the crime problem. The detection and apprehension
functions of law enforcement are performed by police
and sheriff agencies organized on town, city, -or county
bases. These agencies turn their cases over to court systems that are usually organized on a county basis but
often have their operations subdivided both geographically and substantively. Many jurisdictions divide their
court systems into two tiers with several "lower" tier
courts scattered throughout the county. The substantive
jurisdiction of these "lower" courts is usually limited to
setting bail; determining probable cause for felonies; accepting guilty pleas to misdemeanors; trying misdemeanor cases; and binding felony cases over to the superior
court for formal accusation and trial if probable cause
exists. The superior courts are usually located at one
central location and can accept guilty pleas to felonies or
try them.

to assume this role can be attributed to a variety of factors.

One fundamental reason is historical. The prosecutor's
office is the last of the main agencies of the justice
system to develop into a major organizational force. The
prosecutor's office has traditionally been a small and
often part-time operation (McDonald, 1979; Jacoby,
1980a). In the last century prosecutors were used to
write indictments and to try felony cases (or dismiss or
plead them). The justice process was largely controlled
by the police and the judiciary. Prosecutors were absent
from the lower courts, often referred to as "police
courts," where the police served as prosecutors. If cases
were screened out of the system at all, it was done by
the judicial officer at either the initial appearance or the
preliminary hearing (or by prosecutors nol-prossing (dismissing) cases after they were indicted). These arrangements still exist in many jurisdictions 2 or have only recently been changed. Until the early seventies in Chicago, for instance, the police controlled the initial charging
In contrast to the fragmentation among police agencies decision (to be defined) and the preliminary hearing
and within the two-tier court systems, prosecutors' of- served as the major screening mechanism in the system.
fices are typically organized on a countywide basis. In 1967 about 80 percent of the 1600 cases which the
They usually do not have their substantl.ve jurisdiction police had charged as felonies were dismissed or resplit between felonies and misdemeanors (U.S. Bureau of duced and disposed as misdemeanors at the preliminary
the Census, 1978). Also, in contrast to the court system hearing (Mcintyre, 1968).
where each judicial officer is an equal among equals
with respect to deciding legal matters, 1 assistant prosecu- One obstacle to the full realization of prosecutorial contors are subject to the policy preferences of the chief trol of the justice process has been the unwillingness of
prosecutor. He or she can specify what standards he or the police to yield control of the initial charging process
she wants followed in which kinds of cases. Thus, be- and of the lower courts. In Monroe County (Rochester),
cause it is organized on a countywide basis, because it New York, 5,800 of the 7,000 felony cases filed by the
spans the work of the numerous separate police agencies police in 1978 were disposed of as misdemeanors or dismost of which will never be consolidated (Skoler, 1978), missed by the grand jury. 3 The chief prosecutor hopes to
because it covers the justice process from postarrest eventually take control of the initial charging decision,
through sentencing, and because its policies are subject but feels he must gradually prepare the smaller, outto the control and review of one chief executive, the county police departments to accept the move. Otherprosecutor's office is structurally in the most feasible po- wise the political resistance would be too· great. In Madisition of any justice agency to control the criminal jus- son County (downstate), Illinois, the chief prosecutor
tice process. It can bring efficiency, uniformity, and ef- took his chances and unilaterally announced to the local
feCtiveness to the justice process. The two primary police that either they get his office's approval before
levers for doing this are through the charging and the filing cases with the court, or he would not prosecute
the cases. The Chicago (Cook County) prosecutor's
plea bargaining processes.
office managed to get the police to yield control of the
However, while the prosecutor's office is theoretically initial charging decision but had to agree to leave with
best suited to assume this position of chief coordinating them the power to reverse the prosecutor's decision in
and policymaking agency of the justice process, only a serious cases if the police disagreed (McDonald et al.,
few prosecutors' offices have moved to fully implement 1981). The Philadelphia District Attorney was unable to
this role, and even their moves are of comparatively
recent (late 1960's) origin. The slowness of prosecutors
2
An official known as a "police prosecutor" still officially exists in 74
agencies in 23 states (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1978).
3 Source: Field notes from the Police Prosecutor Relations Study, W.
F . McDonald, Project Director, Georgetown University Law Center.

1
As distinct from administrative matters which are typically decided
by a chief judge.
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persuade the police to let his office do the initial charging, so he secured a Supreme Court rule which permits
any prosecutor's office to require that the police obtain
its approval before filing cases with the courts.
In other jurisdictions, like Henrico County (suburban to
Richmond), Virginia, the prosecutor's office has the authority to control the lower court processes, but the
shortage of manpower sometimes results in police officers conducting the proceedings by themselves. In still
other jurisdictions prosecutors have not taken full control of the justice process either because they have not
yet seen it as their responsibility to assume that pivotal
role or they would prefer not to be burdened with additional political risks which it entails.

controls the decis10ns regardmg both of these instruments.4 The number, degree, and type of charges contained in these instruments are the best indications of the
prosecutor's policy toward the use of his or her charging
power. Some of the criticism of charge bargaining is directed at this formal accusatory decision. But much is directed elsewhere because it is only one part of the
charging process. The effective charging decision is often
made by the police decision to release a suspect after
arrest; or by the judge's decision at the warrant application stage or at the preliminary hearing that probable
cause does not exist; or the grand jury's decision to nobill; or by the prosecutor's decision to reject cases at initial screening or dismiss or reduce charges after initial
charging or after formal charging.

A critical aspect of the emerging role of the American
public prosecutor is his office's relationship to the charging process. This relationship must be examined from
two perspectives: the way in which the charging process
is organized in a jurisdiction and the standards used in
making the charging decision. These two perspectives
are addressed below.

For misdemeanors the effective charging decision is the
initial charging decision because no subsequent indictment or information will be filed. Also, for felonies that
are disposed of as misdemeanors or dismissed before the
case is referred to the grand jury (or for the drafting of
the felony information) the initial charges will have
served as the formal charges. In many jurisdictions much
of the "felony" caseload is disposed of before reaching
the formal accusatory stage. In Delaware County, Pa.,
for instance, 53 percent of the cases in which the initial
charges were felonies or misdemeanors were disposed of
by reductions to a misdemeanor or outright dismissal or
withdrawal at the preliminary hearing. For these reasons
it should be evident why the initial charging decision has
also been a focal point of the concern about charge bargaining.

The organization of the
charging process
The charging decision cannot be identified with any one
decision at a single point in the criminal justice process.
Rather it is better conceived of as a process, a series of
interrelated decisions culminating with the filing of
formal charges (Miller, 1969:12). That process includes
not only the decision as to which offense(s) to charge
but also the degree of crime; the number of charges arising from a single criminal event; the number of counts
arising from separate criminal events; and whether to
charge the defendant with being a habitual offender,
sexual psychopath, bail violator or other condition that
makes him eligible for a more stringent sentence.

Jurisdictions differ widely in the organization of their respective charging processes and, hence, in where the e~
fective charging decision is made and by whom. In addition to the de facto charging decisions by which a case
is effectively terminated from the system, there are four
decisions that are referred to as "charging" decisions.
They are the ones regarding the booking charges, the
initial charges, the formal charges, and something called
the prosecutor's "screening" decision. The relationships
among these decisions and other aspects of the overall
charging process are presented in a generalized scheme
in Figure 2.1.

The charging decision is not wholly within the control
of the prosecutor. The actual division of control varies
among and within the states according to variations in
legal, structural and policy differences. In about half the
states (mostly eastern ones) the formal accusatory instrument (charging document) is the indictment of the grand
jury (Katz et al., 1972). In the rest it is accomplished by
the prosecutor's filing of an information. The prosecutor

• Grand juries are notorious for being "rubber-stamps" for the prosecutor for virtually all routine criminal matters.
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Figure 2.1

Generalized scheme of the decision points in the charging process and related matters
Booking Charges ,

Decision Point
Possible Point of
Prosecutorial
Review

R,

Formal Charges

Initial Charges
R,

R.

R.

Decision maker

Police

Police Court
Prosecutor

Prosecutor

Other Significant
Activities at This
Stage of Process

Plea Negotiations

Bail; Plea Negotiations

Preliminary Hearing;
Plea Negotiations;
Bail

Time From Seizure
of Defendant*

2-4 hrs.

6-72 hrs./Without
unreasonable delay

3-45 days

Prosecutor Grand Jury

* General estimates

After a suspect has been seized and brought to the station, the police enter in their own records the charge(s)
which they regard as the crime(s) for which the arrest
was made. The booking charge(s) (sometimes referred to
as "police" charge(s)) are not ordinarily part of the controversy regarding charging practices. They are, however, occasionally used by researchers as a baseline against
which they judge the "accuracy" of the prosecutor's
charging decision (Wildhorn et al., 1976). These charges
are not without C@nsequences. Their main effect is their
impact on the bail decision at the stationhouse. Bail decisions are often mechanically determined by a schedule
tailored to the police charge. The booking decision is
usually made within a few hours after the seizure and is
ordinarily without prosecutorial review or input.
The initial charging decision refers to the choices related
to the filing of the initial complaint with the court to
begin proceedings. That document will list one or more
charges on it. Depending on the jurisdiction the decision
to file the complaint and the selection of the charges will
be made by one of four officials: the police, the judge, 5 a
prosecutor's office with jurisdiction limited to misdemeanor cases and preliminary proceedings in felony
cases, or a prosecutor's office with general jurisdiction.

accepted and charged at the highest level. They want
the felony ·arrest and clearance statistic, which in some
places is linked to whether the case is accepted and initially charged as a felony. For the defendant the initial
charges will again heavily influence the bail decision (if
stationhouse bail was not set). If the crime is a misdemeanor, the initial charges will constitute the formal
charges- on which the defendant will be tried. There will
be no other charging document (information or indictment) filed. If the crime is a felony and a plea bargain is
struck before the formal charges are drafted, the initial
charges will be the ones. that are negotiated.
The initial charging decision controls the workload of
the court system and affects the prosecutor's task in various ways depending upon the law and the prosecutor's
policy. As critics of "overcharging" pbint out, having
the largest number and highest degree of charges filed
provides the prosecutor with leverage in plea negotiations. Charges can be dropped or reduced in exchange
for pleas without giving the whole case away. But this is
not the only reason why prosecutors may support the
filing of maximum initial charges.
In all jurisdictions the initial charges must be filed without unreasonable delay-which can mean up to 72 hours
after seizure of the defendant. Some jurisdictions have
adopted time limits as stringent as 6 hours (e.g., Detroit).
Obviously such short timeframes limit the amount and
quality of information available to the person making the
initial charging decision. It restricts the amount of postarrest-preinitial-charge investigation as well as laboratory testing of physical evidence such as drugs or weapons, and the careful assessment of the witness' credibility

The initial charges carry important consequences for everyone involved. The police are anxious to have the case

• While judges are not ordinarily thought of as charging agents, in
some jurisdictions, e.g., Knox County, Tenn., initial charging is accomplished by the police filling out a description of the criminal event and
the judge choosing the offense covered by the facts-although the
police frequently fill in the offense for him.
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and commitment to cooperate with the prosecution. If
the case were to be initially charged low and later determined to be more serious, then the charges would have
to be amended. While this is legally permissible
(McDonald et al., 1981) it is regarded as undesirable or
impractical administratively. In some places it means dismissing the case and starting over again. In other places
it means taking the case out of the normal court processing and then reinserting it with new charges. This adds
delay and complication to an already complex logistical
task. Prosecutors' officers which are intent on disposing
of cases expeditiously (e.g., within 60 days of initial
filing) are loathe to add any delays to the process. Everyone recognizes that it is always more efficient to
reduce or dismiss charges than add new charges to an
existing charging document.
In still other jurisdictions (e.g., Maryland) the law does
not permit juries to find a defendant guilty of a lesser offense included within the most serious offense charges.
Thus each separate lesser offense must be charged in
order to ensure that if the top offense is not proven the
defendant will not go scot-free.
The formal charging decision occurs anywhere from 3
to 45 days after the defendant is seized. It has special
significance for the prosecutor because of the common
(but increasingly antiquated) opinion that the pattern of
case attrition after the formal accusation is filed is almost
exclusively the prosecutor's responsibility. Hence that
pattern can be used as a measure of prosecutoriaJ performance . In this view cases dropped .or bargained before
the formal accusation may represent poor police work or
inadequate initial charging over which the prosecutor (in
many places) has no control. Therefore those cases
should not be blamed on the prosecutor.

ln ad d itio n to these separat charging decision points,
t here is frequent reference t o " the prosecutor's creening
decision ." This phrase gets used indiscriminantl y, ornetimes referring to the initial charging decisions or the
formal charging decision, or to the hasty adjustments of
charges at the pr~liminary hearing. In its most useful
sense it refers to that point in the process where the
prosecutor's office carefully and deliberately reviews
cases, decides whether to proceed, and selects the
charges. As indicated in Figure 2.1 this could occur at
any one of four points in the process: prior to booking
(R1); just prior to the initial filing (R2); shortly after (310 days) initial filin g (R3); or just prior to the grand j ury
or the drafting of the formal information considerably
later in the proce (up to 45 days) (R4). Al so it may not
occur at all.

the preliminary hearing may have come to serve as a
screening mechanism. In others there may be little or no
screening until the case gets to the grand jury or
beyond. Whatever " creening' doe· occur at the preliminary hea ring in suc h places amounts to nothing more
than a hurried conference between prosecutor and police
officer. T he pro ecutor's power to rationally select
charges in such situations is severely restricted both by
his lack of clear (to the police) authority to make the
charging decision and the lack of time and additional
sources of information (e.g., witnesses to be interviewed)
w ith which to make optimal decisions.
The prosecutorial screening recommended by national
standard setting groups is that which occurs just prior to
initial charg ing (R2). The National District Attorneys
Association (undated:65) states:
Screening should commence as close to the time of
arrest as practical. It should be completed prior to
the defendant's initial court appearance. The defendant should be presented for arraignment on the
charge designated by the District Attorney immediately upon the filing of the complaint. This criminal
complaint shall be filed within 48 hours of defendant's arrest.
Actually, a closer time to arrest (by a few hours) than
the initial filing in court would be just prior to the booking decision, which typically occurs within 2 to 4 hours
after the defendant is seized. This locution of prosecutor's screening decision is rare. 6
More commonly, prosecutorial screening programs are
located either just prior to initial charging (R2) or within
a few days afterwards (Ra). The available research is in
disagreement over which of these two arrangements is
more frequent and even on the question of how frequently the police file their cases directly in court or
take them first to the prosecutor for a review. Based on
a 16.7 percent response rate to a questionnaire mailed to
3,415 prosecutors' offices, the National Center for Prosecution Management (1 972) reported that in 87 percent
of all American j uri dictions ca es involving felony
charges are reviewed by the p ro ecutor before lhey are
fLied in court. F or misdemeanors only 67 percent of the
jurisdictions involved a prosecutorial review.7

• lt was tried by the Philadelphia District A ttorney's O ffice. Beginning
in A ugust 1971, that ofUce perated a 7-day week, 24-ho ur program of
screen ing whe rein 15 prosecutors were placed in the pollee station to
review cases before booking (Merrill et al., 1973:22). Although the
program was described as a success at the time (ld.), it was subsequently discontinued when its Federal funding ended.
7 The nature of the "review" was not defined in the questionnaire.
Traffic cases were excluded.

The prosecutor's office may not systematically review
cases at any point in the process. In some jurisdictions
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In contrast, based on a 95 percent response rate to a telephone survey of a 10 percent sample of jurisdictions
with a population over 100,000, McDonald et al.
(1981:206) found that in most (51 percent) jurisdictions
the police file their cases directly with the courts without a prosecutorial review. In an additional 13 percent
of the jurisdictions the police either have the option of
filing cases either with the prosecutor or the court, or
felonies are filed one way and misdemeanors another. In
only 36 percent of the jurisdictions did the police file all
cases with the prosecutor's office first.

charging decision could now effectively limit the judge's
sentencing discretion. Thus, the charging decision assumed the character of a sentencing decision and the
prosecutor was thrust into a sentencing role. 9 This legitimated and reinforced the growing sentencing role which
prosecutors had been informally developing through
plea bargaining. Gradually the prosecutor's role in the
justice system was transformed from merely that of the
attorney for the state and enforcer of the law to sentencer as well. Prosecutors came to look at their charging function from the perspective of someone who is responsible for proper sentencing.

Proper charging and conflicting purposes

This is illustrated in contrasting ways by the chief prosecutors of New Orleans and Alaska. Harry Connick in
New Orleans has restricted charge bargaining but has
also made extensive use of the habitual offender law
with its mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. His
office uses this law to prevent judges from giving sentences that he regards as too lenient. In contrast, A vrum
Gross, the Attorney General who initiated the no-pleabargaining policy in Alaska, expressed concern that his
no-charge-bargaining policy was resulting in sentences
that were inappropriately severe. The evaluation of his
policy (Rubenstein and White, 1979) had indicated that
his policy's main effect was to give longer sentences to
cases that "deserve" to be treated leniently (the first-time
offender, the marijuana user, and the assaults between
relatives) while serious criminals received about the
same sentences as always. Formerly, the "deserving"
cases had obtained less severe sentences through charge
bargaining. Gross has indicated half jokingly that if the
judges did not adjust their sentences downward for these
deserving cases and if there were no other way to
achieve greater equity in sentencing he would favor a
return to charge bargaining. 10 The concern for sentencing exemplified by Connick and Gross indicates the
subtle transformation of the prosecutor's view of charging. The question of what constitutes proper charging
has become commingled with the question of what conHowever, while the legal standard has remained the stitutes proper sentencing.
same, the nature and significance of the charging deci- The second major development which has radically alsion has changed dramatically. Two separate develop- tered the significance of the charging decision has been
ments account for this. The proliferation of mandatory the explosion in the volume of cases entering the court
sentencing statutes as well as habitual offender statutes systems. By the end of the last century, as the result of
(especially ones with mandatory minimum sentencing the inauguration of modern professional police departprovisions) blurred the functions of prosecutor and judge ments; the increasing size and urbanization of the popu(or jury). Under these laws the sentencing decision
which was once wholly the prerogative of the judge (or
jury), was transferred in part to the prosecutor. His

Much of the difficulty with defining "overcharging"
arises from the fact that there is no clear consensus on
what constitutes proper charging. Professor Brunk
(1978) was correct in observing that "there seems to be
no even theoretical standard of proper charging derivable from the penal philosophy underlying the (criminal
justice) system as there is in the case of 'normal sentencing.'" 8 We lack a jurisprudence of charging. This undoubtedly is due to the comparatively recent origin and
recognition of the functions that the charging decision is
being forced to serve. At one time in the last century it
was sufficient for the charging decision to be nothing
more than a legal judgment as to the appropriate kind,
number and level of charges for which there was probable cause to prosecute. Today the legal standard for
charging remains the same. As long as he has probable
cause the prosecutor may bring wha~ever charges he
chooses without violating constitutional standards. The
Supreme Court reiterated this standard in Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), as follows:
In our system, as long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or
not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his
discretion.

• For two excellent analyses of the relationship between the sentencing
structure and the charging decision see Ohlin and Remington (1958)
and La Goy eta!. (1979).
10
Remarks at Special National Workshop on Plea Bargaining, French
Lick, Indiana, June 15-17, 1978.

• His statement was rephrased in the edited, published version of his
paper, (Brunk, 1979:547) and lost some of its precision.
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lation; an increased number of criminal laws; and an in- not agree on how much higher. 13 The recommended
creasing reliance on the courts for the settling of private standards fall into two groups, those approximating what
disputes, the urban courts could no longer afford to offer we shall call either a prima facie standard or an even
every defendant a trial. They were looking for ways to higher convictable, winnable, or beyond-a-reasonable
rid themselves of their ,growing backlogs (McDonald, doubt standard . Included in the former group are the
1979; and McDonald et al., 1981). Prosecutors responded standards of the Al3A (197 1:§ 3.9) which recomme nded
to this development by nol-prossing (dismissing) many .that a case should not be accepted unless the evidence is
cases and plea bargaining others. 11 By the 1920's after "reasonably supportable"; the NDAA (1977:§ 9.4),
the numerous local, state and national crime commissions which stated that the evidence should be admissible at
had documented the extensive amount of attrition from trial and capable of being "reasonably substantiated"; the
the courts, the search for a jurisprudence of charging ALI (1975:§ 350b), which recommended there be admiswas launched. 12 By then it had become evident to most sible evidence sufficient to sup} ort a guilty verdic t"; and
observers that the charging decision would have to the CDAA (1974:7), which required that the evid ence be
serve a new function. The courts could no longer afford strong enough to "warrant conviction."
to allow every case for which probable cause existed to
even enter the court systems, much less have a trial. The This prima facie standard differs from mere probable
practice of nol-prossing weak cases after they had been cause in that it requires that the evidence be admissible
charged and allowed to consume court resources was and sufficient to support a conviction if not controverted
not an efficient answer. Unworthy cases had to be kept by other evidence. It is a standard familia r to triaJ j udges
out of the court system from the start. The logical solu- who must decide at the completion of the state's pre ention was to have the prosecutor control case intake at tation of its case at trial whether the evidence that has
initial charging and to refuse to accept cases unless they been admitted is sufficient on its face to warrant a reamet a standard of proof that was something higher than sonable man to conclude that the defendant had commitprobable cause. The charging decision had to b~come a ted the c rime. Meeting thi standard is what pro ecutors
screening decision; and prosecutors had to stop passively mean when they worry abou t whethe r they can "get a
accepting cases and start actively seeking ways of rejectcase to the jury." T he prima facie standard is higher
ing them. To the prosecutor's growing role as sentencer
than mere probable cause but not by much. It certainly
was added the role of guardian of court resources. In
does not represent a major dike again t the flood of
this new role they were being encouraged to act as legiscases drowning the court systems.
lators effectively decriminalizing certain (unspecified) offenses by not prosecuting them and reducing the proba- In contrast, other groups have recommended a much
bility of other crimes being prosecuted by raising the higher tandard . They requit·e that the prosec utor not
threshold level of case acceptability.
only determine whether he or she can get t he case to a
This view of the charging function and the prosecutor's jury but whether h or she can get a j ury to return a
role was not immediately endorsed by all parties. Some guilty verdict. If not, the case should not be charged .
of the state and local crime commissions of that era sup- For instance the F lor ida Supreme Court (February 4,
ported it (see e.g., Pound and Frankfurter, 1922, and Illi- 1974) in jts rulemaking capacity issued the followin g
nois Crime Survey, 1929). But the influential Wicker- standard :
sham Commission (U.S. National Commission on Law
Before filin g an informat ion, every State's A ttorney
Observance and Enforcement, 1931 :108) declined to enshould not only eek probable cau e in his investigadorse it. Not until 40 years later was a consensus
tion, but also detem1ine the possibility of provit1g
reached that the charging function should be used in this
the case beyond a reasonable doubt. If the latter
way and the prosecutor should perform the badly
cannot be accomplished no information should be
needed screening function. But even then the new confiled and the defendant should be released.
sensus left unclear many details of how this was to be
done and on certain matters the consensus broke down. The NAC (1973:§ 1.1)-the commission that recomNational groups agreed that the standard of case accept- mended that plea bargaining be eliminated-advised:
ability should be higher than probable cause but they did
The groups referred to will be cited as follows: the American Bar
A sociati on (ABA), the Natio n.al District A tto rneys A. sociation
(NDAA); the America n Law Institute (A D; th California D istri.ct
A ttorneys As ocia tio n (CD AA); and the Na tional Advisory Commts•
sion on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (NAC).
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In Maine prosecutors were nol-prossing so many cases that questions
were raised as to the propriety of this practice (Emery, 1913).
"See, e.g., Illinois Crime Survey, 1929, and Missouri Association for
Criminal Justice, 1926.
11
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An accused should be screened out of the criminal
justice system if there is not a reasonable likelihood
that the evidence admissible against him would be
sufficient to obtain a conviction and sustain it on
appeal. In screening on this basis, the prosecutor
should consider the value of a conviction in reducing future offenses as well as the probability of conviction and affirmance of that conviction on appeal.
The NAC's standard is more flexible than that of the
Florida Supreme Court. The NAC does not specify any
particular level of probability of conviction. Rather it
says the level should vary according to circumstances
(e.g., be lower for more serious defendants). The differences in the charging standards among standard-setting
groups is reflected in differences in the actual standards
being used in the field. A recent telephone survey of a
random national sample of jurisdictions with a population over 100,000 found a considerable variety in the
standards used, as indicated in Table 2.1.

merely accepting cases on minimal evidence. Some of
these practices which are regarded by some writers as
constituting "overcharging" are specifically condemned
by one or more of the national groups. But the two most
common meanings of overcharging, namely, filing the
most serious charge supported by the evidence or filing
all the charges supported by the evidence, are not in
themselves considered improper or unprofessional by the
standard-setting groups (provided the evidence meets the
prima facie level of strength). As we shall see later
something more must be present, such as the prosecutor
being motiva~ed solely to get a guilty plea.
The relevant standards of four of the major national
groups are set forth below.
The ABA (1971) states:
(a) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to
institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges
when he knows that the charges are not supported
by probable cause.
(b) The prosecutor is not obligated to present all
charges which the evidence might support. . . .
(c) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges
greater in number or degree than he can reasonably
support with evidence at trial.

Table 2.1 Frequency of different charging
standards used by prosecutor offices
Percent of
offices
Charging standard

t~sing

standard
[N = 36]

The ALI (1975) states:
Probable cause
Beyond a direct verdict
50/50 chance of conviction
"High probability" of conviction
Beyond a reasonable doubt
No set standard

39%
14%
11%
14%
19%
3%

The prosecutor shall not seek to induce a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere by exerting such pressures
as
(a) charging or threatening to charge the defendant
with a crime not supported by facts believed by the
prosecutor to be provable;
(b) charging or threatening to charge the defendant
with a crime not ordinarily charged in the jurisdiction for the conduct allegedly engaged in by him.

Source: McDonald et al., 1981:215.

From their unanimous insistence that the charging standard be something higher than probable cause, it seems to
follow that the national standard-setting groups would
regard all cases accepted at the probable cause level as
instances of "overcharging" or, at least, of improper
charging. This means that not only are individual cases
in some jurisdictions improperly charged but for many
jurisdictions which continue to accept all cases on nothing more than probable cause the entire charging process
is outside the pale of propriety. According to the telephone survey just cited, this amounts to 39 percent of all
American . jurisdictions with populations over 100,000
(McDonald et al., 1981).

The NDAA (1977) states:
The prosecutor has the responsibility to see that the
charge selected adequately describes the offense or
offenses committed and provides for an adequate
sentence for the offense or offenses.
NDAA further states:
(a) The prosecutor shall file only those charges
which he believes can reasonably be substantiated
by admissible evidence at trial.
(b) The prosecutor shall not attempt to utilize the
charging decision only as a leverage device in obtaining guilty pleas to lesser charges.

Such a blanket condemnation, however, is not what is
ordinarily meant by overcharging. Rather the term
refers to certain practices within jurisdictions other than
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The NAC (1973) states:
No prosecutor should, in connection with plea negotiation , engage in, perform, or condone any of
the following:
1. Charging or threatening to charge the defendant
with offenses for which the admissible evidence
available to the prosecutor is insufficient to support
a guilty verdict.
2. Charging or threatening to charge the defendant
with a crime not ordinarily charged in the jurisdiction for the cond uct allegedly engaged in by him.
3. Threatening the defendant that if he pleads not
gu ilty, his sentence may be more severe than that
which ordinarily is imposed in the jurisdiction in
imilar cases on defendants who plead not guilty.
4. •aiJmg to grant full disclosure before the disposition negotiation. of all exculpatory evidence material to guilt or punishment.

Norfolk, Virginia, in which 360 charges against three individuals were filed but pleas were eventually accepted
to only 15 misdemeanors. T he prosecutor explained his
reasoning in a press release reproduced below.

PRESS RELEASE
DATE: November 16, 1977
FROM: Commonwealth's Attorney, (Norfolk, Virginia)
RE: Charlie Falk
Charlie Falk, Kathryn L. Falk, Fred Hailey and
Charlie Falk's Auto Wholesale, Inc. were indicted
on November 1, 1976, on three hundred sixty
charges arising out of a lengthy investigation. . . .
Indictments were brought against the individuals for
conspiracies to obtain money by false pretense, alter
certificates of title and to commit forgery. In addition individual charges of the same crimes were
brought against three persons for separate instances
of the crimes. The defendants could only have been
convicted of the crimes, or the conspiracies, but not
both. The decision to bring the 198 other c harges
against the Falks and the 77 against Hailey was a
matter of trial strategy, should it have been necessary to try the cases. However, the Commonwealth
has pursued the discussions in this case by reference
to the eight charges of conspiracy pending against
the three individuals.
The Commonwealth has looked to many factors in
reaching a decision as to how these cases should be
disposed of. Exposure of the defendants and the activities they engaged in was very important. We feel
that the indictments · brought and convictions obtained accomplish this goal.
The most important factor to consider was restitution; that is, what could we do to help the victims
of these defendants. It must be pointed out that the
victims whose cars were indicted on were arbitrarily chosen by the Police Department and Commonwealth Attorney's Office, and thus we could not realistically look to only those fifty in terms of restitution. Those whose vehicles the convictions are
based on were chosen completely at random from
the pending indictments. We feel that the solution
we have reached is the fairest under the circumstances. Thus, we have achieved the third aim of
the prosecution.
Certain evidentiary problems have arisen recently in
the prosecution which made it clear that we had to
adjust the original goals we had made. Evidence
which was available to us at the time of indictment
is now of questionable availability. In addition, the
credibility or believability of this evidence have

As already noted, all four groups agreed that the case
acceptance standard should be at the prima facie level or
higher. None of them prohibit the filing of multiple
charges or the highest charge for which evidence meeting the prima facie level is available. Three of the
group (ALI, NDAA and NAC) clearl y intend to prohibit certain charging practices which are linked to plea
bargaining. T he ALI and the NAC specifically prohibit
the filing of charges that are not ordinarily filed, just to
secure gui lty pleas. Prohibiting this practice is of negligible significance, however, because it is not a common
method of overcharging. None of the defense counsel
we interviewed mentioned this in their complaints about
local overcharging practices.
NDAA pecifically prohibits using the charging decision
only as leverage for plea bargaining, But this standard is
ambiguous especially when taken together with
NOAA's other requirement that the charge(s) selected
must adequately describe the offense() committed and
also must provide for an adequate sentence for the
offense( ). Nowhere is the complexity and in~ompatibil
ity of purposes surrounding the charging decision capttued better than in_ trying to reconcile these three standards.
In order to make the charge(s) fit the crime(s) the prosecutor mu t tile as many (if not all) of the c harges and
the highest degree of the offen. e for which he has admissible and supportable evidence. Establishing .a public
record of the extent of the offender's involvement in
criminal activities and the extent to which the crime
problem in the community has been solved by the arrest
of particular indlvidual is one of the functions which
pro ecutors (and NDAA) regard as legitimate and essential Thi'i public accounting function of the eharging decision is occasionally high lighted in instances of major
crimes as, for example in a case of a major fraud in
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been brought into issue. Our experience indicates
that the problems with this evidence are of such a
serious nature that the ability of the Commonwealth
to obtain convictions, particularly against the individual defendants, is questionable. Thus, the Commonwealth has agreed to accept pleas to 15 misdemeanors rather than the 8 felony conspiracy charges
in the cases of Charlie Falk, Kathryn Falk and Fred
Hailey, because of the evidentiary problems.
The question of incarceration of the defendants was
also discussed, and the Commonwealth considered
that any lengthy jail or penitentiary sentences would
have hampered rather than helped our victims in
their actions for restitution. Since our victims must
be regarded first in this type of economic crime, we
opted for the 10 day sentence for Charlie Falk.
The problems and considerations involved in an
economic crime of this magnitude are great, and are
quite different from those involved in a street or
violent crime. Society in general is hurt by this type
of crime, and we feel that the exposure and punishment of the defendants brings justice to society. The
more specific victims can only be helped by making
the defendants available and able to make restitution. We feel, based on our experience in prosecution, that all aims of the Commonwealth have been
achieved.

prosecutors to engage in charging practices that for
many observers constitute overcharging. This inconsistency reflects the competing and partially irreconcilable
demands that have been placed on the charging decision.
The NAC's charging standards are less inconsistent than
NOAA's. This is because NAC starts from the position
that plea bargaining should be eliminated and then proceeds to prohibit certain forms of charge bargaining.
Particularly noteworthy is its prohibition against threatening defendants with more severe sentences if they
plead not guilty. As written, this standard proscribes all
such threats regardless of whether they are connected to
the charging decision. For our immediate purposes the
prohibition against threatening to file additional or more
severe charges is most relevant. In our sample we found
evidence of it only in one jurisdiction, Norfolk; and
there it was done by the police.

The difference between securing pleas by threatening to
add charges in contrast to offering to reduce or dismiss
charges that already have been filed is subtle at best.
Yet, some critics regard the former practice as especially
reprehensible. The effort to have it declared unconstitutional, however, failed. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357 (1978), the Supreme Court declined to provide
constitutional support to the NAC's prohibition against
threatening to add charges as a means of securing pleas.
In filing the multiple charges necessary to describe the In Bordenkircher the prosecutor threatened Paul Hayes
criminality of defendants like the Falks, prosecutors are during plea negotiations that if Hayes did not accept the
doing what many people would call overcharging. The plea agreement being offered, an indictment under the
prosecutors will know that many of those charges may habitual offender statute would be sought. The court
be dismissed either in exchange for a guilty plea or held that this was not an improperly motivated prosecusimply because too many charges make a case cumber- torial act. It was not like vindictiveness for a defendant's
some to try and do not affect the sentence after a certain successfully appealing a prior case or discrimination on
point. NOAA, however, would not call this overcharg- the basis of some arbitrary classification such as race or
ing unless the sole motivation in filing the multiple religion. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that
charges was to plea bargain them. But, how this state of the appellate court had erred in ruling "that a prosecutor
mind is to be determined in individual cases is unclear. acts vindictively and in vi lation of due process of law
The other aspect of the mixed signals given by NOAA's whenever his charging decision is influenced by what he
standards is evident in contrasting the requirements that hopes to gain in the course of plea bargaining negotiaprosecutors make the charges describe the crime(s) and tion." The fundamental difference between the Supreme
that they also provide for an adequate sentence. This Court and the NAC is that the Court approves of plea
emphasis on the sentencing function of the charging de- bargaining and the charge bargaining that is part of it.
cision can lead in two directions, both resulting in prac- As the Court reasoned in Bordenkircher,
tices that are regarded as overcharging. On the one hand
[t]o hold that the prosecutor's desire to induce a
it is an invitation to reduce charges in those cases where
guilty plea is an "unjustifiable" standard, which, like
convicting a defendant of the crime he actually commitrace or religion, may play no part in his charging
ted would result in a punishment which the prosecutor
decision, would contradict the very premises that
regards as too severe. At the same time it supports prosunderlie the concept of plea bargaining itself (ld.:
ecutors in filing additional charges, especially ones that
364).
prevent judges from imposing sentences that the prosecutor regards as lenient. In brief, NOAA may disap- But the objection to Bordenkircher was not necessarily
prove of overcharging, but its own standards require synonymous with being opposed to all plea bargaining
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or even all charge bargaining. Even after Bordenkircher
tactics were found constitutional, many prosecutors objected to them. John Van de Kamp, District Attorney of
Los Angeles, said at that time that his office would not
use them. "In my office, we don't charge low and
threaten high" (Farr, 1978:81). Similarly among 200
prosecutors nationwide there was a consensus that the
Bordenkircher tactics should seldom, if ever, be used
(Id.). They objected to the tactics on the ground that
the tactics "were offensive to anyone with a sense of fair
play" (Id.).
Given the ambiguity and inconsistency among national
standard- etting bodies regarding proper charging, it is
not surprising to find a similar Jack of clarity and agreement in the literatw·e and in the field regarding the
meaning of the term, overcharging. We now turn to that
literature and our field studies to explore further the
nature and meaning of the complaints about charge bargaining and the feasibility of reform measures.

ample evidence to support all of the prosecutor's
charges. (Id.).
The defense attorneys' complaint about horizontal overcharging is that the number of charges filed is "unreasonable ' meaning, evidently, ttnfair. It give the prosecutor a tactical advantage in plea negotiations and at
trial. It is "dishonest' in that the prosecutor is not really
interested in securing convictions to all charge~ and
when he dismisses some charges in exchange for a plea
be is giving the defendant a bogus consideration "the
sleeves from his vest" (Ibid.:95).
The second problem is " 'vertical overcharging' -charging a single offense at a higher level than the circum·
stances of the case seem to warrant" (Ibid. :86). Again,
the complaint here is not that the prosecutor charges
crimes of which the defendant is clearly innocent;
rather, it is that
they set the evidentiary threshold at far too low a
level in drafting their initial allegations. Usually, defense attorneys claim, prosecutors file their accusations at the highest level for which there is even the
slightest possibility of conviction.
The substance of the defense attorneys' complaint is
that while prosecutors may apply standards of "substantial evidence' or 'probable cau e' in deciding
whether to accuse the defendant at all, they do not
apply that standard in determin.ing what crimes to
charge. Indeed the bare possibility that evidence
may emerge to justify an allegation usually causes
prosecutors to "play it safe" . . . (Id.)

Overcharging: a misnamed policy debate
Definitional problems. Overcharging has been referred to
by different terms such as • overfiling ' or "loose filing"
(Carter, 1974); "bedsheeting" (Katz et al, 1972:106); and
"inaccurate" charging (Wildhom et al., 1976). But even
when the same term is used it often has different meanings. One unfortunate and misleading connotation of the
term is that something unlawful or clearly unethical is
involved. For instance, Alschuler (1968:85) found that
prosecutors "define overcharging as a crude form of
blackmail-accusing a defendant of a crime of which he
is clearly innocent in an effort to induce him to plead
guilty to the 'proper' crime." But, he says this is not
what defense attorneys mean by the term. For them (and
most people who employ the term) overcharging does
not imply that the prosecutor has _filed wholly fabricated
charges against someone without evidence sufficient to
meet the probable cause standard. Rather, as Alschuler
(1968:85) puts it, defense attorneys using the term "refer
to different, but equally serious, problems." 14

Thus a prosecutor may have a policy of charging every
homicide as first degree murder even if he or she initially thinks a particular defendant i guilty of only man·
slaughter because circumstance might emerge that
could make the crime murder. Th · policy prevents the
possibility of the defendant pleading guilty to the inap·
propriate lesser charge.
Alschuler's definition of vertical overcharging captures
only one of the two meanings behind that phrase. He im·
plies that prosecutors need to tighten up their case
screening standards in regard to the selection of the
highest charge(s . His definition approximates what
Wildhorn et al. (1976:40) defme as inaccurate charging.
According to them a prosecutor has charged a defendant
inaccttrately if there is insufficient evidence to convict
him of the most serious charges filed.

One of those problems is "horizontal overcharging,' the
filing of numerous accusations against a single defendant.
Th problem here is not the level of proof. On the contrary,
[w ]hen defense attorneys condemn this practice,
they usually do not disagree with the prosecutor s
evaluation of the quantum of proof necessary to ju tify an accusation. Usually, they concede, th.e re is
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The second meaning of vertical overcharging is the most
important of all the definition of overcharging. Yet it
has not clearly surfaced in the literature on overcharging. It refers to cases where th prosecutor has ample

Emphasis added.
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evidence to support the highest charge but for various
reasons local attorneys feel that the highest charge is not
appropriate. One common reason for this is that the fact
pattern of the crime and the criminal fit into a typified
pattern which local attorneys know will usually end up
being treated less seriously than what legally could be
done. For instance, a defense attorney from Chicago
noted that "barroom-brawl" homicides will be charged
as murders but usually disposed of as manslaughters.
Thus, he felt that the correct charge for all barroombrawl-type homicides should be manslaughter from the
beginning.
By implication his standard of proper charging is to
charge at the level at which a particular type of case is
ordinarily disposed of in a jurisdiction. This position
seems to imply that it be accompanied by a ban on
charge bargaining. Katz et al. (1972:131) apparently have
this in mind when they insist that charges should be
"truly realistic" and that this policy should be joined
with a ban on charge bargaining. Similarly, but in reverse order, the Alaska Attorney General's ban on
charge (and sentence) bargaining was accompanied by a
policy of "realistic" charging which approximates what
our Chicago attorney had in mind-as we shall see later.
Not only defense counsel object to vertical overcharging. Joe Busch, the former Los Angeles District Attorney, reportedly referred to it as "legal-blackmail"
(Carter, 1974:66), and prosecutors in a California jurisdiction described by Carter (1974) were split over it.
Some prosecutors felt they should "file high and deal
down." Their thinking was described by one of them as
follows:
Some [prosecutors] feel we should start out realistically, but my feeling is that for a defense attorney
to get his guy to plead, you've gotta give him something. The defense attorney is selling a service, and
if his client feels he hasn't done anything for him,
then it's not being fair to him. You just file high and
then deal it down a notch to what it should have
been all along, and everybody's happy. We get
what we want. The defendant thinks his attorney is
great. The attorney gets his money . . . It's not our
job just to go on the ironclad cases. (Ibid.:73).

plead to a misdemeanor, do you file the felony on
him and cause him to pay more bail and make him
sit longer? To me it's not fair, a lot of people say we
ought to stick 'em, but that offends my conscience.
And another way he can get stuck is that his attorney will charge more. (Ibid.:70)
Generally, either horizontal or· vertical overcharging or
both is what references in the literature to overcharging
mean. For instance Bond (1981:231) writes:
Generally "overcharging" connotes the filing of a
charge more serious than the one the prosecutor believes is justified by the evidence or the one to
which he expects a plea.
Utz (1979:105) says
overcharging [is] charging more or more serious
counts than those on which the prosecutor truly
wants conviction.
In its analysis of felony case dispositions in New York
City's court the Vera Institute of Justice (1977:137) reported the following:
Overcharging was particularly evident in the attempted murder, handgun possession and grand larceny cases. In some cases, felony charges appeared
to be levelled against defendants, guilty at most of
resisting arrest or harrassment, to "cover" use of
force by arresting officers. But more generally,
overcharging involved levying the highest permissible charg~ to set the stage for negotiation of a plea
to an offense that would, in the police view, be appropriate to th.e circumstances.
However, other writers have different definitions of
overcharging. In his analysis of plea bargaining in
Canada, Klein (1976) adopted a definition of charge bargaining akin to the prohibition by the ALI and the NAC
against filing charges not ordinarily filed. Klein writes:
What constitutes overcharging is related more to
normative than legal considerations . . . [It is related] to the norm that is operating in a jurisdiction in
respect to a charge vis-a-vis the behavioral components (as opposed to the legal components) of an act
. . . If the norm in a jurisdiction is to charge an individual who forged and cashed a stolen cheque
with only one offense, then to charge him with
three offenses in relation to this act would be perceived as overcharging. (Id.:118).

\

The type of overcharging being referred to by these
prosecutors appears to be vertical overcharging, where
the evidence may be sufficient to file a felony, but the
cases are almost invariably reduced for disposition as
misdemeanors. The prosecutors who objected to this
practice did so for the same reason Joe Busch did. They
regard it as unfair. One of them put his views as follows:
To me [overcharging] isn't right all the time. I do it
sometimes, but why, if you know he's going to

Other foreign writers have apparently misunderstood (or
decided to redefine) the common usage of the American
notion of overcharging. For example, McCabe and
Purves (Baldwin and McConville, 1977:112) report that
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unlike in America there is virtually no "overcharging"
in England. Americans will note, however, that this conclusion depends entirely upon their definition of terms.
T hey do not regard what they call " full charging" as
"overcharging." But in McCabe and Purves' description
of "full chargi ng" American will recognize the old
wine f vertical and horizontal overcharging in a new
bottl e. · F ull charging" is defined as
inserting every charge which could reasonably be
said to arise from the situation ven when_it is clear
that it is unlikely that every charge could be proved
on the evidence available (Baldwin and McConville,
1977:112).

sense of filing completely fabricated charges, there is still
something (admittedly vague) improper about overcharging. Alschuler (1968:86) says "the line between
'proper' charging and 'overcharging' is far from clear."
But he and others feel there is a line to be drawn.

The difficulty in making distinctions is compounded by
discussion& like that of Bond (1981 :233) who refers to
"legitimate overcharging." He writes that "[s]everal circumstances may justify overcharging," including avoiding being whipsawed by defense into still further concessions which the prosecutor believes are unjustified;
"playing it safe" when the prosecutor does not know
precisely what offense the facts will ultimately prove;
Perhaps McCabe, Purves, and others are under the misand refusing to exercise discretion to achieve an equitaimpression that American prosecutors regularly file fabble outcome. In support of his last example, Bond cites
ricated charges to secure pleas.
some rare case law (e.g., State v. Stevens, 381 P.2d 100
The existence and extent of overcharging in a jurisdic- (Ariz. 1963)) that sustains his argument that the prosecution is often inferred by Americans by the extent to tor need not take into account equitable considerations
which charges are reduced or dismissed after cases have in his charging decision. In so doing, however, Bond
been filed (see, e.g., Keppel, 1978). As a rough indicator leaves the mainstream of the debate about overcharging
such a procedure is of some value. But as Wildhorn et and screenin g. That debate has long since regarded legal
al. (1976:41) point out, many things affect the outcome requirements as too minimal to b of much help in reof charge in a case, onl y one of which is the accuracy structuring the charging process to meet the contempoof the original cha rges. T hus, not too much weight can rary needs of the justice system. It is no longer a matter
be placed on uch ro ugh measure .
of what the law requires but what the system needs in
One way around this problem was devi ed by Baldwin order to balance efficiency with fairness and effectiveand McConville (1977). T hey had the ' 1commital papers" ness. The law may not require prosecutors to exercise an
relating to a sample of cases examined by two independ- equity function at charging, but observers like Graham
ent, expedenced ca e assessors. The assessors were asked and Letwin (1971); Katz et al. (1972); Alschuler (1968);
to predict the likely outcome of the principal count in Miller (1969); the crime commissioners of the 1920's
the indictment on the basis of the evidence available in (e.g., Cleveland, Missouri an'd Illinois); and the standardthe pa pers. In only 25 percent of all cases was a predic- setting groups of the 1960's and 1970's agree that not
tion of acqui ttal made by at least one assessor and in only could prosecutors perform such a function but that
only 10 percent of the cases did the two assessors agree the future quality of justice in American criminal courts
in their predietions. Thus, Baldwin and McConville con- depends upon their doing so and that the charging funccluded that there was no "overcharging" in the English tion must be performed in more than a merely legal,
setting. But once again, their conclusion is a function of technically correct manner.
their circumscribed definition of charging (whi h is in
effect what Wildhorn et al. have called accurate charg- Unfortunately Bond does not make clear what illegiting). The more com mon version of the American notion imate overcharging would be. He cites some case law in
of vertical overcharging is not what Baldwin and support of the view that the prosecutor may not overMcConville's methodology addressed. It is not that the charge to induce a plea (Heidman v. United States, 281
principal charge(s) could not be sustained if they ·were F.2d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 1960)) and Brady v. United States,
allowed to go to trial. It is that certain sustainable cases 397 U.S. 742 (1970)). But the thrust of these rulings has
are regularly reduced for disposition and that, therefore, been overturned by the Supreme Court's holding in Borthey should have been filed that way in the first place. denkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). His only clear
Overcharging and proper charging distinguished. The con- example of illegitimate overcharging is his inclusion of
fusion about overcharging does not end with the multi- the ALI's prohibition against charging crimes not ordiple meanings of the phrase. It thickens as one tries to de- narily charged. It is noteworthy that he does not contermine the relationship between overcharging and demn horizontal or vertical overcharging, nor does he
proper charging. For in tance in Alschuler's discussion it invoke any of the other charging standard of the major
seems that, while overcharging is not improper in the national groups.
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The organizational preconditions for proper charging. In
identified above from the point of view of the charging reviewing the standards of proper charging of various
standards of the four national groups, we can further il- reform groups and other critics, it is crucial to recognize
lustrate the inconsistencies, ambivalence, and inchoate the often unstated assumptions about how the charging
nature of the developing jurisprudence of charging. process must be organized, staffed, and operated. AccuFirst, charging a defendant without probable cause for rate charging assumes not only a technical knowledge of
any of the charges filed would be unanimously con- the law but also experience in local practice and adedemned by all four groups. For that matter, charging a quate information with which to evaluate the case. If
defendant with evidence that would sustain probable prosecutors' offices are going to file only charges that
cause but would not be admissible at trial is regarded by can be proven at trial, then they must have a systematic
each of the groups as improper. Charging a defendant screening of cases based on thorough investigations with
with charges for which there is admissible cause evi- cases reviewed by trial-experienced prosecutors preferdence but which are not ordinarily charged in a jurisdic- ably with direct access to the witnesses and police offition is condemned by two of the groups (ALI and cers in the cases. S:uch screening programs do not exist
NAC). Horizontal overcharging in either of its two in most jurisdictions.
forms 15 presents an ambiguous situation. Assuming there
is admissible probable cause evidence and the charges Little wonder that Alschuler should find that the priare not out of the ordinary, then horizontal overcharg- mary reason for overcharging (especially vertical overing becomes improper to NDAA if the charges are filed charging) is the tendency among prosecutors to "play it
solely to obtain leverage in plea bargaining. However, safe." They "play it safe" because the prosecutors selectthe failure to horizontally overcharge would also be im- ing the charges are usually inexperienced and the inforproper according to NDAA if the additional charges mation upon which they are basing their decisions is
were needed either to adequately describe the criminali- often minimal and untrustworthy. It is often nothing
ty of the offender or to provide for an adequate sen- more than the police report and the local arrest record.
tence! Since a prosecutor could almost always claim Police reports are universally decried by prosecutors as
these latter two motives for his or her horizontal over- inadequate and unreliable. Furthermore, getting the
charging, he or she could never be in violation of the police to do postarrest followup investigations is problematic (McDonald et al., 1981). Prosecutors know that
only-for-plea-bargaining standard.
the police often omit or distort information in their reBy the same logic, vertical overcharging of the kind ports. Therefore, without interviewing the police and
where prosecutors have sufficient evidence for the high- witnesses themselves, prosecutors are never very sure
est charge but routinely accept pleas to reduced charges about how strong their cases really are.
does not violate NDAA's standards. Even though he or
she knows the case will be routinely reduced, the pros- When prosecutors' offices do establish rigorous screenecutor can still claim to be establishing an accurate ing programs, substantial numbers of cases are either republic record of the conduct involved. Thus his or her jected from the system or filed at reduced charges. In
New Orleans when the Connick administration initiated
motive is not solely to secure guilty pleas.
screening, a dramatic increase in case rejections ocVertical overcharging of the other kind that Alschuler curred.16 In the Bronx in 1979 the police made 22,500
describes, that is, where there is sufficient evidence to felony arrests; the prosecutor's office indicted only 2,500
charge some crime, but only the slightest evidence to felonies. In Chicago in 1972, the new felony review unit
support the highest degree of crime, is explicitly and of the prosecutors' office declined to seek indictments in
unanimously condemned by all groups. As the ABA 41 percent of the murder cases brought by the police as
(1971:§ 3.9c) puts it, "[t]he prosecutor should not bring well as 95 percent of the armed robberies, 87 percent of
or seek charges greater in number or degree than he can the rapes, and 97 percent of the aggravated batteries
(Mcintyre and Nimmer, 1973:20). In Philadelphia in
reasonably support with evidence at trial."
1973 an experimental early prosecutorial screening unit
found that 41 percent of the 20,000 arrests could be
quickly eliminated from the system (Savitz, 1975:262). In
"Namely, filing numerous charges arising from separate criminal incidents, e.g., a dozen separate forging and uttering offenses, or filing nu1967 in Los Angeles, the prosecutor's screening process

If we now examine each of the types of overcharging

merous charges arising from different crimes committed in the course
of one criminal incident, e.g., charges of robbery, burglary, larceny,
and carrying a concealed weapon arising from one armed robbery in a
home.

•• See infra for details.
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reduced 64,000 felony arrests to only 24,505 felony prosecutions (Katz et al., 1972:112).
In their criticism of overcharging Katz et al. do not stop
with identifying the symptom. They identify the cause.
They want "realistic" charging and the elimination of
charge bargaining, but they note that this requires a
major commitment of resources to the early screening
process. Their views are interesting not only for the organizational preconditions for proper charging that are
recommended but also because their focus of reform is
only the formal charging (not the initial charging) of
felony cases and, most importantly, because they predict
that realistic charging will eliminate charge bargaining
but will not eliminate the incentive for defendants to
plead guilty.
Katz et al. would have the police do the initial charging
and then within one day of arrest (for defendants held in
custody, 5 days for those released on bail) the prosecutor would review his case and meet with the defense attorney for a charging conference. The result of this
would be the revision of unrealistic felony police
charges (which would be dismissed, diverted, or reduced
to misdemeanors and rerouted) and the filing of realistic
formal felony charges. Once filed, the felony charges
would not be reduced for guilty pleas. Katz et al. assert
that contrary to what critics of their proposal predict,
realistic charging coupled with a no-charge-bargaining
policy would not mean that defendants would stop
pleading guilty. Their support for this claim, however,
seems to be a combination of faith and the problematic
assumption that the new rigorous screening would so
dramatically reduce the court's caseload that the prosecutor would be able (and willing) to get a conviction at
trial in cases where the defendant did not plead guilty.
They (1972: 132) write:
Once the prosecutor shows at the inception of this
reform that his office is prepared to try cases within
the speedy trial requirement, guilty pleas will flow
as they do now because the charges will be realistic.
Defendants will be as ready to plead then as they
ultimately are now, once the opportunity to wait
out the prosecutor no longer exists and the prosecutor makes it clear that he is trying cases and convicting defendants.

their power to review charges. 17 The deceptive nature of
this proposal is that it identifies plea bargaining with
charge bargaining. For Parnas and Atkins the elimination of overcharging is synonymous with the elimination
of plea bargaining. Having closed the front door, however, they then proceed to open the back. In contrast to
Katz et al. they say that once charge bargaining has
been ended it will be necessary to provide defendants
with some alternative incentive to get them to plead.
This, they argue, should be in the form of differential
sentencing with pleaders getting a more lenient sentence
than those convicted at trial. In their view (but not ours)
this is not plea bargaining.
The critical objection to proposals to charge at the level
to which a case is ordinarily pleaded is that it leaves the
prosecutor nothing to offer in exchange for a guilty plea.
While reformers confidently predict that if charges were
truly realistic defendants would willingly plead guilty
for nothing in exchange, practitioners are rightly skeptical of such predictions. The belief that the state should
not unilaterally dismiss or reduce charges without getting something in exchange, like the related belief that
guilty pleas would be less forthcoming without such exchanges, is widespread and axiomatic among practitioners. Even the police are staunch advocates of these
views. For instance, Alaskan police objected strongly to
the no•plea-bargaining policy because it ran contrary to
these views. The Alaska Judicial Council (1977:54) reported,
Police investigators often objected strongly to dismissal of charges by prosecutors. Investigators
working with bad check cases cited several examples of cases in which charges had been dismissed,
giving the reasons they believed had caused the dismissals. "If a guy pays up on a check case, charges
are dropped." "We had a recent forgery case involving numerous checks. The D.A. and defense attorney got together, the defendant pleaded to two
charges and the others were dropped." "In the old
system [plea bargaining], they pleaded guilty to
three out of five charges, without talking to defense
counsel." "If there aren't enough judges to go
around at calendar call or the D.A.'s are busy, they
only take more serious cases and dismiss the
others.'' "If they eliminated plea bargaining entirely,
it would be O.K. But if we've got four counts, some
shouldn't be dropped." Police were indignant that

Other reformers have also suggested a restructuring of
the charging process to achieve realistic charging and
eliminate charge bargaining. But they also hold problematic views about the relationship between their reforms
and the overall practice of plea bargaining. For instance
in an article entitled "Abolishing Plea Bargaining: A
Proposal," Professors Parnas and Atkins (1978) recommend that judges should prevent overcharging through

17
Their recommendation was endorsed by some seasoned defense attorneys with whom we discussed it at a meeting of the Executive
Council of the National Legal Aid and Defenders' Association.
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Some charges should not be filed at all. Merely because you are brought a police file does not mean
that you are required to file a criminal charge. ·In
some cases the facts simply will not justify criminal
prosecution either because it is not warranted in the
interest of justice or because technically we could
not prove the charge. If that is the case do not file
the charge in the first instance. I am not interested
in seeing the office file Assault with a Deadly
Weapon charges and then reduce them to simple assaults with suspended impositions of sentence with
no fine or jail time purely because we never had a
case in the first place. 21

charges were dropped without any concessions in
return from the defendant.
Eliminating overcharging: the Alaskan experience. The
complexity of the issues surrounding overcharging and
the actual impact on plea bargaining of eliminating it are
best illustrated by the Alaskan prosecutor's office's attempt to eliminate plea bargaining. That effort was initiated by Attorney General Gross who as a defense attorney had developed a distaste for overcharging. 18 The
difficulties of implementing a policy of realistic charging
can be traced through a series of his memoranda. The
problems he faced were of two main kinds: defining
overcharging and getting his assistants to agree to the
policy. Notice should be taken of the shifting implicit
definitions of overcharging he uses.
His implementing memorandum of July 3, 1975, implicitly defines overcharging as filing cases "which could not
be made at trial" (a definition similar to Alschuler's definition of vertical overcharging as well the standards of
the ABA, NDAA, ALI and NAC regarding the requirement that evidence be sustainable at trial). The memorandum is ambiguous because it says plea negotiations involving charge reductions are permissible but then tries
to split the hair between reductions which are done
simply to obtain a guilty plea and those which are not
(which you will recall is one· of the NDAA's standards).
It reads as follows:
Plea negotiations with respect to multiple counts
and the ultimate charge will continue to be permissible under Criminal Rule 11 as long as the charge to
which the defendant enters a plea of guilty correctly reflects both the facts and the level of proof. In
other words, while there continues to be nothing
wrong with reducing a charge, reductions should
not occur simply to obtain a plea of guilty. An effective screening of cases filed . . . will have to be
instituted in order to avoid filing cases which might
be "bargained" under the existing system but which
could not be won at trial. 19
Three weeks later he tries to clarify what he means by
"not charging simply to obtain a guilty plea." "I stress
to you . . . that you should file the charge you can
prove." 20 But he does not say what he means by "provable." He continues:

His explanation of what he means by provable introduces yet another definition of overcharging, namely,
the prosecutor should not file cases which are not in the
interest of justice. This standard is unlike the standards
based on exercising a technical knowledge of the law
and of local practice. It does not call for an assessment
of the provability of a case. Rather it imposes an equity
function on the prosecutor at charging. Also, in his clari"
fication he overstates his description of the "nonprovable" charges which his office had been accepting;
namely, ones in which "we never had a case in the first
place." Undoubtedly he does not mean to imply that his
office had been accepting cases which lacked even probable cause. More likely it refers to the second kind of
vertical overcharging we described, namely, filing cases
as felonies because technically they are felonies (and
may even have admissible and reasonably strong evidence) but which are members of a class of criminal acts
which as a matter of de facto policy has become reduced to being treated as misdemeanors in the local jurisdiction.
This unofficial downgrading of felonies to misdemeanors
is one of the unidentified major premises in many a discussion of overcharging. It, together with the assumption that charging should be used to achieve an equity
function, is usually not evident except in some discussions of prosecutors condemning the "overcharging"
done or requested by the police. There it is often clear
that the prosecutor is rejecting the police charge not because of the strength of the case but because the prosecutor feels that while the higher charge is technically
correct it would be inappropriately severe or because
that type of crime has traditionally been handled as a
misdemeanor.
By "type of crime" we are not referring to any legal category of crime such as burglary but rather to certain

Based on interview with A. Gross, French Lick, Indiana, June 1978.
•• A. Gross, Memorandum of July 3, 1975.
•• A. Gross, Memorandum of July 24, 1975.
18

•• A. Gross, Memorandum of July 24, 1975.
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typical patterns of criminal conduct, similar to Sudnow's
(1965) notion of normal crimes." Legal categories like
burglary cover a wide variety of facts and circumstances
from systematic residential burglary of a committed burglar to the breaking and entering of schools by students
seeking to do some mischief. Even theft from automobiles constitutes burglary in some j urisd ictions. A ny one
of these fact patterns could be charged as burglary and
may be supportable at trial. The police will usually
charge them (or want them charged) as burglaries not
only to get the felony arrest tatistic (see McDonald et
al., 1981) but for other rea ons as well. The p lice do
not want to officially assume an equi ty function; 22 also
they often are either unaware of or do npt recognize as
valid the unofficial policy of downgrading of a specific
fact pattern to a misdemeanor.
It is this difficult matter of distinguishing classes of typi-

cal fact patterns within categories of crime which Attorney General Gross tries to identify in yet another memorandum a year later. But his point gets lost because (as in
the general literatw·e on overcharging) he cous;:hes the
issue of a de facto policy of downgrading certain classes
of criminal acts in the language of assessing the provability of cases.
.. . I want to emphasize the thrust of [my] initial
. . . memorandum . . . I wanted charges which
were initially filed to accurately reflect the level of
available proof at that time and that I did not want
overcharging . . . I want you to file the charge or
charge that you think you can prove and stick with
them until and unless you are convinced they are
not proper charges . . . Charges should be dismissed
or decreased only . . . when justified . . . and not as a
quid pro quo for entry of a plea of guilty.
I realize there are times when the elements of the
offense may be highly technical, as a result of which
two ·similar type counts are filed to protec t yourself
dependent upon the way the evidence develops. In
that instance you obviously only intend to seek a
conviction on one or the other, and therefore it obviously makes sense to dismiss one if a plea is entered to the other count. This is not the situation I
am trying to prevent.
What I am trying to prevent is deliberate overcharging. That will not be easy to change, but I
want a real effort made. I know that even if the
facts warrant reduction on a charge, some of you
will be hesitant to make it if you do not get some
sort of implied or express indication from the defendant that he will plead guilty. After all, if the de-

fendant does not want to plead, why give him the
break of reducing ADW [assault with a deadly
weapon] to A&B [assault and battery]? The answer
lies in the fact that if it is the kind of case that
should be reduced to an A&B, it is the kind that
should be filed as an A&B or reduced to one if it
was initially filed at a higher level.
The critical missing element in this attempt at clarifying
what constitutes overcharging is the explanation of how
one knows when 0ne has the kind of ADW which
"should" be filed as an A&B. The memorandum of June
30, 1976, misleadingly suggests that this is determined by
the level of proof. But that is not enough. In addition
one must determine whether the fact pattern involved in
the ADW fits the typical patterns of ADW's which
were alluded to in Gross' earlier memorandum of July
24, 1975. If it is one of those ADW's which in the past
have been reduced to simple assaults with suspended imposition of sentence, then the policy applies. Either it
should not be filed at all or filed only as a misdemeanor.
Also noteworthy in the June 30, 1976, memorandum is
that even with a screening program and an explicit
policy of no charge bargaining, Gross expects that there
will be times when prosecutors must "play it safe" and
file several charges to protect themselves against the
possibility of evidence not developing properly. Thus it
is not so much the desire to·play it safe that is the cause
of overcharging but rather the unwillingness of prosecutors to drop or reduce charges to their correct level
without getting guilty pleas in exchange.
Two years later Attorney General Gross reported that
his no-plea-bargaining policy was a guarded success. He
was sure that his prosecutors were no longer engaging in
sentence bargaining but he was less sure of his success in
eliminating charge bargaining. He reported:
Sentence bargaining [by prosecutors] has been virtually eliminated in Alaska. Charge bargaining,
though, has been much harder to control. The difficulty here is that when a charge is reduced from
that originally filed, it is basically a subjective judgment as to whether the charge was reduced because
the evidence developed in the case after indictment
warranted a reduction, or whether the charge was
reduced by the district attorney for the purpose of
inducing the defendant to enter a plea. Short of
quizzing every assistant district attorney on every
reduction of charge, there is no way to completely
guarantee that a bargain has not been struck, albeit
quietly.
The effort to eliminate charge bargaining initially
focused on convincing district attorneys that the ap-

•• Although the police do frequently tnke the initiative in directing
prosecutors to reject charges (Graham and Letwin, 1971).
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propriate charge should be brought in the first instance, or, if subsequent facts convinced them that a
charge should be reduced, that it should be reduced
independently of an agreement for a plea. There has
been some progress in this area and charge bargaining has clearly been reduced. At the same time, no
one should delude himself into thinking that after
many, many years of plea bargaining a directive
from an Attorney General is going to change everyone's past practice and attitudes overnight. There
are certainly still some cases where charge bargaining takes place either directly or surreptitiously, but
hopefully the practice is on the wane.
Statistical evidence from the evaluation of the Alaska
program suggests that the policy of realistic charging
did not result in the wholesale rejection or dismissal of
large numbers of cases. For the three major cities involved (Anchorage, Fairbanks and Juneau) there was a
decline in the number of felony charges filed, from 1,815
in the year before the policy to 1, 771 for the first year of
the policy. Given the tough language of the policy, this
is a surprisingly small decrease and, at that, much of it
was apparently due to the decline in the actual number
of cases being brought in due to the tapering off of the
construction of the Alaskan pipeline and its associated
crime problems (Gross, 1978).
However, while the number of felony cases filed did not
appear to be affected by the accurate charging policy,
there was other evidence that the policy was having an
impact. In following the transformation of the charges
from arrest to disposition, it appeared as though initial
charging had become more accurate. The proportion of
initial charges that changed to lesser charges at disposition declined (Gross, 1978). The other side of the coin,
however, is that while charge bargaining may have
ended, plea bargaining did not. It was merely forced
back into a sub rosa form of differential sentencing
through implicit bargaining (see Chapter 5). This suggests Katz et al. (1972) were wrong in their prediction
that realistic charging would keep guilty pleas flowing
without any substitute inducement.

The decision to arrest is clearly made by the police.
The decision as to whether to charge the suspect
and the selection of the charge are the responsibility
of the prosecutor. The prosecutor's charging decision is manifested by his approval or refusal of the
issuance of a warrant.
It should be evident from our prior discussion that this

description implies a much greater uniformity in the organization of the charging process than actually exists.
The charging process is one of the most diverse components of the American justice system. While there are
some commonalities, its diversity is most prominent.
This diversity makes national standards of proper charging problematic.
The following section describes the diversity in the
charging and screening processes in six jurisdictions.
Special attention is given to the relationship between
these processes and the nature of plea bargaining. A statistical comparison of selected aspects of the charging
process (presented in Table 2.2) highlights some major
dimensions of the differences which exist. In addition,
Figure 2.2 shows the differences among the jurisdictions
regarding relative proportions of charge and sentence
considerations in the guilty plea agreements in our samples of robbery and burglary cases. The narrative descriptions of each jurisdiction which follow will set
these statistical differences into their respective contexts.
Delaware County (Pa.). The case screening process in
Delaware County is dominated by the police decision regarding initial charges. Nowhere in the early stages of
the process is there a systematic review of cases by the
prosecutor. It is possible for a felony case to be initially
charged, bound over at the preliminary hearing, placed
in an early diversion program and eventually nol-prossed
without a lawyer reviewing the case for probable
cause. 23 The initial charges are selected and the cases are
filed by the police in the lower courts. These district
courts used to be located in police stations and referred
to as "police" courts. The district court judges are the
former justices of the peace and are mostly nonlawyers.
The prosecutor's office does try to influence the early
charging process but its ability to do so is hampered by
the fact that cases originate in 32 separate district
(lower) courts spread throughout the county. The prosecutor's office has assigned assistant prosecutors only to
the district courts in two cities (Upper Darby and Chester) that contribute about 40 percent of the total volume
of cases to the county's court system. Those prosecutors,
however, act only as resource people for the police.

Charging practices in six jurisdictions
A leading textbook (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971:395)
describes the social organization of the charging process
in American jurisdictions as follows:
The typical situation surrounding criminal prosecution is characterized by Wayne LaFave as 'one in
which the police make an arrest without a warrant
and then bring a suspect to the prosecutor with a
request that he approve the issuance of a warrant.'

A prosecutor would review these cases but the review would not be
For probable cause.

23
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Table 2.2

Selected aspects of the charging process by jurisdiction (robbery and
burglary cases that went to guilty plea or trial)

Characteristic

El Paso

New
Orleans

Seattle

Tucson

Delaware
County

Norfolk

[N=247] *

[N=521] *

[N= 758] *

[N=571] *

[N=654] *

[N=632] *

83.0%
10.9%
6.0%

48.4%
43.2%
8.4%

76.1%
21.0%
2.9%

47.1%
45.3%
7.5%

1.8%
24.0%
74.1%

54.6%
28.6%
16.8%

89.5%
7.0%
3.2%

88.9%
9.9%
1.2%

61.2%
33.8%
5.0%

29.9%
53.4%
16.7%

0.7%
19.0%
80.3%

22.8%
49.3%
27.8%

89.5%
7.5%
2.9%

91.4%
8.2%
0.4%

84.9%
13.4%
1.7%

78.3%
19.5%
2.2%

72.5%
22.6%
5.0%

53.3%
33.5%
13.1%

Number of charges in initial complaint
1
2-3
4+
Number of charges in formal accusation
1
2-3
4+
Number of charges convicted of
1
2-3
4+

• N's vary slightly by each characteristic due to item nonresponse.

Figure 2.2

Types of plea concessions in robbery and burglary cases by jurisdiction
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They will advise them on what to charge if asked. Similarly, there is a "duty man" available by phone 24 hours
a day from the DA's office who, if asked, will advise the
police serving the other district courts as to what
charges to file. The police say they do consult with the
prosecutor in serious cases and when they have any
doubts; but otherwise the police have no specific charging policies. 24 In two police departments interviewed the
procedure is simply to have a supervising sergeant
review the case with the arresting officer and help select
the charges. One officer with 23 years experience said
the police usually "wing it" most of the time. The assistant prosecutors say that when the police do ask for
advice about charging specific cases, they usually recommend filing a lower number or degree of charges. Evidently, however,, their advice has not had a general restraining influence on the police tendency to file numerous charges. Delaware County has by far the highest
number of initial charges per case of any of our six jurisdictions. Four or more charges were filed in 74 percent
of the robbery and burglary cases in our sample; see
Table 2.2. Within 2 to 10 days after the initial appearance in district court, a preliminary hearing is held at
which there will ordinarily be no prosecutor present
(except in Upper Darby or Chester) unless the case is of
special interest to the prosecutor's . office. The office
comes to know about such special cases in three ways. It
is sent copies of all cases being initiated by the police
immediately after their initiation. It may also have been
further alerted to' an especially serious case either by a
call from the police or through the newspapers. For the
most part the preliminary hearing will be put on by the
police, and the nonlawyer judge will decide whether the
case should go any further. Of 7,593 criminal matters
(including felonies and misdemeanors) 25 entering the
Delaware County court system in 1976, 4,010 (53 percent) were dismissed or withdrawn at the preliminary
hearing. It is believed that many of the dismissed cases
were arrests initiated by citizens who had filed complaints in the lower courts. Another 10 percent (742
cases) resulted in guilty pleas to summary offenses. The
remaining cases (including felonies and level 1 and level
2 misdemeanors) were bound over to the Court of
Common Pleas (superior court).

torneys that the district judges are virtual "rubberstamps" for the charges selected by the police. If the
prosecutor's office wants different charges filed than
those leveled by the police, it either dismisses the case
and has it rebrought; or, more likely, it requests special
l~a~e of t~e court to amend the charges. Either way, revtsmg pohce charges is done only occasionally.
The review in the prosecutor's office is based on the
case file forwarded from the lower court, which contains a form filled out by the judge. It states the name of
the defendant, the dates of the crime and arrest, the
names of the arresting officer, and maybe the witnesses.
There is no description of the crime or of the evidence;
nor is there information about whether bail was set. This
file is reviewed by a nonlawyer in the prosecutor's office
to determine whether the defendant appears to qualify
for the diversion program CARD-accelerated rehabilitative disposition). This initial determination is made
simply on the basis of whether the charge(s) fit within
the District Attorney's list of charges eligible for diversion.26 If so, the case is given to an experienced prosecutor to review it even further using additional information
(primarily arrest records) to determine whether the case
does in fact qualify under the DA's charging criteria and
other criteria regarding prior record. If it qualifies, the
defen~~t, his or her attorney, the arresting officer, and
the vtchm are notified and a date is set for hearing on
the diversion recommendation. If placed on diversion,
the defendant may serve up to 2 years on preconviction
probation; and if he· or she meets the terms of diversion,27 the case will be dismissed. In 1976 between 847
and 1,000 cases were placed in the diversion program.2s

If a case does not qualify for diversion, then the
nonlawyer prepares the formal charges by simply filing
the charges listed by the police and bound over by the
district judges. These cases are then submitted to the
prosecutor's "screening" attorney who reviews the
ch.arges and the police file; sees if the charges are appropnate; sets the priority of the case and assigns it to a
trial team. If the prosecutor wants to change the charges
he may request special leave of the court to do so. But
this rarely happens. In our sample, the number of
charges filed by the prosecutor was identical to the
Notwithstanding the substantial number of cases dis- number filed by the police 97 percent of the time (see
missed in the lower courts, it is the opinion of local at•• For list see Appendix A.
., E.g., drunk drivers must attend the alcoholism council for testing;
drug users must be tested; indecent exposure offenders must get psychiatric testing.
•• Systematic data on case flow in the Delaware County court is not
computerized. Both the court and the prosecutor's office keep their
own statistical records, which do not always agree.

•• Except that one department will not file charges for violating the
Sunday blue laws or for gambling (bingo) at church carnivals or fairs.
A former chief had been fired after doing so.
•• Misdemeanors in Pennsylvania are graded into three levels with the
first level being punishable by up to five years of incarceration and the
second level up to two years.
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Table 2.2 for comparison with other jurisdictions). The
prosecutor is more likely to dismiss cases (nol pros) than
alter charges. During the case review and preparation
process and later (up to the time of trial) cases are nolprossed. In 1976, 552 of 2,841 (19 percent) of the cases
bound over to the Court of Common Pleas were disposed of in that manner. After the review the case is
presented at a formal arraignment conducted by a
layman who reads the formal charges to the defendant.
The arraignment occurs about one to two weeks before
trial.
Some plea bargaining occurs at various stages of the
process, but the bulk of it occurs on the day of trial in
what attorneys describe as a "panicky" atmosphere at
the back of the courtroom. A lot of guilty pleas come
only after a trial has begun. The plea bargains involve
both charge bargains and sentence recommendations.
The amount of charge reduction is enormous. Most
cases start out with many charges and end up convicted
of few. However, defense attorneys were in general
agreement that the charge bargains were rarely of any
value. It is the sentence commitment that concerned
them. Most of them said things like: "A charge reduction is always immediately available but they're not
worth anything to the defendant. It's the time he is concerned about."
Another lawyer said: "They reduce charges in almost all
the cases but that's not the heart of the matter. If the
man is charged with six crimes, you don't care if he's
convicted of all of them because the judge only needs
one conviction to put him in jail. So I don't worry about
the number of charges."
Because most Delaware County defense attorneys see
charge bargaining as being largely irrelevant to the sentence, they are generally not upset at the overcharging
which, most of them (10 of 13 or 77 percent) believe
goes on. As one public defender put it when asked about
prosecutorial overcharging, "TI}.ey do, but I wonder if it
matters. They seem to put on more than is necessary for
prosecution but they get dropped through a plea bargain, nol pros, or suspended sentence. It doesn't have
any effect-with the possible exception of a hidden
fine."

Norfolk City (Va.). The charging process in Norfolk is
divided among the police, the prosecutor, and the district (lower) court. Initial charges for both felonies (arrested without warrants) and misdemeanors are initiated
by the police by obtaining a warrant from a magistrate
(formerly, justice of the peace). The police decide
whether the case is a felony or a misdemeanor and set it
on the appropriate court docket. The police are under
virtually no guidelines in selecting charges other than to
pick the charges which seem to fit the facts. 29 Typically
they pick the highest charge. For example, drug possession cases are always charged as "possession with intent
to distribute" no matter how small the amount of the
drug. The police use overcharging to accomplish several
goals. One officer stated, "Yes, generally I charge higher
in order to hold it over their heads. It helps to up the
(bail) bond and it also helps in plea bargaining."
As for the number of charges, our sample of cases indicates the police most frequently file only one charge (55
percent) but almost as frequently file multiple charges
(45 percent). In a small but substantial proportion of
cases (17 percent) they file four or more charges per
case. While this is considerably less heavy multiple
charging than that of the Delaware County police-who
filed 74 percent of their cases with four or more
charges-it is two to eight times higher than that of the
other four jurisdictions (see Table 2.2). It is no coincidence that this high degree of heavy multiple charging
occurs in the two jurisdictions where the prosecutor's
screening mechanism does not involve an early review
of cases or a direct interaction with the police regarding
the charges.
All cases are usually presented within 24 hours in the
(lower) District Court (referred to as the "police court")
for an "initial appearance." At this point most misdemeanors are acted upon. Many are disposed of by guilty
pleas. 30 But many others are tried, convicted, and appealed to the (upper) Circuit Court for retrial,3 1 These
misdemeanors are presented either by the police or the
court clerk. Prosecutors are rarely involved. Felonies
will have a preliminary hearing date set for 2 weeks
later.

One exception is homicide. The police have a policy of charging all
The defense attorneys accept and expect the police to ••homicides
with first degree murder.
overcharge because they figure the police do not know
30 See Chapter 6 (Judicial Supervision) for a description of the rapid
how to charge correctly. The phlegmatic attitude of the
disposition of these misdemeanor cases.
Delaware County defense attorneys towards overcharg- 31 Almost as many misdemeanors as felonies reach the Circuit Court. In
ing by police and prosecutors stands in sharp contrast to 1976, a monthly average of 291 misdemeanors compared to 507 feloearlier reports of the widespread condemnation by attor- nies were commenced in the Circuit Court, according to court statistics for five months.
neys of the practice.
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The preliminary hearing constitutes the main prosecuterial screening mechanism. Prosecutors reduce many felonies to misdemeanors in exchange for guHt y pleas and
some cases are dismissed completely. T his charge modification and disposition process at the preliminary hearing is considered the primary form of clearing cases. Unfortun ately no statistics are available on the extent of
the felony reduction and dismissal at preliminary hearing. Some observers believe that most of the adjustments
of the cases are in the form of charge bargains rather
than ou tright dismissals. One cour watcher estimated
that less than 10 percent of the felony cases are dismissed outright. Everything that can be reduced or dismissed will be. Prosecutors note that there are important
advantages to adjusting cases before they are bound over
to the Circui t Court. As one noted, 'if you are going to
reduce a .ale (of drugs) to accommodation, then try to
do it in Police Court. You get a lot less ex:posw·e there,
plus it saves time and money. In Circ uit Court there
might be a reporter present."

level 23 percent of the felonies are dismissed by the
prosecutor. 32

The case screening process in Norfolk is notable for the
unusual and somewhat inconsistent views that local attorneys have of it. The prosecutors and defense attorneys tend to define the screening function as a responsibility shared between the prosecutor and the court but
with the court holding the major share of the responsibility. Most defense attorneys reported that both horizontal and vertical overcharging occurs; yet they were
also of the opinion that the prosecutor's office did a
fairly good job of screening! They blamed the overcharging on both the police and the prosecutor; but they
attributed the perceived inadequacies of the case screening process to the District Court judge. They blamed
him (not the prosecutor) for failure to eliminate more
cases at the preliminary hearing. No one seemed to think
that the prosecutor should take the initiative in dismissing more cases. As for the overcharging, the defense attorneys were almost unanimously pleased with it because
Prosecutors also believe, however, that there are some of its advantages to them. They noted that it gives them
cases which "must" be allowed to proceed to the Circuit something to take back to their clients. One stated, "We
Court even though they will be plea bargained to misde- have to sell things to our clients. However, if he is a
meanors or dismissed. Such case are not delineated by professional, then he will tell you about overcharging."
any explicit office policy and do no constitute any speMost noted that gettmg "overcharges" reduced or discific, class of offense (except possibly homicide) but
missed
makes them look good in the eyes of their clients
rather are identified 0n an individual basis. T hey are
and
makes
the defendants feel thal they are getting a
ones where the charge are too serious to reduce; or
good
deal.
(Obviously
it is this p tential for deception
there is a lack of information in the me; or there i presand
manipulation
which
has contributed to the concern
sure from the community or the victim to have the case
of
some
critics
of
charge
bargaining.)
handled seriously; or other circumstances dictate that the
case should be given fuller treatment.
Norfolk prosecutors also blamed the failure in the
screening process on the D istri.c t Court judge. T he prosCases that are bound over to the grand jury and for- ec utor's office bad established a screeni ng d ivision at one
warded to the prosecutor's office are assigned to individ- time but according to prosecutors i.t did not succeed beual prosecutms who select the formal charges to be cause the District Court judge was unwilling to cooperftled. Their choices are approved by a superyj or, but ate. They did not define screening as an indepenrlen '
this review is not guided by any explicit charging tand- prosecutorial function.
ards. Generally, prosecutors add more charges (of a
lesser-included kind) to the most serious cl1arge tiled by In addition to whatever screening is done by the Comthe police. One assistant prosecutor explained, 'For ex- monwealth Attorney's Office there is an unknown
ample, they will come in with a charge of burglary. We amount of unofficial screening and charge bargaining
will then add grand larceny and po session of burglary done by the police. T hey use their charging power' to
tools on the indic tment. ' By the time of the formal obtain informers, confessions, and g uilty pleas. One officharging decision of the prosecutor, the police are sup- cer stated, "If there is a felony arrest it must go to
posed to have completed any postarrest investigation Police Court. Unofficially, I will not make an arrest if I
needed in the case and forward ed that information to the think he can be of service [as an informer], thus bypassprosecuto r. (This information is typically not available to
the prosecutor during the "screening" at the preliminary
hearing.) The ineffectiveness of the preliminary hearing 32 Based on Circuit Court caseload statistics for January, February and
screeuing is evident by the fact that at th e Circuit Court April, 1977.
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ing the official procedure." Another stated, "If I see
someone who might be a possible informer in the future,
we will charge that individual with a lesser offense and
treat it as a misdemeanor." One defendant reported that
he pleaded guilty because "the police told me they
would help me as much as they could and they would
drop the strong-arm robbery charge. They said I would
end up with 36 months."
Another explained, "I did it to keep from getting other
charges. I was nervous at the time. I gave a statement
since there was no use in going to court and pleading
not guilty."
A third said, "The police told me that if I put away all
my connections, they would guarantee me 12 months."
Yet another defendant reported, "I pled guilty to five
counts of statutory burglary. The police told me if I
didn't make a statement, they would give me 15 more
charges of burglary."
Over half of the police officers interviewed said they
engage in plea negotiations with defendants. The basic
forms of plea bargaining by the police are either the
threatening to add charges or the offering to dismiss
charges and then putting in a "good word" with the
prosecutor. The deal is usually made directly with the
defendant during the questioning period after arrest. The
defendant is told he will be charged with many more
crimes if he does not make a statement. After making his
statement the defendant goes to police court, has an attorney appointed, and is told by him that there is very
little that can be done unless the statement can be suppressed-which rarely happens.

The police importance in charging (and plea bargaining)
extends even into the Circuit Court. The Commonwealth Attorney's Office has a policy of contacting the
police officers in a case before plea bargaining and requesting their recommendations. A few other jurisdictions have similar policies, but in Norfolk it appears to
be more than a matter of professional courtesy or even
of checking for additional information. The police opinion of the correct charges and dispositions seems to
carry considerable weight. All police officers interviewed stated that they usually were contacted by the
prosecutor's office before the indictment is filed and
asked for their recommendations or comments. One officer went on to say, "If they don't contact us about a
case that we want reduced, then we will contact them.
They usually go along with our recommendations."
The power of the police regarding charging and plea
bargaining was emphasized by one private defense attorney who had served as a local prosecutor for two years.
In his view, "the real prosecutor in Norfolk is the police
officer." He explained:
If the police officer won't agree to deal there is no
deal. You really negotiate with the detective (in
felony cases). You go down there and tell him, "I
promise my man won't be back this year." Then
he'll say, "No. We've got to have some time on this
man." Or, "We don't feel this guy has to have any
time." Or, "This guy is high on our list. He's a real
bad actor. We have to put him away." Those police
officers sound just like lawyers, the haggling they
go through.
Then you go see the assistant prosecutor and tell
him "The detective doesn't feel too bad about this
case." The prosecutor will then call and check with
the detective and confirm what you've reported.
And the prosecutor may then say to you, "Well, if
the judge will go along with it then I'd accept it."
Then you'll see if you can fly it by the judge.

The police role in plea bargaining is further enhanced by
the fact that the prosecutor's "screening" is done in the
"police court" at preliminary hearing. Much of this
"screening" is just plea and dismissal bargaining. Defense attorneys know that the key to successful plea bargaining (or outright dismissal) is getting the police officer to agree to the disposition. Unlike that in New Orleans where prosecutorial screening involves a private discussion between the police officer and the prosecutor in
the prosecutor's office, Norfolk's screening is done in
open court with police officers, defense attorneys, and
prosecutors milling about trying to strike agreements on
dispositions and exchanges. Defense counsel approach
police officers for information about their cases and for
their approval of certain "screening" decisions. Case
strength is not a major consideration in this combined
screening, bargaining and dismissing process.

This attorney noted that charge bargaining (or plea bargaining generally) by police differs from that of prosecutors. Factors relevant to case strength are unimportant
to the police in setting the terms of the deal.
The policeman is only concerned with what he
wants to do with the guy and who you (the attorney) are. You don't argue about is it a good search
or good arrest. To police officers every search is a
good search. Every arrest is a good arrest. They are
afraid to admit any error in the arrest because they
fear it will be based against them in trial. If you
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point out an error they are likely to say, "Well,
we'll see about that."
Tucson (Pima County, Ariz.). In Tucson screening of
cases by the police before referral to the pr<:>secutor's
office is minimal. All cases are sent to be revtewed by
the County Attorney's Office. Depending on whether
the case is referred by detective squads or uniform
police officers, an investigative prosecutor or police liaison officer will review the case. Detective squads take
the case directly to the investigative prosecutors while
all other officers refer their cases to the police liaison officer in the County Attorney's Office. The function of
the liaison officer is to coordinate the investigations of
the police officer with the County Attorney's Office. If a
case is rejected by the liaison officer, it is returned to the
sergeant at the police department. If the case is again referred to the County Attorney, it bypasses the police liaison officer and goes directly to the investigative prosecutors. Estimates suggest that only 2~3 percent of cases
are screened outright by the police liaison officer.

Police officers stated that the only policies for screening
cases are those in the prosecutor's office (2:2). 33 However, the role of the police officer can be important in the
disposition of cases. Officers are routinely consulted by
the prosecutor before an inctictment is issued if the prosecutor wants clarification of arrest information (2:2). ln
addition, they are approached by defense counsel prior
to final disposition in approximately 80 percent of all
cases (1 :2). Defense counsel sometimes encourage them
to agree to a plea bargain or, at least, not to object to a
plea bargain (1 :2); but counsel rarely ask them to 'tone
down" reports or "withho.ld information" (2:2).
Police officers play a very limited role in their contacts
with the defendant. They stated that they never engaged
in plea bargaining with defendants (other than informants). They do not try to persuade defendants that they
will "do better" by pleading guilty. The officers said
that in order to bargain a defendant into being an informant, permission must be obtained from the prosecutor before making the deal. (Several interviewed defendants noted that police officers or narcotics agents had informed them of the possibility of dismissed charges in
exchange for information. The typical plea agreement
with informants was a dismissal or reduction of charges
in exchange for evidence in three other cases.)
The County Attorney's Office screens cases through its
Issuing Team of four experienced attorneys who are in

charge of investigating cases. In 1977 the team issued approximately 55 percent to 65 percent of the cases referred (compared to 51 percent of the cases in 1976).
Prosecutors said their standard in accepting cases was
"evidence strong enough to get the ca e to trial." The
County Attorney hoped that he had established the
policy of indicting people on provable charges and on
enough counts to "impress" the jury. By this he meant
that if the defendant had a pattern of 20 robberies then
the indictment should show that the defendant is a multiple offender. However not all 20 robberies should be included because that could confuse the grand jury and
hinder successful prosecution. He did not feel that his
office overcharged.
The views of defense attorneys regarding the charging
practices in the prosecutor's office disagree with the
County Attorney's. A majority of defense attorneys
stated that the prosecutor's office usually screens out
cases that have serious legal or evidentiary weaknesses
(7:10) and accepts ca e that are strong enough to get to
trial ( 10:10). However, most defense attorneys also felt
that the prosecutor's office accept orne cases that
would not withstand a motion for a directed verdict of
acquittal. These cases are accepted because of the prosecutor's belief in the factual guilt of the defendant, or
the nature of the crime, or the background of the defendant (8: 10). Counsel noted that prosecutors attempt to
get a guilty plea to a lesser included offense in such
cases.
Notwithstanding their belief that the prosecutor usually
only accepts cases with evidence greater than probable
cause and despite the fact that 35 to 45 percent of the
felonies are rejected by the pro ecutor's screening unit, 9
out of 10 defense attorneys claimed that the pmsecutor's
office overcharges! Examples of overcharging included
adding 'kidnapping for-" charges to rape or robbery
charges, or charging someone with "burglary when 'the
evidence suggests 'possession of burglary tools." Overcharging was believed to occur because it increa es the
prosecutor's leverage in plea negotiations or otherwise
increase the number of guilty pleas (8:10). Also it was
believed that police officers sometimes pressure the prosecutor's offtce to indict on particular charges if the officer is involved in developing the ca.<;e (2:10). Almos·t half
(4: 10) of the defense counsel suggested that vertical
overcharging was common. Others stated that horizontal
overcharging (3: 10) or a combination of both (2:10) occurred. Regardless of the type of overcharging, most defense counsel stated that it was routine in all cases (7:10)!
The perceptions of defense counsel regarding widespread overcharging are undoubtedly linked to the fact
that charge bargaining is the major form of plea bargain-

•• The first number in the parenthesis refers to the number of persons
agreeing with the preceding statement. The second number refers to
the total number of persons questioned about the specific topic.
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ing in Tucson (see Figure 2.2). In the Superior (felony)
Court sentence agreements are rare. 34 Charge reduction
and dismissal as well as agreements not to file habitual
offender charges account for almost all of the plea bargains according to judges and defense attorneys. Our
ample of cases confirmed this perception. Ninety-three
percent of the plea agreements involve cha.rge bargains
(either exclusively or witb sentence considerations). The
latter o cucred in o nly 16 percent of our cases. Charge
reduction was reflected in the substantial decrease in the
number of charges per case between formal accusation
and ultimate conviction. Seventy percent of our Tucson
sample had 2 or more charges listed in the indictment,
but only 22 percent of the cases resulted in convictions
on two or more charges. Most convictions (78 percent)
were on only one charge (see Table 2.2).

The final decision as to whether a case will be given
SOB treatment is made bv the Bureau Director.
SOB cases can be plea bargamed but the terms must
meet the minimum SOB guidelines, which are designed
to achieve the twin goals of accurately reflecting the
original offense and placing "the defendant within a sentence range sufficient to deal with the· degree of criminality involved" (Op. cit.:2). The guidelines focus primarily on what charges may not be dismissed or reduced. The policy is as follows:
PIMA (ARIZONA) COUNTY ATIORNEY'S
OFFICE
MINIMUM GUIDELINES FOR SOB PLEA
NEGOTIATIONS (1977):

Tucson defense attorneys indicated that overcharging influences the advice they give their clients. If a case is
vertically overcharged and the evidence is strong, they
feel that a guilty plea to a lesser offense is usually the
best available option for avoiding a harsh sentence. On
the other hand, if the evidence is weak they are more
likely to seek a dismissal or advise their client to plead
not guilty. In contrast, horizontal overcharging does not
usually affect the advice of counsel because there is no
consecutive sentencing in Tucson.

GENERAL:
(a) There will be no plea agreements designating
probation or limiting prison time to less than the
maximum provided by law.
(b) Provable priors [offenses] will not be dismissed
unless the defendant's exposure to Arizona State
Prison is at least ten years without the prior on a
single count.
(c) Aggravation hearings will be held where appropriate and will not be waived by plea agreements.
(d) The sentencing judge will not be designated by
agreement.
(e) Plea negotiations will be terminated at least ten
days prior to trial in all cases.

The prosecutor's office operates a Serious Offender
Bureau (SOB) which is related to charge bargaining and
creening in important ways. The goal of the SOB is to
"devote special attention to career criminals and serious
offenders, to minimize delay, and to prevent manipulation of the weaknesses of the system. . . . [S]elective and
vigorous prosecution of serious and habitual criminal offenders, along with a clearly defined and limited plea
bargaining policy, will utilize existing judicial resources
to their fullest extent, and insure swift justice to the
criminal who deserves it . . . . " 35 The initial selection of
potential SOB cases is made by the prosecutor's Issuing
T eam (screening unit) using an "objective rating system
applied to all incoming criminal ca es" (Op. cit. :2). This
ev.aluation system is based on the seriousness of the offense and the seriousness of defendant's prior record. As
to the matter of case strength, the Office Manual explains, "In order to avoid unnecessary w aste of SOB and
judicial resources the strength of the case will also be
ce nsidered, but will not be the controlling factor" (Id.).

VIOLENT OFFENSES; ARMED OFFENSES; •
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES:
(a) Defendant may plead to the count against each
victim carrying the highest minimum prison sentence, or,
(b) Defendant may plead to the two counts in the
indictment or information carrying the highest minimum prison sentence.
OTHER OFFENSES:
Defendant may plead to the county carrying the
highest minimum prison sentence, provided that
maximum exposure is at least ten years, or to any
combination of counts necessary to raise maximum
exposure to at least ten years, where possible.
NOTE:
These are mmzmum guidelines. Stricter terms may
be set by the assigned deputy in appropriate cases
with the approval of the Bureau Director. In no
event will more lenient terms be agreed to without

In contrast, in the (justice) misdemeanor court, sentence agreements
occur in about 70% to 90% of the guilty pleas, IICCOrding to estimates
of the judges.
35
(Pima (Arizona) County Attorney's Office, Operations Manual for
Serious Offender Bureau, 1977, p. !.)
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the approval of the Bureau Director and the County
Attorney.
Seattle (King County, Wash.). The Seattle (King County)

court system has two tiers, a District (lower) Court of
limited jurisdiction and a Superior (upper) Court of general jurisdiction. Until the mid-1970's all felonies and
misdemeanors were filed in the District Court. Prosecutors used the preliminary hearing of the District Court
to screen felony cases. If a case looked strong, it was
bound over or refiled in the Superior Court. Otherwise
it was reduced to a misdemeanor and disposed of in the
District Court. This changed when a new 60-day speedy
trial rule made a "dry run" at the preliminary hearing an
unaffordable lp.xury. Since then only "expedited"
(minor) felonies are filed in the District Court and are
expected to be disposed of there as misdemeanors. 36
This will typically happen at the preliminary hearing,
where the prosecutor will move to reduce the charge to
a misdemeanor, usually in exchange for a guilty plea.
These expedited felonies as well as the misdemeanors are
initially charged on the basis of a complaint filed by the
police. (One defense attorney claimed he sometimes is
able to convince police officers to file felonies as misdemeanors.) All other felonies are filed directly in the Superior Court.

fense, the police bring it to a member of the prosecutor's
Morals Unit. These are experienced attorneys picked for
their ability to handle sensitive cases. All other cases are
brought to the prosecutor's Filing Unit, composed of
deputies with at least a year's experience who serve on
the Unit for 3 months and then go back to trial practice.

The police bring these felonies to the appropriate
"filing" deputy prosecutors. If the case involves a sex of36

"Expedited" cases are specifically defined by the King County District Attorney's Plea Bargaining standards (pre-June 22, 1977) as follows:
"Expedited Crimes" are:
(a) larceny of any type where the total value of all property taken pursuant to a common scheme is less than $250, except
(I) from the person, or
(2) as part of a business enterprise, or
(3) where the property possessed was stolen in a residential burglary
and circumstances exist which give probable cause to believe that the
defendant committed the burglary, or ·
(4) where the property possessed was stolen in more than one criminal
incident.
(b) forgery when the total face value of all instruments forged is less
than $250, unless two or more different identities are involved.
(c) credit card forgery where the total value of all items charged is less
than $25, unless two more different identities are involved.
(d) credit card theft where the possession involves the cards or identification of one person only.
(e) joyriding where the vehicle was abandoned within 24 hours of the
theft, no stripping occurred or where there is no evidence of intent to
permanently deprive.
(f) possession of marijuana in quantities less than 250 grams.
(g) possession of dangerous drugs in quantities less than:
(I) amphetamine-50 tablets
(2) barbiturates-10 capsules
(3) others-quantities sufficiently small to indicate personal use as opposed to sale
(4) Class I controlled substances are always treated as felonies.

According to the chief criminal deputy, the official filing
standard is "whether the case will get to a jury." He
added that deputies like to win cases and consequently
the actual standard is probably even higher, something
close to being winnability at trial. Defense attorneys
generally agreed that the prosecutor's evidentiary standard at screening is high. Six described it as "getting to a
jury" or stronger. Two described it as "pretty strong."
Only one said it was not "getting the case to a jury.
Rather," he said, "it was 'we think they are guilty.'"
Evidently the detectives in the Seattle Police Department have learned and incorporated the prosecutor's
high filing standards. 37 About 90 percent of the cases
they bring over are accepted. The Seattle detectives prescreen their cases and do not bring them over if they do
not meet the filing standards (except for homicides and
politically sensitive cases, all of which are brought over).
According to the legal counsel for the Seattle Police
Department, there are no official policies about the kinds
of cases to screen out (except for the prosecutor's guidelines about filing "expedited" cases and misdemeanors in
the District Court). Typically, the detective does not
bring the case over until it has been thoroughly investigated. The detectives will be told by the deputy prosecutor if the case is to be filed or declined or needs further investigation before they leave the filing conference.38 The charging decisions for both minor ("expedited") and serious ("high impact") felonies 39 are governed
by explicit policy. Minor felonies are all to be filed in
the District Court by the police.
All "high impact" crimes are to be filed in the Superior
Court. The guidelines controlling the charging and plea
bargaining of high impact cases attempt to achieve the
triple goals of evenhandedness, appropriate sentence, and
an appropriate record of the actual offenses committed.
Plea bargaining is not prohibited but is regulated to

Officers from other departments in King County with small caseloads have had less experience with the filing unit and tend to bring
weaker cases over.
"They can appeal declinations all the way to the chief prosecutor.
37

39

Murder; manslaughter; assault in the first degree; rape; robbery; kidnapping in the first degree; residential burglary; and arson in the first
degree or involving a residence. King County (Washington) District
Attorney's Office Policies, Section 1051(1), pre-June 22, 1977.
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SECfiON 1053: DISPOSITION

achieve these goals. Proper charging and charge bargaining (as defined by the King County District Attorney, Christopher Bayley) are a critical part of the guidelines. The filing policy is as follows:

HIGH IMPACT CRIMES
(1) Sentence recommendations pursuant to these

SECfiON 1052: FILING
HIGH IMPACT CRIMES
(1) All high impact crimes will be filed directly in
superior court unless there are specific evidentiary
reasons for a preliminary hearing.
(2) If weapons were used or were present and capable of being used in the commission of the crime the
appropriate special allegation will be charged in all
cases. This applies whether or not an individual defendant actually possessed the weapon.
(3) If a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions which have resulted in prison sentences,
and if the present charge includes a high impact
crime, an allegation of habitual criminal status will
be made in the original information. See Section
1320 for specific procedures on charging and handling habitual criminal allegations in other cases.

EXPEDITED CASES
(1) All expedited cases will be filed in district court
as felonies. The only exception will be those cases
where the defendant's prior record is such as to require the imposition of a sentence involving loss of
liberty for more than six months. These cases will
be filed direct in superior court. 40

The disposition guidelines specify what sentence recommendations shall be made and what charges may not be
bargained away. The deliberate filing of multiple charges
of the horizontal type (i.e., separate criminal incidents as
well as different criminal acts committed as part of one
incident, e.g., vandalism in addition to damage done
when burglarizing) is an important feature in this plea
bargaining policy. Multiple charges are to be filed but
not for the purpose of being traded away. Their purpose
is to assure either an appropriate sentence or an appropriate record of conviction (even if it does not increase
the sentence). For instance, one will notice that Standard
4 (below) insists that charges arising from separate criminal incidents for certain offenses may not be dismissed.
But then Standard 5 (below) directs deputies to recommend that conviction for these separate counts be served
concurrently. The standards are as follows: 41

° King County (Washington) District Attorney's Office Policy
Manual, pre-June 22, 1977.
.. Only those standards relevant to charges are presented here.

4
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standards will be made in all rape, robbery and residential burglary cases. All sentence recommendations in these cases will involve some loss of liberty.
The amount of loss of liberty to be recommended
will be determined by reference to the attached recommendation standards for the crime involved. The
only factors which are relevant to the amount of
loss of liberty are the nature of the present crime,
any aggravating factors which may be present, and
the defendant's prior criminal record.
(2) Aggravating factors will be applied in the following manner.
(a) Multiple Incidents-One additional step will be
added for each additional incident up to a maximum
of two additional steps.
(i) Uncharged criminal incidents will not be considered unless probable cause exists to believe the defendant committed the uncharged crime.
(b~ Physical Injury Resulting-One additional step
w1ll be added for each victim who is physically injured.
(c) Weapon Used-One additional step will be
added if a weapon was used in the commission of
the crime. Only one additional step may be added in
the category.
(d) Prior High Impact Crime Conviction-One add~tional step will be added if the defendant has previOusly been convicted of a high impact crime.
Only one additional step may be added in this category.
(e) Vandalism Present-One additional step will be
added to residential burglary recommendations
where the residence was vandalized in addition to
damage resulting from the entry and the theft. Only
one additional step may be added in this category.
(3) In rape, robbery or residential burglary cases
firearm or deadly weapon allegations where the
weapon was used or was capable of being used in
furtherance of the crime and habitual criminal allegations are not the subject of bargaining and will
not be dropped for any reason other than our inability to prove the specific allegations.
(4) In rape, robbery or residential burglary cases
counts representing separate high impact criminal
incidents shall not be dismissed.
(a) "separate incidents" mean independent crimes
i.e., two robberies of different victims at different locations are separate criminal incidents; the robbery

C~ime

of two victims at the same time and location is one
criminal incident.
(b) multiple counts arising from a single criminal incident, including crimes committed while withdrawing, may be dismissed as part of a plea bargain, i.e.,
grand larceny of "property taken in a burglary, an
assault committed in the course of a robbery, or the
robbery of several different victims at the time and
place.
(5) Concurrent maximum terms of 20 years in the
case of rape, robbery and burglary in the first
degree and 15 years in the case of burglary in the
second degree will be recommended. 42
The policy allows for exceptions in all cases but they
must be approved in writing by certain senior prosecutors. The dropping of allegations requiring mandatory
sentences is allowed only for one of the following reasons:
(a) where proof problems make conviction on the
original charge unlikely or,
(b) where the defendant is able to provide information or testimony that will reasonably lead to the
conviction of others who are responsible for more
serious criminal conduct or who represents a greater danger to the public interested or,
(c) where specific factors present require the reduction or elimination of punishment on the grounds of
mercy. 43
Turning now to expedited felonies, the charging and disposition policy for them involves that second kind of
vertical overcharging discussed earlier. It is not that
these cases lack ample evidentiary strength. Rather, it is
that they are routinely filed as felonies and reduced to
misdemeanors in exchange for pleas. The policy is institutionalized as follows:
SECI'ION 1053: DISPOSITION
EXPEDITED CASES
(1) The defense attorney will be informed that upon
an agreement to plead guilty in District Court the
defendant may enter a plea to the crime listed
below. Preliminary hearings will not be held in expedited cases. If a plea of guilty has not been entered by the date of the preliminary hearing the case
will be dismissed and filed directly in Superior
Court.

•• Ibid., Section 1053.
•• Ibid., Section 1054.

charged

Larceny
Forgery-checks
Credit card forgery &
theft
Joyriding
Possession of
marijuana
Possession of
dangerous drugs 44

Crime reduced to
Petit larceny
Petit larceny
Petit larceny
Petit larceny
Possession of marijuana
Possession of
legend drugs

When we asked local practitioners about the amount and
kind of overcharging that occurred, the responses were
mixed and conflicting. Prosecutors did not see their District Court policy as a form of institutionalized overcharging. As for Superior Court cases, they said their
filing standards are very high. Defense attorneys generally agreed about the high standards in the Superior
Court. Nevertheless, 4 of 10 defense attorneys also said
that the prosecutor's office overcharges! (Three said
overcharging was both horizontal and vertical. Orie said
it was mostly horizontal.) Two other attorneys said that
the Criminal Division (of the DA's Office) does not
overcharge but the Fraud Division does (horizontally).
Another attorney believed that the prosecutor does not
overcharge except in habitual offender cases. When
asked to clarify what he meant, he gave an unusual definition of overcharging. He said that prosecutors "overcharge" on the habitual offender allegation in that they
use it as if there were insufficient legal basis for the
charge. 45 Two attorneys described practices which
might be regarded as sub rosa overcharging. They said
that in some cases the prosecutor does not file all the
charges that the . available evidence would support.
These unfiled charges are later used to encourage guilty
pleas. Prosecutors threaten to file them or to "sling
mud" at sentencing if the case goes to trial.
Our sample of robbery and burglary cases shows a comparatively small amount of horizontal charge bargaining.
Most cases (76 percent) were initially charged with only
one charge. In a few cases (15 percent) extra charges
were added to the formal accusation and in some cases
(23 percent) charges were dropped at conviction (see

•• ld.
" This response was most surprising because prosecutors regulariy
complain about the habitual offender proceedings being so much trouble. They say that such charges are usually not filed unless careful
documentation is available.
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Table 2.2). This conforms with the general view that the
dominant form of plea bargaining in the Superior Court
is sentence recommendations (see also Figure 2.2). In
our sample 46 percent of the guilty pleas involved sentence recommendations alone. Very few (8 percent) involved charge modifications alone. Inasmuch as our
sample involved two crimes covered by the office policy
of filing multiple charges for separate incidents and not
bargaining them away, one would not expect much dismissing of charges. Thus, the decrease in the proportion
of cases with two or more charges from 39 percent at
formal accusation to 15 percent at conviction seems high
given the policy. 4 s

New Orleans (La.). In Louisiana the initial charges in a
case are decided by the police but the decision to file
formal charges belongs solely to the district attorney. 47
In all but capital cases and those punishable by life imprisonment, the district attorney may proceed by bill of
information rather than grand jury indictment. 48 Unlike
some other states, 49 a magistrate's finding of probable
cause is not a necessary prerequisite to the filing of a
formal charge. If after a preliminary hearing a magistrate
finds no probable cause, the only necessary result is that
the arrestee is freed from custody. Prosecution is not
barred. 50 The prosecutor's charging decision awaits receipt of the police report, delivered anywhere from 1 to
10 days after arrest. 51

On the day after the arre t or initial hearing, the Screening Division sends notices to the victim and the witnesses 52 to come to the District Attorney's Office.
Before accepting or rejecting any charges, the screening
attorney interviews the victim and as many "ne.cessary" 53 witnesses as po sible. The number of witnesses
interviewed varies with t he attorney and the demands of
the case.
In the vast majority of cases the arresting officer i interviewed. He or she is sometimes pivotal to the charging
decision. If he or she does not bring over the case in
person, the screening assistant may interpret this to mean
that the officer does not really care about the case
(unless, of course, the officer is working midnight shift).
lf present, the officer may be able to prevent the refusal
Of a case by provicfing mformat10n- to the SCreening attorney's questions which are not adequately answered by
the police report. As one screening prosecutor noted,
sometimes a case does not look so bad after talking to
the officer. On the other hand, the fact that an officer
wants to charge an arrestee (or sometimes wants his case
refused) is not decisive. At times various officers get
quite frustrated by the office's refusal to prosecute "bad
actors" whom they have arrested. Yet again, they are
sometimes upset for the opposite reason. If strong evidence is present, the screening attorney may accept the
case over an occasional officer's objection. One officer
complained he had been unsuccessful in getting the
Screening Division to refuse certain drug cases which he
thought should not have been prosecuted because of certain factors in the arrestee's favor.
Some officers generally have their cases accepted; others
rarely do.5 ' In many cases, the police officer's credibility
determines how much weight the screening prosecutor
gives to his input. The prosecutors ask themselves
whether the officer generally "makes good cases"; accurate investigations; legal "busts"; and whether he or she
tells you "how it really went down."

•• However, this disparity might not represent a breakdown in policy.
The charges dismi sed could be charges other than the ones covered
by the policy. Also, many of the burglaries in our sample are nonresidential and the refore not restricted regarding charge dismissnl . .
47 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 61.
•• Ibid., Art. 382.
•• See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399, U.S. 1 (1970).
•• Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 386. Informally, the
New Orleans magistrates have adopted an unwritten policy regarding
release of arrestees against whom timely charges have not been filed.
The prosecutor must accept or reject charges against an arrestee
within the shorter of two possible time periods: 1) within 10 days after
the initial appearance (which is u bond hearing held within a few hours
of booking); o r 2) within 3 days afte.r rhc preliminary hearing (set by
the magistrate only on request of the defendant anywhere from I to 7
day aft r the in itial appearance depending upon the schedule of the
arresting officer).
•• If c harges have no t been accepted during this period of time, the
magistrate may grant 11 11 extension if the arrestee i on bond. With jail
cases, the magistrate may grant a release on recognium::e if the crime
is not serious. For a more serious crime, the magistrate is likely to
grant an extension even though the defendant is in jail. If the magistrate refused an extension in a serious case, the assistant district attorney present would probably file some charge against the arrestee
simply to prevent his release and to allow the screening division the
time needed to review the case.

•• If the police report has not arrived, the screening division gets the
names of at least some witnesses from the arrest register which is available to the prosecutor at the initial appearance from the police.
""Certain person. li ted as witnCS~;es, usually ce rtai n police officers, are
not "nece.'>Sa ry" becaus they cannot testify to anythi ng in court. ln
the case of police officers, they may be listed as witnesse altho ugh
they only trOJ1Sported th e arres tee to police headquarte rs and could no t
be used to testify to anything at trial unless the arrestee gave a statement while in their custody.
•• For an analysis of the difference among police officers in getting
cases accepted, see Forst, Lucianovic and Cox, 1977.
The length of the delay is related to the complexity of the case and to
whether or not the police department is currently paying its officers
overtime. According to one screening prosecutor, when overtime pay
is not available, a backup in the flow of police reports occurs.
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The screening prosecutor may also hear from the defense attorney but the defense attorney must initiate the
contact. 55 The value of defense counsel's involvement at
the New Orleans screening is problematic. Most of the
information which he or she might bring to the attention
of the screeners would probably be found out by them
eventually.56 One possible value noted by a defense at"
torney is the locatmg of alibi wttnesses. He claims that
people in lower class, high crime neighborhoods will
talk to defense attorneys but will not cooperate as readily with police and prosecutors.

convenience or because a police officer thinks the District Attorney's Office will refuse a charge.
Under prior district attorneys, the screening of cases was
minimal. A very small proportion of the prosecutor's
manpower was devoted to "the desk" where incoming
cases were accepted or rejected. Approximately 75 to 85
percent of the incoming cases were accepted. The result
was a glut of cases in the court system. Many cases sat
dormant for years in file drawers. There was no systematic docket control.

Although the police have no formal screening authority, After assuming office in April 1974, the new District Atthey may in fact informally screen cases in several ways. torney, Harry Connick, gave priority to controlling the
Some officers, e.g., narcotics officers, may tend to screen flow of cases. An inventory recorded over 7,500 open
out cases thought unworthy of prosecution, e.g., posses- cases, many old and some dating as far back as 1936.
sion of marijuana, simply by not arresting persons who Within 6 months approximately 5,000 cases were nol
have committed the offense. At times, officers may agree prossed as unprosecutable. Next, the prosecutor's office
not to arrest in return for information. This constitutes a established an extensive screening system, 57 Connick
type of plea bargaining. If the officer were to arrest the built his other policies (most notably his limited plea barperson and then attempt to get his charges reduced or gaining policy) around this strategy of intense screening.
dismissed, he would have to go through channels by getThe Screening Division has the responsibility to fully inting a letter from the police superintendent's office to
vestigate cases before acceptance or rejection. The
the district attorney requesting such consideration. For
screening prosecutor must interview the victim and essome misdemeanors, the police have the option of charg'sential witnesses (police and lay) before deciding on
ing the defendant with the appropriate municipal offense
charges. Theoretically, the creening att rneys accept
rather than the corresponding state charge. By sending
onl y charges that can be proved beyond a reasonable
the case to Municipal Court, the police can avoid the doubt at trial without any reduction for plea purposes.
District Attorney's Office and deal, instead, with the
City Attorney's Office. This is done at times either for As part of an overall policy of accountability the
Screening Division maintains a system of review. The
screening assistant must record his reasons for the refusal
•• If the defendant is not yet represented by counsel, of course, no one of every case not accepted. In turn, a supervisor reviews
will appear on his behalf. In the case of indigents, counsel is appointed all refusals. As for acceptancys, when at a later stage a
at the initial bond hearing and again at the preliminary hearing. This
attorney, however, is not the one who will later represent the individ- trial assistant desires to nol pros a case, he or she must
ual if charges are accepted against him. Particular counsel is not gener- get approval from the screening attorney who accepted
ally appointed until arraignment on the formal charges. Between arrest the case as well as from the Chief of Trials and the First
and this arraignment an indigent is not actually being represented Assistant. This holds the screening attorney responsible
except at his appearances in Magistrate Court.
for judgment calls and uses his or her knowledge of the
The question naturally arises as to whether the indigent receives "unequal treatment" as a result of the lack of representation at the screen- case as a check against the trial assistant's judgment of
ing stage. The answer to this is unclear. No doubt in some cases pri- the same case.
vate attorneys gain concessions for their clients that are not generally
available once a case is accepted. In such cases, the paying defendant is
being represented. In other cases, defense attorneys agree on behalf of
their clients to enter pleas at arraignment to what appears to be a
charge lower than what might otherwise have been accepted. In fact,
however, according to certain assistant district attorneys, some of
those cases are ones that otherwise would have been rejected/
•• This is in sharp contrast to the situation in other jurisdictions where
prosecutorial screening is less aggressive. In Greenville, S.C., for instance, a defense attorney who is a courthouse regular reported that
one of his most important services to his clients is in supplying the
prosecutor's office with information which they need to screen out or
properly assess the case. He might produce a hotel receipt showing the
defendant was out of town on the date in question. In New Orleans the
screening prosecutors would be expected to find such receipts through
their own investigations.

The emphasis placed upon screening requires that the
screening be done by more experienced trial attorneys.
Only they can be expected to know whether a case can
be proven to a jury. Traditionally, however, assistant
district attorneys have preferred the "action" of the
courtroom to the responsibilities of the "desk." Accordingly, Connick employs incentives in terms of pay and
status to entice experienced trial assistants to the position
of screening attorney. As a result, the less experienced

Funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
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attorneys generally staff the individual trial courts. Not
all of the experience, however, has been drained from
the courtroom. A separate division, the Career Criminal
Bureau (CCB), 58 composed of more experienced trial attorneys, screen as well as try the more serious cases.

As indicated in Table 2.3 there was approximately a 20
percent decrease in the number of cases accepted in both
1974 and 1975 as compared with the last calendar year
of the previous administration, 1973. Also the number of
cases accepted in both 1974 and 1975 is slightly lower
than even the 1972 figures.
Connicks' policy specifies that only strong, triable cases
are to be accepted for prosecution. The rationale for the
policy is to avoid glutting the system with cases that
cannot be tried and hence must be either plea bargained
or nol prossed. Connick believes the screening policy
makes it possible to enforce a tough, "no" (limited) plea
bargaining policy because the prosecutor is always in the
position to go to trial.· Consequently, once a case is accepted for prosecutionr office policy dictates that the defendant either plead guilty as charged or go to trial.
Connick has not tried to eliminate plea bargaining. He
believes it is a legitimate tool in limited circumstances.
His purpose has been to eliminate the atmosphere of
"dealing" between prosecutor and wrongdoer. He wants
plea bargaining to be the exception rather than the rule
and he wants to see serious criminals given appropriately
severe sentences.
Given Connick's screening and plea bargaining policy
one would not expect to find any overcharging. This
was generally borne out both in the opinion of defense
attorneys and in our sample of cases. However, several
attorneys thought a little bit of horizontal overcharging
occurs. However, as Table 2.3 shows, the District Attorney's Office accepts a much smaller percentage of the
counts (police charges referred to the office) (38 percent) than it does cases (56 percent) or defendants (54
percent). This reflects the difference between the police
tendency to list two or more crimes in their initial
charging papers and the prosecutor's tendency to go
with one charge. 59 This difference can also be seen in
Table 2.2 wherein 52 percent of the cases contained two
or more charges on the initial complaint but only 11 percent of the cases contained two or more charges on the
formal accusation.
Table 2.2 also appears to indicate that Connick no-pleabargaining policy is successful. There is aim st no
change in the proportion of cases with only one charge
at the formal accusation (90 percent) compared to conviction (91 percent). In other words, it appears that defendants are pleading as charged. This is true but deceptive. It does not reflect the whole picture. It does not
include the reduction in the habitual offender allegations

CCB forms another basic building block in Connick's
overall policy. CCB combines the functions of the trial
and screening attorneys. Experienced attorneys target arrestees who have five or more felony arrests and/or convictions. When a "career criminal" is arrested, a CCB attorney takes charge of the investigation, often at the
point of arrest, decides whether the case will be accepted or rejected, and follows the case from the first appearance through trial of the case. The CCB unit also
maintains its own system of supervisory review.
Under Connick's policies, a large number of cases is
screened out of the system. The impact of these policies
can be seen in Table 2.3 below which includes a partial
comparison with the screening practices of the previous
administration.

Table 2.3

Case rejection at initial screening, New
Orleans, 1972-76

1972

1973

1974 * 1975

1976

Acceptances:
Cases

6756

7937

6312
(59%)

6375
(60%)

5063
(56%)

Defendants**

NA

9127

Counts***

NA

NA

7642
(58%)
NA

7605
(58%)
NA

6057
(54%)
7454
(38%)

Refusals:
Cases

NA

NA

4363
(41%)

4884
(40%)

3919
(44%)

Defendants

NA

NA

Counts*

NA

NA

5483
(42%)
NA

5454
(42%)
NA

5142
(46%)
11,885
(62%)

• The Connick administration assumed office on April 1,
1974.
• * Not available.
••• Joinder of offenses was not generally permissible in
Louisiana until September 1975. See La. C.C.R.P. Article
493.

•• The prosecutor's charging practice in this regard is influenced by the
rules of joinder of offenses in one indictment. A defendant upon
motion can routinely get a severance of offenses (State v. McZeal, 352
So. 2d 607 (1978). Thus each count must stand on its own. Obviously,
this minimizes horizontal overcharging.

" Also Federally funded.
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nor does it reflect sentence recommendations. Our data
(which include those matters) indicate that charge reductions or dismissals alone occurred in 27 percent of the
cases JID.d sentence recommendations alone occurred in
56 percent (see Figure 2.2). (Still more of each occurred
in combination with each other.) One common form of
charge bargaining not reflected in the formal accusation
or conviction statistics is the agreement not to file the
"multiple bill" (habitual offender provisions) or to
reduce the number of prior convictions alleged in the
multiple bill. 60 This has a direct consequence on the sentence because the multiple bill places a mandatory minimum on the sentence which is increased with every additional prior conviction alleged. Through the use of the
multiple bill the prosecutor's office is able to get defendants to plead as charged while simultaneously controlling the sentencing of judges who are considered too lenient.
The main complaint about charging in New Orleans was
not about overcharging but about undercharging. The
police and defense attorneys believed the prosecutor's
office undercharged cases. By this they meant two
things. The office rejected cases that should have been
accepted; and it filed lower charges than were appropriate, for example, simple robbery when a basis existed for
armed robbery with an implied weapon (finger in the
pocket).
Police complaints about the charging practices of prosecutors are common in most jurisdictions (McDonald et
al., 1981). But in New Orleans where the case rejection
rate went from about 20 percent under the old administration to about 45 percent under Connick, they reached
a peak. The Police Department publicly declared that
they refused to believe they were "wrong" in almost
half of their arrests (Times-Picayune, 1974). A summit
meeting between the two agencies was held at which the
District Attorney's Office presented a report showing
the reasons for the rejections of the cases. For many
cases the reason was that the victim/witness did not
want to pursue the matter. For these cases the prosecutor's office had written "sign off' statements from the
victims/witnesses. The Police Department has evidently
been appeased. It has now begun a case review process
of its own in which it records the disposition it expects
in a case. When these expectations were compared to
what actually occurred, they were largely (90 percent)
in agreement with the prosecutor's office's actual decisions.

Assessing the validity of the complaint by defense attorneys that the Connick administration undercharges is difficult. It again raises the uncertain nature of what constitutes proper charging. Rather than some objective standard the definition of proper charging ultimately involves
an ethical choice. One must first indicate what overall
penological strategy one is attempting to accomplish.
Then "proper" charging can be defined in relationship
to that objective. The charging standards of the national
groups do not address this first order issue. They deal
with second order issues which set certain ethical limits
on the means by which the overall strategy is pursued.
One oversimplified but fundamental choice in designing
an overall strategy is between giving a little punishment
to a lot of cases or a lot of punishment to a few, selected
cases. Connick believes in the latter strategy. His critics
seem to be upset for either one or both of two reasons.
They believe the former strategy is in the better interest
of community safety; or they cynically believe that the
main reason for pursuing the latter strategy is its political benefits. It allows the prosecutor to accept only
cases he can win and thereby gives his office a good
"track record."
El Paso County (Tex.). El Paso County has two separate
prosecutors' offices. The District Attorney handles felonies in the District Court and the County Attorney handles misdemeanors in the County Court. In El Paso
City, a third office, the City Attorney, handles violations
of municipal ordinances. Initial charging is done by the
police, who are under no guidelines regarding the
degree or number of charges to file. Generally police officers seem to select charges based on a literal reading of
the penal code for the maximum crime(s) that fit(s) the
offense(s), as suggested by the following interview with
a patrolman.
Q: How do you charge? Do you include all things
you can?
A: We had a case where these people stole a car
and robbed two guys. We charged them with
"stolen auto" and "aggravated robbery."
Q: Do you know what the D.A. finally charged
these people with?
A: I am sure they went for the aggravated robbery.
But the stolen vehicle was kind of shaky.
Note: The D.A. did not charge aggravated robbery;
nor was the stolen auto charged. On!y robbery was
charged.
Occasionally, a specific policy comes into being as a
way of trying to deter a particular problem. According
to a robbery detective, the patrol officers "used to
charge those guys who go into convenience stores and

8
° For further analysis of the use of the habitual offender law in Louisiana, see Subsection G on that general topic herein.
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take six-packs of beer with 'theft.' Now they're charging
them with 'robbery' because it's happening too much."
The initial charges that the arresting officer wants filed
are reviewed at the booking desk in the police department by his supervisor. The nature of this review depends entirely upon the individual supervisor on duty.
As one patrolman explained,
"Some will go over it carefully and tell you if you
have a good case. Some guys will go over it for
spelling only. They're not concerned with the content at all. Some supervisors, you take it in there,
lay it on the desk, and they don't even look at it.
My supervisor will want to know everything about
the case and what we want to file."

code definitions to the facts of particular cases. Interviews with the police officer in charge of the CAP
(crime against persons) unit and the Head of the Sex
Crimes unit reveal how adroit the police can become at
screening. These officers do not appear intent on overcharging. Rather, their sophistication suggests that with
training and adequate supervision experienced police officers could serve as effective initial screeners.
Q: So you make the [screening] decision based upon
the arrest report whether a given case should be
sent on or to whom it should be sent?
A. (CAP Officer): At the point that it comes into
our office for screening, from the original field officer's report, at that point we determine what type
of investigation should be initiated * * *. Some
cases involving assault we won't know how to specifically handle it until we see or talk to the persons
involved to determine the type of injuries or the
means of the offense committed.

Supervisors who do review cases check to see if the elements of the crime are there and whether the report is
understandable. Some warn patrolmen against blatant
overcharging, as one patrolman reported:
"Some will tell me to go another charge. Like some
times in class C cases, I bring a guy in; I file drunk,
disorderly conduct, interfering, all this; all the way
down the line-[somebody gave me a real hard
time). And, the [supervisor] will say, 'Why don't
you go "drunk and disorderly" because the prosecutor will think you're "picking" on a guy.' "
Cases will be reviewed again within the Police Department by detectives who decide whether a case should be
sent to the District Attorney or the County Attorney's
Office. One detective explained,

Q: What types of things do you look for on deciding if a case should be screened out?
A. (CAP Officer): We look for elements that constitute that particular penal offense. There may be one
element that's decisive whether it should be sent to
the D.A. or County Attorney.
A. (Sex Officer): We have about the same problem
screening cases [as does CAP). Yet age is the most
important part of any sex offense.
Q: In what way?
A. (Sex Officer): The difference in age between 16
and 17, say in an exposure case, is the difference between a Class C misdemeanor and a third-degree
felony.
We have a lot of cases where a boyfriend is accused
of raping a girl and after a few days she has second
thoughts on it and decides, "Well I don't want to
get him into all that trouble, get him sentenced to
jail."
Q: What if you have an 18-year-old kid who is with
his date and pulls off her underwear then she jumps
out of the car screaming? What do you do with
that?
A. (Sex Officer): Well, it's attempted rape. But, how
are you going to prove it? What were his intentions? Well, you can't prove he intended to rape
her. Maybe he wanted to look at her. Attempted
rape is an impossibility to make.
Q: In this case what would you do? Forward it on
to the D.A.?
A: We'd probably have an assault by contact case.
When it boils down to it, that's all we got. That's
assuming she'll press charges. We don't have any

"We have good working relations [with the D.A.).
They leave a lot of initial screening up to our discretion * * *. There are different offenses that
range down from C misdemeanor on up to first
degree felony. It's a matter of whether or not it
would be impractical to all parties concerned to
present a case to the D.A. when it should have been
presented to County Attorney's. So we use discretion where to send a case. * * * Of course if anything does come up in investigations that a case
should be changed to a felony, then it will be sent
up to the D.A. But initial screening is right here in
our office."
These officers have developed a detailed knowledge of
the legal requirements of specific offenses and the kinds
of proof problems which occur. They differ from many
police officers in this degree of detailed knowledge of
the law. But they are similar to police officers everywhere in that they lack an experienced prosecutor's feel
for the subtleties of case strength. They can recognize
when they don't have a case but for the most part their
screening is based on a mechanical application of penal
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sex violation. I might add that, again, in the screening process you're trying to read elements to fit
laws of our state.
Q: You look for the elements that constitute an offense?
A. (Sex Officer). Right.
Q: If there aren't elements, you'd drop the case at
this point?
A. (Sex Officer): No. We can change the charge.
Say we don't have grounds to prove a rape, then
we have sexual abuse or some other charges we can
put it under. Might be lesser charge or sometimes a
harder charge.

blatant weaknesses in a case, such as a lack of statements
from witnesses or a failure to substantiate the elements
of a crime. But they are unable to anticipate how a case
will look at trial and how local juries will perceive witnesses. The cases his Bureau rejects are not ones where
there is no evidence linking a defendant to a crime.
They are ones where the evidence is not enough to
make a conviction very probable.
Local defense attorneys generally agree that there is no
overcharging by the District Attorney's Office. Rather
(as seems to be typical in places where prosecutors operate vigorous screening standards) defense counsel accused the District Attorney's Office of accepting only
"pure gold" (very strong) cases in order to protect its
conviction record. Our sample of burglary and robbery
cases indicates that the police rarely file more than one
charge per case (17 percent); the District Attorney's
Office rarely changes the number of charges; and
charges are rarely dropped at conviction. Of course, it
must be recalled that the District Attorney's Office doe;s
no plea bargaining of any kind.

Q: Are there any formal or informal policies regarding screening? For example, are there crimes that
are not routinely processed?
A. (CAP Officer): No. Generally we go strictly by
guidelines in the Penal Code. It's very clear.

These officers do not screen out cases in which an arrest
has been made. All such cases, even ones which they
know will have to be terminated, are transmitted to the
D.A. (or other prosecuting official) who takes responsibility for the actual termination. All felony cases are delivered to the D.A.'s Screening Bureau, which is located
in the same police building. It is staffed by two attorneys
who have had some trial experience and two investigators from the Police Department. Their view of cases
relies largely upon the information provided by the detectives, who will usually have spoken to the prosecutors already about the investigative needs of the cases as
the detectives were screening them. The prosecutors
may still ask for further investigation (e.g., clarification
of a witness' statement) before deciding what formal
charges to bring. The prosecutors themselves do not
usually meet with victims and witnesses. They rely on
the police to make those important judgments about the
credibility and reliability of these people. One robbery
detective explained, "Most of the time he'll [the prosecutor] ask us if he's a 'good' victim, credible, reliable. Does
he gotta good record? Not a good record? Does he have
a record?"

One additional fact about the screening of felonies by
police and prosecutors in El Paso is of particular note.
When the District Attorney decided to end all plea bargaining by prosecutors, the judges were left with the job
of supplying defendants with the incentive to plead.
Rather than assume that responsibility they established a
point system by which defendants could assess whether
they would get probation or incarceration if they pleaded guilty. One of the key determinants of the score a defendant received in the point system was the seriousness
of the charge in the instant offense. In addition the seriousness of charges in his prior record also influenced the
points. Under this system the charging decision assumed
a new significance. Given the popular notion that restricting discretion at one part of the justice process only
shifts it to another part, one might have predicted that
either the police or the prosecutor might have used their
newly enhanced charging power to decide the sentencing fate of defendants. But such a prediction would have
been wrong. The police were generally unaware of the
point system or how it worked; and the screening pros·
ecutors' overriding concern was the triability of cases.

Prior to the establishment of the Screening Bureau in the
early 1970's the preliminary hearing ("examining trial")
was used as the main screening mechanism. Now preliminary hearings are held in about 5 percent of all felonies.
Instead the District Attorney takes his cases directly to
the grand jury. The standard of case strength used by
the Screening Bureau is whether a case can be won at
trial. Approximately 60 percent of the cases forwarded
to the Bureau are rejected. According to the Chief of
the Bureau, the detectives do a good job of catching the

The handling of misdemeanors in El Paso differs from
felonies. There is no followup investigation. Disposition
decisions are usually made on the basis of the police
report alone. The charges are those filed by the police.
There is no screening as such. Rather cases are briefly
reviewed for disposition which frequently is either a
quick dismissal or a "slow" dismissal (after diversion) or
a guilty plea. One key determinant of whether the out-
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come is a dismisal or a guilty plea seems to be whether
or not the defendant can afford counsel. Dismissals are
usually obtained by defense attorneys by contacting the
County Attorney's Office between the time the case is
initially filed by the police and the Friday "arraignment"
session. Counsel may argue that the case is weak or the
penalty wouJd be too severe. The County Attorney's
Office appears to be Jes interested in case trength than
in the impact of the conviction on the defendant. For example, if the defendant drives a truck for a living and is
charged with driving while intoxicated, the case will
almost always be dismissed.
Misdemeanor defendant who do not have attorney will
discuss their cases directly with the Assi tant County
Attorneys who generally advise them to plead gui lty to
avoid being "creamed" if they go to trial and in order to
get probation or diversion right away. These cases do
not ordinarily get dismissed outright. They either get diverted and then dismis ed or they plead guilty and get
probation . One assistant County Attorney reported that
deaJing directly with defendants is more difficult than
dealing with attorneys and that this affects the ultimate
disposition.
I try to treat each case as it comes along. On reflection, though, there may be some categories, types of
responses that I usually have to certain C8.$eS. One
thing, it's more difficult to deal with defendants
who are unrepresented because they don't understand what's going on . . . Those defendants with
lawyers come out better because I feel safer in discussions with attorneys.
Later when asked how he would handle a case where
the evidence falls apart after the case is in the system,
this prosecutor replied:
My response to it varies depending on whether
there is a defense attorney involved in the case. If
there is a defense attorney, I'll dismiss it . . . If
there is no attorney I'll try to get the defendant to
plead guilty.

Charging habitual/repeat offenders
One aspect of the charging process which requires separate mention is the use of the "repeat" or "habitual" offender laws. Most states have pecial sentencing provisions which either permit or require more severe sentences for repeat offenders (Tappan, 1960:742). These
laws are notable for two main reasons: their lack of use
and their involvement of the prosecutor in the sentencing process. Typically the entence-enhancing effect of a
habitual offender law can only be applied if the prosecutor has charged the defendant with being a habitual offender. This u ually involves filing documents which es-

tablish that the defendant is a person who has been previously convicted of one or more felonies. The effect of
these charges vary by jurisdiction. Some increase the
maximum sentence allowable; others impose a mandatory minimum. Experience has shown that where these
law are used at all they usually have been employed as
bargaining chips to be traded away in exchange for pleas
rather than to secure severe sentences (Tappan,
1960:473). But by and large the laws are not used. Even
in jw·isdictions where the law requires that prosecutors
rue habitual offender proceedings against eligible offenders district attorneys refuse to file the charges (Miller,
1970:380).
All six of our jurisdictions have habitual offender laws.
All but Pennsylvania provide for enhanced penalties
upon a second conviction of a felony. In Pennsylvania a
third penitentiary sentence of more than one year triggers the habitual offender statute, as does the cotnmission of a second crime of violence within 5 years of the
instant offense. In Arizona the commission of a second
felony doubles the maximum which can be imposed. In
Virginia it autllorizes any term up to life imprisonment.
In Washington conviction for a second felony trigger a
minimum 10-year sentence. In Texas it makes the maximum sentence for the second crime the mandatory sentence. In Louisiana prior felony convictions impose mandatory minimum sentences which increase with every
additional felony conviction. If one prior conviction is
established, the mandatory minimum sentence is not less
than one-third and not more than twice the maximum
for the instant conviction. 81 For two prior convictions,
the mandatory minimum is not less than half the maximum. For three, it is not less than 20 years or the maximum, whichever is longer, and not more than life.
The infrequent use of the habitual offender laws was reconfirmed by our research. In tive of the six jurisdictions, substantial proportions (from 22 percent to 50 percent) of the defendants in our sample had records of
prior felony convictions within five years; 82 yet, few
had their sentences enhanced (see Tables 2.4 and 2.5). Of
the 908 defendants in all six jurisdictions combined who
appeared to be eligible for enhancement only, 14.1 percent had the habitual offender laws applied to them.
Only in New Orleans was the habitual offender law invoked against a substantial (56.1 percent) proportion of
the eligible defendants. As noted earlier, this is due to
Louisiana Revised Statute Annotated, 15:529.1. The statute was held
constitutional, State v. Vale. 252 La. 1056, 215 So. 2d 811 (1968).
62 The within-5-year qualification is not required by law but we added
it becau e in o ur experience older prior records tend to be disregarded
by decisionmakers. Thi restriction means our findings underestimate
by a slig.hi amoulll the size of the population eligib le for habitual offender proceecting .
61
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in exchange for a plea, Connick's office can obtain a plea
"without reducing the charges." The structure of the
Louisiana habitual offender sentencing provisions gives
the prosecutor's office powerful levers to induce pleas.

District Attorney Connick's policy of using the mandatory minimum provisions of the habitual offender law as
an important plea bargaining and sentencing weapon. By
agreeing to reduce the number of prior felonies alleged

Table 2.4 Frequency of prior felony convictions within 5 years of instant offense
among defendants who pleaded guilty or were tried for robbery or burglary by
jurisdiction
EIPaso
Number of prior felony convictions
within 5 years of instant
offense
None
1-2
3+

New
Orleans

Seattle

Tucson

Delaware
County

Norfolk

(N=197)

(N=321)

(N=735)

(N=474)

(N=605)

(N=515)

77.7%
18.3%
4.0%

56.6%
37.4%
5.0%

66.5%
29.8%
3.7%

50.2%
31.7.%
18.1%

57.8%
30.1%
12.1%

54.8%
30.5%
14.7%

Table 2.5 Frequency of habitual offender enhancements of sentences of defendants who pleaded guilty or were tried for robbery or burglary and had one or
more prior felony conviction(s) within 5 years by jurisdiction*
El Paso
Was defendant sentenced as
habitual offender?
Yes

New
Orleans

Seattle

Tucson

Delaware
County

Norfolk

(N=44)

(N=180)

(N=246)

(N=236)

(N=73)

(N=233)

22.7%

56.1%

3.2%

5.1%

8.2%

0.0%

• For Delaware County only defendants with three or more prior felony convictions are included.

Formalization and plea bargaining

own decisions without specific policy guidance except
for the "important" decisions which are to be made by
the chief prosecutor. But staff. attorneys are often left
with little guidance as to which decisions are important
enough to be referred to the chief. The guidance provided by one chief prosecutor makes this point. He tells his
assistants, "You're right until you're wrong."

Analysis. Along with the trend of the prosecutor assuming greater .importance in the administration of criminal
justice there has been a trend toward increasing formalization of the prosecutor's office. The larger offices have
established centralized managerial control through the issuance of written policies and the hierarchial structuring
of the chain of command and of case review. The difference among offices in this regard is a matter of degree.
In smaller offices formalization has not occurred to any
substantial degree. Policies, procedures, chain-of-command, and review of decisionmaking are not well developed or systematically observed and applied. The ideology of management in such offices is that every prosecutor is a professional person who can make his or her

The effort to exert managerial and policy control over
assistant prosecutors has been met with resistance and
resentment. It conflicts with assistant prosecutors'
images of themselves as professionals. The hallmark of
professionalism is the authority to exercise one's individual judgment and discretion. Policies that restrict discretion are lampooned as turning expensive legal talent into
paper-pushing clerks.
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A second objection is even more fundamental. It is the
pervasive belief that every case is unique and therefore
discretion is a necessity and specific policy guidance an
impossibility. The kernel of truth in this assertion often
gets nourished into a general objection to written guidelines and policies on the grounds that policies cannot
decide individual cases.
These objections together with the historically small size
of prosecutors' offices probably account for the slow development of explicit prosecutorial policies of control
and review. But that is changing 63 and some observers
would believe this is for the better (e.g., Brietel, 1960;
Davis, 1969; and Jacoby, 1975, 1980a, 1980b, and 1980c).
The broad discretion of the American prosecutor has
long been worrisome both because of its potential for
abvse as well as its consequences for the evenhandedness
of case dispositions. Reformers have believed that these
dangers can be minimized by policy controls.
As shown earlier, prosecutors' offices that have developed the greatest degree of formalization have included
policies governing both the charging and the plea bargaining decisions. This formalization should be related to
numerous aspects of case processing, especially those
having to do with the consistency of case handling. One
would also expect that greater formalization would be
positively correlated with the swiftness and efficiency of
dispositions as well as the thoroughness of case record-'
keeping. Also, inasmuch as formalization has meant
higher charging standards (at least in New Orleans and
Seattle) one would expect less charge bargaining and
generally stronger cases (among those that are accepted).
We examined some of the correlates of the degree of
formalization of the prosecutor's office using the sample
of robbery and burglary cases. In this analysis five of
our six jurisdictions 64 were rank ordered along a scale of
degree of formalization from highest to lowest as follows: New Orleans, Seattle, Tucson, Delaware County,
and Norfolk. This ranking is not based on any quantified
formula but rather on our judgments. The extent to
which one or more of the following conditions were
present was used in deciding the rank order of the offices: the use of a managerial information system (either
computerized or manual); the existence, specificity and
comprehensiveness of office guidelines for case disposition decisions; the presence of specialized decisionmaking units; the use of required sign-off and review procedures; and the degree of use of written documentation of

decision and their rationales. The five jurisdictions differed in many other ways besides the degree of formalization mo t notably by the size of the office and of the
caseload. Given our sample of only five jurisdic tions,
these other factor couJd not be held constant. Thus, this
analysis can only be regarded a exploratory. The relationships that were found must be verified with a large
sample.
The degree of fonnalization of prosecutors' offices was
found to be significantly related to selected aspects of
ca e processing (see Table 2.6). In the jurisdiction with
the m re formalized prosecutors' offices the number of
police charges were lower. (P sibly the police had adjusted their c harging practices to those of the prosecutor.) The arnow1t of charge bargaining was lower.
(There were fewer charge on U1e indictment/information; there was a lower probability that the charges on
the indictment/information would be reduced· if formal
charge were dismissed, fewer were involved in the dismissal; the plea bargain was more likely to include a sentence recommendation; and the t tal number of charges
at conviction were fewer.) Th cases which go to guilty
plea or trial were stronger. (They were more likely to
have phy ·ical evidenc and more likely to have an eyewitness.) 6 5 Guilty pleas were more fair and open to
review in the sense that there is a greater probability
that a record of Lhtt plea agreement will be in the flies.
Cases were disposed of more quickly (with the difference being due primarily to a shorter time from arrest to
indictment).

Di cussion. While tllis statistical analy is is only suggestive f possible correlates of formalization, , its findings
consistently agree with the impressions we developed
through our observations and interviews. The c haracter
of plea bargaining differ from one juri diction to the
next based on the role the prosecutor chooses to play in
the system. One crucial aspect of that role is the nature
of lhe screening process.
Plea bargaining in jurisdictions where (a) case have
been rigorously screened by (b) trial-experienced prosecutors (c) using a high threshold level of legal proof
and (d) having direct interactions with the police who
investigat d the cases (e) as well as with victims and
witnesses is qualitatively different from plea bargaining
in .other juri dictions. Several of the institutional weaknesses of plea bargaining as a method of dispensing
criminal justice are igniticantly offset ·by such a system
•• Note that this does not mean that the police in those more formalized
jurisdictions are bringing in ,stronger cases. Rather it r~flects the efficacy of the prosecutor's screening practices. That is, his office only
allows strong cases to go to guilty plea or trial at the felony level.

"' For a report on one attempt to screen cases using a quantitative scale
based on office policy, see Jacoby, 1975.
•• El Paso was excluded because of its no plea bargaining policy,
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Table 2.6

Relationship between degree of formalization of the prosecutor's office and selected
aspects of case dispositions*

If there is a high degree of formalization of the prosecutor's office, then:
1. there is a lower number of police charges filed;
2. there is a lower number of charges in the indictment/information;
3. it is less likely that the number of charges in the indictment/information will be
reduced;
4. in cases where some charges are dismissed after indictment, then fewer charges
are involved in this modification;
5. the total number of charges on which the defendant is convicted will be fewer;
6. the plea bargain is more likely to include a sentence recommendation (either
alone or in combination with a charge dismissal or reduction);
7. it is more likely that there is physical evidence in the case;
8. it is more likely that there is an eyewitness identification of the defendant in the
case;
9. it is more likely that there will be a record of the plea agreement;
10. the time from arrest to disposition is shorter (the difference being due primarily to
a shorter time from arrest to indictment).

N

df

x2

gamma

3136
3120

16
16

1734
2052

0.31
0.58

2953

4

357

0.15

3084
2997

20
12

1922
312

0.53
0.45

1681
2994

4
4

711
217

0.38
0.28

2804
2014

4
4

216
211

0.21
0.41

3009

48

1155

0.31

P<.01

..
.
..
.•
..
.

• Based on robbery and burglary cases that went to guilty plea or trial in New Orleans, Seattle, Tucson, Norfolk and Delaware
County. El Paso was not included because of the no plea bargaining policy.

of rigorous case screening. In unscreened systems the
evidentiary strength of cases varies enormously and ordinarily is not subject to an impartial testing. Whatever
challenge of the evidence that does occur happens in the
context of plea negotiation. There each side is trying to
convince the other of its strength. In contrast, in rigorously screened systems the strength of the evidence in a
case is independently scrutinized by prosecutors with the
intent of eliminating weak cases.
The extent to which rigorous case screening approximates the same degree of impartial and thorough scrutiny of a case that would occur at trial is arguable. Skeptics would say that prosecutors are inevitably biased in
favor of prosecution despite their ethical obligation to
seek justice, not convictions. However, the experience in
New Orleans and Seattle suggests that, assuming this is
generally true, it can be modified by appropriate incentives. Prosecutors in the screening unit in New Orleans
are rewarded for ensuring that weak cases do not go forward. Prosecutorial skill is defined in terms of thorough
case investigation and accurate assessment of case
strength rather than in compiling a long list of convictions. Weak cases which slip through the screening unit
are traced back to the screening prosecutor and regarded as an error on his part.

impartial and thorough means of testing evidence. Many
a tried case may have had its evidentiary strength tested
more thoroughly by a rigorous screening unit than what
was done at trial. Of course, even if rigorous screening is
something less than a thorough challenge of the evidence, there is always the possibility that residual weaknesses will be discovered later by defense counsel.
The significance of rigorous screening is that it increases
the degree of confidence we can have that the guilty
plea process is convicting provably guilty defendants. It
partially restores to the justice system those values associated with ideas about legality and the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Those concerns are
eroded by wide open plea bargaining in unfiltered systems. Moreover, the fact that only strong cases are allowed to proceed also minimizes the influence of case
strength on plea bargaining outcomes. This enhances
evenhandedness and restricts the influence of this penologically irrelevant factor. In addition, the integrity of
the charging function is maintained. Accurate, supportable charges can be filed and maintained so that pleas
will be. to charges that will both correctly reflect the
crimes committed and allow for appropriate punishment.
The main concern about screening programs with high
threshold levels of case acceptability is that they reject
cases that could have been convicted through plea bargaining. For those who believe that a little bit of punishment for a lot of offenders (regardless of the seriousness
of their crimes or their prior records) deters more crime
than the selective prosecution of a smaller number of se-

This kind of check on the judgments of prosecutors may
not be equivalent of the challenge that is possible in an
adversary process. But, on the other hand, observers familiar with biased juries and ill-prepared defense counsel
suspect that the trial process itself is often not the most
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rious offenders, rigorous screening is not regarded as a
progressive reform.

Conclusion
That part of the controversy over plea bargaining which
focuses on charge bargaining has been mired in the semantic quicksand of discussions about "overcharging."
Underlying that controversy are three fundamental interrelated p licy is ues: wh ther there should be any plea
bargaining at all; what role the prosecutor should play in
the criminal justice process; and how the screening of
cases in the postarrest-pretrial tage of the criminal justice process should be done (by who m, at what point in
the process, and according to what standards). Historically, plea bargaining bas been used as the main device
by which cases were screened and disposed of. However, ince the 1920's there has been a growing consensu.
that the creening of cases should be a separate function
performed by the prosecutor at an early point in the
process using an evidentiary standard of case acceptance
that i higher than the constitutionally required standard
of probable cause. Cases that do not meet this higher
standard should be rejected outright (orr turned for further .investigation). They should not be allowed to enter
the system and disposed of by guilty pleas. The fact that
these cases have been allowed to enter the court system
and then di posed of by guilty pleas is behind a lot of
what is meant by the complaint about "overcharging."

dence. The implied answer of some cnttcs of "overcharging" is that after a certain point the piling on of
extra charges even though they are supportable is
wrong.
A second issue is whether charges should ever be
dropped or reduced in exchange for guilty pleas. In
other words, should charge bargaining have any role in
the djsposition process or is the charging function to be
something which should be kept separate and distinct
from the plea negotiating process? This question does not
necessarily presume that plea bargaining should be eliminated. P1·osecutors might still be allowed to negotiate
over sentences or judges might either plea negotiate or
establish differentials for pleading.

At stake here are the practices in two kinds of jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions virtually alJ the plea bargaining is done through charge bargaining. Charges for a11
crimes at all levels are routinely dropped one or more
grades in exchange for pleas regardless of the quality of
the evidence. Eliminating this ystem would not necessarily eliminate plea bargaining in those jurisdl tions but
would require dramatic adjustments. Thi issue ornetimes gets lost behind disou sions of vertical overcharging because one of the practices it addresses is similar to
vertical overcharging (although it has never beeLl correctly identified). This unidentified practice consists of
the routine reduction of charges in exchange for guilty
pleas regardless of the quality of evidence. In some jurisdictions this occurs in virtually aU negotiated cases. In
That ambiguous term has been misunderstood by some many jurisdictions it occurs in certain types of ca es
people to mean the filing of charges for which there is which have been unofficially downgraded from the legal
not even enough legal proof to meet the probable cau e category in which they properly fit to something less
standard. Others define it as filing charges not ordinarily (e.g. burglary of motor vehicle. may not be treated as a
filed. More commonly it i defmed as filing many burglary when the evidence is overwhelming). This
charges arising from eparate incidents (horizontal over- downgrading serves not only to reduce caseloads but
charging) and filing the highest charge relevant to the also to fine tune the broad categories of the penal code
offense (vertical overcharging). In both of these kinds of to the different degrees of seriousne s of criminal activiovercharging it is granted that the pro ecutor has at ties that technically fall within the same legal category.
least enough evidence to charge the defendant with The complaint about this kind of "overcharging" is not
some offense. In our view all of these definitions are mis- about level. of proof but about the use of the charging
leading. The question is not one of legal proof. For in- mechanism to ecure pleas. Charging ca es at one level
stance, nine defense attorneys from four jurisdictions knowing that these cases will be routinely reduced in exwho aid they though the prosecutor's u ual charging change for pleas is regarded by critic ·as "legal bla kstandard wa at least a submissibl case or stronger also mail and a corruption of both the charging proce s and
aid that " vercharging" is routine! Eight more who be- the criminal justice system's record of information about
lieved the pro ecutor's charging standards were that the true seriousness of crimes committed. Reformers
high said that overcharging occurs occasionally. For argue that "truly accurate" harges are the ones to
these attorneys overcharging wa nothing more than which the case would b reduced after plea negotiation
filing all or many) of the charges that could lawfully be and that these charges should be Lhe ones filed originalftl ed. Their complaint about overcharging is not about ly. Some believe that if truly accurate charge1 were filed
law bu about policy. The underlying question is about originally there would be no need to offer defendants
how many charges should be ftled when there are many anything to induce them to plead guilty. Others believe
c harge which could be supported by admissible evi- that something else would have to be substituted to
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eliminated the need to offer defendants an incentive to
plead guilty. Cases are stronger and disposed of more
rapidly. The influence of case strength on the terms of
any plea negotiations is reduced because of the uniformly high case strength. Thus, this penologically irrelevant
National groups have attempted to define proper charg- factor is minimized in the negotiation process. Moreover,
ing. However their standards have confounded rather the fact that cases are reviewed by experienced prosecuthan resolved the issue. They recognize in the charging tors who are rewarded for keeping cases out of the
function two potentially conflicting goals. Generally, ac- court system provides a major protection against one of
cording to these standards prosecutors do not have to the crucial weaknesses of plea bargaining as an institufile all charges and should not file any charges unless tion. It restores in part that crucial principle of Anglothey have evidence greater than probable cause. Also
American jurisprudence that before penal sanctions are
prosecutors should not file charges solely for the purimposed there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
pose of securing guilty pleas. Yet at the same time, they
In jurisdictions with truly rigorous screening we can
are supposed to file an adequate degree and number of
have a greater degree of confidence that defendants concharges to establish a proper record of the crime and of
victed by plea bargaining are probably guilty defendants.
the seriousness of the defendant, and they are to charge
in a way which allows for a proper sentence. These
latter two standards can effectively put the prosecutor in With regard to misdemeanors (and sometimes minor
the position of having to file the highest degree or great- felonies) the situation is different. In jurisdictions we
est number of charge(s) to establish an adequate record studied, those cases continue to be largely unscreened;
but then to reduce the charge(s) in order to assure an ap- controlled by the police; maximum charged; and routinepropriate sentence. The dual responsibility of establish- ly reduced for pleas. The reforms of the charging and
ing an adequate record and assuring an appropriate sen- plea bargaining processes that are being applied to
tence is .an invitation to charge bargain (although theo- felony cases are not being extended to petty offenses.
retically charges could be dropped unilaterally without The same prosecutor's office that has tried to eliminate
being exchanged for pleas). In addition, the national maximum charging in felony cases has institutionalized a
groups specify or imply that prosecutorial screening policy of maximum charging for the purpose of reducing
should occur between arrest and initial charging. How- charges for pleas in minor cases. The double standard of
ever, this standard needs reconsideration .. It does not justice depending upon seriousness of offense is comseem feasible in jurisdictions with numerous outlying monplace. Equal justice for the accused does not require
lower courts which the prosecutors' offices cannot perfect equality of treatment between the pettiest and
afford to staff, and it may be less effective than a review the most serious case. But it does require a mitigation of
conducted at a later point in the process when a fuller the existing double standard.
investigation can be completed. The jurisdictions in our
sample with the most rigorous prosecutorial screening Our data suggest that charge bargaining and the "overconducted that screening 3 to 10 days after arrest. In charging" of felony cases can be controlled by policies
those jurisdictions that have responded to the call for short of prohibiting all plea bargaining by prosecutors.
truly rigorous prosecutorial screening the nature of plea In implementing these policies the quality of justice is
bargaining in felony cases differs in important ways from enhanced and certain important dangers of the plea barthose which have not. Charge bargaining is reduced al- gaining system are minimized. Similar policies could opthough not eliminated. "Accurate" charging has not erate at both the felony and the misdemeanor levels.

induce guilty pleas. (They recommend sentence differentials-more lenient sentences for pleaders than those
convicted at trial-which they do not regard as "plea
bargaining.")
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Chapter Three
Prosecutorial Bluffing
and the Case Against
Plea Bargaining
Introduction
One of the sources of concern about the institution of
plea bargaining is the belief that gamesmanship plays a
substantial role in the disposition of cases. That is, cases
are often disposed of not on their merits but on the ability of the attorney for either side to outwit the other. Of
course, the fate of cases that go to trial is sometimes determined by trial tactics. But the gamesmanship in plea
bargaining is of a different kind. The concern is not
about the inevitable differences between attorneys in
legaJ kill but th unethical and otherwise inappropriate
practices believed to be integral to the plea-negotiation
process. A variety of questionable tactics have been reported. Defense attorneys are reported to extract lenient
plea bargains by threatening to "court-bust" -take all of
their cases to trial (Mills, 1971). Prosecutors are reported
to bluff defendants into pleading guilty even when the
state has no case (Alschuler, 1968). We attempted to determine the frequency of and attitudes toward each of
these two practices in our ipterview with defense attorneys and prosecutors. Our finding regarding the courtbusting proclivities of defense attorneys are reported in
Chapter 4. Our findings regarding bluffing by prosecutors are described below.

prosecutors apparently disapprove of bluffing" (1968:67)
and that some prosecutors "freely avow their own practices of bluffing, concealment, and telling only half the
truth" (1968:68). Bluffing, he says, is part of a routine
phenomenon of "deceptive sales practices" (1968:67) that
are not effectively checked either by judicial inquiries at
plea acceptance or by defense counsel. The latter "are
not equal competition in the game of deception"
(1968:68); "it is not always easy to 'call' a prosecutor's
bluff' (1968:66) especially "when he resorts to deliberate
misrepresentation in an effort to sustain it" (1968:66).
Two aspects of bluffing as described by Alschuler do
indeed sound horrendous. One is his report that bluffing
is used to secure convictions in cases which he characterizes as "no case at all," "hopeless" cases that are "effectively unconvictable" (1968:65). A typical example of
this "ultimate in a weak case" is the situation "in which
a critical witness has died, refused to testify, or disappeared into the faceless city" (1968:65). "In this situation," he says, "plea negotiation commonly becomes a
game of bluffing" (ld.). 2 Given the frequency with
which this situation occurs, 3 the inference is strong that
a lot of bluffing is going on.

The only report on the latter practice is by a leading
plea bargaining abolitionist, Professor Albert Alschuler
1968). He lists it' among th " horror ' (1968:64) of plea
bargaining he present in order to "ju tify" (1968:64) his
'admittedly unorthodox position that plea bargaining
hould b abolished' (l968:52). He found that 'very few

Emphasis added.
We have no direct measures of the frequency of this event, but estitn(lle nre possible. Brosi's (1979:14) comparison of PROMIS data from
12 jurisdiction found. that from 13 percent to 46 percent of felony
cases are dropped after filing. One of the two main reasons for thi wus
·•witne.c;s problems" which· cover a variety of subcategories. The subcategory ··unable to locate/unavaflable'' accounted for 50 percent of
the "witness problems" in Jndinnapoli and l9 percent in the District
of Columbia. lf one add to thL ihe cases of witnesses who refused to
testify, the majority of cases dropped due to witness problems are ac2

3

' Alschuler disclaims our characterization of his report on bluffing.
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The other disturbing part of Alschuler's report is his
findings regarding the willingness of prosecutors to
engage in deliberate misrepresentations to sustain their
bluffs-sometimes going to considerable lengths. He
quotes a Philadelphia prosecutor who admitted that he
had "sometimes misrepresented the facts in an effort to
induce the compromise of constitutional defenses"
(1968:67). He says that "[p]rosecutors sometimes go to
the point of empaneling a jury before dismissing a hopeless case, hoping all the while to exact a guilty plea"
(1968:66). A Pittsburgh prosecutor told him of an occasion when he induced a guilty plea by "telling the defense attorney that a missing witness was waiting in his
office for a chance to testify. After the guilty plea was
offered the prosecutor put the arresting officer on the
witness stand, and the officer presented hearsay evidence
concerning the missing witness' version of the facts"
(1968:67)~ 4 A San Francisco defense attorney reported
that he had sometimes received telephone calls from
prostitutes after he had been retained to represent their
pimps. He says the prostitutes told him that the D.A.
'bribed" them to make a statement (1968:65). And finally, a Houston defense attorney recalled an occasion
where a prosecutor threatened to go to trial if he (the
attorney) forced him (the prosecutor) to produce a missing witness. The prosecutor claimed the witness had
been located and served a subpoena. The subpoena
return was on file but because the attorney had been
unable to locate the witness himself he "suspected that
the process server had been made a party to the bluff
and had filed a fraudulent return" (1968:67). When he
refused the prosecutor's offer the case was dismissed.
Alschuler's portrayal of bluffing undoubtedly would
give pause to even the staunchest supporter of plea bargaining. The image of prosecutors out to get something
from every defendant; exhibiting a remarkable disregard
for false conviction; magnifying pressures to plead guilty
in cases where the evidence is most dubious; and lying,
bribing and filing fraudulent returns in order to convict
defendants in cases that are effectively unconvictable, is
indeed a frightening prospect. In our view this portrait
cried out for verification. We set out to determine the
pervasiveness of bluffing and its susceptibility to remedial control. Our findings lead to a less abhorrent view of

counted for (in netroit, Los Angeles, the District of Columbia, New
Orleans, and Indianapolis). Of course, if Alschuler is right, then for the
most part these cases represent only unsuccessfully bluffed cases. The
successes are listed among the guilty pleas.
• This ruse succeeded, Alschuler implies, because "[t]he defense attorney raised no objection; he and everyone else involved in the proceedings were interested only in concluding the 'formalities' as rapidly as
possible" (1968:67).

prosecutorial ethics and of the role of bluffing in the
plea bargaining process.

Findings
In one respect our findings agree with Alschuler's. The
majority of our prosecutors approve of bluffing and
most would bluff to obtain a guilty plea. But what they
mean by bluffing differs in important respects from what
Alschuler implies. Prosecutors regard only some bluffing
as clearly improper and other bluffing as not only proper
but desirable. In addition, there is a gray area where
prosecutors disagree among themselves as to where to
draw the line.
Bluffing of a certain kind and in certain circumstances is
common, but most bluffing does not appear to be as unseemly as Alschuler suggests. Bluffing accompanied by
deliberate misrepresentation and elaborate fraud did not
appear to occur in our study sites with any frequency.
The premise for Alschuler's criticism of what he seems
to regard as the most deplorable type of bluffing-bluffing when the prosecutor has "no case at all''-is problematic. Our prosecutors did not agree that his "noncase" was "fatally defective." In order to make these
points clear, it is necessary to provide some distinctions
and to review the various circumstances under which
bluffing might occur.
Central to bluffing is the notion of a weak case. The essence of bluffing is to pretend that one's case is stronger
than it actually is. Cases can be or become weak for various reasons and bluffing could be resorted to under any
of these circumstances. The bluffing that Alschuler condemns does not encompass all situations. Rather, it is
limited primarily to the case which is so weak as to be
"no case at all.". -We shall distinguish that case from
other situations.
One kind of weak case is that in which completely
groundless charges are brought against an unquestionably innocent defendant. A prosecutor who bluffed in
such a case would clearly be acting not only unethically
but illegally. We found no indication of this type of
bluffing. There is little doubt that bluffing under these
conditions would be unanimously condemned by prosecutors.
A second kind of weak case is one in which there is
some evidence but it is weak. The key to the propriety
of the prosecutor's decision to proceed with this type of
case is whether he made a good-faith judgment that the
case met the legally required standard of probable cause.
If the prosecutor believed that it did not meet that standard but accepted it anyhow, he would have indulged in
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a bluff that was virtually as illegal and unethical as our
first example. This type of bluffing was also not found.
Some cases are or appear to be quite strong at initial
charging but subsequently become weak. Two types of
weaknesses occur. One is related to the inherent quality
of the evidence. For instance, a reliable alibi witness
may be discovered; the prosecutor's star witness may not
be able to pick the defendant out of a lineup; or a subsequent interview may reveal that a witness is confused
and inconsistent. These kinds of weaknesses must be distinguished from those generated by logistical and administrative problems that may affect whether the case can
be proved. For instance, the physical evidence may be
lost or the witness may not have been notified to appear
at a court hearing. This distinction between inherent and
administrative weakness in a case is important. It is the
basis for one of the informal courthouse norms regarding
the limits of proper bluffing. Most prosecutors have no
compunctions about hiding weaknesses caused by administrative problems, but they do have reservations about
suppressing information regarding the inherent quality of
the evidence.

(although we regularly heard that prosecutors will make
the discovery procedure more cumbersome for certain
defense attorneys whom they disliked or distrusted). In
regard to exculpatory evidence, the situation is more difficult to assess because exculpatory evidence is not clearly defined. Some evidence is clearly exculpatory (for example, reliable evidence showing that the defendant was
at some other place at the time of the crime). But as one
moves away from this polar situation, the notion of what
is exculpatory becomes clouded.
Most prosecutors take a narrow view of exculpatory evidence. They feel they must produce evidence indicating
factual innocence, and they also feel obliged to deal with
certain aspects of legal guilt-for instance, ensuring thai
the statute of limitations has not expired. But most do
not feel any obligation to notify the defense about logistical or administrative problems that may reduce the
probability of obtaining a conviction. Here is where they
part company with Alschuler.

The situation he describes as "no case at all" is not one
involving a factually innocent defendant. It is a case
where evidence exists that might support a conviction if
The range of potential deceptiveness in bluffing varies the case went to trial. But then something happens, such
widely from the mild puffery of an offhand remark, such as the accidental loss of the physical evidence; or a
as "We've got the goods on your client," to much more break in the chain of custody of the evidence; or witelaborate frauds. Some of this territory is governed by nesses refuse to testify or cannot be located or die. In
law and by codes of professional ethics. However, it is Alschuler's view, these developments reduce the probanot until one reaches the territory that lies either outside bility of conviction to zero. But prosecutors who have
of or on the boundary of that area which is clearly gov- bluffed in such situations disagreed that these cases were
erned by official norms that bluffing practices become "fatally defective." In their view, just because a witness
problematic.
cannot be found does not mean he is absolutely unlocataThere exist legal restrictions on bluffing. Prosecutors ble. Citing the occasional case where they had flown a
may not legally file charges where the evidence does not witness from Africa or other remote place, they pointed
meet the probable-cause standard. Also, they are no out that if the state really wants to go to the expense of
longer permitted to hide certain aspects of their cases. locating someone, they can. As for the reluctant witness,
Upon request of defense counsel, prosecutors must make they noted that such witnesses can be and are occasionavailable the results of ballistics tests, chemical analyses, ally made to testify (e.g., Kiernan, 198l:Bl). They could
lineups, statements made by the defendant to the police, also think of possible ways around other supposedly fatal
and other aspects of the case (Brady v. United States, 373 defects. Of course, there was no guarantee that their tacU.S. 83 [1963]). In addition, prosecutors have a duty to tics would work or that the state would be willing to go
turn over any exculpatory evidence, even without a to great expense to find missing witnesses or force relucprior request having been made for it (United States v. tant witnesses to testify. But the fact that these options
Aqur, 427 U.S. 97 [1976]). Thus if a bluff involved sup- are available transforms what sounds like a black and
pressing discoverable or exculpatory evidence, it would white issue into a cloud of gray.
be illegal.
Prosecutors pointed out an important reality underlying
Alschuler does not suggest that prosecutors are suppress- plea bargaining and justifying their views on bluffing.
ing discoverable evidence. As for exculpatory evidence, There are no cases with a zero or a 100 percent probahis findings are less clear in part because of the ambigui- bility of conviction. There is nothing certain about case
ty of the notion of exculpatory evidence and in part be- outcome! It is possible that an innocent individual can be
cause his study was done before the Supreme Court im- successfully prosecuted even with quite flimsy evidence.
posed this rule on prosecutors. We found no evidence Similarly there is no such thing as a truly dead-bang
that prosecutors were suppressing discoverable evidence case. Experienced lawyers all know of instances illustrat-
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ing these points. They have seen juries acquit defendants
who did not have a chance of winning and convict
people whose innocence seemed clear. They have located unlocatable witnesses, and they have seen evidence
admitted in one court that might not have been admitted
in another. It is precisely this uncertainty that causes
some attorneys to be cynical about the justice process
and to compare it to a game of Russian roulette. Even
though these cases are the exception, not the rule, the
principle they establish has important consequences. The
fact that nothing is certain becomes an important incentive for plea bargaining and an equally important justification for bluffing.
We presented prosecutors with the distinction that
Packer (1968) makes between factual and legal innocence together with the argument that bluffing is a
means by which the state secures convictions in cases
that would have been lost at trial. We argued further
that bluffing is, in effect, a way of convicting legally innocent defendants, and hence defeats the basic principle
of legality.
This argument was regularly dismissed on two grounds.
The first was the uncertainty of case outcome. Since any
case might result in conviction, legal innocence is not
undermined by plea bargaining or by bluffing. That
notion itself is predicated on the idea that outcomes in
criminal justice are only probabilities. Our examples of
the dead witness or _the lost drugs were not regarded as
all that weak. 5 Many prosecutors had had or had known
of weaker cases that had gone to trial and been convicted. They did not feel that plea bargaining in such circumstances subverted the principle of legality. They did
not regard bluffing in such cases as wrong provided that
the bluff did not include withholding exculpatory evidence and (for many of them) provided that it did not
require them to cross an imaginary line between legitimate puffery, posturing, and gamesmanship, on the one
hand; and outright lying, on the other. Many of them
draw that line at the same specific point. They would
not stand up in court and say they were ready for trial if
a critical witness or piece of evidence were lost. 6 But

' They claimed that there are several ways of salvaging such cases. For
instance, in the case of the dead or missing witness, they said they
were permitted by Jaw to use the transcript of that witness' testimony
at the preliminary hearing and at trial if necessary. See Barber v. Page.,
390 U.S. 719 (1968).
• In one jurisdiction, the chief prosecutor had even issued guidelines
specifically dealing with the matter of announcing ready for trial. They
read: "Trial: (A) Announcement of Ready; (1) Never announce ready
until all witnesses are present or on standby. (2) Make sure contraband
has been analyzed and the chain of custody is intact. ... "

they might do things short of that to make the defense
think that they were ready for trial. Many of them said
they would willingly admit to defense counsel that they
were not ready for trial if counsel had asked that question directly. But prosecutors say counsel never do.
A major incentive for not crossing that line between legitimate puffery and outright deceit is s~lf-interest. An
attorney's personal credibility and reputation are at
stake. Credibility is essential for lawyers, particularly in
the criminal courts. There seems to be no middle
ground. One is trustworthy or not. Once lost, credibility
is hard to regain. Without it, the practice of law can be
considerably more difficult. Much of what lawyers do,
especially in plea bargaining, depends upon trust between parties to represent the truth and to honor commitments. Ironically, although truthfulness is demanded,
some deception is both expected and tolerated. The
boldfaced liar, however, finds that other lawyers will respond with whatever informal sanctions are available.
Notoriously deceitful defense counsel will have to pry
all discovery out of prosecutors through the time-consuming process of filing motions. Informal sanctions can
be severe. Judges occasionally bar defense attorneys or
assistant prosecutors from practicing in their courts because of past deceitful acts.
Thus prosecutors are restrained in bluffing by their
awareness of the occupational norms regarding the limits
of honesty and the importance of credibility. They are
guided by general rules known to courthouse regulars
that define the limits of the occupational norms concerning acceptable bluffing. Some of those limits are congruent with those set by the law of discovery and the law
on the production of exculpatory evidence. But some
areas are not covered by law. Prosecutors indicated, for
instance, that they were frequently aware of constitutional weaknesses in cases due to questionable arrests or
searches, but they did not feel ethically or legally compelled to tell defense counsel about them. That, they
said, would be doing the defense counsel's job.
Even more often prosecutors were aware of administrative problems that weaken their cases and were often the
prime reasons for plea bargaining. Many prosecutors did
not seem to feel that they have or should have any obligation to inform defense counsel of these weaknesses. In
their view, the notion of legal innocence means that defendants are entitled to all of the due-process guarantees
that the constitution provides and that a factually guilty
person may be found legally innocent if one of those
guarantees is infringed. But it does not and should not
mean, in their view, that a factually guilty person should
be allowed to slip through the criminal justice system
because of administrative or logistical errors. The use of
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plea bargaining and what they might call legitimate
bluffing seemed in their view to be entirely proper, even
indicated, in such circumstances.

experience whether they were able to determine why
the case had been dropped. This question provided some
grounds for judging whether there had been a bluff.

In our in-depth study of six jurisdictions, we pursued the
matter of bluffing systematically. We attempted to estimate the frequency of bluffing in situations where the
prosecution had no case at all. Defense counsel were
asked how often, if at all, they had had cases in which
an indictment (or information) had been filed, the prosecutor had made a plea offer that was refused, and the
case had been subsequently dropped by the prosecutor.
Of course, this set of facts by itself does not mean that
the prosecutor had been bluffing. Therefore we also
asked defense counsel who reported having had such an

Responses to these questions are shown in Table 3.1.
Partic ularly triking is the general in£r quen y wi th
which defense counsel repor ted havi ng case d r pped
after an offer had been made. Also remarkable i lhe fact
that this practice does not appear to vary by the degree
of formalization of U1.e prosecutor's offi e.7 One might
have expected that in jurisdictions with a low degree of
formalization, there w old have been more of a need Lo
bluff due to a higher incidence of administrative or logi tical errors and a lower ense of accountability among
as istant prose ~ u tors. However these data sugg st that
this is not the ca e.

Table 3.1

Defense attorney responses to question relating to case dismissals by city

ed in a dismissal of the case by the prosecutor?
How often? Were you able to ascertain why the
case was dismissed? Why? Was it dismissed?

Have you had cases where after an information
has been filed or an indictment returned, the prosecutor has approached you with a plea offer
which, upon your client's refusal to accept, resultElPaso
"No, I've never had cases where that
happened to me. I always approach
the county attorney with an offer."
Both on a misdemeanor and felony
level, counsel has never seen this
happen.
"No, I always approach them. They
never approach me."
"No, that's never happened. Do you
mean, are they trying to get something for nothing? No, I don't think
they are. If the case is bad, I would
never accept an offer unless the defendant wants to, but I would advise
against it."
"That's never happened to me."
Counsel indicated that he always approaches the prosecutor and so he
has never been approached by them
with a plea offer. He was referring
both to the county attorney's office
and the district attorney's office.

"No."

New Orleans
It is very rare for the district attorney's
office to offer a reduced charge. But
in eight of ten cases where a charge

reduction was offered and this attarney refused to deal, the charges were
eventually nol-prossed. This was generally because a victim or witness
was unavailable or unwilling to testify.
Yes, it happens, but not frequently.
Counsel could not think of a particular
case.
Yes, this may happen when they accidentally overcharge or are conned by
a witness. Counsel does not believe
this is bluffing because the prosecutor
has acted in good faith. This occurs in
perhaps 15 percent of all cases. It
usually results in witnesses' changing
testimony or discovery that the witnesses were lying.
Counsel could think of only one incident. It involved a defendant charged
with accessory to fraud . The district
attorney wanted the defendant to go
into a diversionary program. The defendant rejected the offer, and the
prosecution dismissed the case.
Yes, this has happened 5 to 10 times
in 4 years. It occurs because the
prosecution has no case. This usually
occurs if the information the prosecutor has is not valid; for example,
someone made a mistake in screening.

7

Yes, 2 times in 4 years. In one of the
cases, counsel recalls he knew that
from the trial of the codefendant, the
evidence against his client was weak.
No. In fact, counsel had had the opposite occur. He had had a case in
which he offered to plead guilty to
simple robbery on a charge of armed
robbery. Instead the district attorney's
office dropped the case altogether.
Yes; it's part of the game of bluffing.
However, it involves perhaps less
than 20 percent of all cases. The
usual reason is lack of evidence.
Two or three times in 6 years. Normally counsel knows when in advance that the district attorney does
not have anything.

Seattle
Yes, this happens infrequently. Typically it happens when the prosecutor
has difficulty getting a critical witness.
If it gets to the stage when getting the
witness is impossible, they have to
tell counsel. Sometimes you find out
when your client holds out in an impossible case (the state's case is very
strong) and suddenly the case is dismissed.

See Chapter 2 for our ranking of each of the jurisdictions doing this
variable.
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Table 3.1

Defense attorney responses to question relating to case dismissals by city-Continued

ed in a dismissal of the case by the prosecutor?
How often? Were you able to ascertain why the
case was dismissed? Why? Was it dismissed?

Have you had cases where after an information
has been filed or an indictment returned, the prosecutor has approached you with a plea offer
which, upon your client's refusal to accept, resultThis happens on occasion. Counsel
doesn't know how often, but it's probably more than he has found out
about.
No.
No. Counsel would be shocked if it
had occurred.
Yes. Not very often, and usually they
won't try to get very much. For example, they'll try to get a little information in exchange for a dismissal.
This has not happened to counsel. "I
don't think prosecutors bluff much. It
would hurt their credibility. I don't bluff
either. The closest thing I have had
was a rape case where we ended up
winning in trial. The prosecutor didn't
want to try the case, but because
there was a complaining witness, he
would not drop it. Several plea offers
were made prior to trial.
Counsel has had offers of pleas
where the case was ultimately dismissed but he does not think the
prosecutor was bluffing. "For example, a DWI case usually has one witness, the cop. If the cop doesn't
show up, the prosecutor doesn't try to
bluff." Rather the prosecutor will tell
this attorney what has happened. The
attorney in turn will plead his client to
physical control to avoid the risk a
judge will grant a continuance.
The prosecutor doesn't usually approach the defense. "If the case is
bad, I don't go to negotiate. I go to
trial." They almost never voluntarily
dismiss a case. They dispose of it in
some other way. This occurs because
they almost never change their minds
about the strength of the case. About
the only time they dismiss is when a
witness disappears. This just happened in a murder case.

Tucson
Yes. Counsel has had this happen but
it only happens in about 1 percent of
the cases. The prosecutor will usually
make a very good offer and this will
suggest that something is wrong. If
one prosecutor in particular makes

any offer at all; you know something
is wrong with the case.
Counsel has had this happen in two
cases.
Counsel has had a few cases where
this has happened, and he believes
they were ones in which the witnesses were not cooperative.
Yes, counsel has had these cases. In
one case the prosecutor offered to
have the defendants participate in a
diversion program. The defendant refused, and the case was dismissed.
Counsel has had lots of these kinds
of cases. He estimates that approximately 5 percent of the cases he handles fit this category. They are equally
divided between cases that were
weak initially and those where a crucial piece of evidence was subsequently lost.
No. Counsel has never had this
happen. Prosecutors don't want to
lose face, so they simply schedule for
trial. They may then dismiss without
prejudice so it looks as if the case
was strong.
Counsel has had one case of this
kind.
Yes, counsel has had cases of this
kind, but he believes this is a very
rare occurrence.
Counsel could not remember any
such cases.
Counsel has had a couple of these
cases.

Delaware County
Counsel has had one or two of these
cases in 2 years; they had absolutely
no evidence.
Counsel has had no such case. If a
district attorney had a case like that,
he would probably try to continue it.
He would rather do that than admit he
didn't have his witness.
Yes, but counsel couldn't recall a
specific case. "Certain district attorneys, whether because of personalities or attitudes, will say 'I don't have
my witness.' The district attorney's job
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is not to convict but to prosecute with
what they have. But then there are
others who will do anything. They are
after you with jail time, long sentences. It's embarrassing. But you
can laugh at them or walk away if you
know your own case and if you know
the district attorney."
Yes, counsel has had such cases. "In
most cases like that, the district attorney knows he would be embarrassed;
maybe it's a case of police brutality.
They don't want to get mixed up with
that. So they'll come in with a deal.
Often you won't know who's telling
the truth about the beating, but the
client will say, 'No deal, I didn't do it.'
Then the district attorney will go
huddle and come back and ask if he'll
pay court costs. I had one guy refuse
to pay the 60 bucks, so they dismissed it. They'll stonewall it out as
long as they can. But then sometimes
I'll get a better deal than I deserve."
Yes, it has happened a couple of
times. In one case, "they couldn't
have proven the case if it went to trial
because their witness had left the
area, but I didn't find out in time-not
until after the guilty plea. I was [annoyed] with myself on that one, but in
my opinion you can't get mad at the
district attorney. You're blaming him
for something you should have done.
He's just playing loose."

Norfolk
Yes, it happens, but it's rare. Counsel
had one robbery case 3 years ago in
which the prosecutor said, "This isn't
any big deal. We'll let him plead to a
reduced charge.'' "We wouldn't take
it. So they moved to nol-pros. It
turned out that they didn't have any
witness."
It is very rare. "If they have a missing
witness, they will tell me and try to
get a continuance. If not, they may
reduce it to a less severe offense.''
"It rarely happens to me. It gets back
to my relationship with the people in
the prosecutor's office."

Table 3.1

Defense attorney responses to question relating to case dismissals by city-Continued

Have you had cases where afte~ an information
has been filed or an indictment returned, the prosecutor has approachad you with a plea offer
which, upon your client's refusal to accept, result-

"Yes, it does happen but not very
often. You might have a case where
the state's witness or victim has disappeared. You might find out depending on how friendly you are with the
prosecutor. "

ed in a dismissal of the case by the prosecutor?
How often? Were you able to ascertain why the
case was dismissed? Why? Was it dismissed?

"Yes, but not very frequently. Usually
I can find out, and in most cases it's
a witness problem."
"No, I have not had any cases."
"It's only happened a few times that I
can remember."
"Yes, but nothing comes to mind right
now."

" Yes, I think so. However, it doesn't
happen a lot. They will come with an
offer and I or my client will reject it.
They will then dismiss the case. We
usually already know why."
Yes, but none were very serious
charges.

References are to plea·bargaining practices of the misdemeanor prosecutor's office,
Note: Some responses are not verbatim but summaries or paraphrases of responses unless indicated by quotation marks.

Of course, our findings are subject to plausible alternative explanations. Perhaps counsel were trying to save
face with us. They might not have wanted to admit that
they had been successfully bluffed. Hence our findings
might underestimate the true extent of the problem. We
discount this possibility, however, on the ground that
the responses of defense counsel were largely paralleled
by those of prosecutors in the same jurisdiction (at least
to certain questions).
Prosecutors were asked to recall their last 10 cases in
which there had been plea bargains. For those cases,
they were asked to estimate the probability of conviction
in those cases had they gone to trial. An attempt was
made to have the respondents answer in terms of specific probabilities or ranges of probabilities that could be
coded as follows: cases in which the probability of conviction is 91 percent or higher, or "dead-bang" or "airtight;" probability of conviction from 70 to 90 percent,
or "strong" cases; probability of conviction between 41
to 69 percent, or "could have gone either way;" probability of conviction from 21 to 40 percent, or "strong
enough to beat a directed verdict but defendant probably would have been acquitted;" probability of conviction from 10 to 20 percent, or "probably would have resulted in a directed verdict of acquittal;" and probability
of conviction less than 10 percent, or "definitely would
have resulted in a directed verdict of acquittal or might
have even been unable to establish a prima facie case."
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It is arguable as to when a weak case is so weak that it
is no case at all. But because weak cases can be won, we
feel that the most appropriate category to use for approximating the no-case-at-all is those cases with less
than 10 percent possibility of conviction. Such cases
were rarely experienced by prosecutors (Table 3.2).
Only 4 of 40 prosecutors indicated that they had secured
plea bargains in cases with less than a 10 percent probability of conviction. Their combined experience in this
regard amounted to 7 cases. Given that eleven prosecutors in one area were asked this question and that the
question referred to their last 10 cases, a total of 110
cases were in effect covered by the question. Thus in 7
out of 110 cases (6 percent) covered by this question, the
cases were so weak as to approximate being no case at
all. But this percentage gets even smaller if one considers that forty prosecutors were asked about their last ten
cases and only four of them said they had had the nocase-at-all situation.

Calculating the probability of conviction is risky under
the best of circumstances, much less when one is trying
to recollect one's last ten cases. Thus we realize that
these calculations cannot be regarded as anything but
rough indicators. All we claim on their behalf is that
they are an advance over the method that was previously used to estimate the scope of this problem. Our estimates convey the general sense that plea bargaining in
"nonexistent" (as opposed to merely "weak") cases is
not pervasive. This, in turn, suggests that bluffing to
hide "nonexistent" cases must also be infrequent.

Table 3.2

Prosecutors' responses to questions referring to probability of conviction at trial, by
jurisdiction

Referring to your 10 most recent felony cases In which there were plea bargains agreed to, please estimate what
the probability of conviction at trial would have been for each

New Orleans
30-percent chance of winning.
50-percent chance of winning.
33-percent chance of winning. In
some of those cases, the defendant
refused the deal that was offered; the
case went to trial and he was convicted.
"It is very hard to get any sort of percentage figure reflecting the probability of winning a case."
In those cases prosecutors plea-bargained because of a possibility of
losing a case; the probability of any
conviction at all (as charged or even
a reduced charge) was between 20
and 30 percent.
In very few cases did prosecutor have
no chance of conviction. In most
cases, it was 50 percent of some
conviction (either as charged or to a
lesser included offense).
"There is a certain small percentage
of cases that . . . prove to be unwinnable." If, nevertheless, there is no
doubt about the defendant's guilt,
prosecutors would like to get a plea.
But given the anti-plea bargaining
policy in the office, defense counsel
are likely to suspect that there is a
problem with the case when the office
is willing to plea bargain. Moreover, if
there is any doubt in the prosecutor's
mind about the defendant's guilt, she
or he would nol-pros rather than take
a plea.
There are only a few cases that are
not winnable. If a case is really not
winnable, those cases are usually norprossed.
If there is no chance at all of winning
the case, she would probably nol-pros
the case rather than take the plea.

Seattle
Six of them had between 91 and 99
percent probability of conviction; 3 between 71 and 90 percent; and 1 between 41 and 70 percent.
None of this prosecutor's cases are
between 91 and 99 percent probabili-

ty of conviction. This prosecutor said
there was never a certainty that a
case was open and shut. Eight of this
prosecutor's last 10 plea bargains
were cases that had between 91 and
99 percent probability of conviction; 1
between 41 and 70 percent; 1 between 21 and 40 percent.
This prosecutor's remarks were all directed toward plea bargaining in the
misdemeanor courts. All 10 of this
prosecutor's last plea bargains had a
probability of conviction of between
91 and 99 percent. "District court
cases are usually pretty simple and
pretty straightforward. Police could
probably win most of them without a
prosecutor. There are some cases
where the police make a bad charge
or a wrong charge, but not too
many."
It is hard to answer this question but
most cases were "strong."

Tucson
75 to 80 percent probability of conviction in all 10 of the last felony plea
bargains.
70 to 90 percent chance of conviction
in 8 of the last 10 plea bargains. Four
of these had a 90 percent chance;
two had an 80 percent chance, and
two had a 75 percent chance. In addition, he had two cases with about a
50 percent chance of conviction.
Seven of ten of the last felony plea
bargains had between 70 and 90 percent chance of conviction.
Three of the last felony plea bargains
had between 91 and 99 percent
chance of conviction; five between 70
and 90 percent; one about 50 percent; and one between 21 and 40
percent.
Seven of ten had between a 70 and
90 percent chance of conviction.
Precise estimates could not be given.
He did say that in general even if a
case is weak, prosecutors always
have a chance of winning at trial.
They will not take a case to trial if
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they know they have almost no
chance of conviction unless there is a
very serious crime and a serious oflender. In such cases, they will either
dismiss the case or try it.
All ten had between 95 and 100 percent chance of conviction.
Seven had between 91 and 99 percent chance of conviction. Two had
about 50 percent chance of conviction; arid one had between 10 and 20
percent probability of conviction.

Delaware County
"I can't remember any case where I
wasn't convinced that it wouldn't be a
conviction."
He could not remember his last 10
cases but felt they probably all would
have been convicted if they had gone
to trial.
"All of my recent plea-bargains would
have been convicted at trial. They
were a prosecutor's dream-every
witness ready, or we had statement
by the defendants, or else heavy circumstantial evidence."
The prosecutor could only remember
the last three cases. The first the
probability of conviction was "high."
"We had him cold." The second case
the probability of convictions was
"pretty sure." "The victim wasn't so
great. He was a bum." The third case
was "iffy." "I would have had difficulty
proving the burglary.... I didn't trust
the witness (victim). He was a friend
of the defendant. The defendant had
stayed with him a couple of nights."
The prosecutor could not remember
the 10 last cases but referred to a
few cases that he could remember. In
a recent case of bad checks, he offered the defendant the option to
enter a pretrial diversion program.
The defendant declined. The case
went to trial and resulted in a hung
jury. The defendant might still be convicted in the case because the prosecution has the option of retrying the
case.

...

All of them would have been convicted. "The evidence was there." Several "were defense motivated." They
wanted to get it over with. "But I
could have convicted anyway whether
they believed it or not."
The prosecutor could not remember
the 10 last cases but did discuss a
few. He said "in general, the chances
are 50-50 or better for us. The odds
are good for conviction." The first
specific case he discussed involved a
corporation that dumped a deadly
chemical in an area that endangered
people living in the neighborhood. He
felt there was a 50-50 chance of conviction of the corporation. The second
case was a charge of arson. The
prosecutor did not believe the sole
witness for the commonwealth and
felt there would be only a 25 percent
probability of conviction. Consequently, he was willing to offer the defendant the option of entering pretrial di;
version.
The prosecutor could remember only
three cases. One was a rape case

with a 40 to 60 percent chance of
conviction. "The girl was a bad victim.
She was not a very pleasant person,
and three males would testify against
her character." The second was a
murder case that was upcoming and
in which he estimated a 90 percent of
conviction on at least some charge
(not first-degree but at least thirddegree murder).

Nine would have been convicted; in
one, there was some question.
"I figured that if I had one in three
chances of winning a case, then I will
qo with it. Of. the cases that I pleabargatned, I would probably lose 7 of
10 if they went to trial.
Six cases had about 100 percent
probability of conviction; two about 80
percent; and two about 50 percent.

All would have been convicted of
something.

Three about 100 percent; two about
95 percent; four about 90 percent;
one about 20 percent; one about
zero.

All would have been convicted of
something.

One about 100 percent; three about
zero; and six about 50 percent.

In eight cases, there would have been
about 90 to 100 percent chance of
conviction; one about 50 percent; and
in one they had the wrong charge.

"That is difficult to answer.. I can think
of one case where there would not
have been a conviction. A percentage
would be very inaccurate."

In most cases, they would have been
found guilty. There was one recent
case in which a witness was missing
that would have been about a zeropercent chance of conviction.

This prosecutor reviewed his docket
and gave the following estimates:
eight cases about 99 percent chance
of conviction; two about 71 to 90 percent; and two about 10 percent. ·

Norfolk

Note: The question was initially open-ended. allowing respondents to use their own descriptions of the probability of conviction in the relevant casos. However. after the Initial response. the
prosecutors were presented with the following set of categories and asked to classify their responses into them The probability of conviction was between 9 1 and 99 percent (dead-bang);
between 71 and 90 percent (strong); 41 and 69 petcent (could havo gona either way); 21 and 40 percent (strong enough to beat a directed vordlct but dofendant probably would have been
acquitted); 10 and 20 percent (probably would haVll resulted in a directed verdict); and 0 to 9 percent (definitely would have been a directed verdiat).

To explore this issue further, we asked prosecutors how
often they had had cases fall apart because a critical
piece of evidence or an essential witness had been lost.
(This question captures Alschuler's description of the
noncase.) We also asked prosecutors how they handled
such cases: Did they try to get a plea? Did their han-

dling depend upon the type of crime or type of criminal?
Did they think it proper to call ready for trial in such
cases in order to bluff the defense into pleading guilty?
What should the limits of ethical behavior by prosecutors be in such situations? The answers to these questions
are presented in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3

Prosecutors' responses to questions relating to plea bargaining In cases that fall apart

Questions

Yes (I am more likely to seek a plea if the crime or the
criminal is serious)
No (It makes no difference)

29
4

If yes, how often?
Only one in my career or rarely or "not very often"
About once every six months
About once a month or more often or other
More than rarely but otherwise unspecified (for example,
"enough, " "occasionally," "a lot" )

7

1
3

16
10

Do you think it is proper for a prosecutor to call ready for
trial (when calendar is called) in order to convince the
defense to plead in such cases? (Sometimes answered
as if the question had been: "Have you or would you do
this?")
Yes
No

10
20

9 What should be the limits of ethical behavior by prosecutors in this type of situation? (The question was openended. More than one answer may have been given by
the respondent)

How have you usually handled it, or how would you handle
it?
Try to get a guilty plea
Dismiss it
It depends on (who the defense counsel is; the crime or
criminal; whether evidence is permanently lost; whether I
want to take a chance at trial anyway; if I thought
defendant was guilty)

Total

If yes, does (would) the way you handle it depend upon
whether the crime is very serious and/or the defendant
a bad actor?

Have you ever had a case fall apart, that is, the piece of
critical evidence is lost (such as the illegal drugs are lost in
the police evidence room or the critical witness dies) and
you know that if the case goes to trial, the judge would
almost undoubtedly rule that the government had not
established a prima facie case?
Yes
No

Questions

Total

22
10

20

Always tell defense counsel
Do not lie in open court (or call ready when you are not)
Disclosure of this type of information should not be ethically required
It depends on the crime and the criminal
Tell defense counsel if a witness or evidence is permanently lost
Tell defense counsel if a witness has lied
If there is not evidence present or available for state,
prosecutor should nolle prosequi

1
14
5
2

1'
2
1

Note: Some respondents did not answer all parts of the questions or gave uncodable answers. Therefore, the number of responses in a
jurisdiction varies.

Twenty-nine of the thirty-three prosecutors (89 percent)
indicated that they had been in a situation where either a
critical witness or critical evidence was lost and the
prosecutors felt they no longer had a prima facie case.
However, as Table 3.3, question 2 shows, this type of
situation is not pervasive. Seven prosecutors had had it
happen only once or rarely in their career. An additional
three prosecutors said it happens about once a month or
more often. Nine prosecutors said it happens more often
than rarely, but they did not specify how often.
We were surprised and perplexed by these responses. In
the first phase of our study, it had appeared that cases
fall apart with much greater regularity than was being
suggested by these responses. Upon further reflection,
however, we realized that there is no necessary conflict
between our early impression and the data presented

here. The data in Table 3.3 are not about weak cases in
general, but about a special class of weak cases: the extremely weak or nonexistent case. It may be true that
there are a lot of weak cases in the system, but they are
not all impossibly weak or nonexistent cases. The many
weak cases we heard about were apparently only moderately weak. This conclusion puts a new light on the importance of case strength as a factor in plea bargaining.
It contradicts the impression that the state could never
have won a lot of plea-bargaining cases if they had gone
to trial.
The next question asked (question 3 in Table 3.3) is
about how prosecutors have usually handled these cases
that have completely fallen apart. (In a few cases the responding prosecutors had never had such a case; consequently the question was rephrased to ask how that

58

person would handle one if he did get it.) Fifty-two
prosecutors answered this question. Ten said that they
would definitely dismiss it; 22 said they would try to get
a guilty plea; and 20 gave mixed or qualified responses.
They said they would either dismiss the case or try to
get a plea depending upon one or more of the following
conditions: the defendant's prior record; who the defense
counsel was; whether the evidence was permanently lost
or just misplaced; whether the prosecutor wanted to
take a chance at trial, and whether the prosecutor was
certain that the defendant was guilty. It is clear from the
pattern of responses to this question that prosecutors are
far from unanimous in their views as to the proper way
of handling a case that falls apart. This is as true within
individual jurisdictions as it is among them.
The fact that 81 percent of the respondents indicated
they would try to get a plea (at least in certain cases)
indicates that the majority of prosecutors are willing to
do a certain amount of bluffing even in very weak cases.
But this is not to say that they would deliberately lie or
file fraudulent service returns in order to sustain their
bluffs. How far a lawyer will go in bluffing is governed
by courthouse work norms and ethics. The rule frequently used is whether the prosecutor would call ready
for trial. We asked prosecutors if they would call ready
for trial in this situation where their case falls apart. As
question 5 in Table 3.3 shows, 20 of the 30 prosecutors
said either that they had not or would not answer ready
for trial in these cases. Thus, the majority say they have
not or would not engage in what might be regarded as a
small bluff-calling ready for trial-much less engage in
the kind of elaborate fraud suggested in Alschuler's
anecdote about the process server's phony report. Even
calling ready for trial falls short of being an elaborate
fraud. Most prosecutors, however, said they would not
do this. Their major rationale seems to be indicated in
the responses to question 6 in Table 3.3. Most prosecutors who gave some opinion as to what the limits of ethical behavior should be when dealing with the noncase
said the line should be drawn at lying in open court. In
addition, the next most frequent response to this question
was that prosecutors should not be ethically required to
inform defense counsel when the prosecutor's case has
fallen apart. Thus, what most prosecutors regard as ethical and proper gamesmanship, when the state's case has
fallen apart to the point of no longer being even a prima
facie case, lies somewhere. between keeping it a secret
and engaging in the bluff of announcing ready for trial.

as it has been described. lt cypically does not involve
violations of legal or ethical norms, elaborate frauds to
sustain deceptions, or cases in which there is no chance
that the defendant would be convicted at trial.
Prosecutors appear to abide by the law relating to discovery and the production of exculpatory evidence (as
required in 1976 by the Supreme Court), but they interpret the latter in a narrow sense. They do not feel they
have or should have any obligation to tell defense counsel about weaknesses in their cases that arise from logistical or administrative problems, such as the accidental
loss of drugs or the failure to notify a witness of a hearing. At the same time, a number of prosecutors said they
would willingly give an honest answer if defense counsel
asked them specifically if they had lost the evidence or if
the witness was present in the courthouse.

Conclusion

Prosecutors are restrained in their bluffing not only by
law and professional ethics but also by the unofficial
norms of the workplace. The last is a powerful restraint
because it is related to the self-interest of individual
prosecutors. Lawyers must protect their reputations for
honesty in negotiations if they are to maintain smooth
relations with other lawyers. As several prosecutors
pointed out, bluffing that involved outright lies would
hurt their careers more than it would help. If it were
true that prosecutors were regularly obtaining convictions by bluffing in situations where they had what Alschuler calls "no case at all," then this would indeed be
a strong argument in the case against plea bargaining.
But our data suggest that this is not the case. Very weak
cases, ones which approximate being no case at all,
occur infrequently. Forty percent of the prosecutors indicated that they had experienced only one such case in
their entire careers. What is more, while the majority of
prosecutors (82 percent) said they would try to obtain a
conviction in an important case that fell apart, most also
indicated that they would stop far short of even the officially prescribed limits of propriety in bluffing. Many of
them (20 of 30) indicated they would not even go so far
as to announce ready for trial at calendar call in order to
sustain the appearance that their case had not developed
a serious weakness. None of them mentioned a willingness to bribe witnesses, file fraudulent service returns, or
empanel a jury. One who said he would answer "ready
for trial" at calendar call even though he did not have
his witness available did not regard this as a lie or even
a half-truth. He felt he would in effect be saying that he
was ready to have his case dismissed by the judge once
the witness' absence was discovered.

That part of the case against plea bargaining that is built
on objections to the practice of bluffing needs to be reconsidered. Bluffing does not appear to be as unseemly

Undoubtedly, some prosecutors do exceed the bounds of
fairness and honesty in bluffing defendants into guilty
pleas. But this is not an inherent weakness in the institu-
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tion of plea bargaining. It can and has happened in cases
that went to trial (see, e.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1
(1967), where an Illinois prosecutor convicted a man for
the sexual attack and murder of a young girl on the basis
of a pair of shorts covered with red material which the
prosecutor contended was the victim's blood although
he knew it was paint).

substantially different than if he had failed to counter a
prosecutorial tactic at trial. If lying is defined as deliberate misrepresentation of the clearly unequivocal kind,
such as filing fraudulent returns and bribing witnesses,
then the evidence of prosecutorial lying is thin at best.
We did not uncover any instances of outright lying or
deliberate fraud.

Whether prosecutorial lying is more likely to occur in
plea bargaining than in trial cases depends on where one
draws the line between bluffing and lying-something
which practitioners do not find easy to do. If all bluffing
is lying, then plea bargaining probably loses. But such a
view would be completely at variance with that of the
majority of prosecutors. They regard bluffing (short of
deliberate misrepresentation) as one of the tactics of negotiation which defense counsel are expected to understand and counteract. If counsel fails to do so it is not

As a whole, the practice of bluffing is not as capricious
and unscrupulous as it may sound. The best protection
against a bluff is a defense attorney who knows that
before agreeing to a plea offer he must check the
strength of the prosecutor's case. He must ask a series of
simple and direct questions about whether the prosecutor is really ready to go to trial. If the case for abolishing plea bargaining is to be made, it will have to rest on
more persuasive grounds than the unseemliness of bluffing.
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Chapter Four
Evaluating the Case:
Determinants of the
Plea Bargaining
Decisions
Introduction

Methods

Studies have identified many factors that are believed to
influence plea bargaining decisions. However, because of
the limitations of method or sample, these studies have
raised many questions but left them unresolved. Are certain factors relevant to all plea bargains? How much of
an impact do specific factors have? Do their respective
impacts vary under different conditions? Do prosecutors
evaluate cases differently from defense counsel? How
consistent is plea bargaining? This last question has several meanings, one of which refers to whether different
attorneys (depending upon whether they are acting as
prosecutors or defense counsel) would evaluate the same
case the same way.

Research on plea bargaining decision-making has been
based primarily on interviews and observations (Alschuler, 1968; Mather, 1974; Rosett and Cressey, 1976;
Newman, 1956; Newman, 1966). A few studies have
been based on statistical analyses of available records
(Bernstein et al., 1977; Heuman, 1975; Rhodes, 1978).
One had prosecutors and defense counsel give standardized ratings of 11 dimensions of actual cases they were
mutually involved in (Horney, 1980). Two studies have
used simulation techniques of substantially different
kinds. Jacoby (1980b and 1980c) developed a set of 279
hypothetical cases of varying type and seriousness, and
presented them to 855 prosecutors in 15 jurisdictions. In
contrast, LaGoy et al. (1976) adapted the information
processing analysis technique ("information board") developed by Wilkins (1965). Substituting plea bargaining
for the sentencing decisions, LaGoy presented two hypothetical cases to 20 prosecutors from one state. Unlike
Jacoby's method, this technique allows one to follow the
information sorting patterns of the decisionmaker. Our
research presented in this chapter is based on interviews
as well as a modified version of LaGoy's technique
which includes a quasi-experimental design. 1

The research presented in this chapter is based on interview data as well as a decision simulation technique. It
addresses those questions listed above regarding how the
plea bargaining decision is determined. It focuses upon
the evaluation of cases for plea bargaining, that is, the
process of sorting and weighing information in order to
decide whether to plea bargain and on what terms. A
comparison is made to determine whether prosecutors
do this differently from defense counsel. The importance
of two factors, namely, the strength of the case and the
seriousness of the criminal, are given special attention.
They are analyzed in two ways: first, to determine consistency (i.e., do different attorneys evaluate these factors the same way); and secondly, to determine how
much of a difference variations in these factors make in
the evaluation of the case.

1
Alt~gh we used the same technique as LaGoy, there are major differences in the content of the simulation, the variables used, the nature
of the samples involved, and the inclusion of a quasi-experimental component.
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Sampling. Some of the interviews with prosecutors, de-

fense counsel and judges are from both phases of our
study. The structured interview data, however, are from
five of the six sites which were studied in depth and in
which plea bargaining was not prohibited. The decision
simulation wa administered to a total of 138 prosecutors
and lOS defense attorneys, of which 46 percent were
from the five cities studied indepth. The o thers are obtained at national professional meetings and at jurisdictions convenient to the District of Columbia.
The simulation. The plea bargaining decision simulation

was administered as follows. R espondent were asked to
imagine t hat lhey were in a hypothetical j ur i diction
with certain specific characteri tics which were decubed to them ( ee McDonald, 1979). It was explained
that the use of a hypothetical juri dictio n was necessary
because the study was being done nationally, and, therefore, jurisdictional differences had to be held constant .
No respondent objected to this requirement or reported
that it made the simulation less real. Virtually all the respondents who commented on the simulatio n reported
that it was very realistic. This report w as validated by
our own observations that virtually all respondents took
the simulation seriously.
Re pondents were further asked to imagine that a less
experienced attorney came to them for advice about
whether to plea bargain in a part icular case and what
the "bottom line" terms of the bargain should be. However, the only things about the case that the senior attorney was told were the charge and the penalty for that
charge in our hypothetical jurisdiction. The senior attorney (i.e., the respondent in the simulation) then had to
seek as much additional information as he or she felt he
or she needed in order to advise his or her less experienced colleague. The respondent was told that the answers to virtually all the questions which he or she
might want to know about the case were contained on
an "information board" (folder) with which he or she
was presented. T he folder for the burglary case contained 39 item of information on separate cards enclosed
in plastic holders. T he cards were fanned out so that
only a half inch of the bottom of each card could be
seen. On that half inch was written a short descriptive
title of the information contained on the upper (hidden)
portion of that card.

much time and consult as many items of information as
he or she wanted but that he or she should try to act as
close to what he or she would do in real life as possible.
The items of information chosen were recorded by the
researcher in the order in which they were chosen.
When the respondent was ready, he or she was asked to
make several decisions. He or she could recommend that
t he case be dropped altogether from prosecution (only
.relevant when the game was played with pro ecutor or
that it go to trial or that it be plea bargained. lf the recommendation was to plea bargain then the re pondent
was asked what the 'bottom-line" (not the .. pening
offer" ) term of the bargain should be. For prosecutor
this meant the most lenient offer they would make
before either insisting the case go to trial or dropping it.
For defense attorneys this meant the most severe terms
they would accept before insisting the case go to trial. 2
Respondents choosing to plea bargain were asked to
specify the bargain in terms of type and length of the
sentence to be recommended to the court, and the estimated probability of conviction at trial assuming they
were attorneys in the case and the case were tried in
their local jurisdiction. Each respondent was given two
cases to decide: one robbery and one burglary. Prosecutors and defense attorneys were given the exact same
sets of facts except that the words "prosecutor" or "defense counsel" were submitted at relevant places.
A unique feature of our simulation is that two variables
were manipulated, namely, case strength and seriousness
to the offender. Case strength was varied by using two
versions of the card entitled, "Evidence-S ubstance of
Available." The seriousness of the defendant was varied
by having two versions of the card entitled "Defendant's
Prior Record and Police Reputation." (For a description
of all items of information used in the simulation, see
McDonald, 1979.)

Findings from interviews
Numerous facto rs have been identified as being influential in plea bargaining. The review that follows discusses
those factors reported by other researchers and substantiated by our own interview findings. A second analysis
of the same factors based on our plea bargain ing simula-

The respondent was instructed to familiarize him or herself with the labels on the cards and to think of things
which he or she would want to know about the case in
order to advise his or her junior colleague. He or she
was then instructed to pick items of information he or
she wanted to know and to stop as soon as he or she
was ready to make a decision about what to do with the
case. He or she was told that he or she could take as

2
Technicall y speaking. defense attorneys do not accept or rejecl plea
bargains. Thei r clients do. 'However, in acluol practice, we found that
defendants rely he.avily o n the advice of· attorneys and altho ugh some
attorneys go to great lengths to avoid making a decision for the defendant, most are willing to e)\press their opinion about what the best
deal is. Therefore, in reporting our findings here, we shall speak as if
the decision were made by the defense counsel.
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tion will be presented in a subsequent section of this
paper.
Caseload. One of the most common justifications for plea
bargaining is the volume of cases. Just how caseload
pressures come to influence plea bargaining decisions,
however, remains unclear. Some researchers (Alschuler,
1968; and Rhodes, 1978) believe these pressures act at a
distance and simply require that some portion of the
caseload be plea bargained, but do not determine which
cases shall be plea bargained or what the terms shall be.
But Mills (1971) describes caseload pressures as having a
direct and distressing impact on plea bargaining. He reports how a New York public defender uses the backlog
problem as a club to dictate the specific terms of the
plea bargains he wants. If the terms are not met, he
threatens to take all of his cases to trial. This practice is
referred to as "court busting," but it appears to be more
of a courthouse myth than a reality. We found virtually
no cases in the jurisdictions we visited where "court
busting" was an established practice. We heard of only
two cases where a defense attorney threatened to take
his caseload to trial if he did not get the deal he wanted
in a particular case. In both cases the prosecutors were
unperturbed by the threat and the situation backfired.
The defense attorneys went to trial with their caseloads
but were quickly worn out by the heavy doses of trial
work. The overwhelming majority of defense attorneys
(50 out of 51) told us that they had never tried to court
bust and had never heard of it happening. Most of them
thought the idea of making such a threat was "ridiculous," "moronic," "very unwise," or "stupid."

seriousness of the criminal (usually defined in terms of
prior record) and seriousness of the crime are influential
factors in plea bargaining. But there are some disagreements and strange patterns of relationships between
these factors and the plea bargaining decisions. Moreover, there has been little insight ' into how these two
global factors are interpreted and applied in practice.
The question of how the seriousness of the crime affects
whether a case will be plea bargained or set for trial has
not received much systematic attention. It is generally
assumed that misdemeanors are less likely than felonies
to be tried and that among felonies the more serious the
crime the more likely it is to go to trial. For each assumption there is considerable supporting evidence
(Oklahoma Administrative Office of the Judiciary,
1976:140; Jacoby, 1980b:37; Brosi, 1979). But there is
also some evidence that among felonies the more serious
crimes (e.g., personal vs. property offenses) are not more
likely to be tried (Vera Institute of Justice, 1977). 3 One
study that attempted to assess which factors determine
whether a case goes to trial or pleads guilty concluded
in frustration. It reported that " 'the guys who couldn't
make a deal' remains perhaps the single most accurate
description of the group of defendants who go to trial"
(Connecticut Justice Commission, 1980:92).

As for the impact of the seriousness of the crime on the
terms of the plea there is considerable agreement that
the more serious the crime the less favorable the terms
of the plea agreement will be from the defendant's perspective (Jacoby, 1980b; Mather, 1979; Neubauer, 1974).
Based on our interview data we would agree with the But, Horney (1980) found no correlation between the
view that caseload pressures act as general determinants value of the plea bargain and the seriousness of the
of the need to plea bargain but do not determine which crime; and Bernstein et ~tl., (1977) found a strange patspecific cases will be bargained or what the terms of the tern of relationship between type of felony and the probbargains will be. However, caseload does determine in ability of receiving a substantial charge reduction.
general the kind of cases that are more likely to be plea Among defendants whose final disposition occurred at
bargained. The greater the pressure the less attention is their first court presentation, those charged with assault
given to the less serious crimes. Cases that once might were more likely to receive a more favorable reduction
have had some possibility of going to trial if suitable ne- than those charged with burglary, robbery, or larceny;
gotiations could not be worked out will be less likely to and defendants charged with burglary were least likely
go to trial and the terms of the bargains may become to receive a more favorable reduction. Among cases
whose final disposition occurred after the first court
more generous.
presentation, there was no significant relationship beSeriousness of the criminal and the crime. Two aspects of tween type of offense and the amount of charge reducplea bargaining decisionmaking are of special interest. tion.
One focuses on the question of what factors influence
whether a case will be plea bargained or go to trial (or Turning to the matter of the seriousness of the criminal,
be dismissed). The other focuses on what factors influ- one also finds disagreement and strange results both with
ence the terms of the plea agreement. Many studies (Als- regard to the plea-or-trial decision and to the effect on
chuler, 1968; Bernstein, et al., 1977; Britt and Larntz, the terms of the bargain. Several studies (Newman, 1956;
1980; California Legislature, 1980; Chambliss and Seidman, 1971; Jacoby, 1980b and 1980c; Lagoy et al., 1976;
Neubauer, 1974; and Newman, 1966) have found that the 3 See also, Bernstein et a!., 1977.
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and Chambliss and Seidman, 1971) suggest that recidivists are less likely than first offenders to go to trial possibly because they know the advantages of plea bargaining. Others (Greenwood et al., 1973; Mather, 1974; Baldwin and McConville, 1977; Jacoby, 1980b; Thomssen
and Falowski, 1979) have found that defendants with
more serious prior records are more likely to go to trial.
A study of victimless crimes found that having a prior
record was associated with going to trial in only one of
four types of victimless crime and at that the independent effect of prior record was small (McDonald, 1977).
As for the effect of prior record on the terms of the plea
bargain, studies generally suggest that the more serious
the record the less generous the state will be in its plea
offer (Jacoby, 1980b; Neubauer, 1974). However,
Horney (1980) found no relationship between these two
variables while other studies report that there is a relationship but it is not a simple linear one. Britt and Larntz
(1980) report that for property offenses, no matter how
serious the instant property crime is, there is a bias
against incarcerating the defendant as long as his previous record consists of no more than two arrests and no
adult felony convictions. They suggest this represents a
buffering process preventing prior record from adding to
the severity of the sentence until the individual's contact
with the criminal justice system has become frequent
and/or felonious. The findings of Bernstein et al. (1977)
are generally supportive of Britt and Larntz's conclusion
up to a point but then add a confusing twist. They found
that defendants with prior arrests but not convictions get
larger charge reductions than defendants with prior arrests and convictions. But those same defendants with
prior arrests and no convictions also got more generous
reductions than defendants with no prior records at all!
Bernstein et al. speculate that this supports the belief that
recidivists use their prior experience with the criminal
justice system to obtain better deals than first offenders.

As for how the seriousness of the offense and the seriousness of the offender affect the terms of plea bargains,
our impression based on our interviews was that in both
cases the relationship was a simple linear one. Respondents said that Je s generous deals were being offered to
more serious crim inals and in the more serious crim .
However there are substantial differences within and between jurisdictions in how seriousness is defined. Some
judges· permit only prior records of convictions to be
used in sentencing discussions, and this policy is carried
over by pro ecutors in their asses ment of cases for plea
bargaining. Other judges and prosecutors readily consider arrest records that do not indicate dispositions. Some
will even consider police suspicions of a defendant's involvement in criminal activities as the basis for determining the criminal's seriousness.
As for the question how much a unit increase in the severity of the seriousness of the criminal or of the crime
affects the severity of the terms of the plea bargain we
are unable to provide any precise answers. But the serendipitous findings of our decision simulation shed some
light on this matter. During and after the administration
of the simulation, we learned how specific items of information are translated by attorneys into increases or decrea es in the lengths of time sought in plea bargaining.
Occasionally a respondent wou ld flip up one of the information cards in the sim ulation and groan, ''There
goes another year." Prosecutors and defense counsel
engage in a very fine calculation of moral turpitude.
Compared with the layperson, their analysis of moral
turpitude is like th differen e b tween measurement · in
terms of pounds and ounces and those in terms of the
finer units of milli- and micrograms. There are subtle
shades of nuance that experienced attorneys appreciate
but are lost on the layman.
For instance, in the pretesting of our hypothetical robbery with a knife case, prosecutors wanted to know such
things a : Wa the Jashlng compl tely unprovoked b y
the victim? Had the victim . aid anything at all o r resisted in an y way? Was the Ia hing ncce ary to accom-.
pli h Lbe crime? Was it done out of nervousnes o r panic
or out of simple meanness? When the robber presented
the knife, how did he present it? Was there actual contact of the knife with the victim? While the layman may
fail to appreciate the distinction between a knife that was
used to threaten and a knife that actually struck a victim,
attorneys are familiar with hundreds of such cases, and
come to appreciate such distinctions and translate them
into differences in time to be served.

Interviews with prosecutors and defense counsel indicate
that seriousness of the offense, seriousness of the crime
and evidentiary strength of the case are the three main
factors they use in evaluating cases. However, the independent influence of these three factors on the decision
as to whether to plead guilty or go to trial was less
clear. Generally it seemed that the less serious cases
were more likely to be bargained; yet attorneys said that
murder cases were regularly bargained as well. Similarly, the attorneys said that defendants with prior criminal
records often plead guilty but sometimes they stubbornly
want to go to trial and "roll the dice." For three-time
losers facing long sentences no matter what happened,
going to trial made sense. They had nothing to lose if
they could raise a sufficient doubt in some juror's mind.

Prosecutors wanted to know not just whether there had
been a slashing but how deep it was, whether there
would be permanent injury or ugly scars in visible
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places such as on the face. This kind of information was
used by prosecutors to assess not only how serious the
crime had been but also how "mean" or "bad" the defendant was. There was no question that robbery with a
slashing was a serious matter and had to be punished,
but there was a question about the precise degree of
punishment that this particular robbery deserved. While
the layman may think that it is enough to know that a
person is a "robber who slashes," the experienced prosecutor has learned to make much finer distinctions.
Some robbers who slash display a greater disregard for
the well-being of their victims than others. In as much as
there is not unlimited capacity in the correctional system
and since distinctions among offenders must be made,
these differences are used as the basis for making them. 4
Strength of the case. Both the decision to plead guilty
rather than go to trial and the terms of the plea agreement are reported by virtually all researchers to be influenced by case strength (Alschuler, 1968; California Legislature, 1980; Horney, 1980; Jacoby, 1980b; Landis,
1974; Mather, 1977; Neubauer, 1974; and Newman
1966). 5
Alschuler (1968) suggests there is a simple negative relationship between these variables. As cases get weaker
plea bargaining is more likely to occur and the terms of
the bargain become more favorable to the defendant
with the most favorable bargains offered when the prosecutor has "no case at all." Jacoby (1980b) also found
that as cases get weaker they are more likely to be plea
bargained. But Mather (1974:286) quotes a prosecutor as
saying that the weaker a case is the more likely it is to
be tried. She analyzed the influence of case strength as it
interacts with the influence of case seriousnt!ss. Her concept of case seriousness combines the notion of serious
crime and serious offender. It refers to the severity of

the sentence that is likely to be imposed in a case. Case
seriousness is dichotomized into "serious" and light"
cases; and case strength is dichotomized into "deadbang"
(strong) cases and "reasonable doubt" (weak) cases.
Deadbang, light cases were usually plea bargained; but it
was not possible to predict whether reasonable-doubtlight cases would be bargained or go to trial. For serious
cases the decision to go to trial in either deadbang or
reasonable doubt cases depended upon how good the
prosecutor's plea offer was.
Rhodes (1978) also found that contrary to expectations
case strength was not strongly and uniformly related to
whether plea bargains would occur. He found that neither the subjective estimate of the prosecutors at screening 6 of the probability of conviction nor the existence of
facts relating to the objective strength of a case nor the
estimated probability of acquittal at trial (based on conviction regressions) were good predictors of whether
charges would be reduced in a case.
As for the terms of the plea bargain, Horney (1980)
found that the value of the plea agreement was inversely
related to the probability of conviction as expected. But,
the relationship did not account for a substantial portion
of the variance. She concluded there was less individualization of plea bargaining decisions than was previously
believed.
In almost all the 31 jurisdictions visited in the first phase
of our study and all six of the jurisdictions studied in
depth (see Table 4.1) our respondents said the practice
was to plea bargain weak cases and take strong ones to
trial. But in Kalamazoo, Michigan, the policy was just
the opposite. There they "plead the gold and take the
dogs to trial." 7

• The belief that such distinctions can and should be made is often the
basis for objections to sentencing reform proposals that would eliminate or drastically reduce the freedom of criminal justice officials who
make these fine adjustments. On the other hand, the belief that these
adjustments are not being made evenhandedly has been given as the
main argument in favor of such sentencing reforms.
5
Defense counsel have even told us that the level of effort they put
into a case not only at plea bargaining but also at trial depends on their
estimate of the probability of conviction.
• These prosecutors are not the ones actually handling the plea negotiations of the cases and are usually inexperienced recruits.
7
The value of such a policy is one which deserves serious consideration. The type of plea bargaining system one would have under it
would meet certain crucial concerns about plea bargaining. In theory,
at least, it would have several beneficial consequences. It would pre-

serve the trial system for the doubtful cases in which judgment calls
about who is to be believed and what actually happened nre mndc by
the jury in an adversary setting rather than by attorneys in backrooms.
(However, many attorneys would prefer not to have these decisions
made by the jury because they do not trust the jury system as much as
they trust their own ability to decide what really happened.) It may
reduce the risk of convicting innocent persons (assuming this is more
likely to happen in plea bargaining than at trial-an assumption not
shared by many practicing criminal justice lawyers). It would reduce
the size of the consideration the state would need to offer defendants
to get pleas. And, it would reduce the impact of case strength on the
sentencing decision-thereby minimizing the influence of a factor that
no theory of corrections has ever regarded as a relevant consideration
in sentencing.
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Table 4.1 Prosecutors' reports of the influence of case strength on their plea offers, by jurisdictions
Summer, 1977
[In Percentages]

In cases where the crime is
serious, the defendant Is a
serious criminal, and the case is El Paso**
(strong: weak), what do you
usually do regarding plea
bargaining?
s w
Require plea as charged; give no
consideration ......................................
Give bogus consideration which has
appearance of a bargain but no
substantive benefit (e.g., drop
charges which were either overcharged or would not have affected the sentence anyway) ..................
Give minimal consideration which
does not affect length of sentence but may affect other aspacts of sentence (e.g., sentence
be served in certain prison) ..............
Give real consideration which (probably) will reduce the length of
sentence .............................................
Other/combination of above/it depends on case ....................................
(N) ....... .... .................................................

Case strength (S=Strong: W=Weak)
New
Orleans

Seattle

Tucson

Delaware
County

Norfolk

s

w

s

w

s

w

s

w

s

w

s

w

Total

50

33

100

0

100

0

50

0

89

33

38

8

68

13

0

0

0

0

0

0

40

40

11

0

23

8

15

2

0

17

0

0

0

0

0

56

0

8

0

0

0

13

50

50

0

80

0

100

0

33

0

58

9

23

6

51

0

0

0

20

0

0

10

11

0

0

39

61

11

21

(6)

(4)

(10)

(10)

(5)

(3)

(10)

(9)

(9)

(12)

(13)

(13)

(53)

(53)

*This question was asked oniy of prosecutors in the County Attorney's office which is separate from the District Attorney's office and was
not participating in the no plea bargaining poilcy.

With regard to the influence of case strength on the
terms of the deal we found that the vast majority of
prosecutors (21 of 24) report that they make their most
generous offers in their weakest cases. But we also
learned that contrary to the impression from the literature the "exploding, plastic character" of deals offered
by prosecutors is not unlimited. Prosecutors will continue to sweeten the plea offer up to a point. But, if the
defendant continues to hold out, then prosecutors will
either try the case or ·dismiss it. 8 They say they would
not offer ridiculously reduced charges or lenient sentence recommendations just to assure a conviction. It
would be foolish to do so because the defense would
"smell a rat"; the judge would not approve the deal; and
nothing would be gained even if they succeeded.

whether attorneys can accurately predict whether a case
will be convicted if it goes to trial. 9 The one study of its
kind is encouraging. Inexperienced prosecutors working
with only that amount of information that is available in
cases within 24 hours after arrest were able to predict
the actual probability of conviction at trial within a few
percentage points for four different offenses (Rhodes,
1978). 10

• Of the various factors used to evaluate cases only the estimate of case
strength can be validated by an independent event, namely, what actually happens at trial. For all the other factors the only question is
whether attorneys agree among themselves as to their importance-although conceivably their judgments could be compared to those of the
general public using survey research methodology.
'° For assault they predicted 69 percent. The actual was 65 percent.
For robbery, predicted 71 percent; actual, 78 percent. For larceny, predicted 73 percent; actual, 66 percent. For burglary, predicted 73 percent; actual, 67 percent.

Accuracy. Given the crucial importance of the ability to
evaluate cases, there is surprisingly little research as to

• See also Chapter 3 on bluffing by prosecutors.
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Perspective: prosecution vs. defense. There has been
somewhat more research on whether cases are evaluated
differently depending upon whether one is looking at
them from the point of view of the prosecutor or the defense counsel. Some studies (Mather, 1974; Neubauer,
1974) and our own interview data indicate that prosecutors and defense attorneys evaluate cases the same
way-at least up to a point. Both types of attorneys
agree on the importance of the big three factors: seriousness of the offense, seriousness of the offender, and
strength of the case. Beyond that, little is known about
whether they continue to look at cases in the same way.
On this point the literature contains only a few somewhat inconsistent hints. Three hypotheses can be identified.

Both Neubauer (1974) and Mather (1974) mention that
defense counsel look for mitigating circumstances. But,
they seem to differ on how this is done and hence
whether this distinguishes defense counsel from prosecutors. Neubauer hints that the evaluation of mitigating circumstances is something which is done after and in addition to the basic assessment of the value of the case in
terms of the big three factors. He describes defense
counsel as making "particularistic appeals" in an attempt
to persuade prosecutors that in this particular case for
some special reason the terms of the bargain should be
even less severe than the normal discount for such a
case. The notion of a two-stage bargaining process is
also hinted at by Alschuler's (1975) observation that defense attorneys try to improve upon standard or
"normal" deals in a jurisdiction.

deals are 11 and they differed significantly in their ratings
of 6 of 11 factors affecting their evaluations of the cases
they had jointly negotiated. Prosecutors rated the seriousness of the crime and the degree of punishment deserved higher than did defense counsel. But, defense
counsel thought the likelihood of conviction was higher.
They also thought that the present workload was higher
and that it would take longer to try the case (2.8 days
compared to 2.0 days). In addition they regarded the
deal they worked out as worth more than what the prosecutor assessed it to be. These findings suggest that the
structural differences between the two parties to the negotiation affect their perceptions of case worth.
Evenhandedness. One of the major concerns about criminal justice decisionmaking is that it be fair, meaning consistent. In practical terms this concerns whether the
same case would be evaluated differently if it were handled by different attorneys. Horney suggests this would
be true if the two attorneys were on opposite sides of
the case. The next question is whether it would be true
among attorneys on the same side. Would prosecutors as
a group and defense counsel as a group be consistent in
evaluating the same case? The evidence on this is ambiguous. Mather suggests that among public defenders there
is not a high degree of agreement about how to evaluate
any particular case. She (1974:272) writes:

Certainly, PD's varied in their judgments and their
predictions, so that one attorney might evaluate his
client's chances differently than another would
have. Or, what is a 'good' bargain for one PD
might not be to his colleague. But, in general there
was a consensus on how to evaluate cases and
choose the best method for disposition.

In contrast, Mather describes plea bargaining decisionmaking as a one-stage phenomenon in which the defense
counsel's assessment of mitigating circumstances is part
and parcel of the calculation of the big three factors.
Her description implies that there is no difference between prosecutors and defense counsel in their respective evaluations of a case (assuming they both consider
the big three factors). A third view is implied by those
researchers (e.g., Alschuler, 1968; Newman, 1966; Rosett
and Cressey, 1976) who have reported that one of the
functions which prosecutors consciously perform at plea
bargaining is to mitigate any undue harshness of the law
(to tailor the punishment to the unique circumstances of
the case and thereby assure that substantive justice is
done). This view says nothing about whether there is a
one-stage or a two-stage process in plea bargaining, but
it strongly implies that prosecutors are as concerned as
defense counsel about mitigating circumstances.

Similarly, Carter (1974) emphasizes the general uncertainty in prosecutorial decisionmaking. In contrast, however, Jacoby (1980b:22) reports that "[t]he resounding
conclusion [of her simulations with 855 prosecutors] is
that prosecutors are rational and consistent in making
decisions." In each of nine jurisdictions the "majority"
of prosecutors evaluated each of 30 cases virtually the
same with regard to the probability the case would be
accepted for prosecution; what the likely disposition

11
On a 100 point scale with IOO=most valuable to defendant, defense
attorneys rated four types of deals substantially higher than prosecutors (felony to misdemeanor, 82 units of value as seen by defense counsel compared to 66 for prosecutors; dropping of felonies, 65 compared
to 49; lesser felony, 81 to 64; dropping counts, 42 to 34). Defense counsel agreed with prosecutors, on the high value of not filing habitual
offender accusations (77 for both); and were close to an agreement on
the comparatively low value of not having other charges filed. However, they rated this deal lower than prosecutors (38 to 42).

Horney (1980) found that prosecutors and defense counsel differ substantially on how valuable certain types of
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would be; and what the appropriate sentence (release,
conditional release, or incarceration) should be if the defendant were convicted. However, she does not say
what the degree of agreement among prosecutors is with
regard to specific cases. She only reports that the "majority" agreed-which could mean that only 51 percent
agreed and the other 49 percent disagreed.
In contrast, Horney (1980) analyzed the variance in the
values of deals offered in real cases and found that the
most powerful factor explaining 16 percent of the variance was the identity of the prosecutor. The second
most powerful factor (accounting for 15 percent of the
variance) was the identity of the defense attorney. Each
of these factors alone explained more of the variance
than all the "case factors" combined (including the probability of conviction, the seriousness of the crime, and
the seriousness of the prior record).
Rhodes (1978) also partially confirms the hypothesis that
plea bargaining varies depending upon who is involved.
Focusing on the decision as to whether a case is bargained or set for trial (as distinct from the value of the
deal offered) he found that the willingness to go to trial
varied significantly among prosecutors but not among
defense counsel and not between types of defense counsel (when counsel were grouped into "public defender"
and "other"). But, Rhodes adds the caveat that his findings do not mean that who defense counsel is does not
matter. It only means that differences in the pleading
proclivities of individual counsel are not so strong that
taking them into account in a statistical analysis improves one's ability to predict whether a case will be
pleaded or go to trial.
Personal attributes of attorneys. The anecdotal evidence
that the identity of the individual attorneys in plea negotiations makes a difference is considerable. Several researchers (Alschuler, 1975; Mather, 1974; Neubauer,
1974; and Newman, 1966) have found, and our own
interview data confirm, that certain attributes of attorneys (both prosecutors and defense counsel) can influence both the decision to plead as well as the terms of
the plea agreement. One attribute is the attorney's reputation. A second is the personal relationship between the
opposing attorneys. 12

12
Horney's (1980) findings are curious on this point. Prosecutors and
defense counsel were asked to rate each other in terms of "ability at
trial" and "relationship with other attorney." On both dimensions they
rated each other equally (i.e., there were no statistically significant differences). Yet, as noted earlier, the identities of the individual attorneys
are the most powerful factors explaining the value of the deals offered.

An attorney's reputation is based on several things, including his honesty, his willingness to go to trial, and his
ability at trial. Trying cases is hard work which prosecutors and defense counsel try to minimize to some extent.
Some attorneys are known for never going to trial. Alschuler (1975) refers to defense attorneys who never take
a case to trial as the "plead them guilty bar." We found
a similar tendency among some prosecutors. They prefer
to negotiate cases rather than try them. These attorneys
who never take cases to trial are believed to negotiate
from a position of weakness. Hence, they either get less
or give away more in their bargaining.
A second aspect of attorney reputation has to do with
skills. Attorneys willing to go to trial vary in their skill
at trying cases. Again it is believed that this difference
affects their bargaining. Supposedly, the skilled trial
lawyer gets better bargains. However, Alschuler (1975)
points out that an attorney can become so famous that
he or she cannot get opposing attorneys to plea bargain
with him or her. They would prefer to try to beat him
or her at trial in order to establish their own reputations.
We uncovered no instances of this. But we did occasionally hear of a related matter. Attorneys do develop personal animosities or "score cards" with each other. Some
attorneys reported that they believe certain other attorneys wanted to take them to trial to try to beat them because the last time the two went to trial the opposing attorney had lost. It was never suggested, however, that
this was the overriding consideration in the decision
about whether to plea bargain or go to trial. With
regard to honesty, we heard in several jurisdictions that
some attorneys have such a reputation for dishonesty
that other attorneys refuse to negotiate with them (although they may make a flat, take-it-or-leave-it offer).
The victim. There is little known about how often the
victim has any input intQ plea bargaining or what influence that input has. An experiment in Dade County,
Florida, found that when victims were allowed to participate in plea bargaining they rarely were vengeful and
generally approved the plea agreements reached by the
attorneys (Heinz and Kerstetter, 1980). What is more,
the presence of victims at the plea negotiation (apparently) did not affect the severity of the sentences (Kerstetter and Heinz, 1979). The Connecticut Justice Commission (1980:55) found that the victim's attitude toward the
case was one of the most frequently cited aspects of
cases evaluated by prosecutors and defense counsel.
Prosecutors tended to be more influenced by victims
whose attitudes were favorable to the defense whereas
defense counsel were more sensitive to victims whose attitudes were more favorable to the state. In assault and
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sex assault cases prosecutors tended to place "pivotal"
importance on the attitudes of the victims.
After our initial survey, we concluded (McDonald,
1977) that the victim's wishes were rarely considered in
the plea bargaining decisionmaking except for particularly notorious cases and in some jurisdictions regularly in
cases of rape. The latter conclusion is supported by the
findings of Lagoy et al. (1976). In our indepth study of
the six jurisdictions we found 52 percent of 50 judges
said they ask for victims' opinions of plea agreements
before finally accepting them. But this varied widely by
jurisdiction. 13 We also found that 49 percent of 43 prosecutors rarely hear from victims about their views on
what the appropriate plea agreement should be. However, 28 percent said they routinely get this information
and 23 percent more said they get it in special casestypically ones involving special violence to the victim or
crimes between family members. However, again there
were major differences among jurisdictions on this score.
Also, 44 percent of 32 prosecutors said that when they
do hear from victims regarding plea bargaining they
give the victims' wishes very little or no weight. But 28
percent said they give the victims' wishes some or a lot
of weight and 28 percent more said it depends on the
case. Again, the victims' wishes were usually weighed
heavily in cases of violent crimes such as rape and in
crimes between people who know each other.
The police. The nature of the police participation in and
influence on plea bargaining has also been largely neglected (but see Kerstetter and Heinz, 1979; Kerstetter
1979a and 1979b; McDonald et al. 1981; and also Chapter 2 of this report). We found that in some jurisdictions
in the lower courts the police either conduct the plea negotiations themselves or they represent the main power
behind the negotiation. Typically, inexperienced prosecutors will be assigned to these courts and they generally will not approve plea bargains unless the police officer involved indicates he has no objection to the deal.

In our six jurisdictions 14 we found that 51 percent of 51
judges seek the police opinions of plea bargains before
accepting the agreements. This varied dramatically by
jurisdictions. 15 We also found that 25 percent of 55 prosecutors said they rarely or never get police opinions as
to what the appropriate terms of the plea bargain should
be. But, 54 percent said they get such input routinely
and 20 percent more said they get it in special cases. 18
The importance of police opinion to plea negotiations is
indicated by the finding that 77 percent of 31 prosecutors reported that it made a "substantial difference" to
them to "know that the police officer had no objection
to the terms of the deal." This was true for most prosecutors in three of the four jurisdictions where the question was asked. 17
We also found that the majority of prosecutors (73 percent of 52) determine how much weight they are willing
to give a police officer's wishes at plea bargaining depending upon who the officer is. They know whether
the officer is credible and has reasonable grounds for his
or her position. Officers who are known to perjure
themselves or who have a past pattern of questionable
arrests or who seem to have insubstantial or vindictive
reasons for wanting a particular disposition will not have
their opinions considered.
Mitigating and aggravating attributes and circumstances.
Various attributes of the defendant or the victim or
other special circumstances relating to the crime are believed to influence the decision to plea bargain and the
terms of the deal. A list of potential special attributes
and circumstances is lengthy. A partial listing of those
identified by others (Alschuler, 1968; Horney, 1980;
Jacoby, 1980b; Lagoy et al., 1976; Mather, 1974;
McDonald, 1976; Neubauer, 1974; Newman, 1966; Williams, 1976) and our interview findings are as follows:

(1) attributes of the defendant, such as age, sex,
race, marital status, social class, political or family
connections, demeanor, history of employment,
drug use, alcohol use, psychiatric problems, physical

In felony-level courts the situation is usually different
but it depends on the jurisdiction, the individual judge
and the particular police department. In Detroit the professional association of police detectives prevailed upon
the judges to require that prosecutors check with the
police before completing any plea negotiations. In Norfolk, Virginia, defense attorneys say that the real key to
successful plea negotiations is getting the police approval
of the deal.

In El Paso only the lower court judges were asked.
El Paso, 0 percent; New Orleans, 0 percent; Seattle, 100 percent;
Tucson, 27 percent; Delaware County, 83 percent; Norfolk, 50 percent.
16
The variation among jurisdictions was not as dramatic on this matter
(at the felony level).
17
Percent saying police opinion mattered: New Orleans, 100 percent;
Seattle, 57 percent; Delaware County, 100 percent; Norfolk, 77 percent. In El Paso where the question was asked only of prosecutors
handling misdemeanors none of four prosecutors answered affirmatively. This is surprising in light of our findings that in misdemeanor courts
elsewhere the police have virtual veto power.
14

15

13
Percentages of judges who do seek victims' opinions of plea agreements are: El Paso (misdemeanor courts), 0 percent; New Orleans, 86
percent; Seattle, 40 percent; Tucson, 0 percent; Delaware County, 92
percent; Norfolk, 72 percent.
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health problems, military service, and length of
local residence;
(2) the defendant's relationship with the victim;
(3) attributes of the victim including things which
could appear in the eyes of decisionmakers to make
the victim "blameworthy" (in a more general sense
than the legal notion of provocation) such as the
victim's age, sex, race, social class, prior record of
criminal deviant behavior, and also victim's willingness to testify and ability to establish a linkage between the defendant and the crime. (Of course, this
latter item is usually considered in connection with
evaluating case strength.); and,
(4) publicity.
Findings from the decision simulation
There is no concise way to convey our data regarding the
items of information chosen in the plea bargaining simulation. The two tables presented below provide complementary, partial perspectives on the data. Both compare the
decisionmaking of prosecutors and defense counsel. Table

4.2 indicates for each item of information contained in the
simulation the respective proportions of prosecutors and
defense counsel who consulted the item before deciding the
case. To highlight the comparison between the type of
attorney, two additional calculations are provided. Column
3 indicates the differences in percentage points between the
respective proportions of prosecutors and defense counsel
consulting each item of information. Column 4 presents the
· difference between prosecutors and defense counsel in the
form of a ratio of their respective proportions. The ratio was
. used to rank all items presented in the table in order of
decreasing ratios of agreement between prosecutors and
defense counsel. Neither measure adequately conveys the
many-sided notion of "agreement" between attorneys. But
taken together, these two measures give some perspective
on the topic. For instance, 54 percent of both prosecutors
and defense counsel consulted the card entitled "defendant's age." On the one hand, this means that there is no
disagreement between prosecutors ~nd defense counsel as
aggregates in the importance of this item of information; on
the other hand, there is substantial disagreement within both
of those groups of attorneys over this item of information.

Table 4.2 Comparison between prosecutors and defense counsel on items of information selected in
burglary plea bargaining simulation in decreasing order of agreement*

Item

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Defendant's age
Defendant's prior record & police reputation
Evidence-substance of available
Ability of defendant to pay restitution
Basic facts of the case
Codefendants
Propriety of police conduct after arrest
Effectiveness of witnesses at trial
Aggravating and mitigating circumstances
Defendant's aliases
Detainers on defendant
Criminal history of defendant's family
Defendant's account of incident
Victim's attitude toward bargain
Pretrial release, probation/parole status at time of offense
Record of alcohol use by defendant
Police attitude toward proposed bargain
Defendant's intelligence and education
Defendant's employment status
Defendant's psychological problems
Record of drug use by defendant
Length of local residence of defendant
Defendant's interests and activities

1

2

%of
Prosecutors
choosing
item
(N=134)

%of
Defense
counsel
choosing
· item

54
92
91
13
97
39
38
69
86
15
43
8
73
41
39
26
38
29
43
32
36
16
10

70

3

4

Column
Column
2 divided
2 minus
by
column 1
column 1

~N=102)

54
93
94
13
94
43
35
65
76
13
37
10
87
30
54
37
23
44
63
47
54
24
15

0
1
3
0
-3
4
-3
-4
-10
-2
-6
2
14
-11
15
11
-15
15
20
15
18
8
5

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.9
1.1
0.9
1.1
0.9
0.9
0.9
1.2
1.2
0.7
1.4
1.4
0.6
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5
Continued

Table 4.2 Comparison between prosecutors and defense counsel on items of information selected in
burglary plea bargaining simulation in decreasing order of agreement*-Continued

Item

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31 .
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Publicity/community sentiment
Length of time since arrest in instant offense
Victim's race, age, sex
Alternatives to incarceration
Defendant's pretrial release status for this burglary
Defendant's marital status
Trial judge's reputation for leniency
Reputation of prosecutor or defense attorney
Defendant's sex
Defendant's military record
Physical health of defendant
Backlog of docket of judge to whom case is assigned
Defendant's religious affiliation
Defendant's race/ethnicity/nationality
Relationship between prosecutor and defense attorney
Defendant's sexual orientation

1

2

%of
Prosecutors
choosing
item
(N=134)

%of
Defense
counsel
choosing
item
(N=102)

13
22
10
22
25
16
33
19
12
9
7
7
1
4
5
1

21
35
17
45
52
39
75
54
36
27
22
26
8
35
45
9

3

4

Column
Column
2 divided
2 minus
by
column 1
column 1

8
13
7
23
27
23
42
35
24
18
15
19
7
31
40
8

1.6
1.6
1.7
2.0
2.0
2.4
2.3
2.8
3.0
3.0
3.1
3.7
8.0
8.7
9.0
9.0

*Source: Georgetown Plea Bargaining Decision Simulation.

Table 4.3 presents a portion of the same data arrayed
differently. It shows which items of information were
chosen by attorneys for each of their first 12 choices.
Because of the length of this table, only the first 12

Table 4.3

choices are presented; and items chosen by very small
proportions were combined into a miscellaneous category.

Rank order of the first 12 items of information consulted before deciding whether to plea
bargain in simulated burglary case by type of attorney
(In percentages)
Rank order of Item
Prosecutors (N = 134)

Basic facts
Evidence
Prior record
Aggravating/mitigating circumstances
Misc. 6 items

% of Prosecutors/
defense counsel
choosing Items

Items chosen first.
79
73
7
9
5
6
2
3
10
6
100%

71

100%

Defense counsel (N = 102)

Basic facts
Evidence
Judge's reputation for sentencing
Prior record
Misc. 7 items
Continued

Table 4.3

Rank order of the first 12 items of Information consulted before deciding whether to plea
bargain in simulated burglary case by type of attorney-Continued
(In percentages)

Rank order of Item
Prosecutors (N = 134)

Evidence
Pnor record
Basic facts
Defendant's account
Effectiveness of witnesses
Aggravating/mitigating circumstances
Misc. 11 items

o/o of Prosecutors/
defense counsel
choosing Items

Items chosen second
45
40
19
23
10
12
5
3
4
22
4
13
100%

Prior record
Defendant's account
Aggravating/ mitigating circumstances
Evidence
Effectiveness of witnesses
Defendant's age
Misc. 17 items

5
4

7
5

42

5

4
31

Effectiveness of witnesses
Aggravating/mitigating circumstances
Prior record
Defendant's account
Defendant's age
Codefendants
None, decision already made
Misc. 20 items

Prior record
Defendant's account
Effectiveness of witnesses
Codefendants
Aggravating/ mitigating circumstances
Defendant's age
None, decision already made
Defendant's sex
Misc. 13 items

100%

Items chosen fifth
15
11
13
11
11
8
20
8

9

6

6

6

6

6

30

4
4
4
32

100%

100%

72

Defendant's account
Evidence
Prior record
Defendant's age
Effectiveness of witnesses
Aggravating/ mitigating circumstances
Misc. 14 items

100%

Items chosen fourth
15
18
13
14
11
9
10
7

100%

Evidence
Defendant's account
Basic facts
Defendant's race and ethnicity
Misc. 13 items

100%

Items chosen third
17
29
16
17
14
14
10
9
10
5
5
4
28
22
100%

Defendant account
Prior record
Aggravating/mitigating circumstances
Effectiveness of witnesses
Police conduct
None, decision already made
Misc. 19 items

Defense counsel (N = 102)

Prior record
Effectiveness of witnesses
Pretrial release status at time of offense
Judge's reputation for leniency
Codefendants
Aggravating/mitigating circumstances
None, decision already made
Defendant's age
Defendant's employment record
Pretrial release status for this offense
Misc. 19 items
Continued

Table 4.3

Rank order of the first 12 items of Information consulted before deciding whether to plea
bargain in simulated burglary case by type of attorney-Continued
(In percentages)
Rank order of Item
Prosecutors (N= 134)

None, decision already made
Aggravating/ mitigating circumstances
Prior record
Defendant's age
Defendant's account
Effectiveness of witnesses
Evidence
Detainers
Police conduct
Victim's attitude toward plea
Misc. 16 items

% of Prosecutors/
defense counsel
choosing items

Items chosen sixth
13
17

10
9
7

9
8
8

7

6

6
5

6
6

4

4

4
4

4
4

31

28

100%
None, decision already made
Aggravating I mitigating circumstances
Defendant's age
Effectiveness of witnesses
Prior record
Evidence
Police attitude toward plea
Pretrial release status at time of offense
Pretrial release status for this offense
Victim's attitude toward plea
Codefendants
Detainers
Misc. 17 items

Prior record
None, decision already made
Judge's reputation for leniency
Aggravating/mitigating circumstances
Defendant's race and ethnicity
Effectiveness of witnesses
Pretrial release status at time of offense
Defendant's age
Defendant's account
Relationship between prosecutor and defense
counsel
Misc. 17 items

100%

Items chosen seventh
18
12

10
6

9
9

6

6

5

6

5

6

5

6

5

5

4
4

4
4
33

4

None, decision already made
Defendant's age
Aggravating/mitigating circumstances
Prior record
Pretrial release status for instant offense
Pretrial release status at time of offense
Detainers
Judge's reputation for leniency
Codefendants
Reputation of prosecutor as trial lawyer
Misc. 22 items

4
24

100%
·None, decision already made
Defendant's age
Codefendants
Victim's attitude toward plea
Pretrial release status for this offense
Police conduct
Time since arrest for this offense
Defendant's drug history
Aggravating/mitigating circumstances
Misc. 22 items

Defense counsel (N = 102)

100%

Items chosen eighth
26
16

4
4

7
6

4
4

6
5

4

5

4

5

4
4

5
4

42

4
4
33

100%

None, decision already made
Codefendants
Aggravating/mitigating circumstances
Reputation of prosecutor as trial lawyer
Defendant's sex
Prior record
Defendant's account
Pretrial release status for this offense
Defendant's employment history
Police conduct
Pretrial release status at time of this offense
Misc. 19 items

100%
Continued
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Table 4.3

Rank order of the first 12 items of information consulted before deciding whether to plea
bargain in simulated burglary case by type of attorney-Continued
(In percentages)

Rank order of Item
Prosecutors (N = 134)

None, decision already made
Police attitude toward plea
Defendant's account
Prior record
Defendant's age
Defendant's employment record
Defendant's education
Victim's attitude toward plea
Defendant's alcoholic history
Detainers
Aggravating/mitigating circumstances
Misc. 21 items

% of Prosecutors/
defense counsel
choosing Items

Items chosen ninth
30
20

6

6

6

5

5
4
4

5
5
5

5

3
3
3
3
3
30

4
4
3
3
3
3
29

None, decision already made
Defendant's employment history
Defendant's age
Police conduct
Effectiveness of witnesses
Relationship between prosecutor and defense
counsel
Pretrial release status for this crime
Defendant's marital status
Judge's reputation for leniency
Docket backlog
Defendant's account
Prior record
Detainers
Misc. 20 items

100%

100%
None, decision already made
Pretrial release status at time of offense
Defendant's drug history
Defendant's education
Defendant's employment history
Defendant's psychological history
Effectiveness of witnesses
Police conduct
Misc. 22 items

Defense counsel (N=102)

Items chosen 10th
37
21
7
9

5

7

5
4
4
4

5
5
5
4

3

4

31

3
3
3
31

100%

None, decision already made
Defendant's employment history
Aggravating mitigating circumstances
Reputation of prosecutor as trial attorney
Defendant's psychological history
Defendant's race and ethnicity
Defendant's education
Judge's reputation for leniency
Defendant's age
Police conduct
Effectiveness of witnesses
Misc. 22 items

100%
Continued
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Table 4.3

Rank order of the first 12 items of information consulted before deciding whether to plea
bargain in simulated burglary case by type of attorney-Continued
(In percentages)
Rank order of item
Prosecutors (N = 134)

None, decision already made
Defendant's psychological history
Defendant's age
Judge's reputation for leniency
Detainers
Aggravating/mitigating circumstances
Local residency
Defendant's alcoholic history
Police attitude toward plea
Police conduct
Misc. 21 items

% of Prosecutors/
defense counsel
choosing items

Items chosen 11th
25
45
6
5

4

5

4

5

4
3

4
4

3
3

4
4

3
3

3
3

22

3
3
3
3
3
3

20
100%

Defense counsel (N = 102)

None, decision already made
Defendant's age
Police conduct
Reputation of prosecutor as trial attorney
Aggravating/mitigating circumstances
Relationship between prosecutor and defense
counsel
Defendant's employment record
Defendant's marital status
Defendant's psychological history
Judge's reputation for leniency
Evidence
Available alternatives to incarceration
Victim's attitude toward plea
Pretrial release status for this offense
Pretrial release status at time of this offense
Defendant's drug history
Misc. 10 items

100%

Items chosen 12th
None, decision already made
Judge's reputation for leniency
Defendant's employment history
Defendant's psychological history
Codefendants
Pretrial release status for this offense
Defendant's alcoholic history
Misc. 21 items

50
4

28
7

3
3
3
3
3
31

7
7
5
4
3
3
3
3
30

100%

100%

None, decision already made
Defendant's sex
Defendant's education
Defendant's employment history
Defendant's psychological history
Judge's reputation for leniency
Victim's attitude toward plea
Pretrial release status for this offense
Pretrial release status at time of this offense
Defendant's drug history
Misc. 30 items

types of attorney (see Table 4.3). Another item of information also related to case strength is "Effectiveness of
witnesses at trial." It was chosen by two-thirds of each
type of attorney and was usually an early choice. Also
consulted by the great majority of both types of attorneys was the "Defendant's account of the incident." The
defendant may have an alibi or a defense or a plausible
alternative version of what happened. Another item of
information related to case strength is "Propriety of
police conduct after arrest." Improper police conduct

Case Strength. There is substantial agreement among all
attorneys with regard to the primary importance of case
strength (see Table 4.2). The concept of case strength
could not be reduced to any one card (item of information) in the simulation. The two cards which are most
obviously related to it are: "Basic facts of the case" and
"Evidence-substance of available." Ninety-one percent
or more of each type of attorney consulted these two
cards before making their decisions. What is more, these
two cards were usually the first cards chosen by both
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could lose or weaken a case. The literature and our
interviews have suggested that plea bargaining is the
way prosecutors salvage cases in which the police have
acted improperly. Thus, it is somewhat surprising that
only 38 percent of the prosecutors and 35 percent of the
defense counsel consulted this item. Perhaps this represents a vote of confidence in the lawfulness of the police
in handling this type of crime. On the other hand, it may
suggest that the local courts are not sympathetic to motions to suppress evidence due to blunders by the constable.
Still another item related to case strength is whether
there are codefendants. About 40 percent of both types
of attorneys consulted this card. A codefendant changes
the nature of a case. The presence of a codefendant does
not in itself make the case stronger or weaker, but it
does make the case more complicated. Each codefendant
will have his own attorney and his own account of the
incident. Multiple defendants provide the opportunity
for bargaining one defendant against the other.
Still other factors less obviously related to case strength
were consulted by some attorneys. Several items of information about the defendant are of this kind. If the defendant had been under the influence of alcohol or
drugs; it may have been difficult to establish the requisite
criminal intent. The case may not have been burglary
but unlawful entry. Some of the prosecutors who consulted these cards later explained that they were concerned with the matter of intent. The fact that so few
prosecutors (about one-third) checked these cards might
be regarded as indirect evidence of the lack of prosecutorial concern for accurate charging. But we feel that
such an interpretation would be stretching the limitations
of the simulation. Had these cards been labeled differently, more prosecutors might have consulted them. For instance, if the label had been "Defendant's state of intoxication at time of offense," more prosecutors might have
checked the card.

fense attorneys (93 percent) that the seriousness of the
defendant ("Defendant's prior record and police reputation") must be consulted before the plea bargaining decision could be made (Table 4.2). Also remarkable is the
fact that by the end of the third item of information
chosen, 42 percent of the prosecutors and 18 percent of
the defense counsel had consulted the item (Table 4.3).
In addition, other cards relating to the defendant's seriousness were consulted. The defendant's age, for instance, is relevant to his or her dangerousness because it
establishes the rate of criminal activity over time and his
or her progress in a criminal career. Other indicators of
defendant's seriousness include such things as whether
the defendant has outstanding detainers; whether he or
she was on some form of release at the time of the instant offense; his military record; and whether he or she
comes from a family that is involved in criminal behavior. Even the defendant's employment status can be used
as a measure of his or her dangerousness. The defendant
with a long history of unemployment readily fits the
image of the criminal who will have to make a living
through crime if he or she is on the street.
Seriousness of the crime. The general level of seriousness
of the crime is established by the nature of the chargein this case, burglary. But there are variations in the seriousness of burglaries, depending upon the circumstances
of the offense. The law, itself, captures these variations
(but only crudely) with its distinctions between degrees
of burglary. Experienced attorneys make finer distinctions. The law in some places distinguishes between day
and night burglaries and between commercial and residential burglaries. Experienced attorneys go further.
They distinguish between whether a residence is being
lived in at the time of the offense; whether it was actually occupied at the time; and whether the trespasser was
breaking in merely to get out of the cold or to find a
place to stay while intoxicated on drugs or alcohol or to
steal or do violence. It is not surprising that the great
majority of prosecutors and defense counsel (86 percent
and 76 percent respectively) consulted the card "Aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the offense," or
that this card was usually consulted early in the decision
making.

In addition to his records of drug and alcohol use, some
attorneys checked other defendant attributes for the purpose of checking case strength. (Asking attorneys why
they chose certain cards was not part of the original
design of the research; but some attorneys volunteered
explanations.) For instance, some prosecutors checked
the defendant's race and then somewhat apologetically
explained they were just making sure that he matched
the description given by the witness. Some prosecutors
checked the defendant's psychological history to make
sure that the issue of an insanity defense would not come
up.

Caseload. Our earlier conclusion that caseload pressures
act at a distance and are not a major factor in deciding
what to do with individual cases is supported by the
finding that only 7 percent of the prosecutors and 25
percent of the defense attorneys consulted the card entitled "Backlog of docket of judge to whom case is assigned." Moreover, this card was not consulted by a substantial number of attorneys within the first 12 choices.

Seriousness of the criminal. There was almost unanimous
agreement among both prosecutors (92 percent) and de-
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Differences in information processing between prosecutors
and defense counsel. The most noticeable difference between defense attorneys and prosecutors is that the defense attorneys consulted more information than prosecutors (Table 4.2). In 29 out of the 39 items of information in the table, a greater proportion of defense attorneys than prosecutors consulted the item. For 22 of the
items the proportion of defense attorneys was one and a
half items or more as great as that of the prosecutors.
For only eight items were prosecutors more likely than
defense attorneys to consult the items; and for only two
of these was the difference substantial. These two items
are: the attitudes of the victim and the police toward the
plea bargain. The fact that 41 percent of the prosecutors
were concerned for the victim's opinion of the plea bargain reveals a much higher degree of prosecutorial concern for victim opinion than was believed to have existed (McDonald, 1977). The fact that 38 percent of the
prosecutors were concerned with the police attitude
toward the plea bargain suggests that prosecutors are
more concerned about police opinion than the police
would lead you to believe (McDonald et al., 1981 ). Also
noteworthy about the prosecutors' concern for the
police and the victim is the fact it occurs earlier in their
decision making than in that of defense counsel.
The distinctive approach of defense counsel to the evaluation of cases for plea bargaining can be further appreciated by reviewing those items of information that defense attorneys consult substantially more often and/or
substantially earlier than prosecutors. There are three
broad classes of such items: defendant's attributes; personal matters relating to criminal justice actors; and
other things. Defense attorneys are consistently more interested in personal attributes of .the defendant including
his or her sex; race and ethnicity; intelligence and education; employment; marital status; history of drug and alcohol use; psychological problems; sexual orientation;
physical health; and whether the instant crime was committed while on some form of release for another crime.
The defense attorneys' interest in these matters was
unlike the prosecutors' concern that criminal intent
might not be provable. Rather, it reflects their special
role in plea bargaining, the job of mitigating the case.
That role was identified by an experienced public defender, quoted by Mather (1974:278) as follows:
Let me put it to you this way: What is our job as a
criminal lawyer in most instances: No. 1 is . . . no
kidding, we know the man's done it, or we feel he's
done it, he may deny it, but the question is, Can
they prove it? The next thing is: Can we mitigate it?
Of course you can always find something good to
say about the guy-to mitigate it. Those are the two
things that are important and that's what you do
[emphasis in the original].

Assessing case strength is something both prosecutors
and defense attorneys do. But, the job of "mitigating:•
the case is primarily that of defense counsel. Mitigation
can be construed narrowly in a legal sense or broadly.
Both prosecutors and defense attorneys are concerned
with aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the
narrow sense, such as whether a weapon was used,
whether there was a provocation by the victim, or
whether the victim was threatened. But the defense
counsel's job of "mitigating" a case means more than
merely consulting the card. "Aggravating and mitigating
circumstances." It refers to the overall strategy and purpose of the defense counsel in plea bargaining. It means
playing down the defendant's worst features and playing
up his or her best. Thus, when it comes to the seriousness of the crime and the criminal, the defense counsel's
job is to reinterpret reality so his or her client will
appear in the best possible light. For instance, a defense
attorney from Norfolk, Virginia, told us how he was
able to get an "excellent" deal in a murder case by
pointing out to the police and prosecutors that the
victim was a well-known drug pusher whom everyone
was delighted to be rid of. The attorney felt he could
have gotten an even better deal but for th~ fact tha.t his
client "had shown bad form" in the killing. His. client
had confronted the victim over an alleged mistreatment
of the client's sister. The victim had pleaded for mercy
and then turned and ran., The client gave chase· and shot
the victim in the back. The defense attorney felt that if
his client had shot the victim when they were face to
face it would have been easier to portray him as simply
an outraged brother. The shooting in the back after the
pleas for mercy could not be easily "mitigated." It conveyed the image of a person who was heartless, hence,
more dangerous, and, hence, deserving of a more severe
plea bargain.
The job of mitigation begins with playing down the seriousness of the offense and the seriousness of the offender
but does not end there. It involves looking "for something good to say about the guy." Neubauer (1974:219)
was correct in saying that defense counsel evaluate cases
the same as prosecutors do as far as the big three factors
are concerned but then go on to make "particularistic
appeals." The idea of a two-stage model of plea bargaining, the first stage dealing with a general discount usually given to a general category of cases and the second
stage wherein improvements upon that general discount
are sought, seems to be supported by our simulation
data. It is at this second stage of plea bargaining where
the defense counsel plays his or her unique role. 18 Here

18
Although we have described plea bargaining as a "two-stage model,"
we don't mean to imply that defense counsel consciously divide their
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is where he or she looks for any reason that his or her
client should get an additional break. This accounts for
the fact that defense attorneys consistently consulted
more information. Several of them desperately flipped
through our array of cards commenting, "Doesn't this
guy have anything going for him?"
The second broad class of items which defense counsel
consulted substantially more often than and earlier than
prosecutors involved personal characteristics of criminal
justice actors. More specifically, defense counsel were
more concerned than prosecutors with: (1) the trial
judge's reputation for leniency (75 percent compared to
33 percent); (2) the reputation of the opposing attorney
(54 percent compared to 19 percent); and (3) the relationship between the prosecutor and the defense attorney (45 percent compared to 5 percent).
By the end of the ninth card chosen, at least 30 percent
of the defense attorneys (compared to 9 percent of the
prosecutors) had consulted the "Judge's reputation for
leniency" card. This suggests that the judge has a much
more influential role in setting the limits of plea bargains
than was evident before. Our interview findings were
ambiguous on this point. On the one hand, it was clear
that some judges establish the upper limits of bargainedfor terms by their sentencing tendencies. Prosecutors
had to offer the judge's known sentence limit or something better in order to get a defendant to plead. In several jurisdictions, judges would not tolerate prosecutors
"embarrassing" them or "putting the heat on them" by
recommending sentences more severe than the judge's
usual standards. It is not uncommon for judges to reprimand assistant prosecutors or call their supervisors and
have them moved to a different courtroom if prosecutors
persist in recommending sentences that are higher than
what the judge cares to impose. Thus, it is somewhat
surprising to find in the decision simulation that relatively few prosecutors (33 percent) showed concern for the
judge's sentencing practice.

sian simulation does not fully resolve that quandary, it
does suggest that in the minds of defense counsel the
judge's preferences are decisive.
Return now to the other two "personal" items that defense attorneys consulted more frequently than prosecutors, namely, reputation of the opposing attorney and the
professional relationship between the two attorneys. Although the literature and our own interviews had indicated that the reputation of an attorney has a bearing in
some pleas bargains, there was nothing to indicate that
this factor would be three times more important to defense counsel than to prosecutors. Nor was there anything to explain why defense attorneys would consult
this item much earlier than prosecutors. If anything, reports about the "plead them guilty bar" would lead one
to predict that prosecutors would be more concerned
than defense attorneys regarding the reputation of the
opposing counsel. Nor can we offer any convincing explanations for why defense counsel were nine times
more likely to want to know about the professional relationship between the hypothetical prosecutor and themselves.
Finally, we turn to the "all other" category. We cannot
convincingly explain why defense counsel should be 3.7
times more interested in the state of the judge's docket.
Perhaps it is because of the defense tactic of seeking
continuances in order to delay a case in the hopes of
weakening the case. Defense counsel's greater interest in
"alternatives to incarceration" is for obvious reasons.
The only surprising thing may be that only 45 percent of
thel]l consulted this card. As to why defense counsel
should have a greater interest than prosecutors in the
victim's age, sex, and race, we have no convincing explanation. In the basic facts of the case it was clear that
the victim had not been personally confronted by the
burglar. Also unclear is why defense counsel are more
concerned than prosecutors with publicity. However, all
of these differences might be explained as part of defense
counsel's desperate search for any grounds for particularistic appeals.

On the other hand, we also found that some judges seem
to follow what the prosecutor recommends. (Of course,
these prosecutors might recommend what they know the
judges want to hear.) Other judges state that they take
the prosecutor's recommendation as the upper limit on
the terms of any deal and then usually settle on something less than that or split the difference between what
the prosecutor and the defense want. In short, our interviews left us in a quandary about whether the judge's
personal sentencing preferences played a decisive role in
setting the limits of plea bargaining. Although the deci-

Consistency of estimates of case strength. The question of
whether given the same case different attorneys would
agree in their estimates of its chance of conviction at
trial is addressed by the data in Table 4.4. Two cases, a
robbery and a burglary, each with strong and weak versions of case strength, were presented to attorneys. As
Table 4.4 indicated, the attorneys were willing to give
estimates of case strength in finer categories than the
simple dichotomy of "deadbang" or "reasonable doubt."
They gave specific probabilities of conviction. Their answers have been grouped into seven categories to show
the considerable disagreement that occurred in some cat-

thinking into two parts. We are making such division only for analytic
purposes.
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egories. However, if one collapses these categories into
three broader categories (namely, 40 percent probability
of conviction or less, 41 to 70 percent; and 71 percent or
greater), then one can more easily see the degree of consistency with regard to these estimates. On the one hand,
there is remarkably strong agreement among both prosecutors and defense attorneys in their conviction estimates for the strong versions of both cases. From 82
percent to 94 percent of these attorneys felt that these
cases had a 71 percent or better chance of conviction.
What is more, there is no statistically significant difference between prosecutors or defense counsel in their estimates in these strong cases. These findings are all the

Table 4.4

more remarkable when one recalls the terms of the simulation. That is, these attorneys had been instructed to
give their estimates of the probability of conviction on
the assumptions that (1) they would be the attorney at
trial and (2) their trial would be before a jury like the
ones with which they were familiar in their own respective jurisdictions. Given the pervasive courthouse folklore about the importance of differences in the trial ability of attorneys and differences in the preferences of local
juries, one would expect much greater disagreement in
these estimates of the probability of conviction. Recall
that our attorneys were from many different jurisdictions.

Attorneys' estimates or probability of conviction by type of attorney, strength of case, and
type of crime*

Strong case
Type of crime and probability of conviction

Estimated probability of conviction in Robbery case was:
Less than 20%
21-40%
41-60%
61-70%
71-80%
81-90%
91-100%

Prosecutors

Defense
attorneys

Prosecutors

(N=69)
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.8
14.5
29.0
50.7

(N=54)
0.0
1.9
3.7
5.6
16.7
22.2
50.0

(N=69)
17.4
8.7
24.6
5.8
10.0
0.0
33.3

100.0%

100.1 %**

d.f=5
P=.49 n.s.
(N=66)
0.0
4.5
7.6
4.5
22.7
24.2
36.4
100.0%
x 2 =10.404
d.f=6
P=0.7 n.s.
*Source: Georgetown Plea Bargaining Simulation.
**Percentages not summing to 100.0 are due to rounding errors.
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100.0%

Defense
attorneys
(N=51)
13.7
11.8
15.7
3.9
0.0
0.0
54.9
100.0%

x 2 =10.2431
d.f=5
P=0.7 n.s.

X2 =4.464

Estimated probability of conviction in Burglary case was:
Less than 20%
21-40%
41-60%
61-70%
71-80%
81-90%
91-100%

Weak case

(N = 52)
0.0
3.8
1.9
11.5
11.5
13.5
57.7
100.0%

(N=68)
4.4
7.4
19.1
4.4
22.1
10.3
32.4
100.0%
X2 =23.846

d.f=6
P<.001

(N=50)
4.0
14.0
6.0
12.0
4.0
0.0
60.0
100.0%

The surprising amount of agreement suggests that (at
least under certain circumstances) the estimation of case
strength can be done with a good deal of reliability.
That is, when cases approach being "deadbang" and
when the estimates of case strength are given in broad
categories (such as "71 percent or better"), there will be
considerable agreement among different attorneys about
the probability of conviction, no matter who the attorney is and no matter what the vagaries of local juries
may be.
On the other hand, looking at the two weak cases in
Table 4.4, one notices considerably less agreement in the
estimates of case strength. A striking disagreement
occurs in the weak robbery case. Also noteworthy is
that the same split occurs among both prosecutors and
defense attorneys. The difference by type of attorney is
not statistically significant.
In the weak case, however, there is both a split among
attorneys of the same type and between the two types of
attorney. The latter split is statistically significant. More
defense attorneys than prosecutors see this case as a very
strong case (91 percent or stronger). But also more def~nse attorneys than prosecutors ( 18 percent compared
with 11.8 percent) .see it as a weaker case (40 percent or
less chance of conviction)!
In sum, the findings suggest that when cases are strong
different attorneys regardless of whether they are prosecutors or defense counsel will agree on the estimates of
case strength. But, when cases are weak there will be
moderate to substantial disagreement among attorneys
and between attorneys of different types. Perhaps strong
cases "try themselves" whereas the skills of an attorney
and the vagaries of local juries make a greater difference
in the weaker cases.

ture suggest that prosecutors would be less likely to dismiss defendants with serious prior records. As to the
effect of case strength, it was hard to know what to predict. There were some grounds to believe that each of
the three options might be increased when a case is
weak. Some prosecutors feel weak cases do not belong
in the system. Hence, weak cases might be nollied more
often. Alternatively, some prosecutors feel that weak
cases are precisely the ones whose outcomes should be
determined by the trial process. Hence, weak cases
might be taken to trial more often. Finally, there is the
"half-a-loaf' hypothesis first noted in the 1920's by
Maley (1929) and reconfirmed by Alschuler (1968) and
our own interview data. Prosecutors feel it is their duty
to try to get a conviction for something rather than dismiss a case or take the risk of losing it at trial (see Chapter 3). Hence the weaker the case the more likely the
prosecutor is to plea bargain it.
Of the three hypotheses, the half-a-loaf hypothesis is the
one that most practitioners and researchers would probably expect to be supported by our simulation data. But
surprisingly, it was not. No matter how the data were
analyzed (including an analysis of variance not presented
here), the half-a-loaf hypothesis was consistently not supported. Prosecutors were not more likely to plea bargain
the weaker version of the cases. Prior record and
strength of case did have a significant impact on the
prosecutor's choice of disposition routes but not in a
simple, straightforward way. Their greater impact occurred when the two factors were taken together.
Table 4.5 illustrates this joint effect and also shows that
the half-a-loaf hypothesis was not supported. The data
indicate that when a defendant with a serious prior
record is involved, differences in case strength do not
produce statistically significant differences in the prosecutor's choice between dropping the case, taking it to
trial, or plea bargaining it. But, when a minor prior
record is involved, then prosecutors are more likely to
either go to trial or to drop the case than negotiate it.

The prosecutor's choice of disposition. The question of
what factors influence the prosecutor's decision to (1)
take a case to trial, (2) dismiss it, or (3) plea bargain it
was the subject of several analyses performed on the decision simulation data. Particular attention was given to
the influence of prior record and case strength. Previous
research and our own interview data gave us conflicting
expectations about what relationships would occur between each of these two factors and the prosecutor's
choice of disposition route. 19 Experience and the litera-

This finding suggests that prosecutors are more consistent and rational in their decisionmaking than their critics
believe. The data indicate that there is a logic to prosecutor's decisionmaking. This fact alone should provide
some comfort to those critics who fear that prosecutors
exercise their discretion haphazardly. But whether or
not the particular logic revealed by the data is regarded
as desirable depends on one's perspective.
There are two critical perspectives from which prosecutorial decisionmaking is usually judged: (1) from a concern for the safety of the community; and (2) from a
concern for the fairness and propriety of procedures

•• American defendants today are not required by law to go to trial.
They may plead guilty. Thus, when we speak of prosecutors "choosing" to go to trial, we only mean they are refusing to offer a plea bargain. The defendants might still plead guilty as charged.
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Table 4.5

Prosecutor's disposition decision by strength of case controlling for prior record and type of
crime*

Type of crime and disposition decision

Robbery:
Nolle prosequi
Go to trial
Plea bargain

Strong case
Serious
prior record

Weak case
Serious
prior record

Strong case
Minor prior
record

Weak case
Minor prior
record

(N=35)
0
6
94

(N=38)
5
8
87

(N=34)
3
12
85

(N=29)
21
4
75

100%

100%

100%

100%

x 2 =5.9730
d.f.=2
P(x 2 )=.05
gamma=.35

x 2 =1.9459
d.f.=2
P(x 2 )=.37 n.s.

Burglary:
Nolle prosequi
Go to trial
Plea bargain

(N=29)
3
10
87

(N=35)
3
6
91

(N=35)
0
11
97

(N=28)
14
11
75

100%

100%

100%

100%

x 2=.50155
d.f.=·
P(x 2 )=.66 n.s.

x 2 =7.3861
d.f.=2
P(x 2 )=.02
gamma=.84

*Source: Georgetown University Plea Bargain Simulation.

used in administering criminal justice. Both types of critics will find things to comfort and distress them in Table
4.5; but what is a comfort to one will be a distress to the
other. Some persons concerned for the public's safety
worry that prosecutors for reasons of laziness, ineptness,
or political ambition prefer to get rid of (dismiss) weak
cases and thereby put the community safety at risk. Such
people should be reassured by the finding that prosecutors are more likely to dismiss weak cases only if the de-fendant has a minor prior record. But while this may reassure people concerned for community safety, it worries persons concerned about due process and the principle of legality. From the latter perspective if cases are
weak enough to dismiss, then prior record should not
have any effect. Such cases should be dismissed regardless of whether the defendant has a serious prior record.

gality through plea bargaining. Among cases with serious prior records there was no significant increase in
plea bargaining among the weak compared with the
strong version of the case. This same finding, however,
may be distressing to the persons concerned about community safety. Less troubled by the possible coerciveness
of plea bargaining, these people may feel that the fact
that prosecutors did not resort to plea bargaining significantly more often when serious criminals were involved
represents a critical neglect of the public interest.
The Prosecutor's Sentencing Decision. In this analysis we
present two sentencing decisions. The first is the prosecutor's choice between type of sentence, i.e., probation,
jail time, or prison time. The second is the length of the
sentence. The focus of our analyses is on the influence of
prior record and case strength on these two decisions.
An analysis not presented here found that differences in
the seriousness of prior record by itself did not significantly affect any of the four decisions analyzed here, i.e.,
the type of sentence and length of sentence decisions for
the burglary and the robbery cases. As for the influence

Another matter addressed by the data in Table 4.5 is the
concern of the due process critics is that plea bargaining
is used by prosecutors to "get" serious defendants in
weak cases that might be lost at trial. To these critics the
findings should b.e of some comfort. They suggest that
prosecutors are not trying to defeat the principle of le-
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of case strength, it by itself did have a significant effect
on the prosecutor's two sentencing decisions (type and
length of sentence) with respect to the burglary case but
not to the robbery case.
The analyses presented in Tables 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 examine the influence of case strength and prior record
taken together. Five of the sixteen comparisons were significant. That is, five combinations of case strength and
prior record but not all combinations made a difference
in the sentencing decisions of prosecutors. When one
looks at just cases involving minor prior records, then
differences in case strength do have a significant impact
on the prosecutor's decision about type of sentence in
both robbery and burglary (Table 4.6). As expected,
prosecutors are more likely to seek a lenient type of sentence in a weak case.
Table 4.7 indicates that when dealing with just weak
cases and only with burglaries a difference in the seriousness of the prior record has a significant impact on
the type of sentence sought by the prosecutor. As expected (logically and from the literature), prosecutors
seek a more lenient type of sentence for the defendant
with the minor prior record.
Table 4.8 indicates that only when one is dealing with
cases that are burglaries and that involve minor prior
records does the difference in the strength of the case

Table 4.6

make a significant difference in the length of sentence
sought by the prosecutor in plea bargaining. Finally,
Table 4.9 indicates that only in robbery cases that are
weak does a difference in the seriousness of the prior
record make a significant difference in the length of sentence sought by the prosecutor. As expected, prosecutors seek more lenient sentences for defendants with
minor prior records.
In summary, differences in case strength and seriousness
of prior record do not by themselves or acting together
consistently influence the prosecutor's sentencing decisions. But when they do have significant impacts either
alone or conjointly, the impacts are in the expected directions. That is, prosecutors are more likely to give
more lenient deals in weaker cases and in cases with
minor prior records. Generally, it seems that the influence of these factors tends to be significant only in
"marginal" circumstances, situations that present the
greatest opportunity for dissent over disposition and
sentence. No one thing identifies these situations; but
they can be thought of as the opposite of those cases
that "try themselves." They are the cases that "do not
dispose of themselves." They tend to be the ones with
the less extreme circumstances, e.g., the crimes of
medium seriousness; the cases that are neither terribly
strong nor completely nonexistent; the ones involving
defendants with some prior record but not a life of
cnme.

Type of sentence sought by prosecutor in plea bargaining by case strength controlling for
prior record and type of crime*

Type of crime-Type of sentence

Robbery:
Time in prison
Time in jail
Probation

Strong case
Serious
prior record

Weak case
Serious
prior record

Strong case
Minor prior
record

Weak case
Minor prior
record

(N=26)
81
11
8

(N=26)
77
15
8

(N=21)
81
19
0

(N=18)
50
28
22

100%

100%

100%

100%

x 2 =1.672
d.f.=2
P(x 2 )=.91 n.s.
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x 2 =6.3032
d.f.=2
P(x 2 )=.04
gamma=t.65

Continued

Table 4.6

Type of sentence sought by prosecutor in plea bargaining by case strength controlling for
prior record and type of crlme*-Continued

Type of crime-Type of sentence

Strong case
Serious
prior record

Weak case
Serious
prior record

Strong case
Minor prior
record

Weak case
Minor prior
record

(N=17)
59
29
12

(N=22)
41
18
41

(N=22)
46
27
27

(N=21)
21
5
74

100%

100%

100%

100%

Burglary:
Time in prison
Time in jail
Probation

x 2 =5.5864
d.f.= 2
P(x 2 )=.06 n.s.

X2 =9.1724

d.f. =2
P(x 2 )=.01
gamma=.72

•source: Georgetown University Plea Bargain Simulation.

Table 4.7

Types of sentence sought by prosecutor In plea bargaining by seriousness of prior record
controlling for strength of case and type of crime*

Type of crime-Type of sentence

Strong case
Serious
prior record

Strong case
Minor prior
record

Weak case
Serious
prior record

Weak case
Minor prior
record

(N=26)
81
11
8

(N=21)
81
19
0

(N=26)

(N=18)
50
28
22

100%

100%

Robbery:
Time in prison
Time in jail
Probation

2

15
8
100%
x =3.6151
d.f.=2
P(x•)=.16

(N=17)
59
29
12

(N=22)
46
27
27

100%

100%

(N=22)
41
18
41

(N=19)
21
5
74

100%

100%

X =4.0437

x 2 =7.6936

d.f.=2
P(x 2 )=.13 n.s.

d.f.=2
P(x 2 )=.02
gamma=+.62

2

•source: Georgetown University Plea Bargain Simulation.
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100%

2

x =2.0522
d.f.=2
P(x 2 )=.36 n.s.
Burglary:
Time in prison
Time in jail
Probation
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Table 4.8

Length of sentence sought by prosecutor in plea bargaining by strength of case
controlling for prior record and type of crime•

Type of crime-length of sentence sought

Strong case
Serious
prior record

Weak case
Serious
prior record

Strong case
Minor prior
record

Weak case
Minor prior
record

(N=35)
46
23
11
8
3
9

(N=38)
45
26
10
8
3
8

(N=34)
47
12
12
17
9
3

(N = 31)
35
10
3
10
10
32

100%
x 2 =1.6525
d.f.=5
P(x 2 )=.89 n.s.

100%

100%

100%

(N=31)
29
23
5
13
23
5

(N=35)
29
14
11
6
11
29

.. 98%

100%

Robbery:
5 years or more
2-5 years
1-2 years
6 mos.-1 year
0-6 mos.
Probation

Burglary:
5 years or more
2-5 years
1-2 years
6 mos.-1 year
0-6 mos.
Probation

X2 =1.5428

d.f.=5
P(x 2 )=.91 n.s.

x 2 =7.6565
d.f.=5
P(x 2 ) = .17 n.s.

(N=35)
14
·11
11
11
34
17

(N=33)
24
6
3
12
9
45

**98%

**99%

x 2 =12.3679
d.f.=5
P(x 2 )=.03
gamma=+.14

*Source: Georgetown University Plea Bargain Simulation.
**Due to rounding error.

Table 4.9

Length of sentence sought by prosecutor in plea bargaining by prior record
controlling for strength of case and type of crime•

Type of crime-length of sentence sought

Robbery:
5 years or more
2-5 years
1-2 years
6 mos.-1 year
0-6 mos.
Probation

Strong case
Serious
prior record

Strong case
Minor prior
record

Weak case
Serious
prior record

Weak case
Minor prior
record

(N=35)
46
23
11
7
3
9

(N=34)
47
12
12
18
9
3

(N=38)
45
26
10
8
3
8

(N=31)
35
10
3
10
10
32

**99%

**101%

100%

x 2 =4.3197
d.f.=5
P(x 2 )=.50 n.s.

100%

x 2 =11.0275
d.f.=5
P(x') = .0.5 n.s.
gamma=+.35

Continued
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Table 4.9

Length of sentence sought by prosecutor in plea bargaining by prior record
controlling for strength of case and type of crime*-Continued

Type of crime-length of sentence sought

Burglary:
5 years or more
2-5 years
1-2 years
6 mos.-1 year
0-6 mos.
Probation

Strong case
Serious
prior record

Strong case
Minor prior
record

Weak case
Serious
prior record

Weak case
Minor prior
record

(N=31)
29
23
6
13
23
6

(N=35)
14
11
11
11
34
17

(N=35)
29
14
11
6
11
29

(N=33)
24
6
3
12
9
45

**98%

100%

100%

**99%

x 2 =5.7220
d.f.=5
P(x 2 )=.33

X 2 =5.630

n.s.

d.f.=5
P(x 2 ) = .34 n.s.

*Source: Georgetown University Plea Bargain Simulation.
**Due to rounding error.

The presence of one or more of these circumstances
makes the calculation of what the just disposition and
sentence should be much more difficult. Reasonable
people are more likely to differ over these cases than
over the cases with the more extreme circumstances. It
is here apparently that differences in case strength and
prior record can make the difference in what decisions
are made about the case. This is not altogether surprising. We had chosen burglary because we regarded it as a
"marginal" crime. In our early field work it seemed that
the greatest amount of consensus among the various
actors in the courthouse occurred in the more extreme
cases. Burglary was one of those crimes that could go
either way depending upon differences in philosophy of
the lawyers involved and differences in the crime prob·
lem facing the jurisdiction. Some suburban jurisdictions
regarded burglary as an extremely serious offense, while
neighboring urban jurisdictions with high burglary rates
treated it less seriously. Even within jurisdictions there
was considerable variation between judges and other
actors in their view of the seriousness of burglary. There
was greater consensus about robbery.

tions where agreement among actors in the system seems
to be at its lowest.
Also, it is not surprising to find that when case strength
did have an effect, it was in the direction of a more lenient sentence for weaker cases. This is part of what is
implied by the half-a-loaf hypothesis. But, it is remarkable that the sentencing implications of the half-a-loaf hypothesis are borne out by the data when earlier we saw
that the halfca-loaf hypothesis' implication regarding the
prosecutor's choice of dispositions (i.e., that he would be
more likely to plea bargain than to go to trial or dismiss
weak cases) are not supported by the data. Also remarkable is the fact that prior record and case strength did not
significantly affect the sentencing decisions more often
than they did. Our conclusion that they seem to make
significant differences only in marginal circumstances is
an ex post facto attempt to make some sense of the data.
But, as an explanation it is something less than compelling. For us the data raise more questions than they
answer.
Differences in outcome choices between prosecutors and
defense counsel. In addition to the question of whether
prosecutors and defense attorneys consult the same items
of information, there is the question of whether they
agree on what should be done with the case once they
have learned the facts. We noted earlier that in estimating the probability of conviction there was not statistically significant difference between prosecutors and de-

Similarly, there seemed to be greater consensus about
what to do with strong cases than weak cases and with
defendants with serious prior records than defendants
with minor prior records. Thus, in retrospect we are not
surprised to find that the influence of prior record and
case strength appear to be significant only in those situa-
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fense attorneys in three of the four comparisons. It was
only in the weak burglary case that the two groups differed.
We turn now to the three subsequent decisions analyzed
in this chapter: the choice as to whether to plea bargain
or go to trial; 20 the choice of type of sentence sought,
i.e., prison time, jail time, or probation; and finally, the
choice as to length of sentence.
With regard of all three decisions we were uncertain
about what, if any, differences to expect between prosecutors and defense counsel. The literature (Alschuler,
1975; Blumberg, 1967; Cole, 1975; Grossman, 1969; Skolnick, 1967) has emphasized that the adversary system
exists in theory only. In practice, the informal social relationships that develop among defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and other courthouse actors compromise
the adversarial nature of the relationship. Defense attorneys have been described as coopted double-agents who
sacrifice their clients' interests in the interests of court
efficiency, the maintaining of good relations with judges
and prosecutors, and the making of a faster buck. Plea
bargaining has been condemned as "an inherently irrational method of administering justice" because, among
other things, it "subjects defense attorneys to serious

20 We have deleted the option of nolle prosequi from this part of the
analysis because it is only relevant to prosecutors.

Table 4.10

temptations to disregard their clients' interest" (Alschuler, 1975:1180).
Our interviews and observations confirmed that informal
social relationships among courthouse actors do develop
and in limited ways do influence their decisions and actions. It is undeniable that plea bargaining offers defense
counsel numerous temptations to sacrifice their client's
interest. But when we asked defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges how often defense counsel succumb to
these temptations, the answers were not unanimous. Yes,
a few defense attorneys are notoriously unethical. Yes, a
few defense attorneys will do anything to avoid taking a
case to trial. Yes, some defense attorneys reveal confidential information obtained from their clients to prosecutors in the course of plea bargaining. But, whether
these and other facts mean that the adversarial system is
dead is another matter. We concluded that the existing
literature had overstated the nonadversarial nature of
plea negotiations. While it is true that defense attorneys
act cooperatively with prosecutors in plea bargaining
and do lean on their clients to plea bargain when the
client would prefer to go to trial, it was not our impression that this was usually done with improper motives or
that this usually involved a sacrifice of the client's interests. We do not feel that cooperation between defense
attorneys and prosecutors precludes an adversarial relationship. It may just make the adversarial characteristics
of the interaction more difficult to see.

Comparison between prosecutors and defense counsel In their decisions
to go to trial or plea bargain by type of crime*
Defense
counsel

Prosecutors

(N=102)
31
69

(N=127)
8
92

Robbery:
Go to trial
Plea bargain

100%

100%
x 2 =20.8559
d.f.=1
P(x 2 )= <.0001
gamma=-.80
(N=98)
32
78

(N=120)
7
93

Burglary:

Go to trial
Plea bargain

100%

100%
X 2 =10.1926

d.f.=1
P(x 2 )= <.001
gamma=-.58
*Source: Georgetown Plea Bargain Simulation.
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Turning now to our first comparison, we have two alternative hypotheses about what the relationship might be
between type of attorney and the decision to plea bargain or go to trial. The literature suggests that either
there would be no difference between defense attorneys
and prosecutors (because defense attorneys have been
coopted and nonadversarial) or that there may be a difference in the direction of defense counsel being more
likely to decide to plea bargain than to go to trial (because plea bargaining is easier, faster, and more convenient for defense attorneys). The results of our comparison are presented in Table 4.10. Once again the data are
surprising. Neither of the two hypotheses is supported.

had not been prepared for these tindings. However, it is
possible to construct a rationale explaining why defense
attorneys were more likely to go to trial. Earlier we
noted that 75 percent of the defense counsel compared
with only 33 percent of the prosecutors consulted the
card entitled "Judge's reputation for leniency." The data
presented earlier (Table 4.2) were only for the burglary
case, but the same proportions were true of the robbery
case as well. In both cases the description of the judge
was the same. It read: "The trial judge is known to be
lenient and considers probation in this type of case. He
generally favors rehabilitative alternatives to incarceration."

There is a significant difference between prosecutors and
defense counsel in whether they would plea bargain or
go to trial. Contrary to expectations it is the defense attorneys and not the prosecutors who are more likely to
go to trial! This is true both in the robbery and the burglary case. In both cases the relationship is quite strong.

Having read this card, it seems obvious why defense
counsel should take the case to trial. They probably
could not have gotten a better deal from a prosecutor
than the maximum sentence they might get from this
judge. Therefore, the logical thing to do was to take the
case to trial and go for an acquittal. If they did lose,
they would not "lose big." This particular judge makes
plea bargaining with the prosecutor an irrelevant waste
of time. 22

When interpreting Table 4.10 and the other tables in this
section, it is important to remember that all attorneys
were clearly instructed to give their "bottom-line" recommendations, not their "opening offers." Thus, differences in their offers do not represent the distance between artificially inflated opening offers between two
seasoned negotiators. 21 Defense counsel (in Table 4.10)
who recommended that the case should go to trial were
not engaging in a ploy to get a better plea bargain out of
the prosecutor. Going to trial was their bottom-line decision.
Having excluded the possibility that the relationship described in Table 4.10 is due to negotiation tactics, it remains to explain what does account for the relationship.
We are again forced to engage in a retrospective interpretatiOn. Although we felt that the literature had overstated the nonadversary nature of plea negotiations, we

Our second comparison between prosecutors and defense attorneys focuses on their choices of type of sentence and length of sentence. That is, the first choice is
among prison time, jail time, or probation. The second
choice is among different lengths of sentence. For both
these comparisons we were uncertain about what to
expect. Several alternative hypotheses could be offered
with equal plausibility. One line of reasoning would lead
one to expect that the two types of attorneys would not
differ in these two choices. It could be reasoned that, assuming attorneys are able to evaluate cases, as they
claim, then both types of attorneys should agree on -the
true value of the case, that is, the type of sentence and
the length of sentence it deserves. Prosecutors and defense counsel might differ in their opening offers in plea

21
Of course, it is possible that the attorneys may have ignored our instructions and given bottom lines which were really closer to opening
offers. However, we feel this would have to have been done on a less
conscious level, because our instructions were clear and unambiguous.

20
We regret that we did not describe one of the judges as a severe
sentencer to see if this would have altered the results of this particular
comparison.
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bargaining, but the bottom line should be fairly close to
agreement.
One could reach the same expectation from alternative
starting points. For instance, the claim that defense
counsel do not take an adversary posture in negotiations
would also lead one to expect no difference between
types of attorneys. Alternatively, saying nothing about
whether attorneys act in an adversarial posture, one
could note the mere fact that in today's administration of
justice 90 percent of the time prosecutors and defense
counsel are able to reach agreements in plea negotiations. Hence, one could expect that there would be no
difference between these types of attorneys in the
bottom-lines arrived at in our decision simulation.
On the other hand, given our earlier discussion about the
defense attorney's special task of mitigating a case, i.e.,
trying to get a deal which is below the true market
value of the case, one might expect that defense counsel's bottom-line would always be lower (more lenient)
than that of prosecutors. Or, one might reach this expectation from the belief that defense attorneys do take an
adversarial posture in plea negotiations and consequently
their demands will differ from those of prosecutors. Still
other plausible hypotheses might be advanced. There is
nothing in the existing literature to persuasively support
one of these hypotheses over another.
We turn now to the data presented in Tables 4.11 and
4.12. In three of the four comparisons, there is no significant difference between prosecutors and defense. Only
in the robbery fact situation in Table 4.11 is there a significant difference by type of attorney. However, contrary to what is indicated in Table 4.12, a separate analysis, not presented here, showed that there was also a significant difference between prosecutors and defense
counsel in the choice of length of sentence of the robbery case. Thus, the data show that prosecutors and defense attorneys agree in the burglary case on both the
type and the length of sentence, but they disagree in the
robbery case on both decisions.
Although we were unable to predict these findings, we
can offer some retrospective commentary on them. It

should be remembered that these tables are based on the
combination of all four versions (the serious and the notserious versions of prior record as the strong and the
weak evidence cases) of the two crimes used in the simulation. Therefore, the discrepancy in recommendations
that appears in Tables 4.11 and 4.12 should not be mistaken for an indication of a general inconsistency in sentencing. The disparity is an artifact of this particular
analysis. Obviously, with the four different fact patterns
presented, one would expect sentencing disparities within
types of attorneys. The crucial question is whether one
could expect these differences to exist between types of
attorneys.
Also, recall that defense attorneys consulted far more information about defendant's background as well as other
miscellaneous attributes of the case. Yet, even after consulting all this information, defense counsel still ended up
agreeing with prosecutors in the burglary case. This suggests that whatever else those additional items of information may be used for in defense attorneys' thinking,
they do not automatically alter the estimates of the
bottom-line value of the case. This does not mean that
plea bargaining lacks an adversarial quality. In fact when
these data are taken together with the findings in Table
4.2 and 4.3, the Qpposite conclusion emerges. That is,
even in the burglary case where the two types of attorney agree on the bottom-line, the data suggest that there
is an adversarial character to the plea negotiations. As
indicated in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, prosecutors arrive at the
bottom-line after consulting a minimum of information.
Defense counsel consult the same information and more.
Even after consulting the additional information, however, they arrive at the same bottom line as the prosecutor.
Why do they bother to consult the additional items of
information? We believe it is because even when attorneys agree on the true value of a case the negotiations
take on a subtle but real adversarial quality. Defense
counsel may appear to be acting cooperatively; but their
special role is to interject information designed to conflict with the prosecutor's assessment of the case.
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Table 4.11

Comparison between prosecutors and defense counsel in type of sentence sought in plea
bargaining by type of crime*

Defense Counsel

Prosecutors

(N=91)
74
17
9

Robbery:
Prison Time
Jail Time
Probation

(N=62)
42
26
32

100%

100%
x 2 =18.381
d.f.= 2
P(x 2 )= <.001
gamma=+.57

(N=80)
41
20
39

Burglary:
Prison Time
Jail Time
Probation

(N=69)
27
27
45

100%

**99%
X 2 =3.2319

d.f.=2
P(x 2 )=.20 n.s.
*Source: Georgetown Plea Bargain Simulation.
••oue to rounding error.

Table 4.12

Comparison between prosecutors and defense counsel In length of sentence sought in
plea bargaining by type of crime*

Prosecutors

Defense Counsel

(N=138)
43
18
9
17
12

Robbery
5 years or more
2-5 years
1-2 years
1-12 months
Probation

(N=105)
46
10
8
17
19
100%

99%
x 2 =4.4213
d.f=4
P(x 2 )=.35 n.s.

(N=102)
30
10
4
25
30

(N=134)
24
13
8
30
25

Burglary:
5 years or more
2-5 years
1-2 years
1-12 months
Probation

100%

**99%
x 2 =4.3413
d.f.=4
P(x 2 ) = .36 n.s.

•source: Georgetown Plea Bargain Simulation
• *Due to rounding error.
,.
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Of course, this may explain what is happening in the
burglary case where the two types of attorneys agree;
but.it does not account for why the attorneys disagree in
the robbery case. For that, we can only speculate. Perhaps because robbery is regarded as a more serious
crime and the stakes are usually higher for all parties
concerned, a strong adversarial quality emerges. That is,
perhaps the adversarial nature of the negotiations
changes with the seriousness of the crime. Maybe when
more is at stake each type of attorney feels the need to
take a stronger position.

Summary
• In evaluating cases of plea bargaining, prosecutors
concern themselves with fewer items of information than
do defense counsel.
• Prosecutors and defense counsel agree on the importance of case strength, seriousness of the offender, and
seriousness of the offense. They also agree on the lack of
importance of caseload as a determinant of plea bargaining decisions in an individual case.
• Prosecutors are far more concerned than defense
counsel with the attitudes of the police and the victim
toward the plea bargain.
• Prosecutors are less concerned than defense counsel
with a miscellany of attributes about the defendant and
the case that do not bear directly on case strength, offender seriousness, or offense seriousness. They are also
less concerned with the trial judge's reputation for leniency, the opposing counsel's reputation, or the nature of
the personal relationship between the opposing counsel.
• Estimating the probability of conviction in a case is
something which is done with a fair degree of reliability
when the cases are strong, but not when the cases are
weak. Prosecutors generally agree among themselves
and with defense counsel in the estimates of the probability of conviction in strong cases. But prosecutors disagree among themselves and in one instance with defense counsel in the estimates of the probability of conviction in weak cases.
·
• The half-of-a-loaf hypothesis that prosecutors would
be more likely to plea bargain weak cases was contradicted by the data. Prosecutors were consistently more
likely to take weak cases to trial or dismiss them rather
than to plea bargain them.
• However, the other implication of the half-a-loaf hypothesis, namely, that the weaker the case the more lenient the plea offer will be, was partially (but not consistently) confirmed. Differences in case strength did significantly affect the prosecutors' choices as to type and
length of sentence but only under certain conditions (i.e.,

when the crime was less serious and/or when a more se~
rious prior record was involved). Even when one or
both of these conditions were present, case strength did
not always significantly affect the prosecutor's plea
offer.
• Differences in the seriousness of prior record did not
by themselves have a significant effect on the prosecutors' two sentencing decisions. But, among weak cases
differences in the seriousness of the prior record do have
a significant impact on these decisions. As one would
expect, the less serious prior record is given the more lenient sentence.
• Prior record and case strength seem to exert significant influences only in "marginal" situations, that is,
those fact situations where there is likely to be the greatest lack of consensus among criminal justice actors about
what the appropriate disposition and sentence should be,
e.g., in "medium" serious crimes, when cases are weak,
or when they involve minor prior records.
• Contrary to what literature would lead one to expect,
defense counsel were more likely than prosecutors to
take a case to trial. However, this may be true only if
the trial judge has a reputation for leniency.
• In the robbery case prosecutors and defense counsel
disagree in both of the sentencing decisions. But, in the
burglary case they did not significantly differ in either of
these decisions.
• "Court busting" appears to be a myth. Virtually all
defense counsel said they never have threatened and
never would threaten to take all their cases to trial as a
tactic to get a better deal in a particular case.

Conclusion
Most of what is known about the plea bargaining decisionmaking process has been based on interview and observational data. The findings of the present study, based
primarily on a decision simulation with a quasi-experiment, strengthen and refine some previous findings but
contradict others and raise several new questions. Contrary to popular belief, prosecutors and defense counsel
are not concerned with the question of the court's backlog or caseload when they are attempting to evaluate
what to do with specific cases. Contrary to courthouse
folklore, defense attorneys do not use the threat of
taking their case to trial (i.e., to "courtbust") in order to
obtain more favorable terms in plea bargaining. As previously reported, the three big factors of case strength,
seriousness of the defendant, and seriousness of the offense are regarded by both prosecutors and defense
counsel as important in the evaluation of cases for plea
bargaining. Not well understood in the past was whether
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and how prosecutors and defense attorneys differ in
their evaluation of cases for plea bargaining, whether the
big three factors had the impact on plea bargaining decisioru; that they were alleged to have, and whether attorneys presented with the same set of facts would arrive at
the same estimates of probability of conviction.
This study indicates that pro eeutors and defense attorneys evaluate cases the arne way up to a point. After
the three big factors are valuated, deferu;e counsel go
on to look for anything that might be said on behalf of
their clients in order to improve upon the normal plea
bargaining discount arrived at on the basis of the big
tluee factors. In addition, defense counsel are far more
interested than prosecutors in information about the personal characteristics of the criminai justice actors. These
two differences suggest the defense counsel do play a
unique role in plea bargaining. That role seems to consist
of three different tasks. First, defense counsel try to
assure that the big three factors have been properly evaluated and that the usual discount for the particular type
of case has been established. Secondly, defense counsel
look for tactical advantages in order to advise their
client about which route to take. If the judge is notoriously lenient, then there would be a tactical advantage
to go to trial and try to win an acquittal. Even if the defendant is convicted, he will not "lose big," given that
the judge is lenient. On the other hand if the judge were
more severe, then bargaining with the prosecutor may
be the better tactic. The third task is that of "mitigating
the case." The job here is to find any reason why the
defendant should be given more than the usual discount
in the case. This seems to be done by introducing information which is designed to contradict the prosecutor's
judgment about what the basic value of the case should
be.
Contrary to those analyses which have stressed the nonadversarial nature of plea bargaining, our findings suggest that there is an adversarial component. However,
that component is of such a latent quality that it can
easily be overlooked. Although it is true that cooperative relationships do develop between criminal justice
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actors, our analysis of the way in which they process information in connection with reaching their plea bargaining decisions suggests that there is a difference between prosecutors and defense counsel both in the
amount and type of information they consult and in the
decisions they make on the basis of that information.
The nature of the adversary relationship that does exist
in plea negotiations lies in the difference in information
processing more than in the difference in the outcomes
of that decision process.
With regard to the evenhandedness of certain aspects of
plea bargaining, we conclude that it is more likely to
occur under some conditions than others. With regard to
that crucial skill of estimating the probability of conviction, we found that when cases are strong both prosecutors and defense counsel can agree in estimating the
probability of conviction. But when cases are weak,
there is far less agreement. Similarly, with regard to the
impact of differences in case strength and differences in
eriousness of prior record, we found that the e factors
have a significant influence on the prosecutors sentencing decision only under certain conditions. Once again,
those conditions are that cases are weak or that there i
a minor prior record or the crime is a less serious crime.
Why this should be true is not readily apparent.
The results of our simulation do not answer the policy
question of whether the plea bargaining should be eliminated or allowed to continue. However, they do how
that some of the arguments in that policy debate are
e.ither entirely inaccu.rate or subject to important modifications. The plea bargaining decisionmaking process is
not as haphazard as it may appear. Our nonrandom
sample of prosecutors drawn from across the country revealed that there is a logic to prosecutorial decisionmaking and that it is distinct from that of defense attorneys. Whether one agrees with that logic depends on
one's policy preferences. Our research will not settle the
debate on plea bargaining. That is ultimately a debate
over policy choices. However, in clarifying and refining
some of the factual bases on which that debate rests, we
have altered the terms of the debate.

Chapter Five
Differential Sentencing
Introduction
" . .. [I]f in one year, 248 judges are to deal with
35,517 defendants, the distri 1 c urts must encourage pleas of guil ty. On way to encourage pleas of
guilty is to establish or announce a policy that, in
th ord in ary ca e, leniency w iJI not be granted to a
defendan t wh tand trial" (United S tates v. Wiley,
185 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill., 1960).)
The primary force behind plea bargai ning is differential
sentencing. Defendants plead guilty because they believe
that i[ they stood trial they w uJd be punished more severely. T his incentiv underlie almost all plea bargains
n matter whether they involve charge c nee sions exp licit sentence concessions, or implicit entenc concessions. Supporters of plea bargaining justify such differentittls as the very heart of the system. Without them defendants would go to trial. Kn wing they would have
nothing Lo lose and verything to ga in defendants would
try to ''beat the rap ' at trial. he d mand for trial
would exceed court ca pacity and the ystem wo uld collapse.
Notwithstanding this grim scenari , critics of plea bargai ning object to differential entencing either in principle or to ne or another of its mor egregious aspects.
One basi concern is its "cl1illing effect'' on the free exercise of the fundamental constitutional right to a jury
trial. It is argued that t he exercise of a right , o basic to a
free society ho uld no t be di couraged by the threat of a
more evere sentence. Mo reover, j ust as confessions induced by promises are of doubtful credibility, so too
convictions based on induced admissions of guilt are suspect. Such a system is too vulnerable to the possibility of
innocent defendants pleading guilty. It compromises the
integrity of the truth-finding process.

as for example when the defendant is faced with the
choice between life or death. Other concerns are with
evenhandedness and the integrity of the sentencing process. The former focuses on the belief that the size of differentials varies widely from case to case, that similar
cases are not given similar sentences. The latter focuses
on the fact that the differentials are based on a factor irrelevant to the sentencing process. In particular the size
of the differential is heavily influenced by the strength of
the state's case (Alschuler, 1968). The weaker the case
the larger the differential must be in order to assure a
plea. Thus the entence imposed is largely determined by
a fac tor that no theory of sentencing or penology has
ever regarded as relevant to the correctional process.

Rationales for differential sentencing
The fundamental rationale for differential sentencing is
its practical necessity for preventing the collapse of
overburdened court systems. Some judges readily admit
this. When asked to justify imposing a more severe sentence on a defendant convicted at trial, one judge put it
this way " He takes some of my time. So I take some of
his." Other judge and other defender~ of the practice
have devi ed various rationales justifying it in terms
other than administrative necessity. Each of the more
commonplace of these rationales has some plausibility
and in a few cases does indeed provide a sound justification for the differential (or at least part of it) in those
cases. But it taxes credibility to believe that those rationales taken either singly or together can justify the differentials in the great majority of cases.
One common rationale is that by admitting his guilt the
defendant is taking the first step on the road to rehabilitation. Therefore differential sentencing benefits the correctional process. Adding to the superficial plausibility
of this rationale is the rehabilitative literature which em-

Alternatively, some concerns focus on certain aspects of
the differentials. The size of the differential in some
cases is regarded as being so great as to be overbearing,

93

phasizes the importance of having a person accept responsibility for his actions and admit his problem before
the rehabilitative p1·oce scan begin (see, e.g., Menninger,
1964). However, to believe t hat an admission of guilt by
a defendant hoping to thereby secure sentencing leniency represents the kind of genuine initial step into elfrecognition and appraisal referred to in the psychotherapeutic literature is a pr:ofound misunderstanding of that
literature. Therapists who have had patients orne to
them under coercion can attest that they are no faster
and probably a little slower in getting "into" therapy
than noncoerced patients.
Experienced attorneys do not take this rationale too seriously. D efense counsel and defendants se the plea of
guilty as a business deal, not as a therapeutic threshold.
A second rationale, however, i given con iderable
credit by court per onnel, especially the defense ba:r. It
is that in cases which go to trial more adverse information about the defendants comes to light. Therefore they
are sentenced more severely than what would have occurred through a guilty plea. Defense counsel frequently
mention the importance of not letting the judge J1ear all
the grue ome detail which might arou e his or her pasian or provoke his or her sympathy for the victim. This
is so important in some cases that part of th plea agreement is that when the plea is entered the pro ecutor wlll
describe t he crime in dry, clinical terms so as not to
arouse the judge's antipathy. For example, the victim
will be described as having received "some lacerations"
rather than being "stabbed repeatedly about the neck
and face."
The problem with this rationale is that it explains too
much. It may fit some crimes of violence where heinous
acts were committed, but it is unlikely to account for the
vast majority of differential sentences. Actually, this rationale should be regarded more as an indictment of the
presentence investigation process than as a justification
for differential sentencing. To the extent that the rationale is true, it means that judge are not being provided
with information relevant to their sentencing decision. If
defendants who plead guilty are being sentenced leniently because judges are inadequately appraised of their
actual criminality, this should not become a justification
for the leniency but a springboard for reforming the presentence investigation process.
Another rationale for sentence differentials is that defendant who go to trial may perjure themselve or
suborn perj ury from others. A few judges explained to
us that in uch cases they have given one sentence for
the original crime plus an additional sentence for "the
perjury." When asked how they were sure the defendants had perjured themselves, their evidence was less
than compelling. One judge relied on how a defendant's

Adam's apple moved. Another relied on his interpretation of the defendant's body language. Of the several examples given by judge the evidence was convincing in
only one. A defendant had maintained he was not the
same person as someone who previously had been convicted of another crime. The judge knew he was lying
because the judge had convicted him. In none of the examples given by judges were the defendants charged
with or tried for their "perjuries."
A final rationale which judges frequently gave us was
the one endorsed by the ABA ( 1968; § 1.8). Defendants
convicted at trial are not sentenced more severely but
those who plead guilty are entenc d more leni ntly.
The subtle difference between these two po ition wa
captured by one judge who after repeating this formula
in robot-like fashion explained it was "the difference between tweedJe-dee-dum and tweedle-dee-dee." However,
he noted, th rationale does provide j udges with a professionally justifiable excuse for their differential sentencing practices.

The legality of sentence differentials
Differential sentencing can result from either the sentencing decisions of individual judges or from differentials built into a state's sentencing structure by law. Differentials resulting from both of these sources have been
upheld by the courts. In both the Brady and the Parker
cases, defendants faced statutorily imposed differential
sentencing schemes. In Brady v. United States, 391 U.S.
742 (1970), defendant Brady wa. charged with kidnapping in violation of 18 D.S.C. § 1201(a), which permitted
the jury to recommend death if the victim was not freed
unharmed as was alleged in that case. Brady pleaded
guilty when the judge refused to try the case without a
jury. The Supreme Court ruled that such an arrangement did not invalidate the plea.
In Parker v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 790 (1970), the defendant charged with first degree burglary faced a death
sentence unless the jury recommended life imprisonment.
However, the tatute provided that if one pleaded guilty
to flr t degree burglary he would receive life rather than
a death sentence. Parker appealed on the ground that the
differential sentences authorized by the North Carolina
law invalidated his plea. But, the Supreme Court dismissed the claim on the basis of Brady:
" . . . we determined in Brady . . . that an otherwise valid plea is not involuntary because induced
by the defendant's desire to limit the possible maximum penalty to less than that authorized if there is
a trial." (397 U.S. at 795.)
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More recently the Supreme Court held that a state procedure that requires a life sentence following conviction
at trial but permits judges to impose lighter sentences
following pleas of non vult or nolo contendere does not
impose an unconstitutional burden on the right to trial
(Corbit v. New Jersey. 439 U.S. 212 (1978)).
Appellate court support for sentence differentials imposed by judges in individual cases varies. There is a
general recognition that such differentials do exist; that
they represent the heart of the guilty plea system; and
they cannot be eliminated without eliminating that
system. For instance, in D ewey v. United States 268 F.2d
124, 128 (8th Cir. 1959), the court took "judicial notice
of the fact that trial courts quite generally impose a
lighter sentence on pleas of guilty cases than in cases
where the accused pleaded not guilty but has been found
guilty by a jury." In State v. Rice, 172 Conn. 94, 103
(197 6), the court recognized that ''an essential ingredient
in any plea bargaining situation is the recognition by
both the prosecutor and the defense that a trial may
produce a less favorable result for the defendant."

"accepted practice to give less severe sentences if the
person pleaded guilty, rather than not guilty" (Ibid: 207).
The Yale survey also asked judges to estimate the extent
to which the difference in the sentence was attributable
exclusively to the fact of going to trial rather than pleading. Some judges stated that the magnitudes varied from
case to case. Others asserted that they could not separate
out the effect of the plea from other factors. Still other
judges gave estimates of from 10 percent to 95 percent. 1
More recent studies of actual sentence differentials continue to suggest that pleaders do indeed get more lenient
sentences. In Alameda County, California pleaders were
three times more likely to get probation and six times
less likely to get a prison term (University of California,
1975). In Los Angeles County, California, Rand (Greenwood, et. al., 1973) found that "across all categories of
offense and prior record, defendants who plead guilty or
SOT 2 are sentenced more leniently than defendants who
are convicted at trial. Defendants convicted in jury trials
are sentenced much more harshly than any others."

However, some courts have concluded that judicially
imposed sentence differentials chill the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights (Bond, 1981:41). Other
courts which have found sentence differentials improper
appear to object to some aspect of the practice involved
in the particular case rather than to the principle itself.
Differentials which are set categorically without consideration of the differences between individual cases have
been disapproved. In United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d
453, 457 (7th Cir. 1959), the court ruled that the judge's
policy of not granting probation to anyone who refused
to plead guilty was an abuse of discretion.

In Philadelphia, it was found that for three offenses (burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault) defendants convicted at trial are given sentences that are
three to seven times longer than pleaders (Constant,
1971). But surprisingly, for three other offenses (narcotics possession, larceny and receiving stolen goods), it
was the pleaders who received the longer sentences! This
was apparently due to differences in their pretrial release
status. Defendants incarcerated prior to trial were often
sentenced to time served, which in some cases was
longer than would have been imposed after trial (ld.). In
the Federal courts differential sentencing is strongly indicated by their annual statistical reports. Federal defendants convicted at trial are about twice as likely to be
sentenced to imprisonment (rather than probation) and
their sentences are about twice as long as those of pleaders (see Table 5.1).

The extent and magnitude of (objective)
differential sentencing
Review of literature. Empirical studies going back to the
1920's have shown that in many jurisdictions defendants
convicted after trial are punished more severely than
those who plead guilty. Illinois defendants convicted at
trial were two and a half times more likely than pleaders
to be sentenced to incarceration rather than probation
(Illinois Crime Survey, 1929). A survey of 17 6 state and
Federal judges found that 91 percent said that they commonly sentenced pleaders more leniently than tried defendants (U.S. Department of Justice, 1939:425). A more
recent survey by the Yale Law Journal (1956:206) found
that 66 percent of 140 federal district judges agreed that
it was "accepted practice to take into consideration the
fact that the person to be sentenced pleaded guilty,
rather than not guilty." It also found that eight of nine
responding Connecticut state judges, reported that it was

1
One 10 percent; five 20 percent; six 25 percent; one 30 percent; three
33% percent; one 33%-50 percent; three 50 percent; one 75 percent;
one 80 percent; two 90 percent; one 95 percent (Yale Law Journal,
1956:207).
2
"Submission on the transcript" of the preliminary hearing.
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Table 5.1 Differences in type and
length of sentences for federal offenders by whether convicted by
plea or trial, 1963 and 1971 *

Conviction was by
Guilty
plea

Trial by
Judge

Jury

Type of sentence
Imprisoned, 1963
Imprisoned, 1971

43%
32%

53%

4.9
4.7

6.8
6.3

72%
61% ...

Length of sentence**
1963
1971

11.4
13.5

*Sources: Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
1963 and 1977.
**Sentences are in "weighted averages".
***Combined rate for jury and judge trials.

Despite the impressive number of studies indicating that
tried defendants are punished more severely than pleaders there continues to be some question as to the extent
to which this is due solely to the fact of going to trial.
The plausible rival hypothesis which could explain the
differentials is that tried cases represent more serious
cases and are punished accordingly. Supporting this alternative explanation is Jacob and Eisenstein (1977) who
found sentencing differentials but were able to account
for them in terms of characteristics of the defendant, the
type of offense, and courtroom work group.
Other studies cast doubt on whether differentials even
regularly occur. Using data from the District of Columbia, Rhodes (1978) found no differentials for three of
four offenses. 3
In Dade County, Florida, Wildhorn et al. (1976:149)
concentrated solely on the impact on sentencing severity
of charge concessions in breaking and entering and robbery cases. They found "that tried disposition (as compared to pleas) did not increase sentence outcomes in a
statistically significant manner." Concerned that this
finding may have been due to the very small number of

3

Assault, burglary, and larceny had no differentials but robbery did.

trials in t heir sample, Wildhorn et al. ad pted a technique similar to the one Rb des ( 1978) u ed . T hey
matched all those convic ed at. Lrial with a group or otherw ise similar defendants who entered tra igh t pleas."'
Amazingly th ffect of trial as to reduce the entence
by about 13 percent.
Differentials in six jurisdictions. The nature and amount
of real differential enlencing in the ix study ites was
determined through a muJtivariate analy i f 3 397 robbery and burglary cases. The analysis permitted an examination of the extent to which rhe m re fact of going
to trial rather than pleading guilty affected the severity
of the sentence imposed holding other factor co nstant. 5
Two d istinct aspects of sentence severity were exa mined, namely, the in-o.r-out decision and tl-te length-oftime deci ion. 6 The ftr. t q uestion fi cused on whether defen dants convicted aL trial we re signiJicantJy more li kely
to receive sentences involving some time to rve in incarceration (iu-time) as opposed to straight pr bation or
other no-incarcerative sentence. T he second question fi cused n whether llied defe11danLS received ign ificantly
longer sentences than the pleaders and how much longer
these s ntences were.
The analysis revealed the exi ten e of real sentence differentials in each of t.he six site although their nature
and magnitude varied substantially. In tw j urisdictions,
going to trial significantly increased the chance that tbe
defendant would receive an in-time entence; ee Table
5.2. I n E l Pa o (where the "no plea bargaining'' experiment wa in operation), defendants who we re c nvicted
at trial experienced a 29 percent increase in the probability of being entenced to incarceration. 7 In Norfolk, tried

• Pleas of guilty without any charge or count concessions but frequent·
ly with some sentence bargain.
• T he oth er factor held constant in thi$ OJllllysls incl uded : offen c
cl)argep; pre. ence of a weapon; monetary loss; am unt of property
damage; number f witn ses: physi I evidence; charge reduction
from inforination l convicLia n; positive identificmtion; tota l charges al
conv iction; hann to victim; marital sta tu. a f defendrull; number of
charges dropped between original filin g and forma l c harging; prior
fel ony co nvic tions: type of co un ~el; length of time between arre.~ t and
d isp ition; ond lengt h of time between filing of formal charging and
disposition. ome of these factors wcr c1 letcd from some of the analyses upon which this composite presentation is based if they were
found to have negligible effects.
• Dividing the sentencing decision into these two parts follows the
work of Wilkins et al. (1978).
7
Interpreting this finding is difficult for two reasons. Some of these
~e ut ences may have been imposed by ju ri ::s-s mething which could
not be controlled for in o ur da ta. A lso, the " no plea hargainin '' program prov ided defendant with u p im system by whi h they were
supposed to be able to determine whether Lbcy w uld re eive probation if they pleaded g ui lty. Thus, one ~ ttld exp c t that thi syste m
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defendants were 12 percent more likely to get sentences
involving in-time.

Reported and perceived differential sentencing
Review of literature. Previous research has concentrated

Table 5.2 Increase in severity of sentence for robbery and burglary
cases convicted at trial compared to
those convicted by pleading guilty,
by jurisdiction

Jurisdiction

Norfolk
Seattle
Tucson
El Paso
New Orleans
Delaware Co.
1 Not

%
Increase
in
probablli·
ty of
incarceration vs.
nonlncarceration
sentence

%
Increase
In length
of
lncarcerat ion

12%
ns•
ns
29%
ns
ns

91%
88%
16%
ns
138%
14%

Actual
increase in
length of
incarceration (In
months)

49.7
75.1
11.1
ns
86.6
5.7

statistically significant.

It was also found that in five of the six sites defendants

who went to trial received significantly longer sentences
than those who pleaded guilty (holding other factors
constant). 8 However, the magnitude of the increase
varied widely from a low of 14 percent in Delaware
County to a high of 138 percent in New Orleans (where
the District Attorney had a restricted plea bargaining
policy in effect). Translated into months this means that
in Delaware County, a defendant charged with robbery
or burglary could expect to get a sentence that was 5. 7
months longer after conviction at trial than he would
have received for a plea. In New Orleans the increase
was an extra 86.6 months. But in El Paso, there was no
significant difference in the length of sentence.

primarily on establishing whether differentials exist and
why. Less attention has been paid to the perception of
differentials and the relationship between the perception
and the reality. It is sometimes assumed that the two are
synonymous. For instance, in reporting that they found
no (objective) differential sentencing, Wildhorn et al.
(1976:148) proceed to a conclusion about whether defendants believe that differentials do exist. "Our statistical analysis [of actual sentencing patterns] did not support the view that the expectation of harsher sentences at
trial induces many defendants to enter a guilty plea." 9
The relative inattention to the perception of differentials
is a serious weakness in the literature. After all, it is the
perception of the actors in the system that govern their
decisions. The advice given by attorneys to the defendants, the willingness of defendants to plead, and the relative strengths of the positions of prosecutors and defense
attorneys in plea negotiations are all influenced by perceptions about differentials.
A few studies related to selected aspects of the perception of differentials are available. Vetri (1964:896) found
that the majority of prosecutors in his sample believe
that defendants are punished more severely for going to
trial. Kerstetter and Heinz (1979:123) found that 60 percent of the defendants in Dade County, Florida, who
pleaded guilty reported that "the fear of a more severe
sentence at trial was an important, if not critical, reason
for pleading guilty." This fear was not significantly increased by having defendants participate in a plea bargaining conference in which the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, and victims or police also participated.
Horney (1980) found that certain kinds of plea negotiations were believed by the prosecutors and defense attorneys who made them to have greater impacts on the sentence differential than others.
Reported and perceived differentials: judges and attorneys.

We approached the perception of sentence differentials
in three ways: by asking judges to report on themselves;
by asking prosecutors and defense attorneys for their
perceptions of the differential sentencing tendencies of
individual judges; and by asking defendants for their perceptions.
Our judges were much less willing to admit to punishing
defendants for going to trial than those surveyed in 1956
by the Yale Law Journal and in 1939 by the Attorney

would encourage defendants who calculated that they were not eligible for probation to go to trial. Once convicted, they supposedly
would be sentenced to incarceration as promised by the point system.
• See fn. 5 above.

• Emphasis added.
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General. Only 11 of 49 judges indicated that they do judge with whom he or she was familiar: "As far as you
senten.ce tried cases more severely than pleader (see know, does Judge--- sentence a defendant more se•
Table 5.3). However, comparing the judges' self-reports verely if he/she goes to trial rather than pleading
with the results of our statistical analysis of actual sen- guilty?" A total of 42 judges in six jurisdictions were
tence differentials (compare Table 5.2 with Table 5.3), rated this way by varying numbers of prosecutors and
one find s reason to be skeptical about judicial self-re- defense counsel.
ports. In Seattle where all ten judges reported they do Four noteworthy features emerge from the analysis of
not differentially sentence, our statistical analysis found the data (Table 5.3). First, there i a surprisingly large
that going to trial adds 75.1 months to the length of the amount of disagreement among the attorneys as to
sentence. 1n T ucson where all 11 judges denied sentenc- whether particular judges sentence differentially. This
ing differentially, our analysis found that going to trial find ing conflicts with the ubiq uitous courthouse trui. m
adds 11.1 months to a sentence.
that regu lar practitioner know the sentencing tendencies
The perceptions of differential sentencing of prosecutors of local judge . It suggests there is a much greater ambiand defense attorneys were obtained by asking each at- guity about lhis e sential factor in plea negotiating and
torney to answer the following question for each local sentencing decisionmaking than has been recognized. It

Table 5.3

Self-reported and perceived sentencing differentials for cases convicted at trial rather than by
pleading guilty by jurisdiction and by type of attorney

Jurisdiction

Judges' self reports of
whether they differentially
sentence

Attorneys' perceptions of whether specific judges
differentially sentence

Norfolk

Yes, 2judges
No, 4judges

3 judges were assessed by 13 attorneys who were almost evenly
split (6 to 7) over each judge. Prosecutors were far more likely
than defense counsel to report that the judges differentially
sentence. Five prosecutors reported that all three judges differentially sentence whereas five defense counsel reported that all
three judges do not.

Seattle

Yes, Ojudges
No, 10judges

13 judges were assessed by 6 attorneys who were split (3 to 3, or 2
to 4) over each judge. Prosecutors were more likely to answer
"yes" (2 of 3 for 12 of the 13 judges) and defense counsel were
more likely to answer "no" (2 of 3 for 11 of the 13 judges).

Tucson

Yes, Ojudges
No, 7 felony judges
4 misdemeanor judges

10 judges were assessed by between 5 and 7 attorneys. Overall
there was general agreement that the judges do not differentially
sentence. For 6 of the 10 judges the attorneys were in total
agreement: 2 defense attorneys thought two judges do differentially sentence: one defense attorney thought that two other
judges differentially sentence.

El Paso

Yes, 1 judge
No, 1 judge
1 judge uncertain

6 judges were assessed by 5 attorneys all of whom except one
were in agreement that one judge does differentially sentence but
the rest do not. The lone dissenter was simply uncertain about
two judges.

New Orleans

Yes,4judges
No, 4judges

10 judges were assessed by from 4 to 6 attorneys who were largely
In agreement among themselves regarding the sentencing prac!ices of specific judges but disagreed with the judges' self-reports
in 3 of the 8 comparisons possible.

Delaware Co.

Yes, 4judges
No, 7 judges

14 judges were assessed by between 2 and 6 attorneys who largely
agreed among themselves that 7 of the judges do differentially
sentence. It is noteworthy that the disagreement among the
attorneys was more likely to occur over the assessment of those
judges who reported that they do not differentially sentence.
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also suggests that, in order to keep plea bargaining operating, it is not necessary for there to be a unanimous or
even close to unanimous perception among attorneys
that differential sentencing exists or that every judge
does it. 10
Secondly, where disagreements occurred, prosecutors
tended to believe that the specific judges do differentially sentence whereas defense counsel perceived the opposite (Norfolk and Seattle).U This unanticipated finding is
difficult to explain. If anything, one would have expected the reverse, namely that defense counsel would be
more likely to believe that judges differentially sentence.
Predicting such a finding would have been logical in
light of the high rate of guilty pleas and the literature
indicating that defense counsel routinely advise clients to
plead guilty (Blumberg, 1967; Mather, 1979).
Thirdly, the amount of disagreement among the attorneys differs by jurisdiction. In three jurisdictions (Norfolk, Seattle, and Delaware County) disagreement is
high. In contrast the other three jurisdictions (Tucson,
El Paso, and New Orleans) show more agreement than
disagreement. This finding was also unanticipated and is
not convincingly explainable even retrospectively. One
might speculate that when the prosecutor reduces or
eliminates his office's role in plea bargaining (as in El
Paso and New Orleans) this forces a clearer recognition
of the importance of differential sentencing. Hence local
attorneys pay more careful attention to this practice.
However, this does not explain Tucson. Fourthly, the
degree of agreement between the judges' self-reports and
the attorneys' perceptions is mixed. Sometimes the attorneys perceive what the judges report and other times
they disagree. What is more this varies by jurisdiction as
well as by individual judge. In Seattle all 10 judges who
were questioned denied sentencing differentially; yet,
some of the attorneys believed otherwise. In contrast in
Tuscon where 11 judges said they do not differentially

10 Of course, there is a difference between asking whether judges do
differentially sentence under the present way of doing business in a jurisdiction and what they would do if no other way of securing pleas
were available. In a jurisdictio,n where all plea bargaining is done with
charge bargaining, there would be no need for any judge to differentially sentence and attorneys may correctly perceive this to be the case
as long as there was no need for the judges to assume a direct responsibility for motivating guilty pleas.
11 There is no way of knowing whether the prosecutors or the defense
counsel were correct in their judgments about individual judges. Our
objective measures of differential sentencing were for the jurisdictions
as a whole with cases from different judges pooled together.
However, we are able to compare the attorneys' perceptions of specific
judges with the self-reports of those same judges in two jurisdictions
(see two paragraphs below). Of course, the judges' self-reports are not
the equivalent of objective, statistical measures of the magnitude and
frequency of the actual differentials (if any) these judges impose.

sentence, the attorneys' perceptions agreed for the most
part with the self reports.
A closer look at the degree of agreement between selfreports and perceptions is available for two jurisdictions
(New Orleans and Delaware County). The data from
those sites were coded so that direct comparisons between the self-reports of individual judges and the perceptions of local attorneys were possible (see Table 5.4).
In New Orleans there is a high degree of consensus
among the attorneys in their perceptions of each judge.
Moreover, there is more agreement than not with the
judge's self-report. 12 In Delaware the attorneys were in
substantial agreement in their perceptions for 8 of 14
judges and disagreed on the rest. Comparing their perceptions with judges' self-reports, one finds discrepancies
in six instances where judges reported they do not differentially sentence but some or almost all of the attorneys
believed otherwise.
In attempting to understand what influences the perceptions of sentencing differentials, one obvious candidate
explanation should be addressed. Is the actual size of the
differentials imposed by a judge related to the perception
attorneys have of his or her practice? Unfortunately, this
cannot be directly answered with our data due to its aggregate nature. But it is still of value to compare the average differential for the whole jurisdiction with the perceptions of the attorneys (compare Tables 5.2 with 5.3
and 5.4). This comparison suggests that the degree of
agreement in the perception of differential sentencing is
not related to the average magnitude of the differential
for the jurisdiction. A high degree of agreement in perception occurs both in Tucson with the second lowest
differential (16 percent increase in length of sentence)
and in New Orleans with the highest differential (138
percent).
One further comparison of Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 is instructive. In Tucson the judges claim they do not differentially sentence; the attorneys largely agree that the
judges do not differentially sentence; and the objective
rate of sentence differential is nonexistent (statistically insignificant) for the in-out decision and minimal (16 per-

12
The two instances of major disagreement (judges E and I) are in the
reverse direction from what one might expect. The judges indicated
they do sentence differentially and the attorneys believed that they do
not. This may represent coding error. In answering this question some
judges seemed to be overly scrupulous. They answered after searching
their souls and thinking that maybe they did differentially sentence.
Others were circumspect, using some justification for their differential
sentencing that seemed like a hollow excuse. Coding these answers required some judgment as to what the correct meaning of the response
was.
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unlike the other jurisdictions, most of the plea agreements involve only charge modifications.

cent) for the length-of-time-to-serve decision. Yet, the
system is managing to keep a steady stream of guilty
pleas flowing. It should also be noted that in Tucson,
Table 5.4

Comparison by individual judges of self-reported and perceived differential sentencing

Jurisdiction

Judge's self-report

Judge

New Orleans

A

no
yes
no
yes
yes
NA 3
no
NA
yes
yes

8

c
D

E
F

G
H
I
J
Delaware Co.

no
no
no
NA
no
no
no
yes
yes
no
yes
NA
yes
NA

A
B

c

D

E
F

G
H
I
J

K
L
M
N

1

For each judge the number of
attorneys who believe the
judge does/ does not
differentially sentence 2

Does
1

5
2
4
0
6
0
4
0
5
3
3
2
3
0
4
4
3
3
4
4
3
4
4

Does not

'

4
0
4
2
4
0
6
0
6
1
3
2
4
3
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1

1. Based on responses to the question, "Do you sentence those defendants who are convicted at trial differently than those who
plead guilty to a given offense?"
2. Based on responses to the question, "As far as you know, does Judge - - - - (names of the individual judges were inserted
here) sentence a defendant more severely if he/she goes to trial rather than pleading guilty?"
3. No answer.

Defendant perceptions. Among defendants interviewed
the perception that they would have been punished more
severely if they had gone to trial was almost universal.
Many of them said they were told this directly and explicitly by someone. Frequently it was their lawyer who
conveyed the message. But police officers and fellow jail
inmates also served this function or reinforced the attorney's message. A sample of defendant responses 13 to one
of our questions illustrates the point. We asked, "Did

anyone at any stage tell you that things would go differently for you if you pleaded guilty as opposed to going
to trial on any of the charges?" They responded:

Norfolk: Defendant
A: My lawyer told me that things would go worse
for me if I pled not guilty and then being forced
into a jury trial I would get more than ten.
Norfolk: Defendant
A: The police told me they would help me as much
as they could and they would drop the strong
armed robbery charge.

" Some responses are summaries or paraphrases of actual responses.
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El Paso: Defendant
A: The defendant said that his lawyer and county
jail inmates told him he would get a harsher sentence if he went to trial. (But, he perceived trial to
mean a jury trial with the sentencing done by the
jury (possible in Texas) not the judge.)
Some defendants did not need to be told about differential sentencing. For them it was common knowledge.
New Orleans: Defendant
Q: Oid anybody tell you what would happen if you
went to trial? Whether things would be worse for
you?
A: No. I kind of figured that myself. I always
heard, you know, if you fight it they're going to
give you the maximum sentence and everything but
the lawyer didn't tell me.
Q: Y au just . . . that was the word you got in the
parish (Jail)?
A: Well, yeah, out of all the times I've been in jail,
and like I say, quite a few times, I always heard if
you fight it they really try to hang you.
Tucson: Defendant
A: Public defender told him things would go harder
for him if he fought the charges. W auld get a
longer sentence.
Tucson: Defendant
A: They used threats against my wife. They said
"one or both of you is going to prison."
New Orleans: Defendant
Q: Did he (the lawyer) tell you what would happen
if you told Judge Shea that you weren't guilty?
A: I knew that then I would have to go to trial and
I would really have no case and I guess I . . . another reason I can't say I copped out was because if
I would have fought against the law I believe I
would have gotten a lot more time than I did.
Q: Is that just what you believe or did the attorney
tell you that also?
A: Well, he also told me that, but I knew that beforehand, you know.
Q: How did you know? From the parish (jail
mates)?
A: Just from the guys that been to court before, you
know, besides me.
New Orleans: Defendant
Q: Did you think you'd get more time if you went
to trial on the case?
A: Oh, sure enough-Q: Did your lawyer tell you you'd get more time?
A: Ah-ah. (Affirmative.)
Q: But you knew it also didn't you?

A: Right.
Almost all defendants reported that an important reason
why they pleaded guilty was to avoid the harsher sentence after trial as indicated by the sample of answers to
our question, "If you pleaded to any of the charges can
you give me all the reasons for doing so? (Probe: Is that
all?)"

Norfolk Defendant
A: I did it to keep from getting other charges.
Tucson Defendant
A: Was pregnant at the time and wanted reduced
sentence.
Norfolk Defendant
A: I thought I would be helping myself. I thought
the judge would go easier.
Noifolk Defendant
A: Back in 1973 a guy got 120 years on narcotics
who claimed he was innocent. My maximum was
220 years and . . .
New Orleans Defendant
Q: Ah, so what was, what was the main reason you
pleaded guilty-because of the sentence?
A: Well, because of the possibility that I might get
the 20 years without the benefit of good time.
For almost all defendants pleading guilty was seen as
making the best of a bad situation. It was a rational strategy for minimizing their losses. Many of them felt that
the state had a strong case against them. They had been
caught in the act, or had already "confessed" to the
police; or they "knew" that codefendants would testify
against them or that the police would lie about the constitutionality of the search or the arrest or the available
evidence. Others felt the cases against them were weak
or problematic but they did not want to risk losing at
trial. Several maintained that because they were Indian
or Negro they thought they could not win their cases at
trial. Several emphasized that they pleaded guilty to get
the case over. The utter resignation and hopelessness
that prompts some pleas is suggested by the following
interview.
Q: So, what ultimately decided to make you plead
guilty other than the fact that you knew you didn't
have a chance in this case? Was that the only
factor?
A: I guess well, after I escaped from down there for
various reasons and everything, I just wanted to get
it all over with, and I knew I was guilty, there
wasn't-Q: They had you, cold.
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A: I guess if I could have come up with some
money to get a lawyer and everything I might
could have got out of it or something, maybe a
good deal, or something. But, I just pleaded guilty,
and it gets to a point where there ain't nothing you
can do about it.

On eliminating plea bargaining

Over the last decade, recommendations to eliminate plea
bargaining and claims that it has been eliminated in particular jurisdictions have abounded. As with much of
what is said about plea bargaining, these statements typically are misleading because of a failure to specify what
None of the usual official rationales with which judges is meant by plea bargaining. At least four distinct meanand the ABA justify sentence differentials were evident ings are useful. The things that might be eliminated are:
charge bargaining; explicit sentence bargaining; implicit
in the reasons given by defendants for their pleas with
sentence bargaining; and the general perception that a
one small possible exception. Two defendants mentioned defendant will receive some special benefit from the
that they felt "morally guilty" or that the crime "both- state by pleading guilty that he would not receive if he
ered them." This reason was given in addition to the fact stood trial. If one accepts our definition of a bargainedthat they thought the case against them was strong and for guilty plea as a plea entered by a defendant with the
that their attorneys had advised them to plead guilty. reasonable expectation of receiving some consideration
Thus their motives in pleading were not solely to from the state, it is evident that eliminating plea bargaincleanse their souls. But, nonetheless, the two cases sug- ing is not synonymous with eliminating charge bargaingest that sometimes the entry of a guilty plea may be ac- ing or explicit or implicit sentence bargaining. Not until
companied by a genuine sense of regret which might defendants no longer believe on some reasonable basis
become the basis for a successful rehabilitative program. (such as the opinions of their attorneys or the experience
On the other hand, however, defendants are aware of of fellow defendants) that they will be punished more sethe importance of appearing contrite and remorseful for verely for going to trial can it be said that plea bargainthe judge in order to assure the acceptance of the plea, ing has been genuinely eliminated.
as is suggested by the following remarks.
Obviously, this subjective standard is a difficult one to
meet. A more feasible test of the elimination of plea barQ: Why did you want to plead guilty?
gaining is the objective one of whether criminal justice
A: Well, I figured if I went ahead and pled guilty
officials (notably prosecutors and judges) have stopped
that I would probably get a lesser sentence, you
offering considerations (such as charge or sentence conknow, in the eyes of the judge by going ahead and
cessions) in exchange for pleas, and stopped fostering or
making my guilty plea. I talked to this DEA man
permitting the perception of differential sentencing. In
that was supposed to, you know. Well the last time
short, if no one in the system is offering considerations
directly; or suggesting that there are implicit benefits for
I talked to him he says, "Don't worry when you go
pleaders; or allowing others to foster that perception,
back to court and plead guilty just . . . you're
then on an objective basis the system has achieved a no
going to get out that way."
plea bargaining policy. 14 Any other kind of "no plea barThus, while there may be some defendants who feel gaining" policy must be understood for what it is. It
some genuine contrition in entering their pleas, there are may mean that one or another criminal justice official
others who do whatever they think judges want to see. (prosecutors and judges) is not plea bargaining. But, it
does not mean that plea bargaining has been eliminated.
It is doubtful that the two could be distinguished with
In examining the merits of these "no plea bargaining
sufficient accuracy to support a policy of lenient senpolicies" one is not choosing among different ways of
tencing for the genuinely remorseful defendant. But even eliminating plea bargaining but rather different ways of
if the distinction could be made, the rationale for such a allowing the practice to occur. Usually the choice is bepolicy needs close examination. It is unclear by what tween having the bargaining done by prosecutors using
ethical theory genuine remorse merits less punishment. either or both charge concessions or. sentence recomSimilarly, if genuine remorse indicates a readiness for rehabilitation, it still does not follow that the sentence
should be shorter. Perhaps it should be longer so that a
In such a system it may take a while before defendants come to bethorough rehabilitation can be achieved. The noncontrite lieve that the no plea bargaining policy is a reality. During that interdefendant should perhaps be released earlier because val the system may continue to benefit from pleas entered by defendants who refuse to believe they will not get some consideration for
there is no hope of rehabilitation and he is just consum- their pleas. To that extent the system has not completely eliminated
plea bargaining.
ing limited rehabilitative resources.
14
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Alaska increases the length of one's sentence by 334 percent (Rubinstein and White, 1979a: 266). What is more,
judges, defense counsel, and undoubtedly defendants are
fully aware of the existence of this implicit sentencing
system.

mendation; or allowing judges to negotiate directly with
the defense; or operating a well-known but indefinite implicit system where the defendant does not know exactly
what he i getting for his plea but knows he would get
something worse after trial.

When prosecutors establish a no plea bargaining policy In New Orleans, the prosecutor established a "no plea
thi usually means simply that charge bargaining wiU bargaining" policy that is better thought of as a restrictend (for all crimes or tho e crimes which falJ within ed charge bargaining policy. lt in volves careful screen some targeted category). u This, of course, does not ing and accurate charging together with o. prohibition
mean that plea bargaining has been eliminated in the jo- against reducing or dismi sing charges solely t ecure
risdiction. Rather it means that the locus and nature of guilty pleas. Once a ca e is barged the assistant pro plea bargaining will shift to the judiciary as occurred in ecutor in the trial division must get a c nviction for that
El Paso, Texas; Alaska, and New Orleans. In El Paso charge unless he or she gets special permission from the
when the p1·osecutor's office refused to plea bargain the screening unit or the chief prosecutor to alter the
judges were left with having to provide the incentive for charge. Alterations happened in 29 percent of the burpleading by offering differentials to pleaders. This ex- glary and robbery cases in our analysis. The policy,
posed them to the risk of public criticism for lenient sen- however, does allow prosecutors to make sentence rectencing. As an alternative, they promulgated a point ommendations as part of plea bargains (which they did
system by which defendants were upposed to be able to in 60 percent of our sample of cases). This policy has the
calculate whether they would be sentenced to imprison- effect of reducing the importance of charge bargaining
ment or probation. In theory defendants were then ex- while increasing the importance of sentence bargaining.
pected to plead guilty, for which they were given no Not surprisingly, as in Alaska, the sentence differential
special consideration. Thus, rather than replace the pros- in New Orleans is substantial and represents the largest
ecutor's plea bargaining system with one of their own, differential among our six sites. Defendants convicted
the judges tried to eliminate explicit and imp1icit sen- after trial can expect a 138 percent increase in length of
tence bargaining. E vidently they were partially uccess- sentence. 16 In contrast to Alaska and New Orleans
ful. No explicit sentence bargaining occurred; and aU the where charge bargaining is eliminated or restricted,
judges except one did not engage in implicit bargaining. Tucson and Delaware County are places where charge
This is confirmed by our statistical analysis of cases bargaining represents the most frequently used token of
(Table 5.2); our interviews with attorneys and the judges exchange in plea negotiation. In Tucson, among those
(Table 5.3); and, ironically by the fact that the court cases in our sample in which plea bargaining had ocbegan to develop backlog problems. Realizing that there curred, 93 percent of the bargains involved charge modiwas no penalty for going to trial, defendants were reluc- fications. Among Delaware County pleaded cases, 98
tant to plead guilty. After two years of the point system, percent involved charge m diftcations. In neither juristhe judges modified it to provide an incentive for plead- diction were sentence recommendations the sole form of
ing guilty.
plea negotiation with any frequency. T his contr asts
In Alaska, the Attorney General's office (which controls sharply with New Orleans where 56 percent f the
criminal prosecutions throughout the tate), announced a pleaded cases involved sentence recomm ndations only .
"no plea bargaining policy' for prosecutors (Rubinstein Coincidental with thls extensive charge bargaining in
and White, 1979a). They could no longer dismiss, Tucson and Delaware County is the fact that these two
reduce, or alter charges solely to obtain a guilty plea. jurisdictions have the smallest sentencing dlft r ntials in
When prosecutorial bargaining ended, the courts imme- our sampleY In contrast to Alaska's diffi rentia1 of 334
diately took up the slack by negotiating with the defense percent and New Orelans' of 138 percent, Tucson has
themselves. Today the "no plea bargaining" policy is only 16 percent and Delaware County 14 percent.
being regarded as a successful instance of the elimination Figure 5.1 portrays the general relationship between the
of plea bargaining. Yet, Alaska has a sentencing differen- degree to which a jurisdiction relies on charge bal."gaintial that is almost three times greater than the largest dif- ing (measured as the percent f guilty pleas in which
ferential in our sample of six sites. Going to trial in any charge concessi ns were given and the size of the

15
Of course, if the prosecutor's office had previously been making sentence recommendations as part of their plea bargains, this will .be terminated as well.

18
However, if the perceptions of local attorneys are correct, only five
of the ten judges are contributing to this differential (see Table 5.4).
17
Excluding El Paso.
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sentence differential (measured in terms of the percent
increase in the length of sentence for tried defendants
compared to pleaders).
In 'Tucson where the bargaining is largely in terms f
charge concessions and where (objective) differential
sentencing is nonexistent for the in-out deci ion and
minimal for the length-of-time-to-serve decision, the
judge all claim thal they do not differentially sentence
and most of the attorneys believe that this is true. Thus
Tucson might be aid to have achieved a no plea bargaining policy that is the inverse of Alaska's policy. Instead of the prosecutor taking himself out of plea bargaining and forcing the judges to provide plea incentives
through differential entencing, the Tuc on prosecutor
carri the bulk of the responsibility for obtaining pleas
through charge canoe sian and free lhe judges from
the real or apparent role of penalizing defendants into
pleading guilty.

There are dangers in a charge bargaining sy tern. It may
encourage inaccurate or maximum charging done olely
for the purpose of bargaining. It a sumes that the pros·
eoutof'' office can and will exercise systematic internal
controls over tl1e bargaining practices (not a valid asumption in some places). And it assumes a rational,
graded sentencing structure.

In contrast, sentence bargaining leaves plea bargaining in
the band, of the judiciary, which in theory is responsible
for the entencing anyhow. However, there are jmportant deficiencies in entence bargaining. Judges are not
privy to the prosecutor's file. They do not know the
strength of a case and therefore are unable to consider
one of the main fa tors used in evaluating a case for plea
bargaining, namely, case ·trength. Judges are not subject
to the centralized policy control and review that is (potentially) po sible within prosecutors' offices. Different
judges may or may not agree to plea bargain and may
The difference between the two jurisdictions represents do it dir ctly or indirectly. The size of differential is
an interesting choice for policymakers and reformers in- likely to vary from judge to judge and even case to case.
terested in abolishing plea bargaining. Neither jurisdic- If the bargaining operates implicitly defendants are less
tion has actually eliminated plea bargaining altogether; able to know what if anything they will receive for their
rather, each has eliminated one of the two main forms of pleas. They will be mo.re dependent on their attorney's
plea bargaining (charge or sentence bargaining) by shift- ability to correctly read the judge's differentia] sentencing the focus of bargaining to the other form. The ing tendencies- which we have seen above is a dubious
choice between the two is whether it ls "better" (fairer, skill.
more just, more effective, more efficient) for plea bargaining to be done by pro ecutor through charg modifications or by judges through implicit but substantial Recasting the no plea bargaining choice
sentencing differentials. The fanner policy places lhe reponsibility for plea bargaining in the office of the pros- The debate over eliminating plea bargaining has been
ecutor, an elected official accountable to the public. The casl as a two-value choice: plea bargaining or no plea
bargaining could be in terms of explicit charge conces- bargaining. Those choices appear to be unnecessarily
sions, which in theory could be controlled by one cen- stark and unproductive. There are other choices. One set
tral office policy, recorded in case files, and ubject to of alternatives has ju t b n described in the foregoing
review and accountability. Defendants could be given comparison between charge bargaining and sentence barspecific con iderations t r their pleas. Thi policy would gaining. Additional choices become evident as one sorts
not liminate sentencing differentials but could change through the objections to and defenses of plea bargaintheir nature, appearance and rationale. Assuming a penal ing.
code with graded classe. of offenses and no mandatory Tho e objections are usually in two categorie those
minimum . entencesJ charge bargaining could be an or- rhat focus on accidental aspects of plea bargaining and
derly proce s of reducing the range of penalty expo ure. those focusing on the inherent, e sentiaJ features of plea
D efendants who refused the plea offer would n t be bargaining. Accidental features are things that might be
punished "more severely" for go·ing to trial. Rather they remedied without changing the e ·sential character of
would be punished for the original c harge. The many plea bargaining. In some jurisdictions, for example, there
defendant who plead guilty would not be punished for are built-in financial incentives for defense counsel to
the crime they appeared to have (or actually) committed plead cases rather than take them to trial. Such incentive
but rather something le . Thi. would make clear that systems add to the general suspicion about plea bargainunder this system the price beu1g extra ted by plea bar- ing. Even if they were remedied, there would still be
gaining was from the comm unity's safety rather than other objections to plea bargaining.
from the defendant. The reason for the price paid would
be the community's unwillingness or inability to bear the Two features of plea bargaining which raise fundamental
cost of providing defendants with trials.
objections are that it is an institutionalized way of dis-
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posing of cases without the evidence in the case being
subjected to review by an impartial third party (see, e.g.,
Alschuler 1976) and that pleas are obtained by "coercing" or inducing defendants. The remedy most relevant
to the first objection is the requirement that judges establish a factual basis for a guilty p1ea 'before accepting
the plea. In practice this remedy has not represented a
complete safeguard. 18 But it could be fortified.

essary to keep a plea bargaining sy t m operating? Ten
percent? One hundred percent? Five hundred per ent?"
Our data cannot answer that question directly because it
is not possible to translate the value of charge reductions
into differences in length of sentence. But our data on
sentence differentials in various jurisdictions do suggest
that the minimum necessary differential is closer to 14
percent or 16 percent than to 138 percent or 334 percent. That is, it appears that if the state offered defendants a reduction in the length of sentence of about 15
percent to 30 percent, that would be sufficient to keep
pleas coming. Perhaps for certain crimes or in some special ca e larger or smaller discounts would be n eded.
But even if our 30 percent discount were doubled, it
would still be smaller than the actual differentials found
in three of our six jurisdictions.

The problem of coercing enticing or inducing defendants to plead guilty is a1 o ubject to a partial solution .
Assuming that ome inducement must be given in order
to get defendant to plead, the partial remedy is to keep
the inducement as small as possible. The compromise objective hould be to determine just how minimal inducements can be and still be enough to keep guilty pleas
coming at a rate sufficient to prevent ystem overload. lf
this could be determined, then a logical alternative to In summary, then, policymaker concerned with balancthe abolition-or-not controver y could be advanced. Plea. ing the need for plea incentives while simultaneously
bargaining could be regarded as an acceptable policy if minimizing the coercivenes and inconsistency of plea
the price for going to trial were no more than the mini- bargaining, would do well to con ider a proposal that
mum necessary to sustain the plea bargaining system and has been recommended in the past (Yale Law Journal,
if it were imposed equally on all similarly-situated de- 1972; Alschuler, 1976). Fixed discounts for pleading
fendants. Such a poJicy would respond to the concerns guilty could be offered to defendants. The size of the
of those critics of plea bargaining who focus on its ex- discounts might vary by type of offense and even by
cessive coersiveness and its inconsistency. It is to these stage in the justice proces (bigger discounts for earlier
questions of whether minimal inducements can be deter- pleas). But, our data suggest that the discounts do not
mined and what they might be, that we turn now.
need to be large. Possibly they could average as little as
14 peTcent off the severity of the sentence that the judge
There is some reason to believe that the state could op- would have impo ed after trial and a prop r pre entence
erate for an indefinite period of time successfully secur- investigation. In jurisdictions where the plea bargaining
ing pleas by giving virtually nothing in exchange. ln one is primarily over charges, the sentence differential could
jurisdiction d fendants regularly plead guilty in exbe considerably less and the standard discount could be
change for promises of concurrent sentencing of multiple in terms of graded reduction in charges.
offense. Yet, ucb concurrent sentencing is required by
law; so in effect the defendants are getting nothing in
the exchange. In Baltimore County, Maryland, a senior
prosecutor described five ca..<ieS of first degree murder in Summary
which the defendants pleaded guilty even though no
plea bargain wa offered and their attorneys evidently The analysis of the reality as well as the perceptions and
tried to convince them that they would get nothlng for self-reports of differential sentencing produced the fol-·
lowing results:
their pleas.
Deliberately operating a system of bogus plea bargains,
however, would raise obvious ethical problems. Thus,
the search must be for minimum non-bogus inducements.
In order to simplify the discussion of the various types
of real inducements which might be offered, it is useful
to think in terms of a continuum which can be quantified, such as the length of a sentence. Thus the question
becomes, "How much of an increase in the length of
sentence is the average minimum sentence discount nee-

18

See Chapter 6.

• Defendants almost universally believe that they will
be punished more severely for going to trial than pleading guilty. This is frequently conveyed to them by their
attorneys but for many it is common knowledge.
• The majority of judges (37 of 49) deny that they
punish defendants who are convicted at trial more severely solely because they go to trial.
• Significant increases in the severity of sentence (either
in terms of an increased probability of being sentenced
to orne time in incarceration or an increased length of
incarceration or both) for defendants convicted at trial
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Several studies suggest that tried defendant are punished more severely than pleaders but mo t of these
studies have not controlled for variables which might ac• The magnitude of the sentence differentials varies count for both the fact that the case went to trial and
enormously among the jurisdictions (from a 14 percent
the fact that it was sentenced more severely. A few studto 138 percent increase in the length of sentence and
ie which were able to control such confounding variafrom a 12 percent to a 29 percent increase in the probabihty of a sentence with time-to-serve). The largest dif- bles found that the mere fact of going to trial did not
ferential occ urred in a jurisdiction where the prosecu- account for the entence difference. However, our analysis, which also controlled for uch variables, came to a
tor's office has a restricted plea bargaining policy.
different conclusion. The mere fact of going to trial does
• The perceptions by prosecutors and defense counsel of appear to contribute to the severity of the sentence. But,
differential sentencing vary in unexpected and unexplain- the nature of the contribution varje considerably b~ the
able ways. Surprisingly, there is a substantial amount of nature of the plea bargaining system in the jurisdiction.
disagreement among attorneys in their perceptions of In jurisdictions where the prosecutor's office has re trictwhether specilic judges do sentence differentially.
ed it$ charge bargaining, there is the greatest degree f
difference in the length of sentences between pleaders
• D efense cow1sel are more likely than prosecutors to
and tried defendants. Where charge bargaining flourbelieve judge do not differentially sentence.
ishes, the difference in lhe sev rity of entences is small• The degree of agreement among all attorneys in their est. This supports the plastic or hydraulic model of the
perceptions of the differential . entenci:ng practjce of justice process which holds that if discretion is reduced
judges varies by jurisdiction but does not vary by the in one area it will be compensated for elsewhere. It also
magnitude of the average actual differential in jurisdic- suggests that programs which purport to have eliminated
or reduced plea bargaining such as in Alaska or New
tions.
Orleans have only shifted the nature of plea bargaining.
• The judges' denial of djfferential sentencing are ques- However, it is in the analysis of the relative merits of
tioned both by the perception of attorneys who know these alternative form of plea bargaining rather than in
their practices and by the existence of actual differentials debates over the ab olute abolition of plea bargaining
in sentences after controlling for relevant confounding that the most productive course of policy foi·mation lies.
variables.
• Perceived sentence differential are an important Although many defendants believe the cases against
factor in the decisions of mo t defendants to plead them are strong and are anxious to settle the matters and
guilty. But a ubsta.ntial number of defendants felt that would probably plead guilty for very little or no consideration, a substantial number of them believe their cases
the cases against them were strong.
are problematic. Thu, it appears that the offering of
• Defendants ee their decisions to plead guilty a · way
so me incentives to plead guilty is necessary. The policy
of cutting their losses. They do not appear to be taking questions are about what th incentives should be; who
the flrsl step on the r ad to rehabilitation although a
hould offer them; and how large a differential between
very few defendants mentioned that in addition to want- pleaders and tried defendants is necessary to secure
ing to avoid a harsher sentence they pleaded guilty be- enough pleas to keep the court system f.rom overloading.
cause they "felt bad" or "morally wrong" about the The main choices are between prosecutors offering
crime.
charge concessions sentence concession , or both; o.r
judges offering sentence concessions. If bargaining is
done by prosecutors it can take account of case strength
i:n setting the terms of the plea. Whether this i desirable
Discussion
or not depends on one's perspective. As a practical
At the heart of the plea bargaining system is the policy matter most attorney regard case strength as a critical
of punishing defendants who are convicted after trial factor in plea negotiations. To some c ritics, however,
more severely than those convicted by pleading guilty. case strength is an inappropriate factor and dilutes the
This policy has been approved by the courts and the legal standard of proof required by our jurisprudential
ABA ha enwnerated a set of rationales ju tifying the ideal~. In so doing it thereby increases the pos ibility of
practice. Nonetheless, it continues to generate controver- wrongful conviction.
y both as to whether the practice actually occurs;
whether it is needed; and whethe( it should be allowed Plea bargaining by prosecutors does not have to mean
to continue.
that case strength would necessarily influence disposi-

compared to those pleading guilty occurred in all six jurisdi tions.
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tions. An aggressive screening program with a high
standard of proof for case acceptability could minimize
the influence of case strength. Further uniformity among
plea offers could be introduced by office policy. Potentially this would allow for greater evenhandedness in
plea bargaining than would occur among judges because
assistant prosecutors are subject to policy control by one
chief executive whereas judges are not.
If the bargaining is done in terms of charge modifica-

tions (dismissals or reductions) the integrity of the criminal justice system's record system is compromised. Defendants are not convicted of the crimes they committed. Moreover, the calculation of the value of changes in
charges is. difficult to interpret meaningfully. It is less
clear to both defendants and the public what, if anything, the state is giving the defendant when, for example, it drops charges which may not have affected the
sentence anyhow. The opportunity for both bogus as
well as overly generous plea considerations to go unrecognized are greater when pleas are in terms of charge
modifications than when they are in specific sentence
lengths. Thus, both fairness to defendant (in terms of letting them know what they are getting) and meaningful
accountability of the prosecutor to the public are less
feasible with charge bargaining than with sentence bargaining.
The question of how much of a sentence differential
needs to be given in order to secure a guilty plea usually
gets answered in practice after an evaluation of the
merits of each individual case. But a policy of tailoring
plea offers to individual cases fosters unevenness in plea

bargaining. 19 Alternatively, plea bargaining could be
made more evenhanded and less coercive by establishing
set discounts for pleas. Coerciveness could be reduced
by holding the size of the discount to the minimum necessary to secure pleas. Evenhandedness would be
achieved by offering the same discounts to all defendants
(or, if necessary, to vary the discount by type of offense). While this policy would not eliminate plea bargaining it would minimize and control two of its more
troublesome aspects. The problem is trying to determine
how much of a differential is enough.
Our analysis was unable to answer this precisely; nor
was it able to determine whether it would be necessary
to vary the size of the discounts by type of offense.
However, for the two offenses on which our analysis is
based and for cases taken as an aggregate it appears that
the threat of as little as about a 14 percent increase in
the length of sentence (plus some charging concessions)
is enough to obtain a sufficient number of pleas to maintain a system. On the other hand, as charging concessions are increasingly restricted the sentence differentials
must be enormously increased-to about 80 percent
when charge bargaining is restricted, to as much as 334
percent when it is eliminated. The inequity and coerciveness of the plea bargaining system seems to increase as
charge bargaining is minimized, the prosecutor removes
himself from the negotiating process, and the system
shifts to implicit bargaining by judges.

19
See Chapter 4 for degree of prosecutorial disagreement over plea
offers in selected circumstances.
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Chapter Six
Judicial Supervision of
the Guilty Plea Process
Introduction
Judicial supervision of the guilty plea process is regarded by many as a crucial strategy for bringing fairness
and legitimacy to the institution of plea bargaining.
Some reformers may have reached this conclusion after
deciding that plea bargaining need not be eliminated because judicial supervision could serve as an adequate
safeguard. Others may have decided that plea bargaining
could not be eliminated; hence, judicial supervision is the
best way to make virtuous this necessity. In any event,
numerous nationally recognized groups as well as appellate court decisions have identified the trial judge as the
key actor in taming the dragon. 1 While these writers are
by no means unanimous on all specific points they are in
general agreement.
The judge is expected to assure the fairness of the process both to defendants and to the community. For defendants he is to determine that (1) their pleas are "voluntary" -an elusive term which has come to mean not
induced by "improper" inducements, such as bribing or
physical violence, but not including the inducements
normally associated with charge and sentence bargaining
(except for inducements involving "overcharging" by
prosecutors); 2 (2) their pleas are "intelligent"-also an
elusive and open-ended term which has gradually assumed greater specificity including the determination
that the defendant knows his rights, the nature of the

1
For a review of the case decisions as well as the legal literature see
Bond, 1981 . For a review of the recommendations of national standard-setting groups see Epstein and Austern, 1975.
2
Two commissions (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice, 1967; and the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973:57) have specifically identified "overcharging" as "improper" inducements which judges should
reject.

charge to which he is pleading, and the consequences of
his plea; and,· (3) the judge is to establish a record of the
plea acceptance as well as the terms of any plea agreement that may have been struck. The last procedure has
been regarded as not only a protection for defendants by
ensuring that they get the deal they thought they had
agreed to but also as benefiting the general community
by making plea bargaining more visible and efficient (by
minimizing appeals on the grounds of broken plea promises).
In addition, the judge is to minimize the possibility of innocent people being convicted by reviewing the evidence and determining that the plea is "accurate," that a
"factual basis for the plea" exists-meaning generally
that there is reason to believe the defendant committed a
crime of equal or greater seriousness than the one to
which he is pleading. As for fairness to the community,
the judge is expected to check the plea bargaining practices of prosecutors and reject plea agreements that are
not appropriate to the total circumstances of the case including such things as the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, the appearance of justice, and the normal sentencing practices that would apply to similarly-situated
defendants. The judge is to reject overly-lenient and
overly-severe plea bargains alike.
This chapter describes the development of standards relating to the judge's supervisory role in the process and
describes how that role is performed in six jurisdictions.
The analysis is based on interviews with judges and
others plus in-court observations of guilty plea acceptances in a total of 711 felony and misdemeanor cases
before 46 felony and misdemeanor courts between July
7, 1977, and August 31, 1977.
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The growth of plea acceptance
standards
As recently as the early 1960's the process of entering a
plea of guilty in court was usually brief. The court
would ask a few questions and defendants, often without
the advice of counsel, gave one-word answers leading to
their convictions-even of serious crimes. The only
formal requirement governing the court in accepting
guilty pleas in most jurisdictions was that it determine
that the plea be voluntarily entered by a competent defendant (Newman, 1966:8; Washington University Law
Quarterly, 1966). Many defendants pleaded guilty after
negotiating deals with either the judge, the prosecutor,
or the police. But this fact was usually not elicited,
much less regarded as having rendered the plea involuntary. On the contrary, such defendants were required to
engage in the "pious fraud" (Enker, 1967:111) of denying for the record that any promises, threats, or inducements had influenced their pleas.
The brevity of the plea acceptance process belied the seriousness of its consequences, a point stressed by the
United States Supreme Court:
A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a
mere admission or an extra-judicial confession; it is
itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing
to do but give judgement and sentence. (Machibroda
v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962), quoting
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927)).
Within a few years the consequences had become even
more grave because the plea operated as a waiver of
precious constitutional rights newly made applicable to
the states including: (1) the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination; (2) the Sixth Amendment right
to confront one's accusers; and (3) the Sixth Amendment
right to a trial by jury. 3
By the mid-sixties reforms of the plea taking process
were underway. Trial and appellate courts were beginning to pay more attention to the requirements of the
process (Newman, 1966:8); and commentators (e.g., University of Chicago Law Review, 1964) and commissions
were recommending changes designed to make the process more visible, uniform, fair to defendants and the
community, and to minimize the risk of innocent defendants pleading guilty.
In 1966, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs the process by which federal courts

See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

accept guilty pleas, was amended in a small but important way. The federal courts had formerly been obliged
to determine that all guilty pleas were entered "voluntarily with understanding" (Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, pre-1966). But no specific procedure for
taking pleas had been prescribed (Washington University
Law Quarterly, 1966:308). The 1966 amendment required that the court personally address the defendant in
making its determination that the plea was voluntarily
and knowingly made. It also added the requirement that.
the court satisfy itself that there be a factual basis for the
plea (Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended
Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966). Nine years later Rule 11
was amended again, this time substantially expanding its
scope. 4
The 1975 text reflected many of the recommendations
that were suggested in the mid-sixties or had already
been established by case decisions. In 1967, the President's Crime Commission (President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
1967:12) went beyond the requirements of the existing
FRCP Rule 11. It recommended that if a plea agreement
were involved in the case, its terms should be fully
stated for the record and, at least in serious or complicated cases, reduced to writing. Such memoranda should
contain "an agreed statement of the facts of the offense,
the opening positions of the parties, the terms of the
agreement, background information relevant to the correctional disposition, and an explanation of why the negotiated disposition is appropriate" (Id.). This material
should be probed by the judge, whose inquiries should
be "more precise and detailed than the brief and perfunctory question-and-answer sequence that [had] been
common in some courts" (Ibid, 13). In contrast to the
1968 American Bar Association Standards Relating to
Guilty Pleas (which were being drafted at the time), the
Commission recommended that the judge's guilty plea
acceptance decision be simultaneous with his sentencing
decision. That is, rather than a procedure by which a
judge accepts a plea contingent upon a favorable subsequent presentence investigation report, the Commission
recommended that such diagnostic and sentencing information should be made available at the time of the plea.
The judge is to use it in deciding whether the agreed
upon disposition is fair and appropriate in light of all the
circumstances. In particular the judge should "determine
that . . . the prosecutor did not agree to an inadequate
sentence for a serious offender," and should "guard
against overcharging by the prosecutor or an agreed sentence that is inappropriately light in view of the crime

3

4
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See Appendix B for a comparison of the 1966 and 1975 texts.

or is lenient as to constitute an irresistible inducement to
the defendant to plead guilty" (Id.).
The following year the ABA (1968) issued its Standards
Relating to Pleas of Guilty, which added a few more requ.irement to the growing list of thing judges were
belng a ked to do. For the most par these requirements
represented specifications of the existing general requirements that pleas be knowingly and volw1tarily given.
The ABA (1968: § 1.4) recommended that:
The court should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere from a defendant without first addressing the defendant personally and
(a) determining that he understands the nature
of the charge;
(b) informing him that by his plea of guilty or
nolo contendere he waives his right to trial by
jury; and
(c) informing him:
(i) of the possible sentence on the charge, including that possible from consecutive sentences;
(ii) of the mandatory minimum sentence, if
any, on the charge; and
(iii) when the offense charged is one for
which a different or additional punishment is authorized by reason of the fact that the defendant
has previously been qonvicted of an offense, that
this fact may be established after his plea in the
present action if he has been previously convicted, thereby subjecting him to such different or additional punishment.
The court should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere without first determining that the plea is
voluntary. By inquiry of the prosecuting attorney
and defense counsel, the court should determine
whether the tendered plea is the result of prior plea
discussions and a plea agreement, and, if it is, what
agreement has been reached. If the prosecuting attorney has agreed to seek charge or sentence concessions which must be approved by the court, the
court must advise the defendant personally that the
recommendations of the prosecuting atto.rney are
not binding on the court. The court should then address the defendant personally and determine
whether any other promises or any force or threat
were used to obtain the plea.
The ABA (1968) also recommended that the judge satisfy himself that a factual basis for the plea exists; a record
be made of the proceedings; and that a defendant not be
called upon to plead until be has had aid of counsel and
time for deliberation.
By 1973, when the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (NACC) issued its

recommended plea taking requirements, the list had
become even longer and more pecific- reflecting
changes in the law. In addition the American Law Institute (1975) and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1974) recommended standards for plea acceptance. Each et of standards varies
from tl1e other in a few parti ulars, • but they agree on
the need for a substantial judicial role in supervising the
guilty plea proce and the main dimensions along whi h
that role should be performed.

Judicial supervision in six jurisdictions
Despite the modification of case law and the various recommended standards for accepting guilty pleas the
judge's role in supervising the guilty plea process remains fluid and uncertain. This is for several reas n .
The standards are: inherently ambiguous; 6 frequently
confused witll each other by appellat courts' 7 and subject to differing views a to how far the judge bould b
required to go in fulfilling them. 8 Moreover, although

• Foe an itemized comparison of the 1975 FRCP, 1975 ALI, 1968
ABA, NAC, and the 1974 Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure see
Epstein and Austern, 1975.
• For instance, the criterion of voluntariness has chameleon-like properties-taking on whatever defmilion best suits it (Bond, 1981:75). Professor Enker (1967:108) has explainc:d it as follows:
It should be recognized fmmediately that the term ~volrwtoriness] is an
ceedingly ambiguous term. This stems not only from the diffl ultles involved In trying to d-isaovar a past slatr! of mind bur ol o from the fact that
we do 1101 even have a clear idea of what, if any, psychological fa ct or
experience we are looking for. The choice ro plead guilty rllther !han face
tlte rack is voluntary in 1/re sense that the subjecl did have a choice, olbeit
betw l!tl unpleasanl alrematives. The defendant who decide.~ to plead guilly
and seek judicial mercy also makes u choice berween what are to him two
wtpleasant altemotives. lf we call 1he first cholce Involuntary and th
second voluntary whal we are really saying Is lfwl lllf.l arc convinced tltat in
the first case almost dlf persons so confronted will choose 10 admit their
guilr but that the deft!ndant's decision Is based on more personal and .w bjectil'e fact(lrs in the second inswnce.
me pleas are invalidated on the grounds of voluntarincss wh en the
fact pattern suggests Lhe more appropriate grounds would have been
lack of requisite knowledge. See, e.g., Pilkington v. United States, 315
F .2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963) defendant was not accurately informed of the
ma.\imum sentence he might receive).
• For instance, in requiring that the judge cstab li ~ h a factual ba.sis for a
plea those reformers who would have. tbe judge serve as a protection
again 1 pleas lu wellk cases and as a mechanism by whic h an impariiul
lhird-party who sse.<>s.:d the evidence might like to requiTe that i:hc
j udge determine whether the evid nee meets some standard of proof
such as probable ca use or beyond a reasonable d ubi . But olher d
not agree that such a standard sl'•ould be required (Bond, 1981).
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the Federal courts developed a set of procedures governing the acceptance of pleas in Federal courts (FRCP
Rule 11, 1975), no specific set of procedures has been
constitutionally imposed upon the states (Bond 1981 :88).
The states are only constitutionally obligated to assure
that whatever procedures they use satisfy due process.
This has meant that state courts may not accept a guilty
pJea unless defendants enter them knowingly and voluntarily. The court in Larson v. Coiner, 351 F. Supp. 129,
130 (N.D. W. Va. 1972) summarized the point as follows:
While state courts are not required to enter into arraignment inquiry to the depth and extent required
of United States District Courts under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures, they must nevertheless determine on the record if the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered.

somewhat less extensive and different set of required
procedures. 10 Similarly, Virginia has even less extensive
required guidelines plus a recommended list of questions 1
to guide the judicial inquiry. 11 Pennsylvania's required;
procedure is minimal but detailed guidelines are recommended in dicta in a leading case. 12 Finally, Louisiana
has minimal required guidelines. However, the judges in
New Orleans have individually established their own
procedures (which vary in certain important respects but
generally incorporate many of the guidelines used elsewhere).13
1

How the laws of the six states regarding plea taking operate in action and whether they provide the kind of
safeguard against defects and abuses of plea bargaining
as envisioned by their advocates are examined below.
The analysis is divided into five parts: (1) the quality of
the plea acceptance process; (2) the knowing standard;
(3) the voluntary standard; (4) the accuracy standard
(factual basis); and (5) the effectiveness of the procedures.

However, as the Federal courts continue to interpret the
knowing-voluntary standards it has become evident that
the minimal plea taking procedures of former times
would not meet constitutional requirements. The state
courts must establish a record sufficient to establish that Background characteristics of the 711 guilty pleas on
the defendant is knowingly and voluntarily pleading and which · this analysis is primarily based are presented in
that he knows he is relinquishing his constitutional Table 6.1. Both felony and misdemeanor courts were obrights, including his privilege against compulsory self-in- served, although the majority of observations (72 percrimination, his right to trial by jury and his right to cent) were of felony courts (except in El Paso). The maconfront his accusers (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 jority of cases involved pleas to felony charges (70.8
(1969)). The court must assure that the defendant re- percent), and in the majority of cases (75.4 percent)
ceives adequate notice of the nature of the charge(s) to counsel was present.
which he is pleading guilty, meaning that not every element but at least "critical" elements of the charge(s) be
explained to the defendant by someone (either the court The quality of the process. One of the limits of legally
or defense counsel) (Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 prescribed inquiries is that their purpose can be defeated
(1976)). The states thus remain free to use different and by the manner in which they are conducted. The most
less stringent procedures for accepting guilty pleas than carefully worded, required inquiry can be made into an
those required in the Federal courts by virtue of Rule 11 unintelligible rattle of words when read off like a tobacand its interpretation. The variation this has permitted is co auctioneer-as was observed in some courts. Similarly, as Mileski (1971) concludes, if defendants are advised
illustrated by the s~x states included in this study.
Two states (Arizona and Washington) have revised their of their rights en masse rather than individually, they are
rules of criminal procedure modeling them after many of less likely to comprehend either the meaning or gravity
the provisions of the ABA's standards and the (anticipat- of the advice. Moreover, it is believed by several standed) 1975 revisions of FRCP Rule 11. Both states pub- ard-setting groups that the effectiveness of the warnings
lished lengthy forms for recording the terms of plea and explanations given in the plea acceptance process
.agreements and to serve as checklists for determining depend in part on who gives them to whom. It is bethat pleas are knowing, voluntary and accurate as re- lieved that the most effective procedure is to have the
quired by the U.S. Constitution and their respective state judge personally address the defendant. 14 But, of course,
case law. 9 In Washington, judges are required to use the there is a tradeoff here. The more painstaking the informs (Washington Criminal Rule 4.2(g)). Texas has a ,quiry, the more time consuming and the less efficient the
• See Appendixes C and D for their respective rules and forms.
See Appendix E.
11
See Appendix F.
12
See Appendix G.
10

" See Appendix H.
14
FRCP Rule II (since 1966) requires the judge to personally address
the defendant as does the ABA (1972) and the State of Arizona (Az.
R.C.P., Rule 17.2). Pennsylvania law does not require it but does recommend it (Pa. R.C.P. Rule 319).
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Table 6.1

Selected background characteristics of the guilty plea acceptances observed by jurisdiction
(June-August, 1977)

Characteristic

El Paso
[N=106]

New
Orleans
[N=120]

Seattle
[N=138]

Tucson
[N=110]

Delaware
Co.
[N=131]

Norfolk
[N=106]

Total*
[N=711]**

9

7

46

Number of judges observed
Type of court
Felony
Misdemeanor

5

6

8

11

19.0%
81.0%

87.3%
12.7%

72.3%
27.7%

75.5%
24.5%

100.0%
0.0%

69.8%
30.2%

72.1%
28.0%

Type of counsel
Public defender
Court appointed
Private
None
Unknown

0.0%
15.4%
0.0%
61.7%
2.9%

44.9%
2.5%
51.7%
0.0%
0.8%

67.4%
2.2%
11.9%
2.2%
16.2%

66.2%
7.3%
15.5%
0.0%
9.1%

66.5%
0.0%
30.7%
0.8%
0.0%

0.0%
26.7%
26.6%
17.1%
27.6%

43.6%
8.3%
23.3%
15.3%
9.3%

Type of charge
Felony
Misdemeanor

22.6%
77.4%

55.6%
44.2%

72.5%
27.5%

62.7%
37.3%

59.5%
40.5%

70.6%
29.2%

56.1%
41.9%

*Percentages that do not total to 100 are due to rounding errors.
• *The sizes of the respective N's vary slightly due to item nonresponse.

guilty plea process becomes. This can lead to a search
for ways around the new safeguards.15

Individualization of the inquiry. Several items in our
structured observation of the plea-taking process are related to the quality of the proces . As indicated in Table
6.2, the majority (78 pe_rcent) of guilty pleas (including
both fe lony and misdemeanor charges and felony and
misdemeanor courts) are taken from defendants who are
addressed on an ind ividual basis and have the litany of
advice and explanations recited to them either in a rote,
tandardized fashion (20 percent) or a more ind ividualized fashion (29 percent); or who in addition to an individualized inquiry also have signed a corresponding list
of rights, warning , and understandings (26 percent)' or
some combination of the above. Few defendants (11 percent) have their pleas accepted without any judicial inquiry being made, and most of these are in misdemeanor
cases (not shown).

•• This has happened in Maryland where an al te rnative to the guilty
plen p~ocedure is regularly used in pa.rl because it is faster than the
regular guilty plea acceptance procedures. The alternative is to plead
not guilty and agree to have a ratcmcmt of facts read intQ the record.
The defendant i. then found guilty at what is official ly recorded as a
"bench trial" but i.n effect is a second form of plea. It is und erstood by
all parties (exce pt sometimes the defendant) that this is a bargained for

disposition; that the outcome of the "trial" is virtually a foregone conclusion; and that the deal the defendant is getting I predicated upon
his willingness to agree to this truncated informal trial .
These informal trials do not completely defeat the guilty plea acceptance procedures that would otherwise have operated. Before accepting
a not-guilty-statement-of-facts, the j udge warns the defendant in a way
similar to the warnin g given at the taking of guilty pleas. .But the litany
is not quite as long. In one case a 59-year-old defendant charged with
sexually molesting a child was advised by the court as follows: "You
give up your right to a jury trial and to having a jury find you guilty
·bey nd a reasonable doubt and to having them do this on a unanimous
bas.is. Do you understand? Do you want a j ury trial? D o you understand Lhat you will be bound by the paper ( tatement of ff!Ct ); there
will be no cross-examination; no live witnesses wiU take the stand?
There will be no confrontation of the witnesses against you'/" After U1e
defendant said he understood, there was a reading of the st<J.temenl of
facts. It was also noted that the State bad agreed to make no sentence
recommendation and not to oppose a presentence investigation in exchange for the defendant's agreement to proceed by the not-guiltystatement-of-facts proced ure.
Even With this rather extensive inquiry, It i reported th at the notguilty-statement-o f-fact procedure is faster than the full procedure required if the defendant pleads guilty. Local estimates are that the full
procedure can take two to four times as long as the "5 minutes"
needed for the alternative.
lL should be noted, however, that notwithstanding the importance attached to it by local perso nnel, the time savings may not be the only
renson why the not-guilty-staternent·of-fact is preferred to the regular
guilt y plea process. There are ther benefit as weU including inflating
the number of "trials,. the system can show it conducted and preserving important rights on appeal that are fo rfeited by a guilty plea.
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Length of the Inquiry: (I) By Type of Charge. One important but not unambiguous indication of the overall quality of the plea-taking process is the length of time it
takes. In general, the longer the plea-taking session, the
more iikely it is to be thorough, individualized and to
accomplish its multiple purposes. But this is not necessarily the case, as the appellate courts themselves have
recognized. They allow the scope of the inquiry to vary
according to the circumstances of the case. The seriousness of the offense, the defendant's answers, the presence
of defense counsel and other factors are supposed to determine the length to which the trial judge goes in supervising the plea (Bond, 1981 :280. 7). The court in State
v. McKee, 362 N.E.2d 1252 (Ohio, 1976) made this point
as follows:

The determination that there has been an intelligent
voluntary waiver with understanding of rights is a
subjective procedure. It can be accomplished by
short interrogation. Each determination must be
made on an ad hoc basis. The depth and breadth of
the interrogation depend upon the totality of circumstances surrounding each case.

Table 6.2

Notwithstanding this important qualification, it is still
useful to examine the length of time plea acceptances
take. This is especially instructive in cross-jurisdictional
comparisons. Assuming the mix of cases in the samples
are similar, major differences in length of time between
jurisdictions cannot be accounted for in terms of the differing needs of individual cases.
The average time for plea acceptance for all crimes
(felony and misdemeanor cases combined) in all six jurisdictions is 7.8 minutes (Table 6.3). The time of accepting
pleas to felony charges (9.9 minutes) is almost twice that
taken for misdemeanor pleas (5.2 minutes). Most interesting but not easily explicable is the significant difference
among the jurisdictions in the length of the plea-taking
procedures. For instance, why felony pleas should take
four times as long in Delaware County compared to Seattle or New Orleans is unclear. It does not appear to be
due to differences in legal requirements. (Seattle has the
more extensive list of mandatory inquiries.) Nor is it apparently due to the efficiency of using prepared lists of
inquiries. (The Delaware County judges all use such a
list.)

Setting and nature of guilty plea acceptances by jurisdiction (June-August 1977)

Setting of proceeding

Defendant(s) were:
In group, without individualized followup
In group, with individualized followup
Individually addressed
Other
Nature of judicial inquiry
Oral/ individualized
Oral/ standardized
Written inquiry not read alot,Jd,
signed by defendant
Oral/plus written inquiry signed by
defendant
No inquiry

EIPaso
[N= 106]

New
Orleans
[N=120]

Seattle
[N=138]

Tucson
[N=110]

Delaware
Co.
[N= 131]

Norfolk
[N= 106]

Total*
[N=711]**

2.9%

0.0%

0.0%

25.5%

0.0%

7.5%

5.5%

55.8%
43.3%
0.0%

1.7%
86.7%
11.7%

2.9%
97.1%
0.0%

19.1%
52.7%
2.7%

4.6%
95.4%
0.0%

5.7%
85.8%
0.9%

13.7%
78.2%
2.5%

77.1%
1.9%

0.0%
5.0%

14.5%
62.3%

91.8%
5.5%

0.8%
6.1%

23.6%
34.9%

32.1%
20.5%

0.0%

0.8%

18.1%

0.0%

19.8%

0.0%

7.3%

0.0%
21 .0%

89.1%
5.0%

0.7%
4.3%

2.7%
0.0%

71 .7%
1.5%

18.9%
41 .5%

31 .6%
11.3%

*Percentages that do not total to 100 are due to rounding errors.
• *The sizes of the respective N's vary slightly due to item non response.
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Table 6.3

Length of time of plea taking process by jurisdiction (June-August, 1977)

Time for accepting guilty pleas

By type of charge
Completed within 5 minutes:
Felony
Misdemeanor
All cases
Completed within 10
minutes:
Felony
Misdemeanor
All cases
(Average (mean) time for all
cases in minutes (m))
Felony
Misdemeanor
All cases
By type of court
(Average (mean) time in
minutes (m))
Felony
Misdemeanor

EIPaso
[N=106]

New
Orleans
[N= 120]

Seattle
[N= 138]

Tucson
[N= 110]

12.5%
93.9%
75.4%

77.6%
84.9%
80.0%

83.0%
100.0%
87.7%

21.7%
65.8%
38.2%

25.0%
96.3%
80.0%

100.0%
100.0%
100.0%

96.0%
100.0%
97.1%

17.2m
3.4m
5.9m

4.3m
3.7m
4.1m

8.7m
3.3m

4.3m
2.7m

Delaware
Co.
[N= 131]

Norfolk
[N=106]

Total*
[N=711]**

1.3%
3.8%
2.3%

24.0%
90.3%
43.4%

41.6%
72.8%
54.7%

71.0%
95.1%
80.1%

20.5%
32.1%
25.1%

50.7%
93.7%
66.2%

65.9%
85.9%
74.2%

4.2m
1.7m
3.5m

10.6m
4.9m
8.5m

18.2m
14.0m
16.7m

11.0m
2.2m
8.4m

9.9m
5.2m
7.8m

4.1m
1.7m

8.3m
3.0m

16.7m
NA

8.8m
1.5m

8.9m
2.6m

• Percentages that do not total to 100 are due to rounding errors.
• *The sizes of the respective N's vary slightly due to item non response.

However, it does appear to be related to the degree of
formalization of the prosecutor's office; 16 but why this
should be so can only be speculated about. Perhaps there
is a compensating mechanism at work. In jurisdictions
where the prosecutor's office has extensive policy guidelines and internal managerial controls, judges may come
to trust in those procedures and feel less of a need to use
the plea acceptance procedure as a major protection
against possible miscarriage of justice. On the other
hand, equally plausible is an explanation in terms of
"local legal culture" (Church, 1981). Prosecutors' offices
that are more highly formalized also tend to be more
concerned about rapid case disposition. Their sensitivity

to speedy disposition may stimulate (or result from) a
similar concern among the local judiciary.
It bears noting that the fact that the average felony plea

acceptance in Delaware County takes 18.2 minutes
means that many acceptances take longer. Six percent of
them took a half an hour. How so much time can be
consumed in plea-taking is illustrated by the following
typical case.

16
This assumes El Paso is deleted from this particular analysis, a reasonable assumption. Given the no plea bargaining policy in El Paso,
the courts may have taken greater time in accepting pleas to assure
that the Court's "point-system" was not misunderstood . For further details in the El Paso no plea bargaining policy see Chapter 2.
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Field Note: Delaware County, Felony Court,
Summer 1977.
The next case was a negotiated plea to a charge of
possession with intent to deliver heroin. Recommended sentence: 21!2 months to Broadmeadow
Prison. The judge noted the prior record of defendant; asked if defendant had completed probation;
told public defender (PD) to advise his client of his
rights; asked defendant his age, can he read and
write? PD read the rights: Does defendant understand he is waiving his right to trial by jury; right to

challenge jury; to have a unanimous verdict; or if he
chooses trial without jury, he has the right to appeal
for a new trial within 30 days; he can stand mute at
trial; does not need to testify; can cross-examine
witnesses? He also has limited appeal rights if he
feels the sentence, or the jurisdiction of court, or
the involuntariness of his plea are improper. If he
cannot afford an attorney, the county will provide
one. By pleading guilty does he realize he is admitting to a crime and he gives up the merits of his
case?
The judge was not satisfied with the defendant's response to the last question so he rephrased it three
different ways until he was certain the man understood.
The PD then explained that the charge the defendant was pleading guilty to was a felony, and told
him the maximum penalty and that a guilty plea was
a recorded conviction. Then he went on to explain
the kind of voluntariness required of a plea; that the
lawyers who agreed to the plea could not promise
the sentence to be imposed; that parole or probation
on a previous charge could be revoked. The PD
then asked if the defendant had discussed the case
and his possible defenses with the PD and was satisfied that the PD was willing to try the case; that the
burden of proof was on the Commonwealth; that
the PD would represent him if he changes his mind.
He then asked if the defendant was suffering from
the effects of narcotics or mental illness.
As the defendant prepared to sign the affidavit, the
judge asked him what grade he had reached in
school. Answer: "some college in prison." Judge
then asked if he could read, write, and understand
"what you're signing?"
The judge requested the clerk to make the guilty
plea statement part of the record. He then asked defendant if the plea was voluntary-if it isn't, "I
won't accept the plea."
He then asked: "What about probation? Do you
know that this plea will be a violation of your probation? Do you know that this plea will be a violation of your probation in Delaware? In all likelihood the judge who sentenced you will revoke it."
PD: "During the negotiation we were attempting to
determine if this won't affect his sentence."
J: "I don't want you to enter a plea if you're expecting this. It's entirely up to the judge in Delaware."
PD: "There's no guarantee."
J: "In all probability, the judge will revoke. It's entirely up to him. You understand that?"
Def: "Yes."
J: "You realize the negotiated plea is just a recommendation of the D.A., but if I find it inappropriate

I am not bound by it. Do you understand that the
criminal code makes it a crime to have the intent to
deliver-the intent to transfer, not necessarily a
sale?"
Judge then told the D.A. to go ahead. D.A. called
an undercover narcotics agent to the stand who testified that the defendant went with him to find a
seller in Upper Chester who would sell him (the
agent) some heroin. The defendant obtained the
heroin and gave it to the agent. The material was
tested and found to be heroin.
The D.A. then asked the agent, who worked for the
probation department, if his sentence recommendation was in line with the probation department's
policies. The answer was yes. There was no crossexamination and the witness was excused.
The judge asked the defendant if the witness' statement was correct. The defendant attempted to
argue that he wasn't guilty but the PD tried to talk
to him. The judge asked him to speak up. Def.: "We
rode all over looking for one to buy-it's not like
I'm a salesman."
A general discussion proceeded. It was obvious that
all the actors were upset at this turn of events. Everyone stood very quietly. The rest of the courtroom got very quiet. The judge began and very gingerly they worked around the defendant's statement. The judge wanted to know if he was part of
"the organization." The D.A. couldn't be certain
but said "his name was well known in Chester."
The PD offered, "But I don't believe he's a dealer."
Finally the judge said he agreed to the plea and told
the defendant "You're 'getting a break. I sentence
you to 2¥2-12 months in the Delaware County
Prison, both counts to run concurrently." There
was a long pause till the PD indicated there was
some problem with the sentence. The negotiated
plea was for less time-to include time served.
There was some discussion about how much time
he had served. After another pause the judge said,
"We'll pass this matter over until we find out what
time was served." (Did not hear final outcome.)
In contrast to Delaware County, plea taking in the fastest jurisdiction (Seattle) relies to a great extent on the
"Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty" (hereinafter,
"the statement") required by the Washington Superior
Court Criminal Rules (Rule 4.2). 17 Despite the existence

17
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See Appendix D .

focuses on the difference between felony and misdemean r court.s. The rationale for this additional analysis
is that studi.es (Robertson, 1974) have suggested that the
quality of justice is more a function of the lev l of the
court than the level of the charge. Therefore, this analysis will explore the implied hypothesis that the quality of
plea-taking will be lower in the lower courts. 10

of the required form, Seattle judges differed considerably in their plea-taking procedures both in terms of the
extensiveness of and the elements in the litany that were
emphasized or included. AU judges used the required
statement but varied in the degree to which they relied
on the defendant's understanding of .the form. Many of
the issue addre sed in the statement were not pur ued
orally by the felony courts.

It can be seen that plea acceptances in felony courts average over three times as long as in misdemeanor courts
(see Tab.le 6.3). The two fastest lower courts (N rfolk at
1.5 minutes and Seattle at l.7 minutes) ar worth describing in greater detail becau, e their contrasting practices illustrate an important point. Plea taking can be
swift and yet till have a baseline of consi tent warnings
and checks built into it. In neither jurisdiction does the
plea ac eptance represent a major protection against Wlknowing, involuntary or inaccmate pleas. But in Seartl
the District Court at least u e a standard ' Statement of
Defendant On Pleading Guilty" form, 20 modeled after
the one used in the Superior Cour . By contra. t, in the
Norfolk District Court, defendants are regularly encouraged to waive aU rights (including the right to an attorney) and to plead guilty as charged without any inquiry
into the plea.

With regard to the difference between felonies and misdemeanors, it is clear that in each jurisdjction considerably le s time is devoted to supervising pleas to mi demeanors than pleas to felonies ( ee Table 6.3). This is tlot
unexpected given that appellate courts have permitted
the scope of the inquiry to be less extensive in less serious crimes (Bond, 1978). However, those courts have
also held that the requirements of Boykin apply to mi demeanors as well as to felonies (see Whela11 v. State, 472
S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1971)); and they do require judges to
widen the cope of the inquiry when defendants are not
represented by counsel (Florida Law Review, 1970).
Therefore, one would expect some minimal level of judicial inquiry in every misdemeanor plea and a greater
level in ca es of unrepresented defendants.
The difference among the six jurisdjctions in the length
of plea-taking to mi demeanor charge ar not as great
as those for felony charges. Most of them average between 2 to 5 minutes. he one exception (Delaware
County) with an average of 14 minutes must be regarded
as a special case because mi demeanors in Pennsylvania
include climes punishable by up to five years in prison.
Thus it is not surprising that th y are treated more like
felonies.

The following field notes provide more detailed pictures.21

Notwithstanding this general similarity among the jurisdictions in taking misdemeanor pleas there remains a
noteworthy difference in the length of time of this procedure. The longest average m~sdemeanor plea-taking
(4.9 minutes in Tucson) 18 is more than twice a long as
the shorte t (1.7 minutes in Seattle). What accounts for
this difference among the jurisdictions is not clear, but
one candidate explanation can be di counted. It is not
due to differences in the presence of counsel. In New
Orleans, where misdemeanors were typically disposed of
witbm 3.7 minutes all defendants bad counsel, whereas
in El Paso none of the defendants (pleading to misdemeanors) had counsel. Yet the pleas took about the same
time (3.4 minutes).
(2) Misdemeanor Courts. The discussion above focused
on the difference in plea acceptance between pleas to
felony and misdemeanor charges. The discussion below

10

Delaware County is excluded for reasons mentioned above.

Field Notes: Norfolk District (lower) Court
(Summer 1977.)
The average number of cases handled per day by
the Norfolk District Court varies from 48 to 399.
All are handled by one judge yet it is not unusual
for the docket to be completed by noon.
The courtroom is noisy. Various people mill
around. Police officer waiting for their cases to be
heard are laughing and talking to each other. Lawyers, police officers, victims, prosecutors, and defendants are walking around either in the courtroom
or in the back hall working out deal . It is so noisy
we had to sil in the front row and still had difficulty
following the proceedings. The frequent comment
of prosecutors, defense attorneys and police officers
was that the COUl't i 'nothing but a zoo."

•• Thi hypothesi could not be explored in the preceding analysis be.
cause not all the pleas to misdemeanor c harges were in misdemeanor
courts. In the following analysis, all the cru;es labeled , "misdemeanor
courts," are pleas to misdemeanor charges whereas the cases labeled
"felony courts" include pleas to feloni ' as well as to misdemeanor
charges.
20
See Appendix I.
21 The "Statement referred" to in the Seattle field notes is the Defendant's Statement On Pleading Guilty,
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The clerk of the court (referred to jokingly as
"Judge") tends to control the proceedings. He often
tells the judge which case to hear first. According
to one of the prosecutors, if the judge sets a very
lenient sentence the clerk might lean over and tell
the judge that defendant has a long record on something and the sentence may be increased. Also, the
prosecutor reports that at one time the clerk took it
upon himself to nol pros (dismiss) cases until the
prosecutor told him that by law only the Commonwealth Attorney's Office could do so. Now the
clerk says, "We will nol pros this case if the Commonwealth will concur."
The typical procedure in misdemeanor cases is that
the defendant's name is called and he approaches
the bench. The clerk or bailiff asks him if he wants
his case heard today or does he want an attorney?
The tone of voice encourages defendant to choose
having his case heard without an attorney. The defendant will then be told to sign a piece of paper
which happens to be a waiver of attorney form . In
many cases, no one will verbally state that the defendant has a right to an attorney. No other rights
are mentioned.
Once the waiver is signed the defendant is asked,
"How do you plead, guilty or not guilty?" There is
no litany or inquiry as to the knowingness or voluntariness of the plea. (I asked the judge about this
and he replied, "If he pleads, then I assume that he
committed it. I don't have time to do anything
else.")
In some cases the judge may ask the arresting officer a question. For example, if the defendant pleads
to simple possession, the judge may ask the officer
about the amount. In some guilty plea cases, the officer may not be present, and no factual basis is established for the plea. The judge then sentences the
defendant. The average time elapsed on a misdemeanor guilty plea is one minute.
I asked the judge about misdemeanor cases in which
the police officer brings the charge and also acts as
the prosecutor. Since there may or may not be any
physical evidence, I asked him how he determined
guilt or innocence. He stated, "That's why a lot of
people don't survive on the bench in police court.
They can't handle the pressure. You tend to go
along with the police officer. I go along with the
police officer unless there is some question as ·to
whether the act actually falls under the charge."
The following are typical cases observed in District
Court:
Case # 1: Charge: Soliciting.
Do you want your case heard today? "Yes."
Rights: Signed waiver of attorney form.
Facts: Police stated the facts.

Sentence: $100 fine.
Time elapsed: 1 minute.
Case #2: Charge: Drunk and disorderly.
Do you want your case heard today? "Yes."
Rights: Signed waiver of attorney form.
Facts: None; no police officer present.
Sentence: $10 and 10 days suspended on good behavior.
Time elapsed: 1 minute.
Case #3: Charge: Possession of drugs.
Do you want your case heard today? "Yes."
Rights: Signed waiver of attorney form.
Facts: Police state the amount.
Sentence: $25 fine.
Time elapsed: 1 minute.
Case #4: Charge: Drunk in public (10 defendants
brought into court at the same time).
How do you plead? "Guilty."
Rights: None; did not sigri waiver of attorney form.
Facts: None.
Sentence: $10.
Note: The judge told this group of defendants that
the fine was $10 whether they plead guilty or went
to trial.
Time elapsed: 1 minute.
Our observations in Norfolk District Court can be
summed up as follows:
1. No constitutional rights are recited to the defendant.
2. The defendant is not asked if he understands the
rights that he is giving up. He simply signs the
waiver of attorney form. In most cases the defendant doesn't even bother to read the form.
3. The defendant is not asked if he is pleading guilty
because he is in fact guilty.
4. In many cases no factual basis for the plea is presented.
5. The defendant was not asked if anyone threatened, ·coerced or pressured him into pleading.
6. The judge did not specify what maximum sentence was permissible by law.
7. No collateral consequences of the plea were
noted.
When the judge was asked about all of these problems he stated, "They are usually so happy that
they don't have a felony conviction or that they
don't have to go to jail, that they don't care."
In Seattle observations were made in three of the five
Seattle District Courts. It should be kept in mind that
the workload of the Seattle District judges appears to be
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con iderably less than that of the judge in the Norfolk
District Court. 22
Field Notes: Seattle (King County) District (lower)
Cowts, (Summer 1977):
The procedures for accepting guilty pleas in the
District Court tend to be very informal. Generally,
there is no judicial litany. Usually the only question
asked by the judge is how the defendant wishes to
plead. Quite frequently even that question is not
asked. If any of the issues considered to be part of
the "litany" are included in the proceeding, they are
usually stated either by the prosecutor or defense
counsel. A "Statement" i almost always required
but is often not ubmitted, or even filled out, until
after the plea has been accepted.
In District Court sentencing frequently occurs immediately following the entry of a guilty plea. It is
very difficult to r ally make a distinction between
the two procedures. Tb judge may ask questions
about the facts of the case after the plea has, in
effect, already been accepted, in order to determine
sentence. Since both the entry of the plea and the
determination of the sentence occur in the same few
minutes of time, the attempted separation of the two
proceedings may be meaningless.
AU of the District Court judges observed appeared
reluctant to allow defendants to enter a plea pro se.
Although pro se proceedjngs were occasionally observed, judges almost always require the defendant
to get an attorney, or at least talk with a public defender present in court, prior to entering a plea.
The amount of participation by the prosecutor and
defense counsel may make fairly extensive comments about their representation of a defendant, but
generally their comments are limited to tating that
the defendant wishes to enter a guilty plea. Comments by the prosecutor are generally limited to
stating t he defendant's name and (if the original
charge was felony) that the state is moving to
reduce the charge. Judicial questiorung doe not
seem to be affected by the extent of prosecution or
defen e comments.
Observations On Specific Courts
One judge relies almost totally on the "Statement."
His questioning prior to accepting a plea is general-

ly limited to, "What's your plea?'' If a "Statement"
has not been handed to the court, the judge will ask
if a "Statement" has been filled out. If not, he tells
counsel to do so and come back. He generally goes
into the fact of the ca e but not until after the plea
has been accepted.
Because the majority of the pleas observed before
this judge were entered at arrrugnment, the defendants were generally informed of the charge and
asked by the prosecutor if they understood the
nature of the charge prior to the entry of a plea. In
addition, tbe judge usually asks defendants if they
have read m have a copy of their rights (meaning
the pmk beet entitled "Rigb~,'' which is given to
each defendant appearing on the di trict court arraignment calendar). He does not ask if defendants
understand those rights.
The judge conducts his court in a very informal
manner and is brusque with everyone.
Another judge places less reliance on the "Statement.' She often does not even require a "Statement" to be submitted until after the plea is accepted. Even then he may require it by saying, "I guess
you d better fill out one of those forms." Judicial
questioning prior . to accepting a plea is generally
limited to "what is your plea to the charge?" and
sometimes she does not even ask that question.
The third judge is really the only one of the District
Court judges observed who conducts a litany at all.
This judge relies both on the "Statement" and on
defense counsel's representation of their clients.
He requires a "Statement'' to be submitted prier to
accepting a plea and tries to ascertain whether defendants understand the "Statement." An interesting
example of thls was his requirement that a defense
counsel read everything in the "Statement" to an illiterate defendant before be would accept that defendant's plea. He usually a ks defendants if they
have read and understood the "Statement," and he
also asks if defendants have been fully advised of
their rights by counsel.

In 1976 the five Seattle District Court judges had a total of 35,225
cases (criminal, civil and other) to dispose of among them (State of
Washington, 1976:44). In contrast the average number of hearings (preliminary, extraditions, and adjudicatory) for the months of January,
March, April, and May 1977 in the Norfolk District Court is 2,712 per
month. (Statistics obtained from Courtroom A, Norfolk District
Court.)
22

The knowing/intelligent standard. The knowing/intelligent plea standard ha three dimension to it: (1) the
waiver of rights, (2) notification of the charges, and (3)
notification of the consequences of the plea. In aU six
jurisdictions the courts are required by virtue of Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), to establish an adequate
record showing that the defendant knowing ly wruved his
privilege against elf-incrimination; the right to a trial by
jury; and the right to confront one's accuser . Only one
of the six jurisdictions (Texas} requires the waiver of
anything more than the three rights enumerated in
Baykin. It requires the defendant be notified of his right
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to be sentenced by a jury (Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 26.14).
Waiver of Rights. Our observations of plea acceptances
indicate that in 45 percent of all cases (different types of
charges and courts combined) three or more rights were

Table 6.4

verbally mentioned by someone to the defendant (see
Table 6.4). The right which is most often mentioned verbally in court is the right to trial by jury (70 percent of
all cases). The least frequently mentioned of the three
rights which constitutionally must be waived is the right
to remain silent (37.9 percent).

Methods of establishing the knowing/intelligent nature of guilty pleas by jurisdiction
(June-August 1977)

Method/type &f charge

El Paso
[N=106]

New
Orleans
[N= 120]

Seattle
[N=138]

Tucson
[N=110]

Delaware
Co.
[N = 131]

Norfolk
[N=106]

68.2%

95.8%

46.0%

98.2%

87.8%

67.9%

76.8%

15.1%

55.0%

29.7%

85.5%

64.1%

16.0%

44.7%

0.0%

24.2%

8.0%

0.0%

51 .1%

0.0%

15.0%

67.9%
12.3%
15.1%
0 .0%
10.4%

94.2%
0.0%
50.0%
81.8%
0.8%

46.7%
7.2%
33.3%
37.05%
1.4%

97.3%
0.9%
80.9%
0.0%
40.0%

67.2%
0.0%
64.2%
78.6%
68.0%

56.6%
0.0%
8.6%
60.9%
11.3%

70.0%
37.9%
44.4%
43.0%
22.4%

22.9%
0.0%
30.5%
46.6%

94.1%
0.0%
5.9%
0.0%

30.4%
12.3%
53.6%
3.6%

98.2%
0.9%
0.9%
0.0%

8.5%
73.6%
14.7%
3.1%

66.0%
0.0%
32.1%
1.9%

51 .9%
16.0%
23.6%
8.6%

19.0%
0.0%
47.6%
33.3%

96.7%
0.0%
3.3%
0.0%

56.5%
0.0%
42.0%
1.4%

91 .8%
0.9%
7.3%
0.0%

24.8%
45.7%
25.6%
3.9%

65.1%
0.0%
33.0%
0.9%

58.8%
8.5%
26.6%
6.1%

8.6%

95.0%

56.9%

18.2%

91 .5%

54.9%

56.3%

37.2%
0.0%

0.0%
28.6%

0.0%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%

54.1%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%

15.5%
4.8%

52.4%

5.0%

37.0%

66.4%

3.1%

73.6%

37.7%

Total*
[N=711]*

Waiver of rights

One or more rights mentioned as waived?
Yes
Three or more rights?
Yes
Five or more rights?
Yes
Which rights were verbally specified as being
waived?
Trial by jury
Remain silent
Confront witnesses
Appeal
Counsel (at no cost)
Who recited rights waived?
Judge
Defense counsel
None
Other
Who asked defendant if he understood rights he
was waiving?
Judge
Defense counsel
None
Other
Was it noted that defense counsel had explained
the defendant's rights to him?
Yes
Explaining the charges

Who explained charges?
Judge with one or more others (prosecutor,
defense, clerk) ...................................................... .
Judge alone, merely reads charges ....................... .
Judge alone, more than mere reading of
charges .................................................................. .

Continued
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Table 6.4

Methods of establishing the knowing/Intelligent nature of guilty pleas by jurisdiction
(June-August, 1977)-Contlnued

Method/type of charge

Prosecutor alone
Defense counsel
Other
No one
Fel. charge
Misd. charge
All cases
Who asked if defendant understood the charges?
Judge
Prosecutor
Defense counsel
Other
No one
Was It noted that counsel had explained charges
to defendant?
Yes

El Paso
[N=106]

New
Orleans
[N= 120]

Seattle
[N= 138]

Tucson
[N=110]

Delaware
Co.
[N= 131]

Norfolk
[N=106]

0.0%
0.0%
7.6%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

8.7%
6.5%
0.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

30.5%
8.4%
0.8%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

7.3%
2.8%
1.2%

.3%
2.4%
2.9%

59.1%
75.5%
66.4%

40.0%
68.4%
47.8%

15.9%
63.4%
33.6%

3.8%
1.9%
3.1%

18.7%
45.2%
26.4%

26.1%
36.6%
30.6%

42.9%
0.0%
0.0%
1.0%
56.2%

80.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
19.3%

36.5%
9.5%
2.2%
0.7%
51 .1%

65.5%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
34.5%

35.4%
0.0%
11 .5%
7.0%
46.2%

63.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
36.8%

53.2%
1.8%
2.5%
1.5%
40.9%

10.5%

93.3%

18.7%

9.1%

19.8%

55.8%

34.4%

35.8%

75.8%

56.6%

80.0%

6.1%

39.1%

48.5 %

99.0%
0.0%
1.0%

91.5%
8.5%
0.0%

7.2%
0.0%
92.8%

97.3%
2.7%
0.0%

99.2%
1.8%
0.0%

97.2%
2.8%
0.0%

79.3%
2.4%
18.3%

99.1%

96.7%

100.0%

92.7%

88.1%

100.0%

96.1%

Total*
[N=711]* *

Explaining the consequences
Defendant notified of the maximum possible sentence?
Yes
Defendant notified he could be sentenced as
habitual offender?
No
Yes
Not applicable
Any collateral consequences of plea explained?
No

*Percentages that do not total to 100 are due to rounding errors.
• *The sizes of the respective N's vary slightly due to item nonresponse.

Again, however, our data are based on what was said in
court. They do not include what may have appeared on
written forms signed by the defendants in connection
with the entry of pleas. Thus, defendants may have been
notified (in wr iting) of more of thei1· rights than it appears from our in-court observation data. However, it
should also be no ted that the use of written forms does
not guarantee that all three of the rights that constitutionally must be waived will in fact be covered. Note for
example that the "Statement" form used in Washington
does not mention the privilege against self-inc rimination
(see Appendix D). This omission is rarely remedied by
the Seattle courts. They verbally mention it in 7 percent
of the cases.

tht recitation, if there is one. (In Delaware defense
counsel are relied upon heavil y (74 percent)). What is
more, in 59 percent of the cases the j udge asked the defendant if he under stood the rights he was waiving. In
addition, in 56.3 percent of theca e it was noted for the
record that defense counsel had explained to his client
the rights being waived.

As for who recites the rights, it is clear that in all jurisdictions except one the judge is more likely to conduct

The Supreme Court has specifically declined requiring a
complete enumeration of the elements of the offense to

Explaining the Charges. With regard to explaining the
charges to the defendant, the issue that has been raised
in the appellate courts is how detailed an explanation
must be given (Bond, 1978). Is a mere notification of the
charges enough or must the elements of the crime be explained?
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which an accused person pleads. Rather it has adopted a
"totality of the circumstances" test that permits each
case to be judged differently. In the leading case in
which the Supreme Court found that the defendant had
not been given adequate notice of the charges, the circumstances included a mentally retarded defendant indicted for first degree murder who pleaded guilty to
second degree murder and who was not advised by
counsel or the court that intent to cause death was an
element of second degree murder (Henderson v. Morgan,
426 U.S. 637 (1976)). The court ruled that "intent is such
a critical element of the offense of second-degree murder
that notice of [it] is required." Also noteworthy in this
case is the court's perception of what typically happens
regarding the explanation of charges.

what acts are necessary to commit the crime, it appears
that Arizona Rule 17 .2(a) will be satisfied.
In contrast, Pennsylvania's requirements are more rigorous. The defendant must understand every element of
the offense. This understanding must be established
through an on-the-record colloquy in which the basic
legal elements of the crime(s) charged must be outlined
in terms understandable to the defendant (Commonwealth
v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974)). Merely reading
the charges and asking the defendant if he understands them
does not meet the requirement (Commonwealth v. Minor,
467 Pa. 230, 356 A.2d (1976)).
If only New Orleans, Delaware County, and Tucson
were involved in this analysis it would appear that the
data established a relationship between the law on the
books and the law in action, that is, that charges were
more likely to be explained where the law required that
they be explained. But when the remaining two jurisdictions are added to the analysis the relationship becomes
unclear.

Normally the record contains either an explanation
of the charge by the trial judge or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the
offense has been explained to the accused. Moreover, even without such an express representation, it
may be appropriate to presume that in most cases
defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the
offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice
of what he is being asked to admit.

Virginia and Texas do not have special requirements regarding explanation of the charges and yet their courts
have rates of explaining charges comparable to Arizona
and Pennsylvania where such explanations are required.
Thus, while the existence of state requirements beyond
Federal constitutional requirements does increase concern for this issue, the absence of such requirements does
not mean a concomitant lowering of concern.

We were unable to determine statistically how often defense counsel explain charges to their clients, but our observations provide a more specific and less reassuring
view of what "normally" happens regarding the explanation of charges in court. In 31 percent of all cases (and
26 percent of the pleas to felonies) no one in court explained or even read aloud the charges to the defendant.
In 41 percent of all cases, no one asked the accused if he
understood the charges to which he was pleading; and in
66 percent of all cases no mention was made for the
record as to whether counsel explained the charges to
his client. Once. again there are wide differences among
the jurisdictions in each of these respects.

It is worth noting the difference between what was done

Those differences are not related to differences in law in
any consistent way. For instance, the two jurisdictions
with the highest rates of not explaining the charges
(New Orleans, 66 percent, and Seattle, 48 percent) are
also ones with no special legal requirements regarding
such explanations. On the other hand two of the jurisdictions with the lowest rates of not explaining charges
(Delaware County, 3 percent, and Tucson, 16 percentfor felonies) are ones where such explanations are required. Arizona requires that the defendant be advised of
the nature of the charge (Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedures 17.2(a)), but the nature of the explanation is permitted to vary from case to case (State v. Duran, 562
P.2d 487 (1973)). As long as the defendant understands

in explaining the charges compared to how the rights
were explained. With regard to charges it was noted for
the record that counsel had explained the charges in
only 34 percent of all cases. Yet for the rights this notation was more likely to be made both for all jurisdictions
combined (56 percent) as well as within each separate
jurisdiction. This suggests that greater care is taken in
assuring the explanation of rights than of charges. Perhaps this reflects the difference between Boykin's requirement that specific rights be enumerated and the
more vague, open-ended requirements of the "totality of
the circumstances" test of Henderson v. Morgan.
Explaining the Consequences. The last component of the
intelligent/knowing plea standard is the determination of
whether the defendant understands the consequences of
his plea. Again, the appellate courts have not made it
clear what consequences must be explained (Bond,
1978). In three jurisdictions studied the defendant must
be advised of one or another aspect of the possible sen-
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Table 6.5

Method of establishing the voluntary nature of the plea and the existence of a plea agreement
by jurisdiction (June-August 1977)
Method

Who asked if defendant was threatened, coerced, or pressured to
plead guilty?
Judge
Defense counsel
Other
No one
Who asked if promises other than
plea agreement were made?
Judge
Defense counsel
Other
No one
If plea agreement reached, what
record made?
Only that an agreement (unspecilied) had been reached
Specific terms of agreement
No record made
Unknown if agreement reached
Other

EIPaso
[N= 106]

New
Orleans
[N=120]

Seattle
[N=138]

Tucson
[N=110]

Delaware
Co.
[N= 131]

Norfolk
[N=106]

Total*
[N=711]**

21.4%
0.0%
0.0%
78.6%

93.3%
0.0%
0.0%
6.7%

31.9%
0.0%
0.7%
67.4%

77.3%
0.0%
0.0%
22.7%

6.9%
48.1%
2.3%
42.7%

50.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50.0%

45.8%
8.9%
0.5%
44.7%

19.8%
0.0%
0.0%
80.2%

17.5%
0.0%
0.0%
82.5%

24.6%
1.4%
0.7%
73.2%

73.6%
0.0%
0.0%
26.4%

5.3%
41.2%
0.0%
53.4%

7.5%
0.0%
0.9%
91.5%

24.2%
7.9%
0.1%
67.7%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
86.8%
13.3%

5.8%
43.3%
50.0%
0.8%
0.0%

0.7%
98.6%
0.0%
0.7%
0.0%

0.0%
100.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

3.8%
96.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

3.8%
53.8%
0.0%
2.8%
31.1%

2.5%
71.4%
10.3%
9.5%
5.1%

*Percentages that do not total to 100 are due to rounding errors .
.. The sizes of the respective N's vary slightly due to item nonresponse.

tence he could receive. 23 In the other three states there
is either no rule (Virginia); or it is recommended that the
defendant be advised of the range of possible sentence
but it is not absolutely required that the defendant be notified of the maximum sentence (Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. McNeil, 305 A.2d 51, 54 (173)); or, it is assumed that defense counsel will advise the defendant of
the consequences and therefore the court must do so
only in cases of uncounselled defendants (Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 556).
Notwithstanding these differences in legal requirements,
however, the forms and standardized procedures used by
the felony courts in the six jurisdictions all include some
specification of the possible sentence-usually the maxi-

23
Texas, Code of Criminal P roccdme Art. 26.13(a) "the range of punishment"; Washington, the max imum sentence (In re Vensel, 564 P.2d
326) and any mandatory minimum sentence (Wood v. Morris, 554 P.2d
1032 (1976); Arizona, Rules of Criminal Procedure 17.2(b) "the nature
and range of possible sentence. . . . including special conditions regarding sentence, parole, or commutation imposed by statute."

mum possible (see Appendixes D through H). In addition in 48 percent of all cases, defendants were advised
in court of the maximum possible sentence. But defendants were rarely (2 percent) told about the possibility of
being sentenced as a habitual offender and rarely (4 percent) told of any collateral consequences of the plea.
The jurisdictions varied widely on the notification of
maximum possible sentence and again this variation does
not show any consistent relationship to differences in
law among them.
The voluntary standard. As noted earlier, the concept of

voluntariness is exceedingly ambiguous. In defining it as
a standard in plea taking, the courts often confuse it with
what would be more accurately classified as violations
of the knowing standard. Thus, for example, in Arizona
if a defendant has been advised of his rights and the consequences of his plea and states that he still wishes to
plead guilty, then it is presumed he is pleading voluntarily. Hence, to the extent that voluntariness is established
by a showing that the plea was knowing/intelligent, our
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findings presented above regarding the knowing standard are applicable as well to the voluntary standard.

In Delaware County an interesting custom has developed that contributes to the appearance, if not the reality, that the plea is voluntary. When it comes to that
point in the colloquy where defendants are asked if they
are pleading guilty because they are guilty, defense
counsel often step back away from the table. The defendant is left there standing alone to admit his guilt.
This is especially likely to be done if the defendant
"chokes" (is initially unwilling to say he did it).

Beyond this there is the matter of whether pleas are involuntary in the sense of being the result of threats, pressures, or promises. The confusion here is that many
kinds of pressures, threats and promises-some with
severe consequences-are a regular part of the plea bargaining system and are not regarded by the courts as per
se grounds for declaring pleas involuntary. A prosecutor's promise to dismiss charges and recommend a sentence in exchange for a guilty plea does not make the
plea involuntary (Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26
(1958)); nor are pleas presumed to be involuntary even if
they are induced by the hope of avoiding the use of a
coerced confession (McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1979)); nor because the prosecutor threatened to invoke
a habitual offender statute (Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 343
U.S. 357 (1978)). Rather the courts have adopted a "totality of the circumstances" rule which requires each
case to be examined individually. This, of course, leaves
the situation without clear guidance. In the six jurisdictions trial judges are given no further guidance by their
respective state laws (excluding the required questions
related primarily to whether the plea was knowingly entered).

Accurate pleas: the factual basis standard
Ambiguity of meaning and purpose. Three serious institutional weaknesses of plea bargaining compared to trial as
a method of determining guilt are: (1) plea bargaining
relies on inducements; (2) in plea bargaining the available evidence may not be assessed against any standard
of proof, much less the hallowed legal standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) in plea bargaining
the available evidence may not be assessed by an independent, impartial third party. For any or all of these
reasons plea bargaining is regarded as posing a threat of
convicting the innocent. 25 A fourth weakness of plea
bargaining is that it often destroys the integrity of the
criminal justice record system by allowing defendants to
appear to be convicted of crimes different from the ones
they actually committed.

In the absence of specific direction judges sometimes include one or more questions in their plea taking procedures. In 55 percent of all cases observed the defendant
was asked (usually by the judge) if he had been threatened, coerced, or pressured to plead guilty (see Table
6.5). This question, of course, can be confusing to the
defendant who is pleading in exchange for some promised deal. It is remarkable that it (as distinct from the
second question on Table 6.5) continues to be asked with
any frequency. Unless accompanied by other questions it
perpetuates the old hypocrisy of denying that the plea of
guilty was induced by the plea agreement. The more accurate phraseology would be to ask whether any promises, threats, or pressures other than the plea agreement
have been made. This was asked in only 32 percent of
all cases. (Where this question is used the attorneys felt
relieved because they think of this as having eliminated
the old hypocrisy.) Where plea agreements were
reached, the specific terms of the agreement were usually (71 percent of all cases) read into the record. 24

The efficacy of using plea acceptance standards to offset
these four weaknesses in the plea bargaining system differs. Eliminating inducements is not possible without
eliminating plea bargaining as such. Hence, the courts
have allowed inducements to continue and have relied
on the standards relating to the knowing and "voluntary" nature of pleas to offset this inherent weakness of
plea bargaining. As for the other three weaknesses, reformers have tried to minimize the danger they pose by
requiring that a factual basis for pleas be established.
Whether this "accuracy" standard represents a safeguard
adequate to such a critical task; whether it assures that
persons will not be wrongly convicted; 26 and whether it
means that evidence will be tested against some standard
of proof similar to the trial standards of either a prima
facie case or proof beyond a reasonable doubt is problematic. The difficulty with the accuracy standard is its
ambiguity both as to meaning and purpose. The evidentiary standards to be used in determining whether a factual basis exists are unclear; the scope of the inquiry and
the methods to be used are ill-defined; and the action to

•• Where written forms are used but not read into the record in court,
they would become part of the record but would be coded in our observation as "no record verbally made."

•• See generally, Washington University Law Quarterly, 1966; Alschuler, 1976; Kipnis, 1976.
•• This latter point is not explicitly made but is implied.

124

be taken by the judge if it appears that a factual basis
does not exist is ambiguous (see generally, Bond,
1978:81).
When the accuracy standard was added to F.R.C.P.
Rule 11 in 1966, no probability-of-guilt tandard was
specified; and the 1974 revision also omitted any such
standard. The 1968 ABA standards required a factual
basis for pleas but gave no probability-of-guilt standard
to be used; _nor wa one given in the 1980 revised ABA
standards. However two other national groups have
specified that certain evidentiary standards be met. The
American Law Institute (ALI) (1975:350.4(3)) recommended that pleas not be accepted unless rea onable
cause exists. The National Advisory Commi sian (NAC)
went further and recommended that a plea no be accepted if the "admissible evidence is insufficient to upport a guilty verdict on the offense'' for which tb plea
is offered, or a related greater offense (.1973 c:3.7(8)),
This is a higher standard than probable (or reasonable)
cause because it requires that the proof be established on
admissible evidence. Thus hearsay testimony and illegally obtained evidence would be excluded from establishing the factual basis. If this standard were used and if
judges were required to reject guilty pleas whose factual
basis could not be established, then plea bargaining
would have one of its major weaknesses significantly
minimized.

to be improved, or more cases will have to be rejected
or dismissed. 27
Adding to the confusion as to what shall be regarded as
an "accurate" plea are the views of appellate courts concerning several common practices which are deemed
beneficial to defendants and. hence, not necessarily in
their interest to prohibit. Some pleas are to offenses that
were not actually committed but which carry les er sentences (e.g., pleas to daytime rather than nighttime burglary). Some pleas are to offenses which are either not
proven by the facts or do not even exist. Sometimes defendants plead guilty but maintain that they are innocent
and are only pleading because it is in their best interest
to do so. For each of these situations some appellate
courts have ruled that the pleas entered were acceptable
(see generally, Bond, 1981:159). Thus the meaning and
purpose of the accuracy standard bas been clouded.

One court clarified the standard as follows: ". . . the
purpose of the factual basis requirement is to ensure accuracy of the plea that is, to ensure that the defendant is
guilty of a crime at least a serious as that to which he is
entering his plea" (Beama1t v. State, 221 N.W. 2d 698,
700 (Minn. 1974)). Under this interpretation . of the "accuracy" tandard (one with which the NAC's standard
quoted above concurs) pleas to inaccurate facts and
charges are "accurate" so long as the facts show that
some crime of equal or greater seriousness was committed by the defendant. Thus the "accuracy" standard is
In considering evidentiary standards that might be incor- not to ensure ' accuracy" in the literal sense. It is not to
porated into the accuracy standard it houJd be recog- guarantee the integrity of criminal justice records so tl1at
nized tha there is a tension between the "efficiency" of future u er of them will be able to determine accurately
plea bargaining and high evidentiary standards of proof. what the real crime was. Its purpose (under this interThe reason many cases are p.lea bargained is precisely pretation) is to afeguard against two possibilities: conthat they are weak. The higher one sets tl1e evidentiary victing completely innocent persons and convicting
standard for acceptable pleas, the more of these pleas are guilty persons of crimes more serious than the ones tl1ey
going to be unacceptable. Higher rates of plea rejections actually committed (e.g., a burglary rather than an atwould necessitate other adjustments in the system. tempted burglary).
Either cases would have to be made stronger or more Beyond evidentiary standards and the meaning of ''accuwould have to be rejected at screening, dismis ed, or set racy," there is th question of how a factual basis should
for trial. Thus; the policy choice i between two broad be established. Aga.in there is a tradeoff between efficienalternatives. If evidentiary tandards are set low plea cy and protection against false conviction. Plea bargainbargaining will continue to have high "efficiency" (dis- ing can be made to more closely approximate a trial dispose of large caseloads of even poorly prepared cases) po ition by requiring that the factual basis be established
but it will also continue to represent a wide departure in ways approximating a trial procedure, such as requirfrom the traditional legal prot.ections built into the trial ing that evidence and witnesses be produced in court
system. If evidentiary standards are set high, plea bar- and testimony b taken as to what could be proven if the
gaining will become a closer approximation of the trial case went to trial. One might expect such a procedure to
system. Innocent defendant will be less likely to be provide courts with a better opportunity to assess case
wmngly convicted. But, plea bargaining will no longer
be able to serve as the great laundering machine it often
is. Shoddy inve tigation and prosecution practices will 27 We assume trial capacity could not be expanded to accommodate the
no longer come out in the wash. They will either have additional volume of cases.
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None of the six states studied has used the factual basis
standard to achieve such an approximation. None has
adopted the high evidentiary standard recommend d by
the NAC nor for that matter have they even addressed
the que tion of evidentiary standards in fami liar legal
phrases uch as ''probable cause ' or a "prim a fa ie''
case. 3 ' Rather they hnve spoken in the ambiguous and
undefined language of "sufficient evidence" (Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure, Article 1.15; Washington, State v.
Newton, 87 Wm. 2d 363, 372, 1552 p.2d 682, 685 (1976)) or
evidence that "negates guilt" (Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 440 Pa. 199, 202, 269 A.2d 709, 711 (1970)).

strength than less demanding procedures (such as asking
defendants if they are pleading guilty because they are in
fact guilty). But the former procedure would obviously
be less efficient than the latter.

The legal standard in six jurisdictions. Unlike the knowing
and voluntary standards, the accuracy standard was not
explicitly imposed upon the states by Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969). Previous studies have reported that
very few state court judges inquire into the factual basis
for pleas (Washington University Law Quarterly, 1966)
and that only a few states require detailed inquiries into
the factual basis for pleas (Bond, 1981: 159). However,
of the six states included in this study, three (Texas, Ari- The states allow the factual basis to be established by a
zona, and Pennsylvania) 28 require a factual basis for wide variety of means including police reports, affidavits
pleas. Washington seems to require it by virtue of the of witnesses, statements of defend ants, and other evifact that on the plea-acceptance form that must be used dence. For instance, an Arizona court ruled that a factuin Washington there is a section where the defendant is al basis was established by a presentence report which
to state the facts that led to his being charged (see Ap- the defendant said was "pretty accurate" (State v. Murib,
pendix D). But case law indicates that the factual basis 116 Ariz. 441, 569 P.2d 1339 (1977)). The states do not
requirement is recommended but not required (State v. require that the defendant participate except in Texas
Newton, 87 Wm. 2d at 369, 552 P.2d at 686). Louisiana where his consent must be obtained to use evidence inhas no law on point-which is reflected in the fact thaf troduced by stipulation (Texas Code of Criminal Procefive of the seven versions of the plea-taking forms devel- dure, Article 1.15). There is no requirement that the inoped by the local judges in New Orleans do not address formation used be reliable except in Washington (where
this issue (see Appendix H). Virginia does not require oddly enough a factual basis, itself, is not required)
courts to establish a factual basis for a plea, 29 but the (Washington, State v. Newton, 552 P.2d 682 (1976)).
Virginia Supreme Court suggests that the judges ask de- There is no requirement that the facts established accufendants, "Are you entering the plea of guilty because rately refle 1 the crime charged or the crime to which
you are, in fact, guilty of the crime charged?" 30
the plea is made (except in the latter case for Ariz na
(S tate v. M cGee, 551 P.2d 568 (1976); nor is it required
By examining the nature of the proof needed to meet the
that a factual basis be established for each element of the
factual basis standard in the states that require or recomoffense except in Arizona (State v. Davis, 112 Ariz. 140,
mend it, the minimal nature of the protection afforded
by this standard becomes apparent. The key to the trial 142, 539 P.2d 897 (1975)).
system's protection of liberty is its requirement that evi- R emarkably, Virginia had what appeared to reformer t
dence in criminal cases meet certain legal tests of reli- be " the greatest protectio n to defendants pleading
ability, legality and persuasiveness. At the core of the guilty" (Wa hington
University Law Quarterly
notion of "legal innocence" is not whether the accused 1966:3 11 ). Virginia required a trial by a constitutional
committed the prohibited act but whether a jury present- provision (V irginia Constitution Arti le 1, § 8) which
ed with the lawfully obtained, admissible evidence was self-exec uting and could not be waived by the acwould conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the de- cused. Thus, Virginia's plea bargaining system seemed to
fendant was guilty. A substantial approximation of this closeJy resemble the trial process i.u that pleas could not
feature of the trial system would require that evidence be accepted w ithout sufficient vidence of guilt being
used to establish the factual basis be credible; be assessed presented to a judg . ln practi e this provision w as fo lby an independent third party; and, at least, meet the lowed literally by local j ustice officials. When felon y
minimum standard of probable cause, if not a higher pleas were taken a witness (usually the principal police
standard.
officer in the case) would give sworn testimony as to

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 1.15; Arizona Rules of
Criminal Procedure Rule 17.3; and Pa., Commonwealth v. Maddox,
450 Pa. 406, 409, 300 A.2d 503, 505 (1973).
29
Kibert v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 660, 222 S.E .2d 790 (1976).
0
' See Appendix F.

28

•• In m Sl felony cases, by the time u guilty plea is entered a de.t ennimlt ion t.ba t probuble cause ex i l~ has been mt•de either by u judge at a
preliminury hearing o r by a grand jury. Thus in such cases at least n
Lhrcsh It! level of legal proof has been established eveo before the factual basis standard is met.
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w hat the state would have proven. 32 Ho wever, in 1976
the Virginia Supreme Court transfo rmed this provision
from one of the nation's strongest to one of the weakest
requirement· for a factual basis. T he ca involved a defendant w ho pleaded guilty to first degree murder. The
Commonwealth bad ev id ence sufficient to upport only
econd degree m urder. Citing A rticle 8 of the V irgini a
Con tit ution a well as Section 19- 1166 of the Virginia
Code (which pro vides that the court will 'try" a case if
the accused pleads guil ty), the defendant argued there
had been in ufficient eviden e t o conv ict. But the court
held tha t these laws onJ y req uir th at a judge will preside
in the event that the accused p lead guilty. They do not
imply Lhat evidence will be presented r that the case
will b e ''tried .' It exp lained that a voluntary and intelligent gui lty plea is a self-suppl ied onvic tion w hich operates a a wai ver of all defi nses (other than jurisdictio nal
defects). I ncl uded in t he waiver is t he potential defe n e
of lack of eviden e or insuffic iency o f evidence (Kibert v.
Commonwealth, 2 16 Va. 6609 222 S.E.2d 790 {1976)).
This decision d id not radicall y change the procedures

"The existence of this procedure was a major factor in our choice of
Norfolk as a study site. We also felt that this procedure may represent
a model compromise be twee n plen bargaining and trial. But after observing i t 11 prnclice, we were J>s. impressed as explained below.

Table 6.6

for accepting pleas in Norfolk, however, as will be
shown below.
The practice in six jurisdictions. The ways in which the
factual basis for pleas are established in the six jurisdictions were determined both through interviews and observations. The interviews with judges indicate that no
one method is used by a majority of the judges, and substantial variations exist both between and within jurisdictions (see Table 6.6).
The most common method judges (40 percent) said they
use is simply to ask the defendant if he committed the
offense. In jurisdictions with plea-taking forms with a
place for statements by the defendants, some judges said
they have the defendant read the statement and tell
whether it is true. This is preferred to having the defendant state the facts orally because it avoids the possibility of a discrepancy between the written and the oral
statements. Such discrepancies require additional time to
resolve and can necessitate rejecting the plea or can lead
to reversal on appeal. Other methods used by judges include asking additional questions about the offense (such
as what the defendant was thinking); and requiring the
state to show some evidence (e.g., the drug analysis) or
to produce one witness (e.g., the police officer in the
case). But none of these were used by substantial numbers of judges.

Methods judges report they use to establish factual bases for pleas by jurisdiction
(June-August 1977)
[In percentages]

Methods

Asks

defendant if
the offense

he

New
Orleans
[N=11]

Seattle
[N=23]

33

82

22

50

67

13

40

33

0

22

36

0

0

20

33

9

9

21

0

38

17

0

0

4

4

22

25

7

0

9

43

0

11

25

15

Tucson
[N = 28]

Delaware
County
[N=9]

Norfolk
[N=B]

Total
[N=88]

committed

Yes
Asks
additional
questions
about
offense
Yes
Requires
DA
evito
produce
denee
Yes
Requires DA to produce on~ witness
Yes
Other
Yes

EIPaso
[N=9]
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Our in-court observations generally parallel the interview findings (see Table 6.7). The most common method
used (59 percent) was that someone (usually the judge)
asked the defendant if he were pleading guilty because
he was in fact guilty. But again, there is considerable
variation among the jurisdictions. Additionally, in 48
percent of the cases the prosecutor either showed or reported evidence. The variation among the jurisdictions
here is interesting. In Texas and Pennsylvania, which require a factual basis and that some evidence be introduced, the rates of intr~ucing evidence are highest. In
Arizona, which requires a factual basis but allows it to
be established by any part of the record, the rate is
lowest. In Virginia, where the formerly high factual
basis standard has been emasculated, the former practice
of entering some evidence and even having a state witness available continues to operate.

Equivocal (''Alford'') pleas. When it came to the matter of
"equivocal" pleas (i.e., defendants pleading guilty but
continuing to assert their innocence), judges were evenly
split. Although ~ch pleas are constitutionally acceptable
(North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)), only half
the judges said they permit them in their courts-a!-

Table 6.7

though this position varied among jurisdictions (El Paso,
0 percent; New Orleans, 100 percent; Seattle, 78 percent;
Tucson, 44 percent; Delaware County, 9 percent; Norfolk, 83 percent). Judges who refused to accept "Alford"
pleas said they distrusted them and worried about the
lack of finality. Most of them would agree with the view
of the Pennsylvania court which wrote: "Defendant
should not be permitted to plead guilty from one side of
his mouth and not guilty from the other" (Commonw~alth v. Roundtree, 440 Pa. 199, 202, 269 A.2d 709, 711
(1970) ). Our in-court observations indicate that defendants rarely (2 percent) maintain their innocence-although again there are substantial differences among the
jurisdictions in this respect (see Table 6.7).
Effectiveness of the plea-taking procedures. Measuring the
effectiveness of the plea acceptance procedures can not
be done in any simple, unequivocal way. Given the ambiguity of the standards, the differing purposes behind
them, and the difficulty of getting valid measures of
what defendants actually perceived and believed when
they were entering their pleas, it is impossible to obtain
anything more than partial and indirect measures.

Methods of establishing the factual bases for guilty pleas by jurisdiction
(June-August 1977)

Method

Who asked if defendant pleading guilty
because he was in fact guilty?
Judge
Defense counsel
Judge and defense counsel
No one
Who asked additional questions establishing a factual basis for the plea?
Judge
Defense counsel alone or with judge
Judge and court clerk
No one
Did the prosecutor show or report
some evidence?
Yes
Did the state have available at least
one witness (sworn or unsworn)?
Yes
Did defendant maintain innocence?
Yes

El Paso
[N= 106]

New
Orleans
[N= 120]

Seattle
[N=138]

Tucson
[N=110]

Delaware
Co.
[N=131]

Norfolk
[N= 106]

Total*
[N=711] ..

41.3%
0.0%
0.0%
58.7%

72.5%
0.0%
0.0%
27.5%

47.1%
2.2%
0.0%
50.7%

70.9%
0.0%
0.0%
29.1%

26.9%
28.5%
10.0%
34.6%

53.8%
0.0%
0.0%
46.2%

51 .6%
5.6%
1.8%
41 .0%

42.9%
0.0%
33.3%
23.8%

5.8%
0.0%
0.0%
94.2%

14.6%
0.0%
0.0%
85.4%

75.5%
0.0%
0.0%
24.5%

44.5%
2.4%
0.0%
53.1%

9.4%
0.0%
0.0%
90.6%

31.4%
0.4%
5.0%
63.6%

100.0%

19.2%

7.2%

5.5%

96.2%

66.0%

48.0%

0.0%

2.5%

0.0%

0.0%

13.8%

66.0%

12.8%

0.9%

2.5%

5.8%

0.9%

0.8%

0.0%

2.0%

*Percentages that do not total to 100 are due to rounding errors.
• *The sizes of the respective N's vary slightly due to item nonresponse.
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Plea rejection rates. One indicator that might b assumed
to measure effectiveness i · the rate at which pleas are rejected. After all it i through the power to reject pleas
(hat lhe judge ultimately controls the plea process. If
judges were to use that power as the most progressive
reformer would have them use it, they would reject
pleas whenever the pro ecution had "overcharged' or
had given away too much or too little or other community interests were not properly erved by the di po ition. Given the frequency with which "overcharging"
and inappropriate plea bargains are alleged to occur, one
would anticipate a high rate of rejection from judge
who were following such a progressive course. But even
if judges were adhering to the minimum requirement
imposed by law, one might till expect a substantial rate
of plea rejection-assuming that there must be many defendants who either are not able to make a knowing
plea, or who have been coerced by improper threats or
promises, or for whom there is no adequate factual basis.

In any case, it i initially surprising to ftnd that the
actual plea rejection rate wa as low as 2 percent overall
for all si.x jurisdictions, with a range from 0 percent in
Norfolk to 5 percent in Delaware County. However,
this finding cannot be taken to mean that judicial supervision of the plea process has fai led. Rejection rate. are
ambiguous when used either as absolute or comparative
measures of the effectiveness of the plea-taking process.
Using the rejection rate as a comparative measure, the
lack of substantial difference among the six jurisdictions
on this measure uggests that the difference in law and
practice among them make little differenc in th bottom
line of plea taking, namely, whether the plea is found acceptable. But, on the other hand, it could be argued that
differences in the quality of the plea-taking practices do
make a difference. The fact that the highest rate of rejection occurred in the jurisdiction with the longest average time for taking pleas (D !aware County) suggests
that differences in the "quality" of the procedures (at
least ru indicated by length of time consumed) do indeed
make a difference in the probability of plea acceptance.

Although both interpretations are supportable, we beJjeve the latter is the more accurate.
As an absolute measure, the 2 percent rejection rate uggests that the tightening of the plea-taking pr cedure
over the last two decades has not met certain goals of
some of the reformers. Tho e who had hoped that the
new plea-taking procedure would in ert into the guilty
plea proce a te t of evidentiary strength approximating
what would occur at trial must conclude that they have
not. The 2 percent plea rejection rate doe not begin to
compare with the 22 percent acquittal rate at bench
trials in our ample of robbery and burglary cases from
our six jurisdictions or the 16 percent to 48 percent acquittal rates at bench trials for all felonies in the four jurisdictions studied by Brosi (1979:49). Also, those who
had hoped that judicial upervi ion would con titute a
check on "overcharging" by pro ecution must conclude
that it ha failed in this regard as well. In five of our six
jurisdictions there were still complaints about ' overcharging."
As for whether th community's interests in pr per entencing is being afeguarded the meaning of the 2 percent rejection rate i less clear. It suggests that at least in
the minds of the judges that intere t is being protected.
The majority of judges told us they would rej~t pleas
that they thought were inappropriate. But it i difficult
to ee how some judges make this determination becau e
they do not use presentence reports or take other teps
to independently check the appropriateness of the sentence recommended by the pro ecutor.
As for the knowing and voluntary criteria of plea acceptability the 2 percent rejection rate seems to indicate
that a far a the judges bothered to determine, most
pleas meet these criteria. However, defendants may n t
really understand and may be ubject to threats or promises that do not get reported in ourt. Pleas may be entered that meet the legal requirements but in reality are
not knowing or voluntary. 1n short, the rejection rate
only measure whether the procedure was followed, not
whether the reality that the procedure was intended to
as ure in fact occurred.
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Table 6.8

The knowing and voluntary standards from the defendant's perspective by jurisdiction*
(June-August 1977)

Texas

Standard/Query

%
The knowing standard
.
"When you actually pleaded guilty in court
did you understand the questions you
were asked about the nature of your plea
and the rights you gave up?"
Yes
Not sure; understood somewhat
No

(N]

New
Orleans

Tucson

%

%

[N]

62

71

0
38

29

75
10

0

15

(8)

Did your attorney advise
answer these questions?
Yes

you

[N]

Delaware
Co.

%

[N]

%

[N]

Total

%

100

91

80

0
0

0
9

7
13

(9)

(20)

(7)

Virginia

(11)

[N]

(55)

how to

33

70

57
(9)

Did anyone tell you the maximum you could
have been sentenced to?
Yes

67

95

100
(9)

Did the judge tell you the maximum sentence?
Yes

100

89

78

89

82

22

11

12
(9)

(44)

79
(10)

0

(18)

(58)

45

80
(9)

100
(2)

91

(10)

(9)

(19)

(54)

(11)

70

89

74

83

(11)

(9)

(19)

(6)

The voluntary standard
Did you feel you had to accept the plea
bargain?
Yes
No

89

26

0

52

45

(7)

(20)

(9)

(6)

Did your attorney tell you the maximum
sentence?
Yes

29
(20)

(7)

(44)

77
23
(11)

(40)

*Interviews were not done at all in Seattle. Interviews were not done in the local jails at El Paso and Norfolk but rather in state
facilities; and most of the defendants interviewed were not from El Paso and Norfolk.
**Data not available.

Finally, any use of rejection rates as an indicator of the
effectiveness of plea-taking must recognize the powerful
incentive among judges to keep rejection rates very low.
Substantial numbers of rejections would add to the trial
docket. Judges are just as concerned, if not more so, as
prosecutors in moving the docket. Such an incentive can
cause legal standards to be adjusted in practice so that
reality is found acceptable rather than being made acceptable. Reformers must realize that in asking judges to
regulate plea bargaining they are not getting a completely disinterested party. Careful and continual scrutiny by
appellate courts of the plea-taking practices of trial
courts may be necessary to prevent the pressures of the

trial docket from reducing plea-taking procedures into
mere legal formalities.
The defendants' perspective. In order to get at the reality
behind the plea-taking procedures, we asked defendants
who had pleaded guilty to tell us about their decision to
plead; why they did it; and what occurred at the pleataking. The samples are small and nonrandom, so their
responses can not be generalized to any known population of defendants. Nonetheless, they are instructive.
They suggest that while defendants pleading guilty
today get a few extra minutes in court, their pleas are
not necessarily knowing; not all the promises made are
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being fulfilled; factually innocent defendants caught up
in cases with circumstantial evidence may be just as
likely to be convicted as before; and defendants continue
to perceive their decisions to plead as "involuntary" (in
the layman's sense).

Q: He didn't ask you whether you were guilty at
all? No? Why didn't you tell him that you weren't
really guilty?
A: You see what really happened, you see, when I
pleaded guilty, they brought me a piece of paper,
like a little cop-out paper, and I had to sign my
name.

The majority of the defendants indicated that their pleas
were "intelligent" in certain respects. Almost all (90 percent) said they were told by someone-usually their attorney (79 percent)-what the maximum sentence could
be (see Table 6.8). Most (80 percent) said they understood the rights they had waived and what the charges
were. Several added credibility to their responses by reciting for us parts of the plea-taking litany almost verbatim. These findings, of course, are encouraging. But a
substantial minority (20 percent) indicated they did not
understand either some or all of what was said. Their
limited understanding as well as the difficulty faced by
the courts in achieving real understanding with certain
defendants are indicated below by selected defendant responses to our questions about whether they understood
what was said to them during the taking of their pleas.

Q: Did you read the cop-out paper?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you understand what was on the paper?
A: I think so.

Q: When you did plead guilty and the judge read
some rights to you, uh, did the judge ask you if you
were pleading guilty because you were, in fact,
guilty? Do you remember that?
A: He asked me if I understood, he asked me if I
was forced to plead guilty and everything, yeahQ: Did-did he ask you if you were guilty?
A: No-he really didn't actually come out and say,
"guilty," or, "Are you guilty." He asked do I understand the paper that I signed and all this, yeah.

Tucson: Defendant #14
A: "I . . . was scared and didn't really understand
what was going on."

Q: On the paper, did it ask whether you were pleading guilty because you were in fact guilty?
A: I can't, I can't read that well-understood before
I did it.

Tucson: Defendant # 1
[Defendant) said he understood rights and such but
the judge used a lot of big words that he didn't understand.

Q: Did you read it or did your attorney read it to
you?
A: I read, uh, what I could understand, yeah. He
told us to read it.

Virginia: Defendant # 1
A: "On one they had to go get a book and show me
because I didn't know what they were talking
about."

Q: Okay.
A: The court, whatever you call it, told us to read
it, uh, and then if we go along with it, well, from
what I understood it seemed like, you know, a fair
shake. And if you can't, don't read that good-I
ain't got but six grade experienceNew Orleans: Defendant #3
Q: Do you remember any of the questions that he
asked you when you were pleading?
A: No, not really. At the time I was under the influence of narcotics, you knowQ: At the time you pled you were under narcotics?
A: Yeah, well, I was, I was a junkie at the time and
I was loaded andQ: You hadn't dried out in the back while you were
waiting in jailA: No. I made bond.
Texas: Defendant #5
Researcher's note: On probing I learned the defendant did not really feel he could plead not guilty. Although I had trouble with his broken English and

Virginia: Defendant #6
A: "I understood the sentence part. I was thinking
more about the sentence than what the judge said.
No one told me the judge did not have to go
along."
New Orleans: Defendant # 10
Q: Okay. when you pled guilty do you remember
the judge asking you some questions? Do you remember him telling you some things?
A: I know, un, some kind of thing about we're not
making you plead guilty-

Q: Yeah-Do you remember all that?
A: I can't remember all of it.
Q: But did you understand what he was telling you?
A: I think so.
Q: Okay. Did he ask you if you were pleading
guilty because you were guilty?
A: I don't know him asking that.
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he had trouble with my Spanish, it seems as if he
was convinced he had no right to plead not guilty.
While pleas today appear to be more likely to be "intelligent" they have not lost their coercive character. The
majority (77 percent) of the defendants said they felt
they had to accept the plea bargain (see Table 6.8). The
sense of coercion is conveyed by some of their responses
to our questions about whether they felt they had to
accept the plea offer.

er sentence if they went to trial. 33 Some complained
about broken promises by the police. In Virginia (where
the plea agreement must be set forth in writing) these
promises by the police are apparently either not included
on the written agreement or ignored by the courts-assuming the following reports by defendants are accurate:
Virginia: Defendant # 10
"The police told me that if I plead guilty they
would help me out in court but they didn't."
Virginia: defendant #4
"The police told me to cooperate and they would
help me. I then made a statement. I thought they
would help me at the presentence hearing but they
didn't."

Virginia: Defendant #7
"I didn't think I had any choice. I didn't see my
lawyer but one time before trial."
Virginia: Defendant #5
"My lawyer insisted that I plead guilty. I tried to
argue with him."
Virginia: Defendant # 10
"The police forced me into it. They threatened me
with more charges."
Tucson: Defendant #15
Defendant felt pressured to take reduced sentence
because she was pregnant.
Delaware County: Defendant #2
"My parents wanted me to. My mother was crying.
I was too young to take a chance on 20 years."

In the only jurisdiction where the question was asked, 2
of 10 defendants maintained they were innocent but had
pleaded guilty anyhow. Both cases involved fact patterns-as told by the defendants-which make it difficult
to know whether the defendants actually committed the
crimes or not. One is worth reporting in detail because it
not only illustrates the difficulty for the plea-taking
standards to separate the guilty from the innocent in circumstances where a factual basis exists, but it also shows
the coercion and deceptiveness that continue to characterize the guilty plea process.
New Orleans: Defendant #6
Q: Tell me briefly what happened ..
A: [T)here was three of us when they caught us but
two of us didn't have anything to do with it, you
know. B"ut I went ahead and pleaded guilty and the
others doing it pleaded guilty because they would
have found us guilty. We would have got 6 months.
That would have been as a maximum, but still, 6
months plus a $500 fine, you know.

Delaware County: Defendant #15
"I didn't know much at the time. I was under an
emotional strain.
"I figured the guy was a lawyer, he knows what
he's doing."
Delaware County: Defendant #9
"The judge told me in front of the jury if I didn't
plead guilty, I'd get knocked out of the box.

Q: Well, on the simple robbery charge you could
have gotten a lot more than 6 months.
A: You see, you see, what we're saying is before
you pleaded guilty they had done dropped it down.

New Orleans: Defendant #7
Q: What do you think would have happened had
you gone to trial on your case?
A: Well, by me being a, uh, colored light-if I had
gotten myself fighting and lose, might have even
got the whole thing-so now----

Q: I see. Did the third guy, did he do it?
A: Right. The one doing it, he pleaded guilty to it,
admitted he did it, and he admitted we didn't have
anything to do with it.
Q: Were you with him at the time?
A: Not when he did it, no sir. We was with himhe had done, you see, he snatched a pocketbook, a
lady's pocketbook somewhere in the French Quarter. And they even got the pocketbook back before

Q: Did the attorney tell you that or did you just
think that?
A: No. But I thought this all along.
None of the defendants who said they felt they had to
accept the plea agreement reported inducements which
courts would regard as per se unlawful, namely threats
of physical violence. Almost all pleaded for virtually the
same reason, namely, to avoid the possibility of a harsh-

" For further discussion see the analysis of differential sentencing,
Chapter 5.
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A: He told us simple robbery. He told me purse
snatching. Well, I'm really- I'm learned about accessory and aU tl1is and I told the policeman, I said,
"It don't take but one per on to snatch a pocketbook, you know, and uh, and we wasn't with him .
You can ask him." And lhe dude told him even
before be th1·ew us in the car. And he said, "Tell
the judge that." The lady- they brought u down
by Jackson Square where they paint themselve - it
was one of those painted ladie that, ub, he snatched
her pocketbook and, uh-she even told him that
she knew that we weren't within the 40 foot of her
when he snatched the pocketbook- if we was anywhere, she said. So he still booked us for it., charged
with-and I told him my rights about it nly take
one person to natch a pocketbook how could he
charge three of us with it. You know. The one
pleaded guilty, you know, and the lady identified
him, o I asked him how could he charge u with it
when we weren't nowhere around.

tne policemen came, but when we got with him he
didn t have no money or nothing on him, you
know, no pocketbook. The lady said he gave it
back. The lady even told the police that we wasn't
with him at the time that he snatched it. They said
that they don't know whether we was in it or what,
she said. But we wasn't with him when he snatched
it.
Q: Okay, now. If they had already dropped you
down to misdemeanor theft before you pleaded
guilty right-why didn't you go to trial on the misdemeanor theft?
A: Because I pleaded guilty . . .
Q: Well why did you plead guilty?
A: Because the police said that they could have got
us for acces ory. In other words from what I understood, and I didn't know about the law then, but I
understood after then when I found out when I
ple-aded guilty, that there no ucb thing as accessory to that charge~ we would have gone to trial.
And, with which I didn't know at the moment.
Anyway, when they did pick up the dude who did
it, we was wjth him. He didn't have nothing on
him, but still, they identified us. He pleaded guilty.
And we wa with bjro, So I don't know whether we
was guilty or what.

Q: OkayA: So that's when he charged me with resisting
arrest.

Q: Let me ask you thisA: I was just trying to stick up for my rights-

* * • * •
A: He [the lawyer] explained all that to me-if you
beat it, you know you 11 go loose. If you don't they
can give you the max which is 6 months plus the
$500 fine. But if you plead guilty, you'll get 60 days,
you know. He already been with the judge. Sixty
days.
Q: He had talked to the judge. . . .
A: Right . . . .

Q: But you thought it was a fair shake?
A: Right. Even though 1 didn' t do it I thought it
was a fair hake because if I would have got found
guilty for it ju t for being with him I would have
gotten the maximum.
Q: Do you think you would have been found
guilty?
A: I don't know, you know, uh. If I could have got
a decent lawyer, I doubt that I would-sin e this
was my first offense and all that, you know.

Q: And so, is that the reason you pled guilty?
A: That was one of the reasons, you know. . .
Q: Okay, you said that that was one of the reasons.
Any other reasons why you pled?
A: Well, uh, well, any reason cause I wasn't that
sure if, you know, how, you know, I didn't know
about the law. I didn't know about accessory. Uh, I
told you about they had talked about the accessory.
Q: Well, did you know the guy that had ripped off
this purse?
A: No, not until after-after we got picked up with
him.
Q: Well, when you got picked up did you ask the
cops what you got picked up for?
A: Yeah, and he told us.
Q: What did they tell you?

The Achille heel of plea-taking procedures is the fac t
that defendants can on their own or as the result f
coaching by their attorneys ans wer all question i.n a
way that will be acceptable to the judge. ln effect, the
same desire for leniency that leads them to plead g uilty
can emasculate the effectiveness of the plea-taking procedure as a protection of defendants' .interests. The majority (52 percent) of the defendants in our sample reported that their attorneys had advised them how t
answer the plea-taking colloquy. Several defendants indicated that their attorneys had told them exactly what to
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say, and evidently these defendants did so without question, as illustrated below:
Delaware County:
(My public defender said), "Don't make any hassles.
Say 'yes' where it says 'yes.' Whatever the sheet
says, say 'yes.' "
New Orleans: Defendant #8
Q: Did he go over a written form with you? Your
lawyer? The state lawyer?
A: No. The only thing he went over with me and
he had me sign some paper that I'm pleading guilty.
Yeah.
Q: Yeah? Did he read what was on that paper?
A: Yeah. He read it to me.
Q: Did you understand what was on the paper?
Okay. Did he tell you how to answer those questions when the judge talked to you?
A: Yeah, he said that everything the judge would
ask about how I would plead to.
New Orleans: Defendant #5
Q: Did your attorney talk to you about this ahead
of time? Did he tell you about the rights the judge
was going to read to you?
A: Well, he came, uh, he came to me with a piece
of paper concerning my rights after I was sentenced, you know-no-it was before I was sentenced, but, it was more or less a plea bargain because, uh, you know, he said I want you to sign
right here. Put your initials right here by each at
the end of each question, you know, saying that you
understand.
Several defendants said their attorneys stood next to
them in court and told them what to say. Occasionally
this arrangement went awry, as reported by a Virginia
defendant. "On the third charge I pled not guilty because [my lawyer] was talking in my ear and I thought
he said to plead not guilty. That blew their minds. Then
I changed it to guilty."
While there is no way of completely protecting plea colloquies from ingenuine but acceptable answers, there are
ways of reducing this vulnerability. Repeating and rephrasing questions; requiring more than simple "yes" or
"no" answers; asking defendants to explain what a jury
trial is before waiving their right to one; having the
prosecutor read the state's version of the crime and then
asking defendants to give their version; and other ways
of going beyond a mere recitation of the plea litany prevent today's plea-taking procedure from being an empty
legal ritual. On the other hand, the use of the plea-acceptance forms, with minimal additional questioning of
the defendant; establishing the factual basis in ways designed to minimize the possibility of a discrepancy between what the defendant believes happened and what

the state says happened; and the use of other measures
designed to meet the mandate of appellate courts in a
streamlined manner bring today's plea-taking close to
being a new kind of "pious fraud."
Of course, the more determined the effort to make the
plea acceptance meaningful the less efficient the guilty
plea becomes. Delaware County's average time for
taking felony pleas, for example, is four times that of Seattle, where judges rely more on the use of the pleataking form. Also, in Delaware County there is an increased risk of having pleas rejected.
The state's perspective. While the expansion of the pleataking procedures since 1966 has not benefited defendants as much as most reformers had hoped, it has come
to be recognized as an important benefit to the state. A
thorough colloquy does not necessarily reduce the probability of the defendant's appealing the plea 34 but it does
reduce his chance of success. This point has not been
lost on either prosecutors or judges. One Pennsylvania
prosecutor reported that his office has devised a lengthy
colloquy, which prosecutors ask of defense counsel. Motioning his hands as if driving nails into a coffin, he said
the colloquy even asks for counsel's opinion as to
whether the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary.35

Several judges emphasized the importance they attach to
using the colloquy to prevent reversals. Fortunately, for
defendants and reformers who would have the plea-acceptance be as thorough as possible, there is here a
happy coincidence of method in achieving a difference
in goals. The greater the state's concern about making
pleas reversal-proof, the more likely the colloquy is to
be thorough and meaningful.

Summary of findings
• All felony-level judges in the six jurisdictions studied
used some form of checklist to guide them at plea
taking. But the checklists do not cover all the same
issues among the six jurisdictions or even within them
(except in two states where standardized plea taking
" Pleas to serious crimes are appealed almost routinely in some jurisdictions.
•• Reacting to our finding that in Delaware County much of the pleataking colloquy is done by defense counsel, this prosecutor expressed
concern for such a practice. For one thing, because plea colloquies
serve the function of "burying" the defendant he did not think counsel
should be the one to do this. But, more importantiy, he believes that
counsel are increasingly recognizing the litigation value of being ineffective. In order to give their clients a basis for appeal some attorneys
are deliberately being ineffective. Allowing counsel to run the plea colloquy increases their opportunity to build in an appeal on the basis of
ineffective assistance.
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forms are required) and do not guarantee that even constitutionally required queries will be made.
• The average time for accepting pleas for all cases
combined is 7.8 minutes. Pleas to felony charges take
twice as long as pleas to misdemeanor charges {9.9 minutes compared to 5.2 minutes). Pleas in felony courts take
over three times longer than pleas in misdemeanor
courts (8.9 minutes compared to 2.6 minutes).
• The six jurisdictions varied dramatically in the time
spent in accepting pleas to felony charges (from 4.2 minutes to 18.2 minutes) and less dramatically in misdemeanor cases (from 1.7 minutes to 4.9 minutes-Delaware
County excluded). No convincing explanation could be
found for the dnmatic differences among the jurisdictions in time sp · nt in accepting pleas.
• At the time of entering their pleas defendants were
usually (78 percent) addressed individually before the
bench and the plea acceptance inquiry consisted of an
oral colloquy (84 percent) sometimes (32 percent) supplemented by the submission of a written inquiry signed
by the defendant.
• The defendants wer usually told they had a right to a
trial by jury (70 percent) and sometimes told of their
rights to confront witnesses (44 percent) and remain
ilent (38 percent). In many cases (56 percent) it was
noted that defen e counsel had explained the defendants'
rights to them. In most cases (73 percent) the defendants
were a ked if they understood the rights which they had
waived.
• In most cases (69 percent) the defendants had the
charges explained to them and were usually (59 percent)
asked if they understood the charges. It was sometimes
(34 percent) noted that defense counsel had explained
the charges to their clients.
• Defendants were not always (48 percent) told of the
maximum po sible sentence; rarely (2 percent) notified
that they were eligible for sentencing as habitual offenders; and rarely (4 percent) notified of any collateral consequences of their pleas.
• Defendants were usually (65 percent) asked if any
threats or pressures had caused them to p lead guilty.
Sometimes (32 percent) they were asked if promises
other than the plea agreement had been made. Usually
(71 percent) the specific terms of any plea agreement
were entered into the record.
• The method for establishing the factual basis that was
most frequently reported by judges (40 percent) as the
one they use is simply to ask the defendant if he committed the offense. This same method was found to be most

frequently u ed in actual plea-takings ob erved (59 percent). Thi, inquiry was upplemented in many ca es by
having the prosecutor s·b ow or report some evidence (48
percent) and by asking the defendant additional questions about the cri me {36 percent).
• Defendants rarely (2 percent) entered equivocal pleas
in which they pleaded guilty while maintaining their innocence. Half the judges said they would not accept
such pleas.
• Overall, judges rarely (2 percent) rejected any guilty
pleas.
• Lnterviews with nonrandom samples of defendants
who had pleaded guilty suggest that most defendants (91
percent) had been told of the maximum entence they
might have received· and most (80 percent) said they under toad what wa aid about the nature of the charges
and the rights they waived. But some (20 percent) indicated they did not understand or only partially understood what was aid . Most defendant (77 percent) said
they felt they had to accept the plea agreement.
• Half the defendants reported that their attorneys advi ed them how to answer the questions at plea taking.
In everal cases the "advice" was to say "ye " to everything.
• A few
promises
required
were not

defendants reported that the police had made
which apparently did not become part of the
written statement of the plea agreement and
fulfilled.

Conclusion
The reforms of the guilty plea acceptance procedures of
the last decade and a half have succeeded in making
pleas more intelligent and in assuring that defendants get
the deals they thought they were going to get. Before
their pleas are accepted the great majority of felony defendants have their con titutional right to trial by jury
explained to them as well as the nature of the charges
against them and the maximum po sible sentence for
which they are eligible. In addition, the terms of the plea
agreements are made part of the record. Most defendants
appear to w1derstand the explanations of their rig)Tts and
the charges against them. But a ubstantial minol""ity of
defendants apparently do not understand. Moreover,
promises made by the police apparently do not get recorded in plea agreements and are not fulfilled .
The reforms have not made guilty pleas "voluntary" in
the sense of being unco reed or free from pressures or
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inducements. Virtually all defendants still plead guilty
because of the inducements offered by the state. But, the
reforms did not try to eliminate all inducements, only
improper inducements such as the threat of violence or
bribery and, in the hopes of two national commissions,
the use of overcharging. The former two kinds of improper inducements do not appear to be a regular part of
plea bargaining, but the latter two continue to be.
A factual basis for the guilty pleas is now established in
the great majority of cases. But this does not guarantee
the "accuracy" of the plea in the literal sense (for defendants are allowed to plead to fact patterns which do
not accurately reflect their crimes); nor does it mean
that innocent defendants are less likely to be wrongly
convicted. Contrary to the hopes of some reformers the
factual basis established at plea taking does not constitute
a test of evidentiary strength. However, it does reinforce
the informed nature of the plea.
In short, the expanded plea-taking procedures have
made guilty pleas far more informed than they once
were and have minimized the possibility of broken, misleading, or misconstrued promises. But they have left the
coercive (induced) character of plea bargaining intact.
They have not moved plea bargaining much closer to
the trial procedure's determination of legal guilt. They
do not constitute a means by which an independent third
party weighs the evidence against some standard of legal
proof. Reformers who had hoped that requiring judges
to establish a factual basis for guilty pleas would make
the guilty plea system approximate the more rigorous
test of evidence that occurs at trial should take careful
note of the only case of "wrongful" conviction by guilty
plea that we have been able to find. The case serves as a
reminder that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of
our trial system is a high standard which is a long way
from merely establishing some evidence that the defendant committed the crime.
The case involved five men who pleaded guilty to gangraping a 42-year-old woman who allegedly was a
"happy drunk" and willingly went with the men. The
fact that the defendants received suspended sentences
provoked a public outcry. This prompted the judge to
order the defendants either to serve prison terms or

stand trial. They cho e the latter and were acquitted by
a jury (which was not told of their earlier guilty pleas)
(Associated Press, 1983).
The effectiveness of the plea-taking procedures is eroded
by three countervailing factors: (1) Defendants are advised by their counsel and willingly agree to give acceptable answers to the litany of queries at plea taking
because of their desire to secure the inducement offered
by the state. (2) Judges are just as anxious as prosecutors
and defense counsel to dispose of cases as quickly as
possible. Hence they are subject to strong pressures to
find pleas acceptable, which they almost always do. (3)
Except in the occasional case of extraordinarily unusual
plea agreements, judges are not in the position of second
guessing the agreements worked out by prosecutors. To
do so on a regular basis would require the judge to
assess the evidentiary strength of the case as well as
other tactical matters (such as using the defendant as an
informer or for state's evidence) that fall within the
province of the prosecutor. Hence, the judge's ability to
protect the community's interest in seeing defendants
sentenced "appropriately" is limited by his not knowing
certain information that is a major determinant of what
an "appropriate" disposition would be.
If innocent defendants choose to plead guilty today
rather than risk a more severe penalty at trial, they will
be better informed about their constitutional rights;
about the nature of the charges against them; about the
consequences of the plea; and about the terms of the
agreement. There is a 50-50 chance they will not be allowed to plead guilty unless they stop asserting their innocence or facts at variance with the state's version of
the crime. And there is an increasing chance that they
will be unable to successfully attack their conviction on
appeal. Thus the expanded plea-taking procedures have
succeeded in bringing a certain kind of fairness to plea
bargaining. But they have not altered the fundamental
nature of securing dispositions by inducements nor have
they remedied the institutional weakness of plea bargaining, the lack of the weighing of the evidence against a
legal standard such as that which would be necessary to
get a case to the jury.
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Appendix A. -Delaware County (Pa.) District Attorney's List of Cases Eligible for Diversion, 1976. NB: Robbery
not Included; Burglary only for non-dwelling; Also note: there must be no prior convictions for misdemeanors or felonies; no prior diversions; and no "bad" record of juvenile or summary offenses:

OFFENSES

Aiding Consummation of Crime X
Aggravated A & D
A& B, Simple
Attempt
Bad Check
Burglary
Business practices, deceptive
Conspiracy
Credit Cards
Disorderly Conduct
Drunkenness
Endangering Another Person
Exposure, indecent
Failure to disperse
False alarms
False Reports
Firearms, Uniforms Act
Forgery
Harassment by Communication
Hindering apprehension
Impersonating Public Servant
Keys, Master to M.V.
Lewdness, open
Loitering and prowling
Minors, Corrupting
Misapplication entrusted funds
Mischief, Criminal
Obscenity
Possession instruments of Crime
Prohibited offensive weapons
Prostitution
Receiving stolen property
Resisting Arrest
Retail Theft
Riot
Sexual Intercourse, vol. dev.
Solicitation
Terroristic Threats
Theft by deception
Theft, failure disposition funds
Theft, unlawful taking
Theft, lost, etc. property
Theft of services
Throwing missile into car
Trespass, criminal, etc.
Unauth. use M.V.
Drugs, poss. marijuana

ALWAYS OR
NEARLY
ALWAYS
INCLUDED

INCLUDED
ACCORDING TO
INDIVIDUAL
CASES

COMMENTS

X

Minor injury

X

Only non-dwelling

X
X
X
X
X

When not accompanied by ineligible
crime

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

When not fired at livingthing
When restitution can be made

X

When not accompanied by Ineligible
crime
When restitution can be made

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

When not accompanied by ineligible
When not accompanied by ineligible
crime

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

With minor consequence
Consenting adults

Less than 240 grams
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Appendix A. Delaware County (Pa.) District Attorney's List of Cases Eligible for Diversion, 1976. NB: Robbery
not included; Burglary only for non-dwelling; Also note: there must be no prior convictions for misdemeanors or felonies; no prior diversions; and no "bad" record of juvenile or summary offenses.Continued

OPFENSES

Poss. hashish
Possession
Public assistance fraud
Leaving scene accident
Turning off lights
Operating Under Influence
Safes tax, non payment, etc.

ALWAYS OR
NEARLY
ALWAYS
INCLUDED

INCLUDED
ACCORDING TO
INDIVIDUAL
CASES

X
X
X
X
X

COMMENTS

Less than 64 grams
Not hard drugs
When restitution can be made

X
X
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When restitution has been made, etc.
When restitution can be made

Appendix B Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: 1966 and 1975 Texts Compared
1966 Text of Rule 11
(as amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966)

A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to
accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and
the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment
upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.
1975 Text of Rule 11
(as amended Apr. 22, 1974, eff. Dec. 1, 1975; July 31, 1975, eff. Aug. 1 and Dec. 1, 1975)

(a) Alternatives. A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court. shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(b) Nolo contendere. A defendant may plead nolo contendere only with the consent of the court. Such a plea shall be
accepted by the court only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the interest of the public in the
effective administration of justice.

(c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty of nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant
personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any,
and the maximum possible penalty provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the right to be represented by an attorney at every
stage of the proceding against him, and if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, and that he has the
right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty
or nolo contendere he waives the right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him questions about the offense to which has
pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers
may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.
(d) Insuring that the plea is voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by
addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of
threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the attorney for the government
and the defendant or his attorney.
(e) Plea agreement procedure

(1) In General. The attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting
pro se may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the attorney for the government will
do any of the following:
(a) move for ·dismissal of other charges; or
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: 1966 and 1975 Texts Compared-Continued

(b) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request for a particular sentence, with the un-

derstanding the such recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the court; or
(c) agrees that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record,
require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea
is offered. Thereupon the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance
or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report.
(3) Acceptance of Plea Agreement. If the court accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the defendant that it
will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the plea agreement.
(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the
parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the
court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and
advise the defendant that if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of the case may
be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.
(5) Time of Plea Agreement Procedure. Except for good cause shown, notification to the court of the existence of a
plea agreement shall be given at the arraignment or at such other time, prior to trial, as may be fixed by the court.
(6) Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers, and Related Statements. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, evidence
of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendereto
the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or
offer. However, evidence of a statement made in connection with, and relevant to, a plea of guilty, later withdrawn,
a plea of nolo contendere, or an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, is
admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under
oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel.
(f) Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a
judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.

(g) Record of Proceedings. A verbatim record of the proceedings at which the defendant enters a plea shall be made
and, if there is a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the record shall include, without limitation, the court's advice to
the defendant, the inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea including any plea agreement, and the inquiry into the
accuracy of a guilty plea.
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Appendix C Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure
RULE 17.1 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
V. PLEAS OF GUILTY AND NO CONTEST
RULE 17. PLEAS OF GUILTY AND NO CONTEST
Rule 17.1 PLEADING BY DEFENDANT
a. Personal Appearance; Appropriate Court. A plea of guilty or no contest may be accepted by a court having jurisdiction to try the offense. Such plea shall be accepted only when made by the defendant personally in open court,
unless the defendant is a corporation, in which case the plea may be entered by counsel or a corporate officer.
b. Voluntary and Intelligent Plea. A plea of gulity or no contest may be accepted only if voluntarily and intelligently
made. Except for pleas to minor traffic offenses, the procedures of Rule 17.2, 17.3, and 17.4 shall be utilized by all
courts to assure the voluntariness and intelligence of the plea.
c. Pleas of No Contest. A plea of no contest may be accepted only after due consideration of the views of the parties
and the interest of the public in the effective administration of justice.
d. Record. A verbatim record shall be made of all plea proceedings occurring in a court of record.
Rule 17.2 Duty of court to advise defendant of his rights and of the consequences of pleading guilty or no contest
Before accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, the court shall address the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following:
a. The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered;
b. The nature and reange of possible sentence for the offense to which the plea is offered, including any special
conditions regarding sentence, parole, or commutation imposed by statute;
c. The constitutional rights which he forgoes by pleading guilty or no contest, including his right to counsel if he is
not represented by counsel; and
d. His right to plead not guilty.
Rule 17.3 Duty of Court to determine voluntariness and intelligence of the plea
Before accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, the court shall address the defendant personally in open court and
determine that he wishes to forgo the constitutional rights of which he has been advised, that his plea is voluntary
and not the result of force, threats or promises (other than a plea agreement). The trial court may at that time
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea or the determination may be deferred to the time for judgment of
guilt as provided by Rule 26.2(c).
Amended May 7, 1975, effective Aug. 1, 1975.
Rule 17.4 Plea negotiations and agreements
a. Plea Negotiations. The parties may negotiate concerning, and reach an agreement on, any aspect of the disposition
of the case. The court shall not participate in any such negotiation.
b. Plea Agreement. The terms of a plea agreement shall be reduced to writing and signed by the defendant, his
counsel, if any, and the prosecutor. An agreement may be revoked by any party prior to its acceptance by the court.
c. Determining the Accuracy of the Agreement and the Voluntariness and Intelligence of the Plea. The parties shall file
the agreement with the court, which shall address the defendant personally and determine that he understands and
agrees to its terms, that the written document contains all the terms of the agreement, and that the plea is entered in
conformance with Rules 17.2 and 17.3.
d. Acceptance of Plea. After making such determinations, the court shall either accept or reject the tendered negotiated plea. The court shall not be bound by any provision in the plea agreement regarding the sentence or the term
and conditions of probation to be imposed, if, after accepting the agreement and reviewing a presentence report, it
rejects the provision as inappropriate.
e. Rejection of Plea. If an agreement or any provision thereof is rejected by the court, it shall give the defendant an
opportunity to withdraw his plea, advising him that if he permits his plea to stand the disposition of the case may be
less favorable to him than that contemplated by the agreement.
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Appendix C Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (continued)
f. Disclosure and Confidentiality. When a plea agreement or any term thereof is accepted, the agreement or such
term shall become part of the record. However, if no agreement is reached, or if the agreement is revoked, rejected
by the court, or withdrawn or if the judgment is later vacated or reversed, neither the plea discussion nor any
resulting agreement, plea or judgment, nor statements made at a hearing on the plea, shall be admissible against the
defendant in any criminal or civil action or administrative proceeding.
g. Automatic Change of Judge. If a plea is withdrawn after submission of the pre-sentence report, the judge, upon
request of the defendant, shall disqualify himself, but no additional disqualification of judges under this rule shall be
permitted.
Form XVIII. Plea agreement
[CAPTION]
PLEA AGREEMENT
The state of Arizona and the defendant hereby agree to the following disposition of this case:
Plea: The defendant agrees to plead guilty/no contest to:
Terms: On the following understandings, terms and conditions:
1. That the defendant will receive a sentence no greater than
less than
and consistent with the following additional terms:

and no

2. That the following charges are dismissed, or if not yet filed, shall not be brought against the defendant.
3. That this agreement, unless rejected or withdrawn, serves to amend the complaint, indictment, or information to
charge the offense to which the defendant pleads, without the filing of any additional pleading. If th~ plea is rejected or withdrawn the origina,l charges are automatically reinstated.
4. If the defendant is charged with a felony, that he hereby gives up his right to a preliminary hearing or other
probable cause determination on the charges to which he pleads. In the event the court rejects the plea, or the
defendant withdraws the plea, the defendant ·hereby gives up his right to a preliminary hearing or other probable
cause determination on the original charges.
5. Unless this plea is rejected or withdrawn, that the defendant hereby gives up any and all motions, defenses,
objections or requests which he has made or raised, or could assert hereafter, to the court's entry of judgment
against him and imposition of a sentence upon him consistent with this agreement.
6. That if after accepting this agreement the court concludes that any of its provisions regarding the sentence or
the term and conditions of probation are inappropriate, it can reject the plea, giving the defendant an opportunity to
withdraw the plea.
I have read and understand the above. I have discussed the case and my constitutional rights with my lawyer. I
understand that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) I will be giving up my right to a trial by jury, to confront, crossexamine, and compel the attendance of witnesses, and my privilege against self-incrimination. I agree to enter my
plea as indicated above on the terms and conditions set forth herein. I fully understand that if, as part of this plea
bargain, I am granted probation by the court, the terms and conditions thereof are subject to modification at any
time during the period of probation in the event that I violate any written condition of my probation.
Defendant
Date
I have discussed this case with my client in detail and advised him of his constitutional rights and all possible defenses. I believe that the plea and disposition set forth herein are appropriate under the facts of this case. I concur in
the entry of the plea as indicated above and on the terms and conditions set forth herein.
Defense Counsel
Date
I have reviewed this matter and concur that the plea and disposition set forth herein are appropriate and are in the
interest of justice.
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Date

Prosecutor

Form XIX. Guilty plea checklist
[CAPTION]
GUILTY PLEA PROCEEDING
The defendant personally appearing before me, I have ascertained the following facts, noting each by initialing it.
Judge's
Initial
1.

That the defendant understands the nature of the charges against him - - -

2.

That the defendant understands the range of possible sentence for the offenses charged, from a
suspended sentence to a maximum of
and that the mandatory minimum (if
any) i s - - - -

3.

That the defendant understands the following constitutional rights which he gives up by pleading
guilty:
(a) His right to trial by jury, if any.
(b) His right to the assistance of an attorney at all stages of the proceeding, and to an appointed
attorney, to be furnished free of charge, if he cannot afford one.
(c) His right to confront the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them as to the truthfulness of their testimony.
(d) His right to present evidence on his own behalf, and to have the state compel witnesses of his
choosing to appear and testify.
(e) His right to remain silent and to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

4. That the defendant wishes to give up the constitutional rights of which he has been advised.
5. That there exists a basis in fact for believing the defendant guilty of the offenses charged.
6. That the defendant and the prosecutor have entered into a plea agreement and that the defendant
understands and consents to its terms.
7. That the plea is voluntary and not the result of force, threats or promises other than a plea agreement.
On the basis of these findings, I conclude that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently pleads guilty to
the above charges, and accept his plea.
Date

Judge

CERTIFICATION BY DEFENDANT
I certify that the judge personally advised me of the matters noted above, that I understand the constitutional rights
that I am giving up by pleading guilty, and that I desire to plead guilty to the charges stated.
Defense Counsel, if any

Defendant
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Appendix D Washington Superior Court Criminal Rules
RULE 4.2
PLEAS
(a) Types. A. Defendant may plead not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty.
(b) Multiple Offenses. Where the indictment or information charges two or more offenses in separate counts the
defendant shall plead separately to each.
(c) Pleading Insanity. When it is desired to interpose the defense of insanity or mental irresponsibility on behalf of
one charged with a crime the defendant, his counsel or other person authorized by law to appear and act for him,
shall at the time of pleading to the information or indictment file a plea in writing in addition to the plea or pleas
required or permitted by other laws than this setting up (1) his insanity or mental irresponsibility at the time of the
commission of the crime charged, and (2) whether the insanity or mental irresponsibility still exists, or (3) whether
the defendant has become sane or mentally responsible between the time of the commission of the crime and the
time of the trial. The plea may be interposed at any time thereafter, before the submission of the cause to the jury if
it be proven that the insanity or mental irresponsibility of the defendant at the time of the crime was not before
known to any person authorized to interpose a plea.
(d) Voluntariness. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty, without first determining that it is made voluntarily,
competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. The court
shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.
(e) Agreements. If a plea of guilty is based upon an agreement between the defendant and the prosecuting attorney,
such agreement must be made a part of the record at the time the plea is entered. No agreement shall be made
which specifies what action the judge shall take on or pursuant to the plea or which attempts to control the exercise
of his discretion, and the court shall so advise the defendant.
(f) Withdrawal of Plea. The court shall allow a defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty whenever it appears that the
withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
(g) Written Statement. A written statement of the defendant in substantially the form set forth below shall be filed on
a plea of guilty.
SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR
STATE OF WASHINGTON, }
Plaintiff,
~~TEMENT~F
vs.
DEFENDANT ON
Defendant.
PLEA OF GUlLTY
1. My true name is - - - - - - - - - - .

COUNTY

2. My age is - - - .
3. My lawyer is
4. The court has told me that I am charged with the crime of - - - - -- - - -, the maximum sentence for
which is - - - .
5. The court has told me that:
(a) I have the right to have counsel (a lawyer), and that if I cannot afford to pay for counsel, one will be provided
at no expense to me.
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(b) I have the right to a trial by jury.

(c) I have the right to hear and question witnesses who testify against me.
(d) I have the right to have witnesses testify for me. These witnesses can be made to appear at no expense to me.
(e) The charge must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
6. I plead
have received.

to the crime o f - - - - - - - - as charged in the information, a copy of which I

7. I make this plea freely and voluntarily.
8. No one has threatened harm of any kind to me or to any other person to cause me to make this plea.
9. No person has made promises of any kind to cause me to enter this plea except as set forth in this statement.
10. I have been told the Prosecuting Attorney will take the following action and make the following recommendation to the court: - - - - 11. I have been told and fully understand that the court does not have to follow the Prosecuting Attorney's recommendation as to sentence. The court is completely free to give me any sentence it sees fit no matter what the Prosecuting Attorney recommends.
12. The court has told me that if I am sentenced to prison the Judge must sentence me to the maximum term required by the law, which in this case is---. The minimum term of sentence is set by the Board of Prison Terms
and Paroles. The Judge and Prosecuting Attorney may recommend a minimum sentence to the Board but the Board
does not have to follow their recommendation. I have been further advised that the crime with which I am charged
carries a mandatory minimum of - - - years. (If not applicable, this sentence shall be stricken and initialed by the
defendant and the judge.)
13. The court has asked me to state briefly in my own words what I did that resulted in my being charged with the
crime in the information. This is my statement: - - - -- - - -- ---:--- -- - - -- - -- - -- -

14. I have read or have had read to me all of the numbered sections above (1 through 14) and have received a copy
of "Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty." I have no further questions to ask of the court.
The above statement was read by or read to the defendant and signed by the defendant in the presence of his attorney,
, Prosecuting Attorney
and the undersigned Judge in open court.
DATED THIS - - - day of---, 19-.
Judge
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Appendix E Texas (Veron's Annotated) Code of Criminal Procedure
Art. 1.13 [lOa] Waiver of trial by jury

The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense classified as a felony less than capital shall have the right,
upon entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by jury, conditioned, however, that such waiver must be made in
person by the defendant in writing in open court with the consent and approval of the court, and the attorney
representing the State. The consent and approval by the court shall be entered of record on the minutes of the
court, and the consent and approval of the attorney representing the State shall be in writing, signed by him, and
filed in the papers of the cause before the defendant enters his plea. Before a defendant who has no attorney can
agree to waive the jury, the court must appoint an attorney to represent him.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.

Art. 1.15. [12] [21] [22] Jury in felony

No person can be convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a jury duly rendered and recorded, unless in
felony cases less than capital, the defendant, upon entering a plea, has in open court in person waived his right of
trial by jury in writing in accordance with Articles 1.13 and 1.14; provided, however, that it shall be necessary for
the state to introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the court .as the basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea
without sufficient evidence to support the same. The evidence may be stipulated if the defendant in such case consents in writing, in open court, to waive the appearance, confrontation, and the cross-examination of witnesses, and
further consents either to an oral stipulation of the evidence and testimony or to the introduction of testimony by
affidavits, written statements of witnesses, and any other documentary evidence in support of the judgment of the
court. Such waiver and consent must be approved by the court in writing, and be filed in the file of the papers of
the cause.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722. Amended by Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p. 1733, ch. 659, § 2, efT. Aug. 28, 1967; Acts 1971, 62nd Leg., p.
3028, ch. 996, § 1, efT. June 15, 1971; Atts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 1127, ch. 426, art. 3, § S efT. June 14, 1973.

Art. 26.13. [SOl] [565] [554] Plea of guilty

If the defendant pleads guilty, or enters a plea of nolo contendere he shall be admonished by the court of the consequences; and neither of such pleas shall be received unless it plainly appears that he is sane, and is uninfluenced by
any consideration of fear, or by any persuasion, or delusive hope of pardon, prompting' him to confess his guilt: Acts
1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.

Art. 26.14. [502] [566] [SSS] Jury on plea of guilty
Where a defendant in a case of felony persists in pleading guilty or in entering a plea of nolo contendere, if the
punishment is not absolutely fixed by law, a jury shall be impaneled to asses~> the punishment and evidence may be
heard to enable them to decide thereupon, unless the defendant in accordance with Articles 1.13 or 37.07 shall have
waived his right to trial by jury. Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.
Art. 27.14. [518] [582] [571] Plea of guilty or nolo contendere in misdemeanor
A plea of "guilty" or a plea of "nolo contendere" in a misdemeanor case may be made either by the defendant or his
counsel in open court; in such case, the defendant or his counsel may waive a jury,. and the punishment may be
assessed by the court either upon or without evidence, at the discretion of the defendant. In a misdemeanor case
arising out of a moving traffic violation for which the maximum possible punishment is by fine only, payment of a
fine, or an amount accepted by the court constitutes a finding of guilty in open court, as though a plea of nolo
contendere had been entered by the defendant. Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.
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Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure and Norfolk Plea Agreement Form
Rule 3A:ll. Pleas.

(a) Permissible Pleas. An accused may plead not guilty, guilty, or in a misdemeanor case, nolo contendere. The court
may refuse to accept a plea of guilty. A plea of nolo contendere may be made only with the court's consent.
(b) Entering of pleas. In a felony case a plea of guilty may be entered only by the accused after being advised by
counsel, except that a corporation may enter a plea of guilty through its counsel or agent. In a misdemeanor case a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be entered by the accused or his counsel. The court shall enter a plea of guilty
if a plea of guilty is not accepted or a plea of nolo contendere is not consented to, or if the accused refuses to plead,
or if the accused fails to appear for trial of a misdemeanor.
(c) Determining Voluntariness of Pleas of Guilty or Nolo Contendere. A court of record shall not accept a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere without first determing that the plea is made voluntarily with an understanding of the
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.
(d) Plea Agreement Procedure.
(1) The attorney for the Commonwealth and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting prose may
engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon entry by the defendant of a plea of
guilty, or in a misdemeanor case a plea of nolo contendere, to a charged offense, or to a lesser or related offense, the
attorney for the Commonwealth will do any of the following:
(A) Move for dismissal of other charges;
(B) Make a recommendation for a particular sentence;
(C) Agree not to oppose the defendant's request for a particular sentence; or
(D) Agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case.

In any such discussions under this Rule, the court shall not participate.
(2) If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, it shall, in every felony case, be reduced to writing, signed
by the attorney for the Commonwealth, the defendant, and his attorney, if any, and, in every case, presented to the
court. The court shall require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, upon a showing of good cause, in
camera, at the time the plea is offered. The court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to
the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider a presentence report.
(3) If the court accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the defendant that it will embody in its judgment
and sentence the disposition provided for in the agreement.
(4) If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall inform the parties of this fact, and advise the defendant
personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court will not accept the plea agreement. Thereupon, neither party shall be bound by the plea agreement. The court shall afford the defendant the
opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere and advise the defendant that, if he persists in
his plea, the disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.
(5) Except as otherwise provided by law, evidence of a plea of guilty later withdrawn, of a plea of nolo contendere,
or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged, or any other crime, or of statements made in
connection with and relevant to any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in the case-in-chief in any civil
or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. But evidence of a statement made in connection with and relevant to a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contendere, or an offer to plead guilty or
nolo contendere to the crime charged or to any other crime, is admissible in any criminal proceeding for perjury or
false statement, if the statement was made by the defendant under oath and on the record.
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Appendix F

Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure and Norfolk Plea Agreement Form (continued)

Virginia Supreme Court, Rules of Court
Form 8. Suggested Questions to Be Put by the Court to an Accused Who Has Pleaded Guilty
(Rule 3A:ll)
Before accepting your plea of guilty, I will ask you certain questions. If you do not understand any question, please
ask me to explain it to you.
1. What is your full name, and what is your age?
2. Are you the person charged in the indictment [information or warrant] with the commission of an offense?
3. Do you fully understand the charge against you?
4; Are you entering this plea of guilty freely and voluntarily?

5. Are you entering the plea of guilty because you are, in fact, guilty of the crime charged?
6. Do you understand that by pleading guilty, you are not entitled to a trial by jury?
7. Has anyone connected with the State, such as the police or the Commonwealth's attorney, or any other official,
in any manner threatened you or forced you to enter this plea of guilty?
8. The Commonwealth's attorney may have advised your attorney or you what punishment he will recommend if
you plead guilty,. Has anyone made you any other promise of leniency?
9. Do you understand that in imposing punishment I am not bound by any agreement between you and your counsel
and the Commonwealth's attorney, and I need not follow any recommendation of the Commonwealth's attorney?
10. (a) If I accept your plea of guilty, the punishment could be imprisonment for not more than . . . . . . years, a
fine of not more than$ . . . . . . . . . . . . . , or both; that is to say, you may be imprisoned or you may be fined, or
you may be imprisoned and fined.* Do you understand the punishment that may be imposed?
(b) If you have been previously sentenced to confinement in a penitentiary, additional punishment can be imposed
under the mulitiple offender statutes. Do you understand this?

11. Have you had ample time to discuss with your attorney any possible defense you may have to this charge?
12. Have you discussed with your attorney whether you should plead not guilty or guilty?
13. After the discussion did you decide for yourself that you should plead guilty?
14. Are you entirely satisfied with the services of the attorney who was appointed to represent you in this matter?
15. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you may waive any right to appeal from the decision of this court?
16. Do you understand all the questions I have asked you?

• The language should be appropriately changed to describe the maximum sentence that can be imposed.
Note: The court may wish to ask other questions-e.g., a question about the accused's education.
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Appeadix F Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure and Norfolk Plea Agreement Form (continued)
VIRGINIA:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF .THE CI'l:Y OF NORFOLK

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

vs.
On indicement(s)/warrane(s) charging:

1.
2.
3.

4.
.5.
~AGREEMENT

MEMOJANDUM

Pursuant to the provision. of Rule 3A:ll(d), the parties
in interest preseue this m.morandum of their plea agreement.

Upon the Defendant's plea(s) ef guilty to the offense(s)
forth below. the Commonwealth will recommend the following
dispositions to the Court:

SEEN & AGREED

befenda:nc
Attorney for the Defendant

Attorney for the Commonwealth
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Appendix G Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure and Delaware County Guilty PleaStatement of Defendant Form
Rule 819. Pleas IDd Plea Agreements
(a) Generally. A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The judge may refuse to accept a plea
of guilty, and shall not accept it unless he determines after inquiry of the defendant that the plea is voluntarily and understandingly made. Such
inquiry shall appear on the record.
(b) Plea Agreements.
(1) The trial judge shall not participate in the plea negotiations preceding an agreement.
(2) When counsel for both sides have arrived at a plea agreement they shall state on the record in open court, in the presence of the defendant,
the terms of the agreement. Thereupon the judge shall conduct an inquiry of the defendant on the record to determine whether he understands
and concurs in the agreement.
(3) If the judge is satisfied that the plea is understandingly and voluntarily tendered, he may accept the plea. If thereafter the judge decides not to
concur in the plea agreement, he shall permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.
Comment: The purpose of paragraph (a) is to codify the requirement that the judge, on the record, ascertain from the defendant that the guilty
plea is voluntarily and understandingly tendered. Recent court decisions have indicated that this is the preferred practice but have not made the
requirement mandatory. See Commonwealth ex rei. West v. Rundle, 237 A.2d 196, 428 Pa. 102 (1968); Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 285 A.2d
448, 445 Pa. 311 (1971).
It is difficult to formulate a comprehensive list of questions a judge must ask of a defendant in determining whether the judge should accept the
plea of guilty. Court decisions constantly add areas to be encompassed in determining whether the defendant understands the full impact and
consequences of his plea, but is nevertheless willing to enter that plea. It is recommended, however, that at a minmum the judge ask questions to
elicit the following information:
(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty?
(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
(3) Does the defendant understand that he has the right to trial by jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that he is presumed innocent until he is found guilty?
(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible range of sentence and/or fmes for the offenses charged?
(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts such agreement?
Many, though not all, of the areas to be covered by such questions are set forth in a footnote to the Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Martin,
445 Pa. 49, 54-56, 282 A.2d 241 (1971), in which the colloquy conducted by the trial judge is cited with approval. As to the requirement that the
judge ascertain that there is a factual basis for the plea, see Commonwealth v. Maddox, 450 Pa. 406, 300 A.2d 503 (1973), and Commonwealth v.
Bernard Jackson, 450 Pa. 417, 299 A.2d 209 (1973).
It is advisable that the judge should conduct the examination of the defendant. However, paragraph (a) does not prevent defense counsel or the
attorney for the Commonwealth from conducting part or all of the examination of the defendant, as permitted by the judge.
Paragraph (b) is intended to alter the process of what is commonly known as "plea bargaining" so as to make it a matter of public record and to
insure that it does not involve prejudicing or compromising the independent position of the judge. See Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 442 Pa. 516,
276 A.2d 526 (1971); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 277 A2d 341, 442
Pa. 524 (1971); Commonwealth v. Evans, 252 A.2d 689. 434 Pa. 52 (1969); cf. Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 202 A.2d 521, 415 Pa. 218 (1964);
A.B.A. Minimum Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty,§ 3.3(a), at 71-74 (Approved Draft 1968); President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice, "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society" 134 (1967).
The "terms" of the plea agreement, referred to in subparagraph (b)(2) frequently, involve the attorney for the Commonwealth-in exchange for
the defendant's plea of guilty, and perhaps for the defendant's promise to cooperate with law enforcement officials-promising such concessions
as a reduction of a charge to a less serious offense, or the dropping of one or more additional charges or a recommendation of a lenient sentence,
or a combination of these. In any event, Paragraph (b) is intended to assure that all terms of the quid pro quo are openly acknowledged for the
court's assessment.
Paragraph (b)(3) requires the judge to permit the defendant to withdraw a plea the judge has accepted when the judge is unable to comply with a
plea agreement on which the plea was based. See Rule 320.
When a plea agreement has been negotiated, there must be an inquiry in order to determine whether the plea is made voluntarily and understandingly. However, the terms of the plea agreement should be stated in the record and it should be made clear that the defendant understands the
nature and effect of the agreement.
Adopted June 30, 1964, effective Jan. 1, 1965; amended Nov. 25, 1968, effective Feb. 3, 1969; amended Oct. 3, 1972, effective in 30 days; amended and effective March 28, 1973.
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Appendix G Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure and Delaware County Guilty PleaStatement of Defendant Form (continued)
I understand that I could be sentenced to the maximum penalty set forth above for each charge to which I am
pleading guilty and that the possible sentence resulting from consecutive sentences on the above charges is
I state that in pleading guilty I am admitting that I committed the crimes charged and admitting my guilt of these
charges, that the guilty plea will appear on my record as a conviction, that the above possible penalties and sentences have been explained to me, and I understand them, that I make this statement of my own free will, that it is
voluntary, that I have not been threatened, forced or pressured to enter a plea of guilty nor received any promise of
the sentence I will receive in return for entering a plea, that I have read this statement and discussed it with my
attorney and I fully understand my constitutional rights.
I also understand that if I am on parole or probation that this guilty plea might well result in the revocation of that
probation or parole.
I also state that I have fully discussed my case with my attorney, that we have discussed the possible defenses to the
charges; that my attorney is fully familiar with the facts of my case. I acknowledge that I have reviewed the factual
basis for these crimes with my attorney and that in pleading guilty I admit committing the acts alleged. My attorney
has advised me that the law presumes me to be innocent, and that the burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove
me guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. I am satisfied that he is fully prepared to represent me and that he has advised
me that he is ready to defend me to the above charges if I did not enter a guilty plea.
I further state that I am not now suffering from any mental illness or the effects of any narcotics or drugs or alcoholic beverages.
Defendant
,· Esquire, Attorney for - - - - - - - - - - , hereby state that I have advised my client
I,
of the foregoing rights; that the client has discussed them with me and believe that he understands them; that I am
prepared to try this case, and that defendant understands what he is doing in entering the above guilty plea.
Attorney for Defendant
Note: To Assistant District Attorney-have this form filled in and signed by the defendant. If defendant signs it and understands what he is
doing, have his attorney sign it before the guilty plea is taken, read this form into record, then enter this statement as an exhibit with record
papers.
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Appendix G Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure and Delaware County Guilty PleaStatement of Defendant Form (continued)
Delware County, Pa.
GUILTY PLEA-STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT (REVISED 2/17/76
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA VS. - - - - - T _

_:_~-,

INFORMATION NO(S). - - - - , - -- - -

SESSION 19

CHARGES:
, hereby state that I am - - years old, that I have been advised by my Attorney,
I,
- - - - - - - - - , Esquire, of all the following rights:
1. My right to have my case tried by a judge and a jury of 12 people from the community and of my right to
challenge the jury and/or the jury panel for cause shown and of my right to participate in the selection of those 12
jurors, and that verdict of guilty by said jury would have to be unanimous.
2. My· privilege to have my case heard by a judge without a jury by leave of court, wherein the judge would be
the sole fact finder.
3. My right to take an appeal, with the assistance of counsel provided free without any cost to myself, from a
verdict of the jury, or from a verdict of a Court without a jury.

4. My right to file motions for a new trial and to have an attorney provided free without any cost to myself, to file
and argue such motions.

5. My right to refuse to testify and to stand mute, and I have been further advised that if I refuse to testify, such
refusal will not prejudice me in any way.
6. My right to confront and hear any witness who will give evidence against me and through counsel to crossexamine all witnesses.

7. My right to waive (i.e. not to have) a trial by a jury and/or by a judge and to enter a plea of guilty. That I have
limited appeal rights if the plea is accepted and sentence imposed. That is, I may only appeal the legality of sentence, jurisdiction of this Court and the involuntariness of the plea.
8. My right to take the above limited appeal with the assistance of counsel free, without any cost to myself, from
the judgment of sentence.

I further state that I have been advised of the nature of the

crime~s)

of which I am charged, that

(a)

is a felony/misdemeanor and that the penalty as provided in 18 P.S.

is

(b)

is a felony/misdemeanor and that the penalty as provided in 18 P.S.

is

(c)

is a felony/misdemeanor and that the penalty as provided in 18 P.S.

is

(d)

is a felony/misdemeanor and that the penalty as provided in 18 P.S.

is

(e)

is a felony/misdemeanor and that the penalty as provided in 18 P.S. - - is
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Appendix H

New Orleans, LA.: Seven Alternative Procedures for Accepting Guilty Pleas Used by
Local Judges
CIJMINAL DISTRJCT COURT

Juclge Charles L Ward

No. ---------

STATZ OP LOUJSIANA

•

V1o. - - - - - - - --

-

W.uvat OP CONsnnJ'T10NAL RICHTS

I'LI4 o•

c:un.n

(1) I.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - haveb-IDformadotazul

'lllldentancl
the c:harsa a c&iue m e iD thia c:ua. I Jmow thiit I have b - charpd
wftb~~eof _ ___________________________

------------------------------------------·----(2) It i8 111.1 iDtelltloll to plead 1Ui1C7 to ~ crime

ol-----------

-----------------------------------·----

(3) The act. c:oaRltutlq the o f f - to w.blc:b I am plaadblc pilt1 han bnD u:•
plaill8cl to m e u

-u u

~

uc:t that fM

tnc:e whida could be JmpoMII era me

Wa crime

~

mu:imum poutlll.r ._.

1&...------------------------

- ---------------------------------·--J11i1t1 I am waivizll mr rts!lt to trial,
rialzt to appeal If I wvw foUDd IWI~ b7 tnal. I also ~~ that I am
waiYiDI 111.1 ri!Jht to ~at wica..... who mar appear azul taW,. •llliDR me,

(fo) I Wldamud that b7 eater!DI tbla pin of
lllld mr

azul mr riiJ}It to c:.roa aamiJae til-. Wita-. llalow that I am waivinl ~ rilht

I ha•e tD COIIIpWaol'1 proc:as. of

~

c:cnut to r.quire wita..... to a ppeu and

tas1:lfy for my clefftiH. I further 'lllldentancl that I

aclliDR ..Utac:rimlaatioa aad bf plaadillc

cWI~

am wai'ViDC my privil• l •

I am lA fac:t 1Dcriml.zlatiA1 my-

·---

~

(I) I haft aoC beaa toreecl, thnateaed, or tatlmiclated, azul I desire to enter thia plea
of pta,. azul It i8
tlla& DO

br 1111

-

frH Will azul i8 IDf '901-tarr act. I UDdamanci

~ wh1c:b mar haft beaa macla to m e br

ADfOM.

other thu u se t

fortla cm ~ -

ot tliia dllclmlat iD ~ pl.. barpi,a, If 11117, an biDdlDC or eafarc:eable azu1 I ralr cna ao ~ promiM.
:-

(1) I 'lllldemud that I han •

rilbt to lloe c:ompeteat COIIDHl reprweat me at

trial,

a1111 If I wve =able to pay tor Coumel tha Ccnan would a ppoillt c:omp• tut c:o~m
Ml to repraeat me, both for trial aad for

a~peal,

If dealred, If I were eonvic:tecl

br trial, bat·l am flll17 ..tilfiaci with tha h.uuW.a.c of my ~

br my attom.,.

- y lA w.hlc!a he baa repreHDtad me.

Aaom.,. for Oatand.aac
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Appendix H

New Orleans, LA.: Seven Alternative Procedures for Accepting Guilty Pleas Used by
Local Judges (continued)

If the cleludant enters a plea of JUilty to - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The State of Louisiana, actin& throup ita cluly authorized representative, the AniataAt

D~d~m~, w.m --------------------------

New Orleau, Louisiua,

this - - - - clay of --------- .u~l'1--

159

Appendix H

New Orleans, LA.: Seven Alternative Procedures for Accepting Guilty Pleas Used by
Local Judges (continued)
CIIMJNAL o1mrcr coultT
PAIIIII Of OI&IANt
n Aft CIII l OIIIIIoUIA

IIC'IIOM

c

.ludae Jerome M. Winsberg

N~ --------------------

ITATB OJ' I.OtJISLUIA

...

~~ -------------------PIZA OF GUILTY

L - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0111117 plu ot GUU.TY
~~ecrlmeof -----------------------~---

ban beea lafonned aad undantand

~e

I anderstand that I ban a rirht

trial and If coavlctecla rirbt ~appeal ud bl' eterizll'

tel

cbup ~ which I am pludinr ruJlt)', - - - -

a plea of rullt,. In thla cue I am wah-inr m)' rlrhbl
TIM act. collltltutlar

~·

me u well aa ~~ fact

~at

offenae

~

wblcb I am

~

trial aad appul. - - - -

pi~

ruiltT haft been uplamed

~

for thb crime I could pouibl7 recain a aentence o f - - - -

I am entarlnr a plaa of pilty ~ ~Ia crime bec:auM I am, Ia fact, ruUty of~~~ crime. _ _
I ba't'e aot beea forced, tbreatelled or Intimidated Into makiar this plea, aor baa a117one
111ade me ny pralllllee Ia order
I andentaad

~at

~at

I eater a pleL - - - - - .

1117 attorntT hu participa ted in plu-barraininr on 1111 behalf with 1117

lulowl&drw ud permlulon. - - - - -

I am fllll7 ntllfltld

wl~ ~·

hucillar of 1117 eue b7 1117 attorne7 aad

llu repnHated m•. -.-.- - -

Defendaat

.ludp

Date
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Appendix H

New Orleans, LA.: Seven Alternative Procedures for Accepting. Guilty Pleas Us~d by
Local Judges (continued)
·
·
·' ·
ClUMUfAL DISTRICT COURt
PARISH OF OIULUI
STAT£ OF LOUISIANA
S£CTIC1t "D"
.JUDGE:

FRANK A. MARULLO, .JR.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

NO,

'IS

VIO:
PLEA OF CUILTY

I. ..........................................................................................• defendant in the above case
informed the Court that I wanted to plead &uilt:y and do plead.·&uilt:y to the
crime .of ....................................................................:and have bean informed and understand
the charge to which I am pleadin& &uilty.

(...........................,

The acts which DAiul up the crima co which I am pleading have been explained
to 111e as well u

the fact th.at for thia crime I coW.d possibly receive a

sentence of ................................................................................-

(

)

I. and.a r.C&Dd that iD pleadin& guilty in this 111&Cter I waive the following
(1) . To a trial by either a judge or a :iury and that further
the right to a trial by judge ext:ends until the first vit:ness
:is sworn, and the right: to a trial by a jury extends until the
first juror i4 5Vorn, and if .c.onvicted the right to an appeal .•
Pleaae specify: .Judge trial or .Jury l'l:ial
( ........................._,

righta:

(2)

To face and cross-examine the witnesses who
accuse me of the cri1118 charged.

(

)

(3)

The privilege against self-incrimination or
havizl& CO Uke the stand myself and testify.

(

)

-(4)
J:

~

To have the Court compel my wit:neuu to
.appear and testify.

uf this crime.

I ba:ve not been forced, threatened or intimidated into making

this 11lea, nor has anyona
11111

'------>

entering a plea 'of zuilt:y to thia crime because I am, in fact, guilty

1118de 1118

any promises in order that. I enter a plea.

I

fully aatiafied witb the handlin& of my cue by my attorney and eh• way in

o~hich

he baa represented

:his matter.

1118.

I -

satisfied with the vay the -court has handled

c~------------J)

bEttNDANf
JUbc:t

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
·Jion::

~:

-------------------

Defendant is to place his initials in
the bloclts provided for same.
Defendant is co block ouc .Judge Trial
or Jury Trial as it applies.
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New Orleans, LA.: Seven Alternative Procedures for Accepting Guilty Pleas Used by
Local Judges (continued)
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT
PAIISM OP OIIWNS
IrAn Of' LOUISIANA

SICTiOHI
Judge Rudolph F. Beckw.

..

m

K~ --------------------

STATE OF LOUISIANA

Vlo. - - - - - - - - -- - - - -WAIVEil OF COrcsrrrtmON..U. RJCHTS
PU4 OF GUILTY

of GUI:t.TY
of---------------------------

I, - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- . before mr plea

to the crime
lulve bee Wormed u4 Wldentalld the cbarl• to which I am pluclla1 ,wltr. -

I UDd.ntaDd that I li.an a
a pl..

rtpi 110 trial ancllf convicted a ript to appeal u4 br entarizll

of llllltr ID W. ca.. I am waivlnl mr ri&htl to trial and appaaL - - -

The acta eonatltulilll the danae to whlch I am plu dln1 pllty hava bHn explabled to
me

u -u u

the fact that for thia crime I could poulbly receive a aat&Dce o f - -

·I IUiduatand that br plu dln&&Uiltr that I am -lviD&mr ripts to, co~ont and crouaambla the wltnaaes who accuse me of the crime char&•cl. and to compulaorr proceu

of the cowt to raq,lllre wttn..... to appear aad
for me.
I am entartqa plea of &Uiltr to thia crime becauae I am, In fact, &Uiltr of thia crime.
test~~,-

I havw not bean forced, thnataned or IDtlmidated Into maldn& thia pleL
I am tullr aatlstlad with the handliD& of m:r cue b:r mr attorzw:r and the way ID whlch
be hal reprnated me.
I fllrther ed.ntand that I am waivlnl m)' privlle&e •labllt self iDcrimlnatlon and
by pleadlnlllllltr I am iD fac:t lllcrilllinatlnl myaelf.
I anderwtand tl:at 11 I electad to have a trial I have a ri&)lt to have competent counsel
to r&Jir&-t me at trial, and lf I -r• unable to par for Counsel the Court .iauld appoint
competant COUIIIal to represent me, 'but 'br atarin1 the plu of &Uiltr I am walviD& these
ri&hta.
U a plea 'bar&aiD all'"ftlent hal bean made I understand that no other promise& which

may haft bHn made to m• other than u set out berelnabove In thi8 plea bar&aiD are
enforceable or biDdlDJ.

Date

Defendant

Attorney for Defendant
The Jud&• hal eddresMd m e personall)' aa to all of these mattars and he has &tven
me the opportlmlt,- to make any atatcment I desire.
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Appendix H

New Orleans, LA.: Seven Alternative Procedures for Accepting Guilty Pleas Used by
Local Judges (continued)

Judre Shea

1.

Right to trial and free appeal i:f convicted.

2.

Waives right to trial and free appeal by
plea of guilty.

3.

By pleading guilty waives ri¢1t against self incrim-

enterin~

ination.
4.

Waives right to confn:mt and cross-examine witnesses
and call witnesses on defendant's behalf.

5.

Waives right to
the State.

6.

(If applicable, withdraw all mtions ~viously filed.)

7.

Waives right to object to the ccmposition and the way
the jury will be selected to try case.

8.

Inform defendant of max:iimJm sentence (Parole Probation - Rm:i Labor) •

9.

Defendant has not been forced, threatened or coerced
into entering plea of guilty and states he is voluntarily
entering the plea of gui1ty because he is in fact
gui1ty as ~d.

obje~

to any evidence offered by

(DEIDIDANT 1S SIGNATUFE)
DATE:

-----

~S:

_______________
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Appelldix H

New Orleans, LA.: Seven Alternative Procedures for Accepting Guilty Pleas Used 'by
Local Judges (continued)
CRIMINAL DISTIJCJ COURT
PAIIIIM Dl OWANI

ftAft Of &oUIIIANA

IICnOit II

Juclp lemanl J. lagelf, Sr.
STATE OJ' LOUISIANA

Ho. - - - - - - - - - - -

Vio. - - - - - - - - - -

PJ..EA. OF GUILTY

I. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - OD ~ plu of GtnLTY
M~ecnm.of----------------------------------------

Jaaft

bte~alzltorm•d

aDd IUident&Ad the

ch&r~re

to which I am pluc!fDw 1Uilt7. - - - -

I adtntaud that I have a richt to ,trfal and If co.mcted a richt to appeal ud bJ" af'.eriq
a plea of culltr Ill thil cue I am waivinc mr rfrhta to trial ud appuL _ _......;._
The actl coll.ltitut:lnc the oUeu.. to whida I am pltadiDc pfity han bHD uplaflled to

me u well u the fact that for this crime I collieS IIOIIIiblTl'lcma a HDtauce o f - - - -

lam utarfuc a pita of ruiltr to thil c:ime becauae I am, ID fact, ruilt7 of thia crime. _
I have Dot bH!l forced, thnate!led or mtimidated lzlto maldDr this plea, DOr baa UJ"'!ll
made me U7 prvmila Ill ordll' tha' I uter a plea. - - - I am fallJ" ptllfted with the hudiiDc of ~ cue bJ" ~ attol"De1 ud the war Ill which he
baa npZ'IIIDted .... - - - -

Jud,.
Data
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Appendix H

New Orleans, LA.: Seven Alternative Procedures for Accepting Guilty Pleas Usetl lily
Local Judges (continued)
CIJMINAL DISTRICT COUll
· - 01' OIUIANI

nA11 Of L0U111A11A

.,_,

.

-~

STATZ OF LO'UJ3IAN4

--------------------

Vlo.---------WAIVER OF CONSnnTnONAL RJCHTS
PUA. OF CUILTT

1. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - oD m:r plea of GUILTY

~~·erim·~----------------------------han ben 1Df01111ecl ud tmdusta'lld ~. charp ~ wllldl I eJD pltadilal' l'llfltr. - - - l111ldantaDd that I han a rll'ht to trial aad If comfctecla r!aht to appaal ud b)' ntciq
a plaa ~ IUIICT Ill th!a cue l
The acta coutftDIIDr

me u

-u u

~

~e

eJD

wal'I'IDI' m:r rirhlll

~

trial aad appeal. - - - - -

ot!•- to which I . . plaacUDr pilt:r haft beu uplaiAed

~

tut that tor thil cnm. I could poulbl:r ncli" a •atuce at - - - -

I DDdtnt&D4 that bJ' pleadUar rulltr that I . . wai..U.r m:r 'rirblll to collfrclat -.ad CZ"OUo
exalllllle tha wfl::ll- wbo accDH me of the eriiDe cbarpcl, to compula0f7 proc ... of ~e
com to nquin wfl::ll- ~ appear ud tudf:r for me, the privilep apimt ••lf·lllcrimillatioa w ha..U... to take ~e lt&Dd mJ-elf -.ad W.ti:IJ', ud to ban pnli::DlDat7 plaadl:lp
filed ud bean

·I eJD

atutq

OD.,. behalf. -------

a plea ~ pUtr to thll

erime

becaDM I eJD, ID fKt, IUlltr ~ th!a

erim&. --

I han DOt beu toreed, thnateaed or bst!mldatad IDto maldaa' thll pl... - - - -

1 eJD tiiiiJ' aa1:ldiM wtth

~e

haadliq ~ IDJ' -

b:r IDJ' attonl•:r ud the W&J' ta wblch he

hu npnMataclma. - - - - -

At:tora•J' for Deteadut
The Jadp hu ad~d me penoaaiiJ' u to all of
the oppo~itr to make &DJ atatamnt 1 deoire.

~

Defendant
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matt. . all4 he hu lifta me

Appendix I

Seattle (Washington) District Court: Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty
D '1111: IZAfti.Z DUTRIC'l' CCOR1' - laHC C'OUIIft - Sftft Oft WMHDC'l'l:ll

••••••••• ••••••••

1101 - - - - - - - -

••••••• ••••••••••
1.

lly u,ae -

3.

lly

c:hu9ed

ia _ _ _,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

l&vyezo ia
by ~ldnt

I

2. Date of Births,__ _ __

4. '1'he ~ baa told . . I c.S.t&tioft u4 aatic:e, with the ~a. of

----------------~feloftJ' I g-r:oa . u . s - I ahd~
araUy u...Secl to •

1:M MXW.

a.ntcc:
_a_f::-o-r-vhic:
':""':'"-:h~.La~.------

110~ - " •

tbaD OM :rae

I

90 d&ya in j&il,

11ot 110re thin nooo
1 JSOO fine, ar both fine an~~ impri8C-t.
S. '1'he COIIZt baa t.old . . tha~ (a) I bave the ri9ht to c:ow~•al (a l&wyer) azu! that
i t I c:azmo~ afford to pay fCIII' c:-el, one viU be prodded at aa -penae to - ·
()I)
I baft the ri9ht to trial by j~. (c:) .I bave the riCJht to bear aN! question
vit:leaMa vho unify aqain8t ... (d) I bave the right to bave vitn••••• testify
fCIII' . . . 'rheaa vitn.. Ha c:an be &ada to apPear at aa ~ ... to... (e ) 'l'he
c:hu9• IIIIR be FQVe4 beyond a r.uonable ~. (f) I have tlle right to appeal.
(9) By .nterin9 a plea of !;uilty, I 9ift up the ri9hta lietad in (b) thrauqb (f)
ud I vUl be aentencad OD tha b . .b of wy plaa.
~o the c:rU\e of
in the CC'IIpl&.IJ\t • oral CGIIIplaint - ci_u_tio....,..-n-&DCI.--:"_n_o_u-:-c-e-,-.-c:o-p-y-o"'f-w""iu.""·'""'c:b
I baft racaived. 7. I .U. thia plaa freely and voluntarily. 8. No one has
thraatenecl bua of any kiD! to M Clll' to any peraon to c.auae . . to make th11 plaa.
t. 110 per- haa aade praaiaaa of any tin~! to causa - to eBt&r this plaa exce.l?t
u aat forth iA th1a stat-ant. 10. I bave !Man told by ay attorney that tba
JRMCU~ attoney viU teJce the foUoviDg act.ioft &All ..:C. the following
1'-.s&tioa to the c:wrt
'

1.

u

I plu4

c~

U. l baft been told and fully u.nderat.uld that thll c:ourt d04!1a cot have tD follow
tlla pro~MC~&tinq attorney'• recoaaenl!aticm aa to •entence. The court 1• c:omp.letely
free to 'lift - MY 1enteace it IHa fit ao lll&tter vllat the pro•e<:utinq at~o.rney
~··
lZ. I IIDderatand that i f I - o n probation or pargle, a plea of
GOII.ft to the preaent ohazoqe vlll be ~icient IJZ'OWid• for a )udge - the parole
boari to ~nolle wy OIZ'Qba~ Clll' ~·· 13. 'fba CQUrt has asked- to st&te
:bdefly iA -.y wo~• what I 4id that reaulted 1D ay bei119 c:h4r9ecl with the
~ia• in the =Qz;rl atnt - -al c:c.plai.nt - c:itation and aotic:e. This is ay
.tat-t

14. I baft a:...S Clll' ha- bad a:ead to - all of the ~ell Hct1ons above ( 1 to
13), u4 baft received a copy of this a t e t - t antitlad •statcment of De.fftlld&Dt
Oil
of Gailey"'. I haft nio ~ quaationa to uk of the caurt

•l•

~ ~C111'890iD9 a t a t - t - . read by ttl:' a:u4 to tlla defeDI!ant and a19fte4 by the
defendant ia tlla ~"- of bia ettDEDey

u4 tile hoaacutinf Att.oney
and tlla udvai.IJDad Jllllv• in opea ooart.

DU!D T I U S _ day of - · - - - - - - 197

•
JUDGE.
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